

**Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC**

# **Digital Cinema System Specification**

## **Compliance Test Plan**

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Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC, Member Representatives Committee**

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# Digital Cinema System Specification: Compliance Test Plan

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# Table of Contents

1. Introduction .....	1
1.1. Overview .....	1
1.2. Normative References .....	3
1.3. Audience .....	3
1.4. Conventions and Practices .....	4
1.4.1. Typographical Conventions .....	4
1.4.2. Documentation Format .....	4
1.5. Digital Cinema System Architecture .....	5
1.6. Strategies for Successful Testing .....	6
I. Procedural Tests .....	9
2. Digital Cinema Certificates .....	11
2.1. Certificate Structure .....	11
2.1.1. Basic Certificate Structure .....	13
2.1.2. SignatureAlgorithm Fields .....	14
2.1.3. SignatureValue Field .....	15
2.1.4. SerialNumber Field .....	16
2.1.5. SubjectPublicKeyInfo Field .....	17
2.1.6. Deleted Section .....	18
2.1.7. Validity Field .....	19
2.1.8. AuthorityKeyIdentifier Field .....	20
2.1.9. KeyUsage Field .....	21
2.1.10. Basic Constraints Field .....	23
2.1.11. Public Key Thumbprint .....	24
2.1.12. Organization Name Field .....	26
2.1.13. OrganizationUnitName Field .....	27
2.1.14. Entity Name and Roles Field .....	28
2.1.15. Unrecognized Extensions .....	29
2.1.16. Signature Validation .....	30
2.1.17. Certificate Chains .....	31
2.2. Certificate Decoder Behavior .....	33
2.2.1. ASN.1 DER Encoding Check .....	33
2.2.2. Missing Required Fields .....	34
2.2.3. PathLen Check .....	36
2.2.4. OrganizationName Match Check .....	38
2.2.5. Certificate Role Check .....	39
2.2.6. Validity Date Check .....	40
2.2.7. Signature Algorithm Check .....	41
2.2.8. Public Key Type Check .....	42
2.2.9. Issuer Certificate Presence Check .....	43
3. Key Delivery Messages .....	45
3.1. eXtensible Markup Language .....	45
3.1.1. XML Documents .....	45
3.1.2. XML Schema .....	46
3.1.3. XML Signature Validation .....	47
3.1.3.1. Extracting Certificates from an XML Document .....	47
3.2. Key Delivery Message Example .....	49
3.3. ETM Features .....	54
3.3.1. ETM Structure .....	54
3.3.2. ETM Validity Date Check .....	55
3.3.3. ETM Signer Element .....	56
3.3.4. ETM EncryptionMethod Element .....	57

3.3.5. ETM AnnotationText Language .....	58
3.3.6. ETM ReferenceList Element .....	59
3.3.7. ETM SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod Element .....	60
3.3.8. ETM Signature Reference Elements .....	61
3.3.9. ETM SignatureMethod Element .....	62
3.3.10. ETM Signature Transforms Field .....	63
3.3.11. ETM Signature DigestMethod Element .....	64
3.3.12. ETM Signature Validity .....	65
3.4. KDM Features .....	66
3.4.1. KDM MessageType Element .....	66
3.4.2. KDM SubjectName Element .....	67
3.4.3. KDM ContentAuthenticator Element .....	68
3.4.4. KDM Signer Certificate Presence .....	69
3.4.5. KDM KeyIdList/TypedKeyId Field .....	70
3.4.6. KDM ForensicMarkFlagList Element .....	71
3.4.7. KDM EncryptedData Element .....	72
3.4.8. KDM KeyInfo Element .....	73
3.4.9. KDM DeviceListDescription Element .....	74
3.4.10. KDM ContentTitleText Language Attribute .....	75
3.4.11. KDM KeyType Scope Attribute .....	76
3.4.12. KDM EncryptionMethod .....	77
3.4.13. KDM CompositionPlaylistId Element .....	78
3.4.14. KDM Validity Fields .....	79
3.4.15. KDM KeyIdList Element .....	80
3.4.16. KDM CipherData Structure ID .....	81
3.4.17. KDM CipherData Signer Thumbprint .....	82
3.4.18. KDM CipherData Validity .....	83
3.4.19. KDM CipherData CPL ID .....	84
3.4.20. KDM EncryptedKey KeyType .....	85
3.4.21. KDM Recipient X509IssuerName .....	86
3.5. KDM Decoder Behavior .....	87
3.5.1. KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element .....	87
3.5.2. ETM IssueDate Field Check .....	88
3.5.3. Maximum Number of DCP Keys .....	89
3.5.4. Structure ID Check .....	90
3.5.5. Certificate Thumbprint Check .....	91
3.5.6. Deleted Section .....	92
3.5.7. KeyInfo Field Check .....	93
3.5.8. KDM Malformations .....	94
3.5.9. KDM Signature .....	96
4. Digital Cinema Packaging .....	99
4.1. Asset Map .....	99
4.1.1. Asset Map File .....	101
4.1.2. Volume Index File .....	102
4.2. Packing List .....	103
4.2.1. Packing List File .....	104
4.2.2. Packing List Signature Validation .....	106
4.3. Composition Playlist .....	107
4.3.1. Composition Playlist File .....	108
4.3.2. Composition Playlist Signature Validation .....	109
4.3.3. Composition Playlist Key Usage .....	110
4.4. Track Files .....	111
4.4.1. MXF Internals .....	111

4.4.1.1. Overview .....	111
4.4.1.2. MXF Header Partition .....	111
4.4.1.3. File Package .....	112
4.4.1.4. Encrypted Essence .....	113
4.4.1.5. Essence Descriptor for JPEG 2000 .....	113
4.4.1.6. Essence Descriptor for PCM Audio .....	114
4.4.1.7. Random Index Pack (R.I.P.) .....	115
4.4.2. Image and Audio Packaging Standard .....	116
4.4.3. Timed Text Track File Format .....	118
4.4.4. Track File Length .....	120
4.4.5. Image Track File Frame Boundary .....	121
4.4.6. Audio Track File Frame Boundary .....	123
4.5. Essence .....	125
4.5.1. Image Structure Container and Image Container Format .....	125
4.5.2. Image Compression Standard & Encoding Parameters .....	127
4.5.3. Audio Characteristics .....	129
4.5.4. Timed Text Resource Encoding .....	131
4.6. Digital Cinema Package .....	133
4.6.1. DCP Integrity .....	133
5. Common Security Features .....	135
5.1. SPB Security Features .....	135
5.1.1. SPB Digital Certificate .....	135
5.1.2. Deleted Section .....	138
5.1.3. Deleted Section .....	139
5.2. Intra-Theater Communication .....	140
5.2.1. TLS Session Initiation .....	140
5.2.2. Auditorium Security Messages .....	143
5.2.2.1. Auditorium Security Message Support .....	143
5.2.2.2. ASM Failure Behavior .....	145
5.2.2.3. ASM "RRP Invalid" .....	147
5.2.2.4. ASM "GetTime" .....	148
5.2.2.5. ASM "GetEventList" .....	149
5.2.2.6. ASM "GetEventID" .....	150
5.2.2.7. ASM "LEKeyLoad" .....	151
5.2.2.8. ASM "LEKeyQueryID" .....	153
5.2.2.9. ASM "LEKeyQueryAll" .....	154
5.2.2.10. ASM "LEKeyPurgeID" .....	155
5.2.2.11. ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll" .....	156
5.2.2.12. ASM "GetProjCert" .....	157
5.2.3. TLS Exception Logging .....	158
5.3. Event Logs .....	161
5.3.1. Log Report Format .....	161
5.3.1.1. Log Report .....	161
5.3.1.2. Log Record .....	162
5.3.1.3. Log Record Signature .....	163
5.3.1.4. Log Report Signature Validation .....	164
5.3.1.5. Log Record Proxy .....	164
5.3.2. Event Log Operations .....	166
5.3.2.1. Log Structure .....	166
5.3.2.2. Log Records for Multiple SPBs .....	167
5.3.2.3. Log Sequence Numbers .....	168
5.3.2.4. Log Collection by the SM .....	169
5.3.2.5. General Log System Failure .....	171

5.3.2.6. Log Report Signature Validity .....	172
5.3.3. SM Proxy of Log Events .....	175
5.3.3.1. SM Proxy of Log Events .....	175
5.3.3.2. SM Proxy of Security Operations Events .....	177
5.3.3.3. SM Proxy of Security ASM Events .....	179
5.3.3.4. Remote SPB Time Compensation .....	181
5.4. Security Log Events .....	183
5.4.1. Playout, Validation and Key Events .....	183
5.4.1.1. FrameSequencePlayed Event .....	183
5.4.1.2. CPLStart Event .....	184
5.4.1.3. CPLEnd Event .....	185
5.4.1.4. PlayoutComplete Event .....	186
5.4.1.5. CPLCheck Event .....	187
5.4.1.6. KDMKeysReceived Event .....	188
5.4.1.7. KDMDeleted Event .....	189
5.4.2. ASM and Operations Events .....	190
5.4.2.1. LinkOpened Event .....	190
5.4.2.2. LinkClosed Event .....	192
5.4.2.3. LinkException Event .....	195
5.4.2.4. LogTransfer Event .....	197
5.4.2.5. KeyTransfer Event .....	199
5.4.2.6. SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events .....	201
5.4.2.7. SPBOpen and SPBClose Events .....	203
5.4.2.8. SPBClockAdjust Event .....	205
5.4.2.9. SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events .....	207
5.4.2.10. SPBSoftware Event .....	209
5.4.2.11. SPBSecurityAlert Event .....	212
6. Media Block .....	213
6.1. Security Manager (SM) .....	213
6.1.1. Image Integrity Checking .....	213
6.1.2. Sound Integrity Checking .....	216
6.1.3. Deleted Section .....	218
6.1.4. Restriction of Keying to MD Type .....	219
6.1.5. Restriction of Keying to Valid CPLs .....	220
6.1.6. Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring .....	223
6.1.7. SPB Integrity Fault Consequences .....	226
6.1.8. Content Key Extension, End of Engagement .....	228
6.1.9. ContentAuthenticator Element Check .....	230
6.1.10. KDM Date Check .....	232
6.1.11. KDM TDL Check .....	234
6.1.12. Maximum Number of DCP Keys .....	237
6.1.13. CPL Id Check .....	239
6.2. Link Encryption (LE) .....	240
6.2.1. Deleted Section .....	240
6.2.2. Special Auditorium Situation Operations .....	241
6.2.3. LE Key Usage .....	244
6.2.4. MB Link Encryption .....	245
6.3. Clocks and Time .....	247
6.3.1. Clock Adjustment .....	247
6.3.2. SPB Type 1 Clock Battery .....	249
6.3.3. Clock Resolution .....	251
6.4. Forensic Marking (FM) .....	252
6.4.1. FM Application Constraints .....	252

6.4.2. Granularity of FM Control .....	254
6.4.3. FM Payload .....	257
6.4.4. FM Audio Bypass .....	259
6.4.5. Selective Audio FM Control .....	260
6.5. Image Reproduction .....	264
6.5.1. Playback of Image Only Material .....	264
6.5.2. Decoder Requirements .....	265
6.6. Audio Reproduction .....	270
6.6.1. Digital Audio Interfaces .....	270
6.6.2. Audio Sample Rate Conversion .....	272
6.6.3. Audio Delay Setup .....	273
6.6.4. Click Free Splicing of Audio Track Files .....	275
6.7. Timed Text Reproduction .....	276
6.7.1. Media Block Overlay .....	276
6.7.2. Deleted Section .....	277
6.7.3. Deleted Section .....	278
6.7.4. Default Timed Text Font .....	279
6.7.5. Deleted Section .....	280
6.7.6. Timed Text Decryption .....	281
7. Projector .....	283
7.1. Projector Test Environment for Image Measurements .....	283
7.2. SPB Type 2 .....	284
7.2.1. Projector Physical Protection .....	284
7.2.2. Projector Access Door .....	285
7.2.3. Deleted Section .....	286
7.2.4. Deleted Section .....	287
7.2.5. Deleted Section .....	288
7.2.6. SPB2 Secure Silicon Field Replacement .....	289
7.2.7. Systems without Electronic Marriage .....	290
7.2.8. Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining .....	291
7.3. Companion SPB Type 1 .....	292
7.3.1. Deleted Section .....	292
7.3.2. Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage .....	293
7.3.3. Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining .....	295
7.3.4. Remote SPB Clock Adjustment .....	297
7.4. Link Decryptor Block .....	299
7.4.1. Deleted Section .....	299
7.4.2. LDB TLS Session Constraints .....	300
7.4.3. LDB Time-Awareness .....	301
7.4.4. Deleted Section .....	302
7.4.5. LDB Key Storage .....	303
7.4.6. LDB Key Purging .....	304
7.4.7. Deleted Section .....	306
7.5. Projector Image Reproduction .....	307
7.5.1. Projector Overlay .....	307
7.5.2. Deleted Section .....	308
7.5.3. Projector Pixel Count/Structure .....	309
7.5.4. Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion .....	311
7.5.5. White Point Luminance and Uniformity .....	312
7.5.6. White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity .....	313
7.5.7. Sequential Contrast .....	314
7.5.8. Intra-frame Contrast .....	315
7.5.9. Grayscale Tracking .....	316

7.5.10. Contouring .....	317
7.5.11. Transfer Function .....	318
7.5.12. Color Accuracy .....	319
7.5.13. Projector Test Environment .....	320
8. Screen Management System .....	321
8.1. Ingest and Storage .....	321
8.1.1. Storage System Ingest Interface .....	321
8.1.2. Storage System Capacity .....	322
8.1.3. Storage System Redundancy .....	323
8.1.4. Storage System Performance .....	324
8.2. Screen Management System .....	325
8.2.1. Deleted Section .....	325
8.2.2. Show Playlist Creation .....	326
8.2.3. Show Playlist Format .....	328
8.2.4. Deleted Section .....	329
8.2.5. Automation Control and Interfaces .....	330
8.2.6. Interrupt Free Playback .....	331
8.2.7. Artifact Free Transition of Image Format .....	332
8.2.8. Restarting Playback .....	333
8.2.9. SMS User Accounts .....	334
8.2.10. SMS Operator Identification .....	335
8.2.11. SMS Identity and Certificate .....	336
8.2.12. Content Keys and TDL check .....	337
II. Design Evaluation Guidelines .....	339
9. FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB .....	341
9.1. FIPS Testing Procedures .....	341
9.2. Submitted Materials .....	343
9.3. Test Lab Reports .....	344
9.4. Interpreting FIPS Test Reports .....	344
9.5. DCI Requirements for FIPS Modules .....	346
9.5.1. SM Operating Environment .....	346
9.5.2. LE Key Generation .....	346
9.5.3. SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness .....	346
9.5.4. Security Design Description Requirements .....	347
9.5.5. Deleted Section .....	347
9.5.6. SPB1 FIPS Requirements .....	347
9.5.7. Deleted Section .....	347
9.5.8. Asymmetric Key Generation .....	348
9.5.9. Critical Security Parameter Protection .....	348
9.5.10. Deleted Section .....	348
10. DCI Requirements Review .....	349
10.1. Type 1 SPB Documentation .....	349
10.2. Type 2 SPB Documentation .....	350
10.3. Forensic Mark IP Disclosure .....	350
10.4. DCI Requirements for Security Modules .....	351
10.4.1. Theater System Reliability .....	351
10.4.2. Theater System Storage Security .....	351
10.4.3. Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities .....	351
10.4.4. Security Entity Physical Protection .....	351
10.4.5. Secure SMS-SM Communication .....	351
10.4.6. Location of Security Manager .....	352
10.4.7. Deleted Section .....	352
10.4.8. SM Secure Communications .....	352



10.4.9. Playback Preparation .....	352
10.4.10. Special Auditorium Situation Detection .....	352
10.4.11. Prevention of Keying of Compromised SPBs .....	354
10.4.12. SPB Authentication .....	354
10.4.13. TLS Session Key Refreshes .....	354
10.4.14. LE Key Issuance .....	354
10.4.15. Maximum Key Validity Period .....	354
10.4.16. KDM Purge upon Expiry .....	355
10.4.17. Key Usage Time Window .....	355
10.4.18. Projector Secure Silicon Device .....	355
10.4.19. Access to Projector Image Signals .....	355
10.4.20. Systems with Electronic Marriage .....	355
10.4.21. Systems Without Electronic Marriage .....	356
10.4.22. Clock Date-Time-Range .....	356
10.4.23. Clock Setup .....	356
10.4.24. Clock Stability .....	356
10.4.25. Repair and Renewal of SPBs .....	356
10.4.26. SPB2 Protected Devices .....	357
10.4.27. Clock Continuity .....	357
10.4.28. TLS Endpoints .....	357
10.4.29. Deleted Section .....	357
10.4.30. SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer .....	357
10.4.31. Idempotency of ITM RRP's .....	358
10.4.32. RRP Synchronism .....	358
10.4.33. TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition .....	358
10.4.34. RRP Broadcast Prohibition .....	358
10.4.35. Implementation of Proprietary ITMs .....	358
10.4.36. RRP Initiator .....	358
10.4.37. Deleted Section .....	359
10.4.38. Deleted Section .....	359
10.4.39. RRP "Busy" and Unsupported Types .....	359
10.4.40. RRP Operational Message Ports .....	359
10.4.41. Deleted Section .....	359
10.4.42. FM Algorithm General Requirements .....	360
10.4.43. FM Insertion Requirements .....	360
10.4.44. IFM Visual Transparency .....	360
10.4.45. IFM Robustness .....	360
10.4.46. AFM Inaudibility .....	361
10.4.47. AFM Robustness .....	361
10.4.48. FM Control Instance .....	361
10.4.49. Deleted Section .....	361
10.4.50. SE Log Authoring .....	361
10.4.51. SPB Log Storage Requirements .....	362
10.4.52. Remote SPB Log Storage Requirements .....	362
10.4.53. MB Log Storage Capabilities .....	362
10.4.54. Logging for Standalone Systems .....	362
10.4.55. Logging of Failed Procedures .....	362
10.4.56. SPB Log Failure .....	362
10.4.57. Log Purging in Failed SPBs .....	363
10.4.58. MB Tasks .....	363
10.4.59. Private Keys outside Secure Silicon .....	363
10.4.60. Image Keys outside Secure Silicon .....	363
10.4.61. Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability .....	363

10.4.62. Use of Software Protection Methods .....	363
10.4.63. TMS Role .....	364
10.4.64. D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection .....	364
10.4.65. RSA Key Entropy .....	364
10.4.66. Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy .....	364
10.4.67. MD Caching of Keys .....	364
10.4.68. SPB 1 Firmware Modifications .....	365
10.4.69. SPB1 Log Retention .....	365
10.4.70. ASM Get Time Frequency .....	365
10.4.71. Deleted Section .....	365
10.4.72. SPB Secure Silicon Requirements .....	366
10.4.73. SPB Type 1 Battery Life .....	366
10.4.74. Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert .....	366
10.4.75. Log Collection for Married MB .....	366
10.4.76. Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement .....	366
10.4.77. Standalone MB Single Purpose Requirement .....	367
10.4.78. Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements .....	367
10.4.79. TLS RSA Requirement .....	367
10.4.80. Dual Certificate SMS Authentication .....	367
III. Consolidated Test Procedures .....	369
11. Testing Overview .....	371
11.1. Test Reports .....	371
12. Digital Cinema Package (DCP) Consolidated Test Sequence .....	373
12.1. Overview .....	373
12.2. DCP Test Sequence .....	374
13. Digital Cinema Server Consolidated Test Sequence .....	377
13.1. Overview .....	377
13.2. Server Test Sequence .....	377
13.3. Server Design Review .....	386
14. Digital Cinema Projector Consolidated Test Sequence .....	389
14.1. Overview .....	389
14.2. Projector Test Sequence .....	389
14.3. Projector Design Review .....	395
15. Digital Cinema Projector with MB Consolidated Test Sequence .....	397
15.1. Overview .....	397
15.2. Projector with MB Test Sequence .....	397
15.3. Projector with MB Design Review .....	408
16. Link Decryptor/Encryptor Consolidated Test Sequence .....	411
16.1. Overview .....	411
16.2. LD/LE Test Sequence .....	411
16.3. LD/LE Design Review .....	415
17. Digital Cinema Server Consolidated Confidence Sequence .....	417
17.1. Overview .....	417
17.2. Server Confidence Sequence .....	417
18. Digital Cinema Projector Consolidated Confidence Sequence .....	421
18.1. Overview .....	421
18.2. Projector Confidence Sequence .....	421
19. Digital Cinema Projector with MB Consolidated Confidence Sequence .....	425
19.1. Overview .....	425
19.2. Projector with MB Confidence Sequence .....	425
A. Test Materials .....	431
A.1. Overview .....	431
A.2. Images .....	431

A.2.1. Introduction ..... 431

A.2.2. Sync Count ..... 431

A.2.3. Sync Count (Encrypted) ..... 432

A.2.4. 4K Sync Count ..... 433

A.2.5. Sync Count, 48fps ..... 433

A.2.6. Channel I.D. 5.1 ..... 434

A.2.7. Channel I.D. 1-16 ..... 434

A.2.8. "NIST" 2K Test Pattern ..... 435

A.2.9. "NIST" 4K Test Pattern ..... 436

A.2.10. Black to Gray Step Series ..... 436

A.2.11. Black to White Step Series ..... 437

A.2.12. Color Accuracy Series ..... 438

A.2.13. 4K Color Accuracy Series ..... 439

A.2.14. Black (Empty Frame) ..... 440

A.2.15. White (White Frame) ..... 440

A.2.16. Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence ..... 440

A.2.17. Sequential Contrast Sequence ..... 441

A.2.18. 2K Picture Track File, Maximum Bitrate ..... 442

A.2.19. 4K Picture Track File, Maximum Bitrate ..... 442

A.2.20. DCI Numbered Frame Sequence ..... 443

A.2.21. DCI Numbered Frame Sequence (Encrypted) ..... 444

A.2.22. DCI Scope Transition Sequence ..... 444

A.2.23. DCI Flat Transition Sequence ..... 445

A.2.24. StEM 2K ..... 445

A.2.25. StEM 2K (Encrypted) ..... 446

A.2.26. StEM 2K Multi-Reel A (Encrypted) ..... 446

A.2.27. StEM 2K Multi-Reel B (Encrypted) ..... 447

A.2.28. StEM 2K Multi-Reel A ..... 447

A.2.29. StEM 2K Multi-Reel B ..... 448

A.2.30. StEM 2K 48 fps ..... 448

A.2.31. pixel\_structure\_N\_2k\_j2c\_pt ..... 448

A.2.32. pixel\_structure\_S\_2k\_j2c\_pt ..... 449

A.2.33. pixel\_structure\_E\_2k\_j2c\_pt ..... 449

A.2.34. pixel\_structure\_W\_2k\_j2c\_pt ..... 449

A.2.35. pixel\_structure\_N\_4k\_j2c\_pt ..... 450

A.2.36. pixel\_structure\_S\_4k\_j2c\_pt ..... 450

A.2.37. pixel\_structure\_E\_4k\_j2c\_pt ..... 450

A.2.38. pixel\_structure\_W\_4k\_j2c\_pt ..... 451

A.2.39. FM Constraints Begin (Encrypted) ..... 451

A.2.40. FM Constraints Begin (Plaintext) ..... 452

A.2.41. FM Constraints End (Encrypted) ..... 453

A.2.42. FM Constraints End (Plaintext) ..... 453

A.2.43. 2K FM Control Granularity Begin (Encrypted) ..... 454

A.2.44. 2K FM Control Granularity Begin ..... 454

A.2.45. 2K FM Control Granularity End (Encrypted) ..... 455

A.2.46. 2K FM Control Granularity End ..... 455

A.2.47. 2K FM Payload Begin (Encrypted) ..... 456

A.2.48. 2K FM Payload End (Encrypted) ..... 456

A.2.49. Binary Audio FM Bypass ..... 457

A.2.50. Selective FM Begin ..... 457

A.2.51. Selective FM End ..... 457

A.2.52. Timed Text Example with Missing Font ..... 458

A.2.53. DCI\_gradient\_step\_s\_white\_j2c\_pt ..... 458

A.2.54. DCI_gradient_step_s_color_j2c_pt .....	459
A.2.55. Timed Text Example with Font .....	460
A.2.56. Timed Text Example with PNG .....	460
A.2.57. Sync Count Text .....	460
A.2.58. Sync Count Text (Encrypted) .....	461
A.2.59. subtitle background .....	461
A.2.60. Plain_Frame_nosub_j2c_ct .....	461
A.2.61. m01 Picture Frame Out Of Order (Encrypted) .....	462
A.2.62. m03 Sound Splice .....	462
A.2.63. m05 Picture Track File With Wrong TrackFile ID (Encrypted) .....	463
A.2.64. m09 Picture track file with bad HMAC (Encrypted) .....	463
A.2.65. m11 Picture With Bad Check Value (Encrypted) .....	464
A.3. Sound .....	465
A.3.1. Introduction .....	465
A.3.2. Sync Count 5.1 .....	465
A.3.3. Sync Count 5.1 (Encrypted) .....	465
A.3.4. Sync Count 5.1 48fps .....	466
A.3.5. Channel I.D. 5.1 .....	466
A.3.6. Channel I.D. 1-16 .....	467
A.3.7. Pink Noise, 16 Channels .....	467
A.3.8. Pink Noise, 16 Channels, 96 kHz .....	468
A.3.9. Pink Noise, 16 Channels, 96 kHz (Encrypted) .....	468
A.3.10. Maximum Bitrate, 16 Channels, 96 kHz (Encrypted) .....	469
A.3.11. 1 kHz Sine Wave .....	469
A.3.12. 1 kHz Sine Wave, 16 Channels 96kHz .....	470
A.3.13. 400 hz sine wave .....	470
A.3.14. 400 hz sine wave (Encrypted) .....	471
A.3.15. 400 hz sine wave, WTF (Encrypted) .....	471
A.3.16. Silence, 5.1 .....	472
A.3.17. Silence, 5.1, 15 minutes .....	472
A.3.18. Silence, 5.1, 15 minutes (Encrypted) .....	473
A.3.19. StEM 5.1 Sound .....	473
A.3.20. StEM 5.1 Sound (Encrypted) .....	474
A.3.21. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel A (Encrypted) .....	474
A.3.22. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel B (Encrypted) .....	475
A.3.23. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel A .....	475
A.3.24. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel B .....	476
A.3.25. StEM 48fps 5.1 Sound .....	476
A.3.26. FM StEM 5.1 Sound (Encrypted) .....	477
A.3.27. FM StEM WTF Sound .....	477
A.3.28. FM StEM WTF Sound (Encrypted) .....	478
A.3.29. Binary Audio FM Bypass WTF Sound (Encrypted) .....	478
A.3.30. m02 Sound Frame Out Of Order (Encrypted) .....	479
A.3.31. m04 Sound Track File With Wrong TrackFile ID (Encrypted) .....	479
A.3.32. m10 Sound track file with bad HMAC (Encrypted) .....	480
A.3.33. m12 Sound Track File With Bad Check Value (Encrypted) .....	480
A.4. D-Cinema Packages .....	481
A.4.1. Introduction .....	481
A.4.2. DCI 2K Sync Test .....	481
A.4.3. DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) .....	481
A.4.4. DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles .....	481
A.4.5. DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted) .....	482
A.4.6. DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps) .....	482

A.4.7. 4K Sync Test .....	482
A.4.8. DCI 5.1 Channel Identification .....	482
A.4.9. DCI 1-16 Numbered Channel Identification .....	483
A.4.10. DCI NIST Frame with silence .....	483
A.4.11. 4K DCI NIST Frame with silence .....	483
A.4.12. DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise .....	483
A.4.13. DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs) .....	484
A.4.14. DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise (96 kHz) .....	484
A.4.15. DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs, 96kHz) .....	484
A.4.16. DCI NIST Frame no sound files .....	484
A.4.17. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In .....	485
A.4.18. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted) .....	485
A.4.19. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Flat) .....	485
A.4.20. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Scope) .....	485
A.4.21. DCI 2K StEM .....	486
A.4.22. DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) .....	486
A.4.23. DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence .....	486
A.4.24. DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted) .....	486
A.4.25. DCI 2K 48fps StEM .....	487
A.4.26. 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series .....	487
A.4.27. 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series .....	487
A.4.28. 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted) .....	487
A.4.29. 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted) .....	488
A.4.30. 64 Reel Composition, 1 Second Reels (Encrypted) .....	488
A.4.31. 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted) .....	488
A.4.32. 2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted) .....	489
A.4.33. 2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted) .....	489
A.4.34. 2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted) .....	489
A.4.35. 2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted) .....	490
A.4.36. 2K FM Payload (Encrypted) .....	490
A.4.37. Binary Audio Forensic Marking Bypass Test (Encrypted) .....	490
A.4.38. Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted) .....	491
A.4.39. Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted) .....	491
A.4.40. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted) .....	491
A.4.41. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted) .....	492
A.4.42. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted) .....	492
A.4.43. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted) .....	492
A.4.44. 2K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted) .....	493
A.4.45. 4K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted) .....	493
A.4.46. End of Engagement - Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted) .....	493
A.4.47. End of Engagement - Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted) .....	493
A.4.48. Multi-line Subtitle Test .....	494
A.4.49. Multi-line PNG Subtitle Test .....	494
A.4.50. Subtitle Test Part 1 .....	494
A.4.51. Subtitle Test Part 2 .....	494
A.4.52. Subtitle Test Part 3 .....	495
A.4.53. DCI Black Spacer - 5 seconds .....	495
A.4.54. White Frame Sequence .....	495
A.4.55. Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence .....	495
A.4.56. Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence .....	496
A.4.57. DCI Gray Steps .....	496
A.4.58. DCI White Steps .....	496
A.4.59. DCI 2K Moving Gradient .....	496

A.4.60. DCI 2K Moving Gradient .....	497
A.4.61. Color Accuracy Series .....	497
A.4.62. 4K Color Accuracy Series .....	497
A.4.63. Pixel Structure Pattern N 2k .....	498
A.4.64. Pixel Structure Pattern S 2k .....	498
A.4.65. Pixel Structure Pattern E 2k .....	498
A.4.66. Pixel Structure Pattern W 2k .....	499
A.4.67. Pixel Structure Pattern N 4k .....	499
A.4.68. Pixel Structure Pattern S 4k .....	499
A.4.69. Pixel Structure Pattern E 4k .....	500
A.4.70. Pixel Structure Pattern W 4k .....	500
A.4.71. DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted) .....	500
A.4.72. DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted) .....	501
A.4.73. DCI Malformed Test 3: Sound Splice Tests .....	501
A.4.74. DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted) .....	501
A.4.75. DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted) .....	501
A.4.76. DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted) .....	502
A.4.77. DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted) .....	502
A.4.78. DCI Malformed Test 8: DCP with timed text and a missing font .....	502
A.4.79. DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) .....	502
A.4.80. DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) .....	503
A.4.81. DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) .....	503
A.4.82. DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) .....	503
A.4.83. DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted) .....	504
A.4.84. DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted) .....	504
A.4.85. DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted) .....	504
A.4.86. DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted) .....	505
A.4.87. DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted) .....	505
A.4.88. DCI Malformed Test 18: CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted) .....	505
A.4.89. DCI DCP 2K (Encrypted) .....	506
A.4.90. DCI DCP 2K Multi-Reel 128 A (Encrypted) .....	506
A.4.91. DCI DCP 2K Multi-Reel 128 B (Encrypted) .....	506
A.4.92. DCI DCP 2K Multi-Reel 64 (Encrypted) .....	507
A.4.93. DCI DCP 2K, Malformed (Encrypted) .....	507
A.4.94. DCI DCP 4K (Encrypted) .....	507
A.5. Digital Certificates .....	508
A.5.1. Chain A1 IMB Certificate Files .....	508
A.5.2. Chain A2 IMB Certificate Files .....	508
A.5.3. Chain A3 IMB Certificate Files .....	508
A.5.3.1. chain-a3-root .....	508
A.5.3.2. chain-a3-signer1 .....	508
A.5.3.3. chain-a3-osig-type .....	509
A.5.3.4. chain-a3-isig-type .....	509
A.5.3.5. chain-a3-iosig-type .....	509
A.5.3.6. chain-a3-no-rsa .....	509
A.5.3.7. chain-a3-short-rsa .....	510
A.5.3.8. chain-a3-bad-exp .....	510
A.5.3.9. IMB-chain-a3-BER-enc .....	510
A.5.3.10. chain-a3-no-saf .....	510
A.5.3.11. chain-a3-no-svf .....	511
A.5.3.12. chain-a3-no-ver .....	511
A.5.3.13. chain-a3-no-sn .....	511
A.5.3.14. chain-a3-no-sig .....	511

A.5.3.15. chain-a3-no-issuer .....	512
A.5.3.16. chain-a3-no-subject .....	512
A.5.3.17. chain-a3-no-spki .....	512
A.5.3.18. chain-a3-no-val-f .....	512
A.5.3.19. chain-a3-no-aki-f .....	513
A.5.3.20. chain-a3-no-keyuse .....	513
A.5.3.21. chain-a3-no-basic .....	513
A.5.3.22. chain-a3-path-1 .....	513
A.5.3.23. chain-a3-path-2 .....	514
A.5.3.24. chain-a3-path-3 .....	514
A.5.3.25. chain-a3-path-4 .....	514
A.5.3.26. chain-a3-path-5 .....	514
A.5.3.27. chain-a3-path-6 .....	515
A.5.3.28. chain-a3-path-7 .....	515
A.5.3.29. chain-a3-org-name .....	515
A.5.3.30. chain-a3-role-1 .....	515
A.5.3.31. chain-a3-role-2 .....	516
A.5.3.32. chain-a3-date-exp .....	516
A.5.4. Chain B1 Certificate Files .....	516
A.5.4.1. chain-b1-root .....	516
A.5.5. Chain C1 Certificate Files .....	516
A.5.5.1. chain-c1-root .....	516
A.5.6. Chain C3 Certificate Files .....	517
A.5.6.1. chain-c3-root .....	517
A.5.6.2. chain-c3-signer1 .....	517
A.5.6.3. chain-c3-osig-type .....	517
A.5.6.4. chain-c3-isig-type .....	517
A.5.6.5. chain-c3-iosig-type .....	518
A.5.6.6. chain-c3-no-rsa .....	518
A.5.6.7. chain-c3-short-rsa .....	518
A.5.6.8. chain-c3-bad-exp .....	518
A.5.6.9. chain-c3-BER-enc .....	519
A.5.6.10. chain-c3-no-saf .....	519
A.5.6.11. chain-c3-no-svf .....	519
A.5.6.12. chain-c3-no-ver .....	519
A.5.6.13. chain-c3-no-sn .....	520
A.5.6.14. chain-c3-no-sig .....	520
A.5.6.15. chain-c3-no-issuer .....	520
A.5.6.16. chain-c3-no-subject .....	520
A.5.6.17. chain-c3-no-spki .....	521
A.5.6.18. chain-c3-no-val-f .....	521
A.5.6.19. chain-c3-no-aki-f .....	521
A.5.6.20. chain-c3-no-keyuse .....	521
A.5.6.21. chain-c3-no-basic .....	522
A.5.6.22. chain-c3-path-1 .....	522
A.5.6.23. chain-c3-path-2 .....	522
A.5.6.24. chain-c3-path-3 .....	522
A.5.6.25. chain-c3-path-4 .....	523
A.5.6.26. chain-c3-path-5 .....	523
A.5.6.27. chain-c3-path-6 .....	523
A.5.6.28. chain-c3-path-7 .....	523
A.5.6.29. chain-c3-org-name .....	524
A.5.6.30. chain-c3-role-1 .....	524

A.5.6.31. chain-c3-date-exp .....	524
A.5.6.32. chain-c3-role-2 .....	524
A.5.7. Public/Private Key Pairs .....	525
A.5.7.1. chain-a3-bad-exp-key .....	525
A.5.7.2. chain-a3-leaf-key .....	525
A.5.7.3. chain-a3-no-rsa-key .....	525
A.5.7.4. chain-a3-root-key .....	525
A.5.7.5. chain-a3-short-rsa-key .....	526
A.5.7.6. chain-a3-signer1-key .....	526
A.5.7.7. chain-c1-root-key .....	526
A.5.7.8. chain-c3-bad-exp-key .....	526
A.5.7.9. chain-c3-leaf-key .....	527
A.5.7.10. chain-c3-no-rsa-key .....	527
A.5.7.11. chain-c3-root-key .....	527
A.5.7.12. chain-c3-short-rsa-key .....	527
A.5.7.13. chain-c3-signer1-key .....	528
A.5.7.14. chain-b1-root-key .....	528
A.6. Key Delivery Messages .....	529
A.6.1. Introduction .....	529
A.6.2. KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) .....	529
A.6.3. KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test with Subtitles (Encrypted) .....	529
A.6.4. KDM for DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted) .....	529
A.6.5. KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted) .....	530
A.6.6. KDM for 2K StEM Sequence (Encrypted) .....	530
A.6.7. KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted) .....	530
A.6.8. KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted) .....	530
A.6.9. KDM for 64 1 second reel Composition (Encrypted) .....	531
A.6.10. KDM for 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted) .....	531
A.6.11. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted) .....	531
A.6.12. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted) .....	531
A.6.13. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted) .....	532
A.6.14. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted) .....	532
A.6.15. KDM for 2K FM Payload (Encrypted) .....	532
A.6.16. KDM for Binary Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted) .....	532
A.6.17. KDM for Binary Selective Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted) .....	533
A.6.18. KDM for Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted) .....	533
A.6.19. KDM for Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted) .....	533
A.6.20. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted) .....	534
A.6.21. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted) .....	534
A.6.22. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted) .....	534
A.6.23. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted) .....	535
A.6.24. KDM with two selective audio FM mark URIs .....	535
A.6.25. KDM for 2K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted) .....	535
A.6.26. KDM for 4K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted) .....	536
A.6.27. KDM for Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted) .....	536
A.6.28. KDM for Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted) .....	536
A.6.29. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted) .....	536
A.6.30. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted) .....	537
A.6.31. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted) .....	537
A.6.32. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted) .....	537
A.6.33. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted) .....	538
A.6.34. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted) .....	538
A.6.35. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) .....	538



A.6.36. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) ..... 539

A.6.37. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) ..... 539

A.6.38. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) ..... 539

A.6.39. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted) ..... 540

A.6.40. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted) ..... 540

A.6.41. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted) ..... 540

A.6.42. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted) ..... 541

A.6.43. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted) ..... 541

A.6.44. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 18: KDM for CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted). 541

A.6.45. KDM with invalid XML ..... 541

A.6.46. KDM that has expired ..... 542

A.6.47. KDM with future validity period ..... 542

A.6.48. KDM that has recently expired ..... 542

A.6.49. KDM with incorrect message digest ..... 543

A.6.50. KDM with future validity period ..... 543

A.6.51. KDM with empty TDL ..... 543

A.6.52. KDM with Assume Trust and random TDL entries ..... 543

A.6.53. KDM with the SM alone on the TDL ..... 544

A.6.54. KDM with the projector and LDB on the TDL ..... 544

A.6.55. KDM with the projector alone on the TDL ..... 544

A.6.56. KDM with the LDB alone on the TDL ..... 544

A.6.57. KDM with imminent expiration date ..... 545

A.6.58. KDM with corrupted CipherData block ..... 545

A.6.59. KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint ..... 545

A.6.60. KDM without signer certificate ..... 545

A.6.61. KDM without AuthorityKey certificate ..... 546

A.6.62. KDM with KeyInfo mismatch ..... 546

A.6.63. KDM with invalid MessageType ..... 546

A.6.64. KDM with expired Signer certificate ..... 547

A.6.65. KDM issued before certificate valid ..... 547

A.6.66. KDM validity exceeds signer validity ..... 547

A.6.67. KDM with mismatched keytype ..... 548

A.6.68. KDM with non-empty NonCriticalExtensions ..... 548

A.6.69. KDM with invalid ContentAuthenticator ..... 548

A.6.70. KDM with bad CompositionPlaylistId value ..... 548

A.6.71. KDM with bad CipherData CompositionPlaylistId value ..... 549

A.6.72. KDM with incorrect namespace name value ..... 549

A.6.73. KDM with random TDL entry ..... 549

A.6.74. KDM signed with incorrect signer certificate format ..... 549

A.6.75. KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry ..... 550

A.6.76. KDM for 2K StEM with Device Specific Special Auditorium TDL ..... 550

A.6.77. KDM for DCI 2K StEM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation ..... 550

A.6.78. KDM with a TDL including Responder A ..... 551

A.6.79. KDM with a TDL including Responder B ..... 551

A.6.80. KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and an additional device certificate ..... 551

A.6.81. KDM with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation ..... 552

A.6.82. KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and the "assume trust" thumbprint .....	552
A.6.83. KDM with a TDL that contains one more LD/LE device thumbprints than there are LD/projector thumbprints in the special auditorium situation .....	552
A.6.84. KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry .....	553
A.6.85. KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation .....	553
B. Equipment List .....	555
B.1. Hardware .....	555
B.2. Software .....	556
C. Source Code .....	559
C.1. Overview .....	559
C.2. dc-thumbprint .....	560
C.2.1. dc-thumbprint Source Code Listing .....	560
C.3. schema-check .....	562
C.3.1. schema-check Source Code Listing .....	562
C.4. kdm-decrypt .....	565
C.4.1. kdm-decrypt Source Code Listing .....	565
C.5. j2c-scan .....	570
C.5.1. j2c-scan Source Code Listing .....	570
C.6. Eab_calc.py .....	574
C.6.1. Eab_calc.py Source Code Listing .....	574
C.7. uuid_check.py .....	576
C.7.1. uuid_check Source Code Listing .....	576
C.8. dsig_cert.py .....	578
C.8.1. dsig_cert.py Source Code Listing .....	578
C.9. dsig_extract.py .....	581
C.9.1. dsig_extract.py Source Code Listing .....	581
D. ASM Simulator .....	583
D.1. ASM Requester and Responder .....	583
D.2. Example Log Records .....	594
D.2.1. KeyTransfer .....	594
D.2.2. LinkClosed .....	594
D.2.3. LinkException .....	595
D.2.4. LinkOpened .....	596
D.2.5. LogTransfer .....	596
D.2.6. Prop1 .....	597
D.2.7. Prop2 .....	598
D.2.8. Prop3 .....	598
D.2.9. SPBClockAdjust .....	599
D.2.10. SPBClose .....	600
D.2.11. SPBDivorce .....	600
D.2.12. SPBMarriage .....	601
D.2.13. SPBOpen .....	602
D.2.14. SPBSecurityAlert .....	602
D.2.15. SPBShutdown .....	603
D.2.16. SPBSoftware .....	604
D.2.17. SPBStartup .....	604
D.2.18. BogusLogFormat .....	605
E. GPIO Test Fixture .....	607
F. Reference Documents .....	609
G. DCI Specification v1.2 References to CTP .....	613
H. Abbreviations .....	625

Index ..... 627

**NOT CURRENT VERSION  
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NOT CURRENT VERSION

---

# List of Figures

1.1. Typical DCI Compliant System Configuration .....	6
6.1. Standard Frame Panel Designations .....	269
6.2. Audio Delay Timing .....	274
7.1. Pixel Structure 16 x 16 Array .....	309
7.2. Pixel Structure 8 x 8 Array .....	309
A.1. Sync Count .....	432
A.2. "NIST" 2K Test Pattern .....	435
A.3. Black to Gray Step Series .....	437
A.4. Black to White Step Series .....	438
A.5. Color Accuracy Series .....	439
A.6. Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence .....	441
A.7. DCI Numbered Frame Sequence .....	443
A.8. FM Constraints Begin (Encrypted) .....	452
A.9. DCI_gradient_step_s_white_j2c_pt .....	459
E.1. GPIO Test Fixture Schematic .....	607
E.2. GPIO Test Fixture Connector .....	607

ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

---

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ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

---

## List of Tables

4.1. Essence Container UL Values for D-Cinema .....	112
4.2. Audio Samples Per Frame .....	123
4.3. Image Structure Operational Levels .....	126
11.1. Test Session Data .....	372
12.1. Asset Map Procedures .....	374
12.2. Packing List Procedures .....	374
12.3. Composition Playlist Procedures .....	375
12.4. Track File Procedures .....	375
12.5. Image Essence Procedures .....	376
12.6. Sound Essence Procedures .....	376
12.7. Text Essence Procedures .....	376
13.1. Security Manager Certificate .....	377
13.2. Screen Manager Certificate .....	378
13.3. Power .....	378
13.4. Operator Roles .....	378
13.5. Screen Management System .....	378
13.6. KDM Ingest .....	379
13.7. Interface .....	380
13.8. Log Reporting .....	381
13.9. Security Events .....	382
13.10. Essence Reproduction .....	383
13.11. Text and Image Overlay .....	384
13.12. Media Block Security .....	384
13.13. Forensic Marking .....	385
13.14. FIPS 140-2 Requirements .....	386
13.15. DCI DCSS Requirements .....	386
14.1. Projector Certificate .....	389
14.2. Link Decryptor Certificate .....	390
14.3. Power .....	390
14.4. Secure Processing Block Type 2 .....	390
14.5. Interface .....	391
14.6. Security Events .....	392
14.7. Log Reporting .....	393
14.8. Link Decryptor .....	393
14.9. Image Processing .....	393
14.10. Text and Image Overlay .....	394
14.11. FIPS 140-2 Requirements .....	395
14.12. DCI DCSS Requirements .....	395
15.1. Security Manager Certificate .....	397
15.2. Screen Manager Certificate .....	398
15.3. Projector Certificate .....	398
15.4. Power .....	399
15.5. Operator Roles .....	399
15.6. Screen Management System .....	399
15.7. KDM Ingest .....	400
15.8. Interface .....	400
15.9. Log Reporting .....	401
15.10. Log Reporting for Remote SPB Support .....	401
15.11. Security Events .....	402
15.12. Essence Reproduction .....	403
15.13. Media Block Security .....	404

15.14. Media Block Security for Remote SPB Support .....	405
15.15. Forensic Marking .....	405
15.16. Secure Processing Block Type 2 .....	406
15.17. Image Processing .....	406
15.18. FIPS 140-2 Requirements .....	408
15.19. FIPS 140-2 Requirements for Remote SPB Support .....	408
15.20. DCI DCSS Requirements .....	408
15.21. DCI DCSS Requirements for Remote SPB Support .....	410
16.1. Link Decryptor/Encryptor Certificate (LD/LE) .....	411
16.2. Power .....	412
16.3. Interface .....	412
16.4. Security Events .....	413
16.5. Log Reporting .....	413
16.6. Link Decryptor .....	414
16.7. FIPS 140-2 Requirements .....	415
16.8. DCI DCSS Requirements .....	415
17.1. Security Manager Certificate .....	417
17.2. Screen Manager Certificate .....	418
17.3. Screen Management System .....	418
17.4. Log Reporting .....	418
17.5. Security Events .....	418
17.6. Media Block Security .....	419
17.7. Forensic Marking .....	419
18.1. Projector Certificate .....	421
18.2. Link Decryptor Certificate .....	422
18.3. Secure Processing Block Type 2 .....	422
18.4. Link Decryptor .....	422
18.5. Image Processing .....	422
19.1. Security Manager Certificate .....	425
19.2. Screen Manager Certificate .....	426
19.3. Projector Certificate .....	426
19.4. Screen Management System .....	427
19.5. Log Reporting for Remote SPB Support .....	427
19.6. Security Events .....	427
19.7. Media Block Security .....	427
19.8. Media Block Security for Remote SPB Support .....	428
19.9. Forensic Marking .....	428
19.10. Secure Processing Block Type 2 .....	428
19.11. Image Processing .....	428

NOT ARCHIVED CURRENT VERSION



---

## List of Examples

2.1. D-Cinema Certificate .....	11
3.1. Packing List Example (Partial) .....	45
3.2. checksig execution .....	47
3.3. dsig-cert.py execution .....	47
3.4. An X.509 certificate in PEM format .....	47
3.5. dsig-extract.py execution .....	48
3.6. KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area .....	49
3.7. KDM - AuthenticatedPrivate area .....	50
3.8. KDM - Signature area .....	51
3.9. kdm-decrypt Usage and Output .....	52
4.1. Asset Map .....	99
4.2. Volume Index .....	100
4.3. Packing List .....	103
4.4. Composition Playlist .....	107
4.5. MXF Partition Header .....	111
4.6. Source Package structure .....	112
4.7. Cryptographic Framework and Cryptographic Context .....	113
4.8. Essence Descriptor for JPEG 2000 .....	113
4.9. Essence Descriptor for PCM Audio .....	114
4.10. MXF Random Index Pack (RIP) .....	115
5.1. Log Report Example .....	161
5.2. Log Report Record Example .....	162
5.3. Log Report Signature Example .....	163
C.1. dc-thumbprint execution .....	560
C.2. Using schema-check to check well-formedness .....	562
C.3. Using schema-check to check validity .....	562
C.4. kdm-decrypt execution .....	565
C.5. j2c-scan execution .....	570
C.6. Eab_calc.py execution .....	574
C.7. uuid_check.py execution .....	576
C.8. dsig_cert.py execution .....	578
C.9. dsig_extract.py execution .....	581

NOT CURRENT VERSION

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

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# Chapter 1. Introduction

Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC (DCI) is a joint venture of Disney, Fox, Paramount, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Universal, and Warner Bros. Studios. The primary purpose of DCI is to establish uniform specifications for d-cinema. These DCI member companies believe that d-cinema will provide real benefits to theater audiences, theater owners, filmmakers and distributors. DCI was created with the recognition that these benefits could not be fully realized without industry-wide specifications. All parties involved in d-cinema must be confident that their products and services are interoperable and compatible with the products and services of all industry participants. The DCI member companies further believe that d-cinema exhibition will significantly improve the movie-going experience for the public.

Digital cinema is today being used worldwide to show feature motion pictures to thousands of audiences daily, at a level of quality commensurate with (or better than) that of 35mm film release prints. Many of these systems are informed by the *Digital Cinema System Specification, Version 1.0*, published by DCI in 2005. In areas of image and sound encoding, transport security and network services, today's systems offer practical interoperability and an excellent movie-going experience. These systems were designed, however, using de-facto industry practices.

With the publication of DCI's *Digital Cinema System Specification, Version 1.1* [DCI-DCSS-1-1], now superseded by *Digital Cinema System Specification, Version 1.2* [DCI-DCSS-1-2] and errata publications [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-1-15], [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-16-20], [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-21-33], [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-34-76], [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-77-87], [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-88-89], and [DCI-DCSS-1-2-errata-90-96], and the publication of required standards from SMPTE, ISO, and other bodies, it is possible to design and build d-cinema equipment that meets all DCI requirements. Manufacturers preparing new designs, and theaters planning expensive upgrades are both grappling with the same question: how to know if a d-cinema system is *compliant* with DCI requirements?

**Note: For the purpose of the tests defined in this version of the Compliance Test Plan (CTP), DCI have removed errata 72, 95 and 96 from the scope of testing. The requirements of those errata are therefore not tested by this CTP version. Tests for errata 72, 95 and 96 will be specified in a future version of the CTP.**

Note: This test plan references standards from SMPTE, ISO, and other bodies that have specific publication dates. The specific version of the referenced document to be used in conjunction with this test plan shall be those listed in Appendix F.

## 1.1. Overview

This Compliance Test Plan (CTP) was developed by DCI to provide uniform testing procedures for d-cinema equipment. The CTP details testing procedures, reference files, design evaluation methods, and directed test sequences for content packages and specific types of equipment. These instructions will guide the Test Operator through the testing process and the creation of a standard DCI compliance evaluation report.

This document is presented in three parts and eight appendices.

- Part I: Procedural Tests — contains a library of test procedures for elements of a d-cinema system. Many of the test procedures are applicable to more than one element. The procedure library will be used in Part III to produce complete sequences for testing content and specific types of systems.

- Chapter 2: *Digital Cinema Certificates* — describes test objectives and procedures to test d-cinema certificates and devices which use d-cinema certificates for security operations.
- Chapter 3: *Key Delivery Messages* — describes test objectives and procedures to test Key Delivery Messages (KDM) and devices which decrypt KDM payloads.
- Chapter 4: *Digital Cinema Packaging* — describes test objectives and procedures to test the files in a Digital Cinema Package (DCP).
- Chapter 5: *Common Security Features* — describes test objectives and procedures to test security requirements that apply to more than one type of d-cinema device (e.g., an SMS or a projector). Security event logging is also addressed in this chapter.
- Chapter 6: *Media Block* — describes test objectives and procedures to test that Media Block device operations are correct and valid.
- Chapter 7: *Projector* — describes test objectives and procedures to test that projector operations are correct and valid.
- Chapter 8: *Screen Management System* — describes test objectives and procedures to test that Screen Management System (SMS) operations are correct and valid.
- Part II: Design Evaluation Guidelines — contains two chapters that describe DCI security requirements for the design and implementation of d-cinema equipment, and methods for verifying those requirements through document analysis. Requirements in this part of the CTP cannot easily be tested by normal system operation. [FIPS-140-2] requirements for deriving random numbers, for example, must be verified by examining the documentation that is the basis of the FIPS certification.
  - Chapter 9: *FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB* — provides a methodology for evaluating the results of a FIPS 140-2 security test. Material submitted for testing and the resulting reports are examined for compliance with [DCI-DCSS-1-2] requirements.
  - Chapter 10: *DCI Requirements Review* — provides a methodology for evaluating system documentation to determine whether system aspects that cannot be tested by direct procedural method are compliant with [DCI-DCSS-1-2] requirements.
- Part III: Consolidated Test Procedures — contains consolidated test sequences for testing d-cinema equipment and content.
  - Chapter 11: *Testing Overview* — Provides an overview of the consolidated testing and test reports and a standard form for reporting details of the testing environment.
  - Chapter 12: *Digital Cinema Package (DCP) Consolidated Test Sequence* — A directed test sequence for testing a Digital Cinema Package (DCP).
  - Chapter 13: *Digital Cinema Server Consolidated Test Sequence* — A directed test sequence for testing a stand-alone Digital Cinema Server comprising a Media Block (MB) and a Screen Management Server (SMS).
  - Chapter 14: *Digital Cinema Projector Consolidated Test Sequence* — A directed test sequence for testing a stand-alone Digital Cinema Projector with Link Decryptor Block (LDB).
  - Chapter 15: *Digital Cinema Projector with MB Consolidated Test Sequence* — A directed test sequence for testing a Digital Cinema Projector having an integrated MB and an integrated or external SMS.
  - Chapter 16: *Link Decryptor/Encryptor Consolidated Test Sequence* — A directed test sequence for testing an image processing device which is a remote SPB Type 1 with both Link Encryptor and Link Decryptor capabilities.

- Appendix A: *Test Materials* — Provides a complete description of all reference files used in the test procedures including Digital Cinema Packages, KDMs and Certificates.
- Appendix B: *Equipment List* — Provides a list of test equipment and software used to perform the test procedures. The list is not exclusive and in fact contains many generic entries intended to allow Testing Organizations to exercise some discretion in selecting their tools.
- Appendix C: *Source Code* — Provides computer programs in source code form. These programs are included here because suitable alternatives were not available at the time this document was prepared.
- Appendix D: *ASM Simulator* — Provides documentation on **asm-requester** and **asm-responder**, two programs that simulate the behavior of devices that send and receive Auditorium Security Messages.
- Appendix E: *GPIO Test Fixture* — Provides a schematic for a GPIO test fixture.
- Appendix F: *Reference Documents* — Provides a complete list of the documents referenced by the test procedures and design requirements.
- Appendix G: *DCI Specification v1.2 References to CTP* — Provides a cross reference of [DCI-DCSS-1-2] sections to the respective CTP sections.
- Appendix H: *Abbreviations* — Provides explanations of the abbreviations used in this document.

## 1.2. Normative References

The procedures in this document are substantially traceable to the many normative references cited throughout. In some cases, DCI have chosen to express a constraint or required behavior directly in this document. In these cases it will not be possible to trace the requirement directly to an external document. Nonetheless, the requirement is made normative for the purpose of DCI compliance testing by its appearance in this document.

## 1.3. Audience

This document is written to inform readers from many segments of the motion picture industry, including manufacturers, content producers, distributors, and exhibitors. Readers will have specific needs of this text and the following descriptions will help identify the parts that will be most useful to them. Generally though, the reader should have technical experience with d-cinema systems and access to the required specifications. Some experience with general operating system concepts and installation of source code software will be required to run many of the procedures.

### Equipment Manufacturers

To successfully pass a compliance test, manufacturers must be aware of all requirements and test procedures. In addition to understanding the relevant test sequence and being prepared to provide the Test Operator with information required to complete the tests in the sequence, the manufacturer is also responsible for preparing the documentation called for in Part II.

### Testing Organizations and Test Operators

The Testing Organizations and Test Operators are responsible for assembling a complete test laboratory with all required tools and for guiding the manufacturer through the process of compliance testing. Like the manufacturer, Testing Organizations and Test Operators must be aware of all requirements and test procedures at a very high level of detail.

### System Integrators

Integrators will need to understand the reports issued by Testing Organizations. Comparing systems using reported results will be more accurate if the analyst understands the manner in which individual measurements are made.

## 1.4. Conventions and Practices

### 1.4.1. Typographical Conventions

This document uses the following typographical conventions to convey information in its proper context.

A **Bold Face** style is used to display the names of commands to be run on a computer system.

A `Fixed Width` font is used to express literal data such as string values or element names for XML documents, or command-line arguments and output.

Examples that illustrate command input and output are displayed in a `Fixed Width` font on a shaded background:

```
$ echo "Hello, World!"  
Hello, World! ■
```

Less-than (<) and greater-than (>) symbols are used to illustrate generalized input values in command-line examples. They are placed around the generalized input value, *e.g.*, <input-value>. These symbols are also used to direct command output in some command-line examples, and are also an integral part of the XML file format.

Callouts (white numerals on a black background, as in the example above) are used to provide reference points for examples that include explanations. Examples with callouts are followed by a list of descriptions explaining each callout.

Square brackets ([ and ]) are used to denote an external document reference, *e.g.*, [SMPTE-377-1].

### 1.4.2. Documentation Format

The test procedures documented in Part I will contain the following sub-sections (except as noted).

**Objective** —

Describes what requirements or assertions are to be proven by the test.

**Procedures** —

Defines the steps to be taken to prove the requirements or assertions given in the corresponding objective.

**Material** —

Describes the material (reference files) needed to execute the test. This section may not be present, for example, when the objective can be achieved without reference files.

**Equipment** —

Describes what physical equipment and/or computer programs are needed for executing the test. The equipment list in each procedure is assumed to contain the Test Subject. If the equipment list contains one or more computer programs, the list is also assumed to contain a general purpose computer with a POSIX-like operating system (*e.g.*, Linux). This section may not be present, for example, when the objective can be achieved by observation alone.

**References** —

The set of normative documents that define the requirements or assertions given in the corresponding objective.

**The following language is used to identify persons and organizations by role:**

*Testing Organization*

An organization which offers testing services based on this document.

*Test Operator*

A member of the Testing Organization that performs testing services.

*Testing Subject*

A device or computer file which is the subject of a test based on this document.

**The following language is used for referring to individual components of the system or the system as a whole:**

*Media Block and Controlling Devices*

This term refers to the combination of a Media Block (MB), Screen Management System (SMS) or Theater Management System (TMS), content storage and all cabling necessary to interconnect these devices. Depending upon actual system configuration, all of these components may exist in a single chassis or may exist in separate chassis. Some or all components may be integrated into the projector (see below).

*Projector*

The projector is the device responsible for converting the electrical signals from the Media Block to a human visible picture on screen. This includes all necessary power supplies and cabling.

*Projection System*

A complete exhibition system to perform playback of d-cinema content. This includes all cabling, power supplies, content storage devices, controlling terminals, media blocks, projection devices and sound processing devices necessary for a faithful presentation of the content.

*Theater System*


The projection system plus all the surrounding devices needed for full theater operations including theater loudspeakers and electronics (the "B-Chain"), theater automation, a theater network, and management workstations (depending upon implementation), etc.

Note: there may be additional restrictions, depending on implementation. For example, some Media Blocks may refuse to perform even the most basic operations as long as they are not attached to an SMS or Projector. For these environments, additional equipment may be required.

## 1.5. Digital Cinema System Architecture

The [DCI-DCSS-1-2] allows different system configurations, meaning different ways of grouping functional modules and equipment together. The following diagram shows what is considered to be a typical configuration allowed by DCI.

Figure 1.1. Typical DCI Compliant System Configuration



The left side of the diagram shows the *extra-theater* part, which deals with DCP and KDM generation and transport. The right side shows the *intra-theater* part, which shows the individual components of the projection system and how they work together. This test plan will test for proper DCP and KDM formats (*i.e.*, conforming to the DCI Specification), for proper transport of the data and for proper processing of valid and malformed DCPs and KDMs. In addition, physical system properties and performance will be tested in order to ensure that the system plays back the data as expected and implements all security measures as required by DCI.

While the above diagram shows what is considered to be a typical configuration allowed by the DCI Specification, the [DCI-DCSS-1-2] still leaves room for different implementations, for example, some manufacturers may choose to integrate the Media Decryptor blocks into the projector, or share storage between d-cinema servers.

## 1.6. Strategies for Successful Testing

In order to successfully execute one of the test sequences given in Part III, the Test Operator must understand the details of many documents and must have assembled the necessary tools and equipment to execute the tests. This document provides all the necessary references to standards, tutorials and tools to orient the technical reader.

As an example, Section 7.5.12 requires a calculation to be performed on a set of measured and reference values to determine whether a projector's colorimetry is within tolerance. Section C.6 provides an implementation of this calculation, but the math behind the program and the explanation behind the math are not presented in this document. The Test Operator and system designer must read the reference documents noted in Section 7.5.12 (and any references those documents may make) in order to fully understand the process and create an accurate design or present accurate results on a test report.

Preparing a Test Subject and the required documentation requires the same level of understanding as executing the test. Organizations may even choose to practice executing the test internally in preparation for a test by a Testing Organization.



The test procedures have been written to be independent of any proprietary tools. In some cases this policy has led to an inefficient procedure, but the resulting transparency provides a reference measurement that can be used to design new tools, and verify results obtained from any proprietary tools a Testing Organization may use.

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# Part I. Procedural Tests

Many tests in this Part rely on the Security Manager promptly making available log records of events. In order to provide a bound on test durations, failure of a Security Managers to make the record of an event available as part of a log report within 5 minutes of the event being recorded is cause to fail the test being conducted.

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# Chapter 2. Digital Cinema Certificates

Authentication of devices in d-cinema is accomplished using *asymmetric cryptography*. Unlike symmetric cryptography, which uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt data, asymmetric cryptography uses a pair of keys that each reverse the other's cryptographic operations: data encrypted with one key in the key pair can only be decrypted by the other key in the key pair. In such a key pair, there is a *public key* that is distributed freely, and a *private key* that is closely held and protected. Public keys are not easily distinguished from one another because they don't carry any identifying information (they're just really long random numbers). To address this, public keys are distributed with metadata that describes the person or device that holds the private key, called the *subject*. This set of metadata and the public key comprise the *digital certificate*. The standard that defines a digital certificate for d-cinema is [SMPTE-430-2]. It is based on the ITU standard for Public Key Infrastructure, called X.509, and specifies a number of constraints on the X.509v3 standard, such as the X.509 version that can be used and the size of the RSA keys, among other things.

A digital certificate also contains a *signature*, created by generating a message digest of the certificate and then encrypting that message digest with a (usually different) private key. The signature is then added to the certificate, and is used to verify that the certificate is authentic. The holder of the (private) key used to sign a certificate (encrypt the message digest) is known as the *issuer*, and identifying information about the issuer is in the Issuer field of the certificate, linking the issuer to the subject's certificate. Similarly, identifying information about the subject is in the Subject field. In most cases, the issuer and the subject are different. When the issuer and subject are the same, the certificate is known as being *self-signed*. A self-signed certificate is also self-validating, as its own public key is used to validate its signature. When a self-signed certificate is used to sign other certificates, it becomes the *Certificate Authority (CA)* for those certificates. The collection of certificates, from the top CA certificate to the last certificate (known as a *leaf certificate*) are collectively called the *certificate chain*.

Certificate authentication is recursive: in order to verify that a certificate is valid you have to decrypt the signature using the public key in the issuer's certificate. Once that signature is validated, if the issuer's certificate is not self signed then the signature validation process continues up the chain until a self-signed (CA) certificate is validated. A certificate is trusted only if its entire chain is valid.

The test procedures in this chapter are organized into two groups: tests that evaluate a certificate's compliance to [SMPTE-430-2] and tests that evaluate the behavior of devices that decode certificates. The Certificate Decoder tests are in this section because they are not specific to any particular type of system. All d-cinema devices that decode certificates must behave in the manner described by these tests.

## 2.1. Certificate Structure

The testing procedures that follow make use of the **OpenSSL** cryptographic tools and library. OpenSSL is a well known, free, and open source software package available for a number of hardware platforms and operating systems.

Much of the information in a digital certificate can be viewed in a human-readable format using OpenSSL's 'text' option. The information presented in the text output can be used to validate a number of certificate requirements, and to validate certificate-related KDM requirements by comparing the values present in the text output to the values in the KDM. The following example illustrates the features of a typical d-cinema leaf certificate:

### Example 2.1. D-Cinema Certificate

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in smpte-430-2-leaf-cert.pem ❶
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2) ❷
    Serial Number: 39142 (0x98e6) ❸
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption ❹
    Issuer: O=.ca.example.com, OU=.ra-1b.ra-1a.s430-2.ca.example.com,
```

```

CN=.cc-admin/dnQualifier=0sdCakNi3z6UPCYnogMFIbPMos= 5
Validity 6
  Not Before: Mar  9 23:29:52 2007 GMT 7
  Not After : Mar  8 23:29:45 2008 GMT 8
Subject: O=.ca.example.com, OU=.cc-admin.ra-1b.ra-1a.s430-2.ca.example.com, 9
        CN=SM.ws-1/dnQualifier=H/i8HyVmKEZSFoTeYI2UV9aBiq4=10
Subject Public Key Info: 11
  Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 12
  RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) 13
  Modulus (2048 bit): 14
    [hexadecimal values omitted for brevity]
  Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) 15
X509v3 extensions: 16
  X509v3 Key Usage: 17
    Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment 18
  X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical 19
    CA:FALSE
  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 20
    1F:F8:BC:1F:25:66:28:46:52:16:84:DE:60:8D:94:57:D6:81:8A:AE
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 21
    keyid:D2:C7:42:6A:43:62:DF:3E:94:3C:26:27:A2:03:05:21:36:CF:32:8B
    DirName:/O=.ca.example.com/OU=.ra-1a.s430-2.ca.example.com/
        CN=.ra-1b/dnQualifier=3NMh+Nx9WhnbDcXKK1puOjX41sY=
    serial:56:CE

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 22
  [hexadecimal values omitted for brevity]

```

## Certificate descriptions

- 1 Openssl command line and arguments to view the certificate text.
- 2 The x509 version of the certificate.
- 3 The serial number of the certificate.
- 4 The algorithm that was used to sign the certificate.
- 5 Information about the Issuer of the certificate.
- 6 The validity section of the certificate.
- 7 The date the certificate validity period begins.
- 8 The date the certificate validity period ends.
- 9 The Subject Name of the certificate.
- 10 Information about the Subject of the certificate.
- 11 Information about the Subject's public key.
- 12 The algorithm used to create the public key.
- 13 Information about the RSA public key.
- 14 The modulus value, which is a component of the public key.
- 15 The exponent value, which is a component of the public key.
- 16 x509 Version 3 Extensions. These extensions provide more information about the private key, the purposes for which it can be used, and how it is identified.
- 17 Key Usage. These are the actions that the private key can perform.
- 18 The enumerated list of actions that the private key can perform.
- 19 x509 Basic Constraints. These declare whether or not the certificate is a CA certificate, and whether or not there is a path length limitation. Basic Constraints must be marked Critical.
- 20 The Subject Key Identifier identifies the public key in the certificate.
- 21 The Authority Key Identifier identifies the Issuer key used to sign the certificate.
- 22 The Signature Algorithm used to sign the certificate.

## 2.1.1. Basic Certificate Structure

### Objective

Verify that the certificate uses the ITU X.509, Version 3 standard with ASN.1 DER encoding as described in [ITU-X509]. Also verify that the `Issuer` and `Subject` fields are present inside the signed part of the certificate.

### Procedures

The certificate format and encoding can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -inform PEM -in <certificate>
```

A correctly formatted and encoded certificate will be displayed as text output by `openssl`. An incorrectly formed certificate will cause `openssl` to display an error. A certificate that causes an error to be displayed by the `openssl` command is incorrectly formed and shall be cause to fail this test.

The version of the certificate and the presence of the `Issuer` and `Subject` fields in the signed portion of the certificate can be verified by viewing `openssl`'s text output of the certificate. The version number is indicated by **2** in the example certificate, and the issuer and subject fields are indicated by numbers **5** and **10**, respectively. An x509 version number other than 3, or the absence of either the `Subject` field or the `Issuer` field shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[ITU-X509]	
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.2. SignatureAlgorithm Fields

### Objective

Verify that the `SignatureAlgorithm` of the signature and the `SignatureAlgorithm` in the signed portion of the certificate both contain the value "sha256WithRSAEncryption".

### Procedures

The signature algorithms of the signature and of the certificate can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate text as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The signature algorithm of the certificate is indicated by **4** in the example certificate, and the signature algorithm of the signature is indicated by number **22** of the example certificate.

Verify that these fields both contain the value "sha256WithRSAEncryption". If either field contains a different value, this shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl



### 2.1.3. SignatureValue Field

#### Objective

Verify that the `SignatureValue` field is present outside the signed part of the certificate and contains an ASN.1 Bit String that contains a PKCS #1 SHA256WithRSA signature block.

#### Procedures

The certificate signature value can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

A correct certificate signature will be displayed as colon separated hexadecimal values in the text output by `openssl`. The signature block, omitted from the example certificate, will be present below the signature algorithm at the bottom of the output below callout number 22 of the example certificate. An incorrect certificate signature will cause `openssl` to display an error. A certificate that causes `openssl` to generate errors is cause to fail this test. A signature value other than `sha256WithRSAEncryption` is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.4. SerialNumber Field

### Objective

Verify that the `Serial Number` field is present inside the signed part of the certificate and that it contains a non-negative integer that is no longer than 64 bits (8 bytes).

### Procedures

The certificate serial number can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The serial number field is indicated by **3** in the example certificate. Confirm that the serial number is a non-negative integer that is no longer than 64 bits (8 bytes), and that the parenthetical phrase "neg" is not present. A negative serial number or a number larger than 64 bits shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.5. SubjectPublicKeyInfo Field

### Objective

Verify that the `Subject Public Key Info` field is present inside the signed part of the certificate and that it describes an RSA public key with a modulus length of 2048 bits and a public exponent of 65537.

### Procedures

The subject public key info can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The Subject Public Key Info is indicated by **11** in the example certificate. The modulus length and the public exponent are indicated by **14** and **15**, respectively.

Verify that the Public Key Algorithm type is `rsaEncryption` and RSA Public Key is (2048 bit). Failure to meet both requirements is cause to fail this test.

Verify that the Modulus is (2048 bit) and that Exponent is 65537 (0x10001). Any other value for the modulus length or the exponent shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

### **2.1.6. Deleted Section**

The section "RSA Key Format" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 2.1.7. Validity Field

### Objective

Verify that the `Validity` field is present inside the signed part of the certificate and contains timestamps in UTC. Timestamps with years up to and including 2049 must use two digits (`UTCTime`) to represent the year. Timestamps with the year 2050 or later must use four digits (`GeneralizedTime`) to represent the year.

### Procedures

The presence of the validity field can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate text as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The validity field is indicated by callout 6 in the example certificate. Confirm that the field is present and that it contains a "Not Before" value as a UTC timestamp as indicated by 7 of the example certificate and a "Not After" value as a UTC timestamp as indicated by 8 of the example certificate. If the validity field is not present, this shall be cause to fail this test.

Verifying the format of the timestamps as either `UTCTime` or `GeneralizedTime` can be accomplished by viewing the ASN.1 sequences of the certificate with OpenSSL. Additionally, by using the `grep` command to specify a text string to display, in this case, "TIME", the time formats can be quickly identified:

```
$ openssl asn1parse -in <certificate> |grep TIME
154:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME          :070312145212Z
169:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME          :270307145212Z
```

Confirm that timestamps up to the year 2049 are in `UTCTime` format, and that timestamps starting with the year 2050 are in `GeneralizedTime` format. Timestamps in `UTCTime` format will be formatted as "YYMMDDhhmmssZ", and Timestamps in `GeneralizedTime` format will have the year coded as "YYYYMMDDhhmmssZ", where "Y" represents the year, "M" represents the month, "D" represents the day, and "h", "m", "s", and "Z" represent hours, minutes, seconds, and the Universal Coordinated Time zone. A timestamp prior to 2049 that is not in UTC format shall be cause to fail this test. A timestamp starting in 2050 or later that is not in `GeneralizedTime` format shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.8. AuthorityKeyIdentifier Field

### Objective

Verify that the Authority Key Identifier field is present in the X509v3 Extensions section inside the signed part of the certificate.

### Procedures

The presence of the Authority Key Identifier field can be verified by using the **openssl** command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The Authority Key Identifier of the certificate is indicated by **21** in the example certificate. Confirm that this field exists. The absence of the Authority Key Identifier field shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

NOT CURRENT  
 AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

## 2.1.9. KeyUsage Field

### Objective

Verify that the `Key Usage` field is present in the `x509v3 Extensions` section inside the signed part of the certificate.

For signer certificates, verify that only the "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`) flag is true, the "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`) flag may optionally be present.

For the SM role leaf certificate of a dual certificated MB, verify that the "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`), "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`), and the "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`) flags are false or not present and that the "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`) flag is true.

For the LS role leaf certificate of a dual certificated MB, verify that the "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`), "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`), and the "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`) flags are false or not present, and that the "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`) flag is true.

For all leaf certificates not part of a dual certificated MB, verify that the "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`) and "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`) flags are false or not present, and that the "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`), and "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`) flags are true.

### Procedures

The presence of the `Key Usage` field can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The `Key Usage` field in the certificate is indicated by **17** in the example certificate.

For all certificates, confirm that this field exists. Absence of the `Key Usage` field shall be cause to fail this test.

For signing certificates, confirm that the key usage listed in the usage list (indicated by **18**) has only "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`), the optional "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`) flag may be present. Absence of the "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`) flag, or presence of any other flag except for "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`), shall be cause to fail this test.

For the SM role leaf certificate of a dual certificated MB, confirm that the key usage lists "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`), and that "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`) is absent. Absence of "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`), or presence of "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`), shall be cause to fail this test. Presence of "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`) or "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`) shall be cause to fail this test.

For the LS role leaf certificate of a dual certificated MB, confirm that the key usage lists "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`), and that the "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`) is absent. Absence of "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`), or presence of "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`), shall be cause to fail this test. Presence of "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`) or "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`) shall be cause to fail this test.

For all leaf certificates not part of a dual certificated MB, confirm that the key usage lists "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`) and "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`). Absence of "Digital Signature" (`digitalSignature`) and "Key Encipherment" (`keyEncipherment`) shall be cause to fail this test. Presence of "Certificate Sign" (`keyCertSign`) or "CRL Sign" (`cRLSign`) shall be cause to fail this test.

Note that leaf certificates may have other key usages specified, and the presence of other usages not specifically referenced here shall not be a reason to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.5.1.1, 9.5.1.2, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

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## 2.1.10. Basic Constraints Field

### Objective

Verify that the `Basic Constraints` field is present in the `X509v3 Extensions` section of the signed portion of the certificate. For signer certificates, verify that the certificate authority attribute is true (`CA:TRUE`) and the `PathLenConstraint` value is present and either zero or positive. For leaf certificates, verify that the certificate authority attribute is false (`CA:FALSE`) and the `PathLenConstraint` is absent or zero.

### Procedures

The presence of the `Basic Constraints` field can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The `Basic Constraints` field in the certificate is indicated by **19** in the example certificate. For signing certificates, confirm that this field exists, that the certificate authority value is true (`CA:TRUE`), and that the path length is present and is a positive integer. For leaf certificates, confirm that the certificate authority value is false (`CA:FALSE`) and that the path length is absent or zero. The absence of the `Basic Constraints` field shall be cause to fail this test. For signer certificates, the absence of the `CA:TRUE` value, or a negative or missing `Path Length` value shall be cause to fail this test. For leaf certificates, the presence of the `CA:TRUE` value or the presence of a path length greater than zero shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.11. Public Key Thumbprint

### Objective

Verify that there is exactly one `DnQualifier` present in the `Subject` field and that the `DnQualifier` value is the Base64 encoded thumbprint of the subject public key in the certificate. Also verify that there is exactly one `DnQualifier` present in the `Issuer` field and that the `DnQualifier` value is the Base64 encoded thumbprint of the issuer's public key.

### Procedures

The presence of a single instance of the `DnQualifier` field can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The `Subject DnQualifier` in the certificate is in the `Subject` information as indicated by **10** in the example certificate, and the `Issuer DnQualifier` in the certificate is in the `Issuer` information as indicated by **5**. Confirm that each of these fields contain only one `DnQualifier`. Missing `DnQualifier` values in either of these fields or the presence of more than one `DnQualifier` in either field shall be cause to fail this test.

The public key `DnQualifier` must be recalculated to confirm that the `DnQualifier` value in each of these fields is correct. The following steps perform this calculation:

1. Extract the public key from the certificate (using `OpenSSL`)
2. Convert the public key from Base64 to binary (using `OpenSSL`)
3. Skip 24 bytes into the binary form of the public key (using `dd`)
4. Calculate the SHA-1 digest over the remaining portion of the binary form of the public key (using `OpenSSL`)
5. Convert the SHA-1 digest value to Base64 (using `OpenSSL`)

The steps above can be performed in sequence by redirecting the output from one step to the next, and using `openssl` and the `dd` command present on most posix compliant operating systems, such as:

```
$ openssl x509 -pubkey -noout -in <certificate> | openssl base64 -d \
| dd bs=1 skip=24 2>/dev/null | openssl sha1 -binary | openssl base64
```

The resulting value is the calculated `DnQualifier` of the public key in the input certificate. Confirm that when this calculation is performed on the public key in the subject certificate, the calculated value is equal to the `DnQualifier` present in the `Subject` field. Confirm that when this calculation is performed on the public key in the issuer certificate, the calculated value is equal to the `DnQualifier` present in the `Issuer` field of the subject certificate. A `DnQualifier` that does not match the calculated value of the corresponding certificate's public key shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

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## 2.1.12. Organization Name Field

### Objective

Verify that exactly one instance of the OrganizationName field is present in the Issuer and Subject fields. Verify that the two OrganizationName values are identical.

### Procedures

The presence of the OrganizationName in the Subject and Issuer fields can be verified by using the **openssl** command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The OrganizationName values are in the Subject and Issuer fields in the certificate as indicated by **5** and **10** in the example certificate. Confirm that the Organization name, the value specified as "O=<organization-name>", is the same in both fields. Non-identical Organizational name values in the Subject and Issuer fields shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.13. OrganizationUnitName Field

### Objective

Verify that exactly one instance of the `OrganizationUnitName` (OU) value is present in the `Issuer` and `Subject` fields.

### Procedures

The presence of the `OrganizationUnitName` in the `Subject` and `Issuer` fields can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The `OrganizationUnitName` values are in the `Subject` and `Issuer` fields in the certificate as indicated by **5** and **10** in the example certificate. The absence of an `OrganizationUnitName` in either the `Subject` or `Issuer` fields of the certificate shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.14. Entity Name and Roles Field

### Objective

Verify that the `CommonName` (CN) is present exactly once in both the `Subject` and `Issuer` fields. Also verify that the `CommonName` fields contain a physical identification of the entity (i.e., make, model, or serial number, for devices). For leaf certificates (i.e., certificate authority is set to `False`), verify that at least one role is specified and that it is the role expected for the certificate.

### Procedures

The presence of the `CommonName` in the `Subject` and `Issuer` fields can be verified by using the `openssl` command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

The `CommonName` values are in the `Subject` and `Issuer` fields in the certificate as indicated by **5** and **10** in the example certificate. Confirm that the `CommonName`, the value specified as "CN=<common-name>" is present only once and that it contains information that identifies the entity. For leaf certificates, confirm that the common name specifies at least one role and that it is correct for the certificate. The absence of the `CommonName` value in either the `Subject` or `Issuer` fields shall be cause to fail this test. For leaf certificates, the absence of a role designation shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.15. Unrecognized Extensions

### Objective

Verify that any X.509v3 extensions in the certificate that are not specified in [SMPTE-430-2] (unrecognized extensions) are not marked critical.

### Procedures

The list of X.509v3 extensions in a certificate can be viewed by using the **openssl** command to display the certificate information as described in Example 2.1, e.g.:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate>
```

For signer certificates (certificates that have CA:TRUE), of the X.509v3 extensions listed in the certificate, "Basic Constraints" (indicated by **19**) must be marked critical. "Basic Constraints" may be marked critical for leaf certificates. "Key Usage" and "Authority Key Identifier" (indicated by **17**) may be marked critical. No other unrecognized X.509v3 extensions may be marked critical. A signer certificate with a "Basic Constraints" section that is not marked critical shall be cause to fail this test. A Certificate that has any X.509v3 extension marked critical other than "Basic Constraints", "Key Usage" or "Authority Key Identifier" shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Test Equipment
openssl

## 2.1.16. Signature Validation

### Objective

Using the issuer's public key, verify that the signature contained in the certificate is valid.

### Procedures

For this operation to be successful, validation must be performed down the certificate chain, from the self-signed root certificate (the CA) to the leaf certificate being validated. Certificate chain validation is recursive, so as each certificate in the chain is validated it is included as part of the validation of the next certificate. With OpenSSL, this results in a file that contains the root certificate and, incrementally, each of the signer certificates of certificate chain of the leaf certificate. This file is then used to validate the signature on the leaf certificate. A certificate chain containing three certificates can be validated by following these steps:

1. Verify that the CA certificate signature is valid
2. Verify that the CA's signature on the signer's certificate is valid.
3. Verify that the signer's signature on the leaf certificate is valid.

This example uses **openssl** to validate each certificate, and the unix command **'cat'** to append each successive certificate to a single file. This file is specified to **openssl** using the **-CAfile** option.

```
$ openssl verify -CAfile caroot.pem caroot.pem
caroot.pem: OK
$ cp caroot.pem certchain.pem
$ openssl verify -CAfile certchain.pem signer.pem
signer.pem: OK
$ cat signer.pem >> certchain.pem
$ openssl verify -CAfile certchain.pem leaf.pem
leaf.pem: OK
```

Error messages from OpenSSL indicate that a certificate in the chain did not validate, and that the chain is not valid. Error messages that indicate that the certificate chain is not valid shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl



## 2.1.17. Certificate Chains

### Objective

For a given certificate chain:

- Verify that the certificate chain is complete, i.e., for each certificate specified in an `Issuer` field, there is a corresponding certificate whose `Subject` field matches that `Issuer` field.
- Verify that, for each certificate in the chain, the validity period of any child certificate is completely contained within the validity period of the parent certificate.
- Verify that the root certificate (i.e., a self-signed certificate where the `CA-flag` is true) is a valid root certificate.

### Procedures

A complete certificate chain starts with a leaf certificate and ends with a self-signed (CA root) certificate. Between the leaf certificate and the CA root certificate there should be one or more signer certificates. A leaf certificate is signed by a signer certificate, and the signer certificate is identified by its `DnQualifier` in the "Issuer" field of the leaf certificate. In a chain of three certificates, the signer certificate is in turn signed by the CA root certificate, which is similarly identified by its `DnQualifier` in the `Issuer` field of the signer's certificate. The CA root certificate is self-signed and has its own `DnQualifier` in both the `Subject` and `Issuer` fields.

To verify that the certificate chain is complete, confirm that the certificates corresponding to the `Issuer DnQualifiers` of each of the certificates is present, as explained in Section 2.1.11: `Public Key Thumbprint`. A certificate chain that does not contain all of the certificates matching the `DnQualifiers` specified in the `Issuer` fields of the certificates means the chain is not complete and shall be cause to fail this test.

The validity period of a certificate can be viewed using the procedure described in Section 2.1.7: `Validity Field`. Confirm that for each certificate in the chain, the signer certificate's validity period completely contains the validity period of the signed certificate. A certificate that has a validity period that extends beyond the validity period of its signer (either starting before, or ending after, the validity period of its signer) shall be cause to fail this test.

To confirm that the CA root certificate is a valid root certificate:

1. Verify that the `DnQualifier` in the `Issuer` field is the same as the `DnQualifier` in the `Subject` field as described in Section 2.1.11: `Public Key Thumbprint`.
2. Confirm that the `Certificate Authority` value in the `Basic Constraints` field is true and the `path length` value is a number, zero or greater, as described in Section 2.1.10: `Basic Constraints Field`.
3. Confirm that the `X.509v3 Key Usage` contains "Certificate Sign" as described in Section 2.1.9: `KeyUsage Field`.

A CA certificate that does not have a non-negative `path length` of zero or greater, or that does not have the basic constraints extension marked critical and containing `CA:TRUE`, shall be cause to fail this test.

A CA Root certificate that is not self-signed shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
openssl

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## 2.2. Certificate Decoder Behavior

### 2.2.1. ASN.1 DER Encoding Check

#### Objective

Verify that a certificate is rejected by the decoding device if it contains syntax errors or does not conform to the ASN.1 DER (Distinguished Encoding Rules) format.

#### Procedures

For the malformed certificate below, perform an operation with the device under test using a malformed certificate. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a malformed certificate is cause to fail this test.

1. A certificate encoded as BER (*chain-c3-BER-enc*, *IMB-chain-a3-BER-enc*)

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Material
chain-c3-BER-enc
chain-c1-root
chain-c3-root
IMB-chain-a3-BER-enc
chain-a3-root
chain-b1-root

## 2.2.2. Missing Required Fields

### Objective

Verify that certificates with missing required fields are rejected by a device under test.

### Procedures

For each of the malformations below, perform an operation on the device with the certificate that contains that malformation. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a malformed certificate is cause to fail this test.

- missing SignatureAlgorithm field (i.e, *chain-c3-no-saf*, *chain-a3-no-saf*) - reject
- missing SignatureValue field (*chain-c3-no-svf*, *chain-a3-no-svf*) - reject
- missing Version field (*chain-c3-no-ver*, *chain-a3-no-ver*) - reject
- missing SerialNumber field (*chain-c3-no-sn*, *chain-a3-no-sn*) - reject
- missing Signature field (*chain-c3-no-sig*, *chain-a3-no-sig*) - reject
- missing Issuer field (*chain-c3-no-issuer*, *chain-a3-no-issuer*) - reject
- missing Subject field (*chain-c3-no-subject*, *chain-a3-no-subject*) - reject
- missing SubjectPublicKeyInfo field (*chain-c3-no-spki*, *chain-a3-no-spki*) - reject
- missing Validity field (*chain-c3-no-val-f*, *chain-a3-no-val-f*) - reject
- missing AuthorityKeyIdentifier field (*chain-c3-no-aki-f*, *chain-a3-no-aki-f*) - reject
- missing KeyUsage field (*chain-c3-no-keyuse*, *chain-a3-no-keyuse*) - reject
- missing BasicConstraint field (*chain-c3-no-basic*, *chain-a3-no-basic*) - reject

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Test Material
chain-c3-no-saf chain-c3-no-svf chain-c3-no-ver chain-c3-no-sn chain-c3-no-sig chain-c3-no-issuer chain-c3-no-subject

Test Material
chain-c3-no-spki
chain-c3-no-val-f
chain-c3-no-aki-f
chain-c3-no-keyuse
chain-c3-no-basic
chain-c1-root
chain-c3-root
chain-a3-no-aki-f
chain-a3-no-basic
chain-a3-no-issuer
chain-a3-no-keyuse
chain-a3-no-saf
chain-a3-no-sig
chain-a3-no-sn
chain-a3-no-spki
chain-a3-no-subject
chain-a3-no-svf
chain-a3-no-val-f
chain-a3-no-ver

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## 2.2.3. PathLen Check

### Objective

Verify that, if the Certificate Authority attribute of the `BasicConstraint` field is `True`, the `PathLenConstraint` value is present and is either zero or positive. Verify that if the certificate authority attribute of the `BasicConstraint` field is `False`, the `PathLenConstraint` field is absent or set to zero.

### Procedures

1. Perform an operation on the device under test using a leaf certificate with a `PathLen` greater than zero (0). Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate with an incorrect Path Length is cause to fail this test.
2. Perform an operation on the device under test using a leaf certificate with a `PathLen` that is negative. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate with an incorrect Path Length is cause to fail this test.
3. Perform an operation on the device under test using a signer certificate that does not contain a `PathLen` (`PathLen` absent). Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate with an incorrect Path Length is cause to fail this test.
4. Perform an operation on the device under test using a signer certificate that contains a `PathLen` that is negative. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate with an incorrect Path Length is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Test Material
chain-c3-path-1
chain-c3-path-2
chain-c3-path-3
chain-c3-path-4
chain-c3-path-5
chain-c3-path-6
chain-c3-path-7
chain-c3-root
chain-a3-path-1
chain-a3-path-2
chain-a3-path-3
chain-a3-path-4
chain-a3-path-5
chain-a3-path-6

Test Material
chain-a3-path-7
chain-a3-root

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## 2.2.4. OrganizationName Match Check

### Objective

Verify that the certificate is rejected by the device if the `OrganizationName` in the subject and issuer fields do not match.

### Procedures

Perform an operation on the device with a certificate that has mismatched `OrganizationName` values in the Subject and Issuer fields. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a malformed certificate is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Material
chain-c3-org-name
chain-c3-root
chain-a3-org-name
chain-a3-root

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## 2.2.5. Certificate Role Check

### Objective

Verify that when the validation context includes a desired role, a device under test rejects a leaf certificate with a role that is different than the role expected.

### Procedures

Perform an operation on the device under test using a certificate with a role that is not permitted for the operation. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate with an incorrect role is cause to fail this test.

- Certificate Authority is False and no role specified in CommonName (*chain-c3-role-1*, *chain-a3-role-1*) - reject
- Distribution Root Certificate without a distributor role, remote SPB root Certificate with a role other than SMS role (*chain-c3-role-2*, *chain-a3-role-2*) - reject

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Test Material
chain-c3-role-1
chain-c3-role-2
chain-c3-root
chain-a3-role-1
chain-a3-role-2
chain-a3-root

## 2.2.6. Validity Date Check

### Objective

Verify that the certificate is rejected if it is not valid at the desired time (according to the validation context, e.g., time of playback).

### Procedures

Perform an operation on the device with a certificate that is not valid. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate at a time outside of its validity period is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-2]	9.5.1, 9.8

Test Material
chain-c3-date-exp chain-c3-root chain-a3-date-exp chain-a3-root

## 2.2.7. Signature Algorithm Check

### Objective

Verify that a certificate is rejected by a device under test if the signature algorithms in the certificate body and the signature are not sha256WithRSAEncryption.

### Procedures

Perform an operation on the device with a certificate that has mismatched or incorrect signatures for each of the following types of signature errors. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using an incorrectly signed certificate is cause to fail this test.

- Signature algorithm of the signature not sha256WithRSAEncryption (*chain-c3-osig-type, chain-a3-iosig-type*) - reject
- Signature algorithm of the certificate not sha256WithRSAEncryption (*chain-c3-isig-type, chain-a3-isig-type*) - reject
- Signature algorithms identical, but not sha256WithRSAEncryption (*chain-c3-iosig-type, chain-a3-osig-type*) - reject

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Material
chain-c3-osig-type
chain-c3-isig-type
chain-c3-iosig-type
chain-c3-root
chain-a3-iosig-type
chain-a3-isig-type
chain-a3-osig-type
chain-a3-root

## 2.2.8. Public Key Type Check

### Objective

Verify that the certificate is rejected if the subject's Public Key is not a 2048 bit RSA key with an exponent of 65537.

### Procedures

For each of the types of incorrect public keys below, perform an operation on the device with the certificate that has an public key that is not correct. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate with an incorrect public key is cause to fail this test.

- Public Key not an RSA Key (*chain-c3-no-rsa, chain-a3-no-rsa*) - reject
- RSA Public Key Length only 1024 bit (*chain-c3-short-rsa, chain-a3-short-rsa*) - reject
- Public Key Exponent other than 65537 (*chain-c3-bad-exp, chain-a3-bad-exp*) - reject

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Material
chain-c3-no-rsa
chain-c3-short-rsa
chain-c3-bad-exp
chain-c3-root
chain-a3-no-rsa
chain-a3-bad-exp
chain-a3-short-rsa
chain-a3-root

## 2.2.9. Issuer Certificate Presence Check

### Objective

Verify that the certificate is rejected if the issuer's certificate cannot be located by looking it up using the value of the `AuthorityKeyIdentifier` X.509v3 extension.

### Procedures

Perform an operation on the device under test using certificates that do not include the certificate's signer specified by the `AuthorityKeyIdentifier`. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation using a certificate without the certificate signer present is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.8
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Material
KDM without AuthorityKey certificate

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# Chapter 3. Key Delivery Messages

This chapter contains tests for Key Delivery Messages (KDM). The test procedures in this chapter are organized into three groups: tests that evaluate a KDM's compliance to [SMPTE-430-1], tests that evaluate a KDM's compliance to [SMPTE-430-3], and tests that evaluate the behavior of devices that decode KDMs. The KDM Decoder tests are in this section because they are not specific to any particular type of system. All d-cinema devices that decode KDMs must behave in the manner described by these tests.

Before diving in to testing KDM files, we will first introduce XML and provide some examples of KDM documents.

## 3.1. eXtensible Markup Language

XML is a file metaformat: a file format for creating file formats. Many of the files that comprise a d-cinema composition (e.g., a feature or trailer), are expressed in XML. While the various d-cinema file formats represent different concepts within the d-cinema system, the arrangement of data within the files is syntactically similar for those files that use XML. This section will provide an overview of XML as used for d-cinema applications. Readers looking for more detailed technical information are referred to the home of XML at <http://www.w3.org>.

### 3.1.1. XML Documents

The main unit of data storage in an XML document is the XML *element*. XML elements are expressed in a document using *tags*; strings of human-readable text enclosed between less-than (<) and greater-than (>) characters. An XML *document* is an element that is meant to be interpreted as a complete unit. Every XML document consists of a single XML element having zero or more (usually hundreds more) elements inside. XML documents may be stored as files, transmitted over networks, etc. The following example shows a very simple XML element, rendered as a single tag:

```
<Comment />
```

By itself, this XML element is a complete, though very uninteresting XML document.

To be more useful, our example element needs some data, or *content*. XML content may include unstructured text or additional XML elements. Here we have expanded the element to contain some text:

```
<Comment>The quick brown fox...</Comment>
```

Notice that when an XML element has content, the content is surrounded by two tags, in this case <Comment> and </Comment>. The former is an *opening* tag, the latter a *closing* tag.

We now have some data inside our element. We could help the reader of our example XML document by indicating the language that the text represents (these same characters could of course form words from other languages). The language of the text is *metadata*: in this case, data about the text. In XML, metadata is stored as sets of key/value pairs, or *attributes*, inside the opening tags. We will add an attribute to our example element to show some metadata, in this case we are telling the reader that the text is in English:

```
<Comment language="en">The quick brown fox...</Comment>
```

The following example shows an actual d-cinema data structure (there is no need to understand the contents of this example as this particular structure is covered in more detail in Section 4.2.1.):

#### Example 3.1. Packing List Example (Partial)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?>  
<PackingList xmlns="http://www.smp-te-ra.org/schemas/429-8/2007/PKL">
```

```

<Id>urn:uuid:59430cd7-882d-48e8-a026-aef4b6253dfc</Id>
<AnnotationText>Perfect Movie DCP</AnnotationText>
<IssueDate>2007-07-25T18:21:31-00:00</IssueDate>
<Issuer>user@host</Issuer>
<Creator>Packaging Tools v1.0</Creator>
<AssetList>
  <Asset>
    <Id>urn:uuid:24d73510-3481-4ae5-b8a5-30d9eeced9c1</Id>
    <Hash>AXufMKY7NyZcfSXQ9sCZ1s5dSyE=</Hash>
    <Size>32239753</Size>
    <Type>application/mxf</Type>
    <AnnotationText>includes M&E</AnnotationText>
  </Asset>
</AssetList>
</PackingList>

```

### 3.1.2. XML Schema

You may have noticed that the basic structure of XML allows the expression of almost unlimited types and formats of information. Before a device (or a person) can read an XML document and decide whether it is semantically correct, it must be possible for the reader to know what the document is expected to contain.

The XML standard dictates some initial requirements for XML documents. The document shown in Example 3.1 above illustrates some of these requirements:

1. Element tags must be correctly nested: an element must be closed in the same scope in which it was opened. For example, the following XML fragment shows incorrect nesting of the Element3 element (it should close before Element2 closes, not after).

```

<Element1>
  <Element2>
    <Element3>
  </Element2>
</Element3>
</Element1>

```

2. The document may not contain special characters in unexpected places. For example, the &, < and > characters may not appear except in certain cases. Special encodings must be used to use these characters literally within an XML document.

A document which meets these requirements is said to be *well formed*. All XML documents must be well formed. An XML parser (a program that reads XML syntax) will complain if you give it XML that is not well-formed. Well-formedness, however, does not help us understand *semantically* what's in an XML document. To know the meaning of a particular XML structure, we have to have a description of that structure.

The structure and permitted values in an XML document can be defined using XML Schema. There are other languages for expressing the content model of an XML document, but XML Schema is the standard used by the SMPTE specifications for d-cinema. XML Schema is a language, expressed in XML, which allows the user to define the names of the elements and attributes that can appear in an XML document. An XML Schema can also describe the acceptable contents of and combinations of the XML elements.

Given an XML Schema and an XML document, a *validating* XML parser will report not only errors in syntax but also errors in the use and contents of the elements defined by the schema. Throughout this document, we will use the **schema-check** program (see Section C.3) to test XML documents. The command takes the instance document and one or more schema documents as arguments:

```
$ schema-check <input-file> smpte-430-3.xsd
```



If this command returns without errors, the XML document can be said to be both well-formed and *valid*.

Some XML documents are defined using more than one schema. In these cases, you can supply the names of any number of schemas on the command line:

```
$ schema-check <input-file> smpte-430-3.xsd smpte-430-1.xsd
```

### 3.1.3. XML Signature Validation

*XML Signature* is a standard for creating and verifying digital signatures on XML documents. Digital signatures are used to allow recipients of Composition Playlists, Packing Lists and Key Delivery Messages (KDM) to *authenticate* the documents; to prove that the documents were signed by the party identified in the document as the document's signer, and that the documents have not been modified or damaged since being signed.

The **checksig** program (distributed with the XML Security library) can be used to test the signature on an XML document. The program is executed with the name of a file containing a signed XML document:

#### Example 3.2. checksig execution

```
$ checksig test-kdm.xml
Signature verified OK!
```

The program expects that the first certificate in the `<KeyInfo>` element is the signer. This has two implications:

1. The program will fail if the signer is not the first (SMPTE standards allow any order)
2. The program does not check the entire certificate chain

To address the first issue, the **dsig-cert.py** program (see Section C.8) can be used to re-write the XML document with the signer's certificate first in the `<KeyInfo>` element. This is demonstrated in the following example:

#### Example 3.3. dsig-cert.py execution

```
$ dsig-cert.py test-kdm.xml >tmp.xml
$ checksig tmp.xml
Signature verified OK!
```

The second issue is addressed by extracting the certificates from the document's XML Signature data and validating them directly with **openssl**. This procedure is the subject of the next section.

#### 3.1.3.1. Extracting Certificates from an XML Document

In order to test certificates separately from the XML document in which they are embedded, this procedure will manually extract them into separate PEM files (see [RFC-1421]). A PEM file contains a certificate (more than one if desired, but we're not going to do that just yet) as a DER-encoded binary string which is then encoded using Printable Encoding (see [RFC-1421]). The encoded text is prefixed by the string `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` followed by a newline. The encoded text is followed by the string `-----END CERTIFICATE-----`. An example of this format can be seen below. Note that the Printable Encoding has newlines after every 64 characters.

#### Example 3.4. An X.509 certificate in PEM format

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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 jBRp4eSiAt8srACcEmUyqGHwPLoaKVEaHXSOY8gJp1kZwqGwoR40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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```

Within an XML document signed using XML Signature, certificates are stored in `<dsig:X509Certificate>` elements. These elements can be found at the end of the document, within the `</dsig:Signature>` element. The encoding method for storing certificate data in XML Signature is virtually identical to PEM. The Base64 encoding (see [RFC-2045]) uses the same mapping of binary data to text characters, but the line length is not limited as with PEM.

It is a relatively easy task to use a text editor to copy and paste certificate data from an XML document:

1. Open a new text editor window, and paste `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----`, then press the Enter key. Note that the number of '-' (dash) characters on either side of the `BEGIN CERTIFICATE` label is five (5).
2. Copy the content of the selected `<dsig:X509Certificate>` element (but not the element tags) from the KDM and paste it into the new editor window. The cursor should now be positioned at the last character of the certificate; press the Enter key.
3. Paste `-----END CERTIFICATE-----` at the end of the new editor window and press the Enter key.
4. Note again that Printable Encoding lines in PEM format files must be no more than 64 characters in length. If the Base64 certificate string copied from the KDM contains long lines, manually break the lines using the cursor and the Enter key.
5. Save the editor's contents to a file, usually with a `.pem` suffix.

In most cases the procedure given above can be automated using the `dsig-extract.py` program (see Section C.9). As shown below, the `-p` option can be used to provide a prefix for the automatically-generated filenames. In this example, the input document contained four certificates.

### Example 3.5. dsig-extract.py execution

```

$ dsig-extract.py -p my_prefix_ test-kdm.xml
$ ls my_prefix_*
my_prefix_1.pem
my_prefix_2.pem
my_prefix_3.pem

```

```
my_prefix_4.pem
```

You can test that the certificate has been correctly extracted by using **openssl** to view the contents of the certificate file:

```
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in <certificate-file.pem>
```

The output from this command should look similar to Example 2.1: D-Cinema Certificate.

To validate a complete chain of extracted certificates, use the procedure in Section 2.1.16.

## 3.2. Key Delivery Message Example

The Key Delivery Message (KDM) is an XML document that contains cryptographic information necessary to reproduce an encrypted composition. A KDM also contains metadata about the cryptographic information, such as the validity period and the associated Composition Playlist (CPL). The format of the KDM file is specified by [SMPTE-430-1]. A KDM is a type of Extra-Theater Message (ETM), as specified by [SMPTE-430-3].

The following examples show the elements of the KDM that will be examined during the procedures. Each example is followed by a list of descriptive text that describes the various features of the KDM called out in the examples. These features will be referred to from the test procedures.

### Example 3.6. KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?> 1
<DCinemaSecurityMessage xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-3/2006/ETM" 2
  xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:enc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
  <AuthenticatedPublic Id="ID_AuthenticatedPublic"> 3
    <MessageId>urn:uuid:b80e668c-a175-4bc7-ae48-d3a19c8fce95</MessageId> 4
    <MessageType>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type</MessageType> 5
    <AnnotationText>Perfect Movie KDM</AnnotationText> 6
    <IssueDate>2007-07-24T17:42:58-00:00</IssueDate> 7
    <Signer> 8
      <dsig:X509IssuerName>dnQualifier=wBz3yptkPxbHI/\+LUUeH5R6rQfI=,CN=.cc-admin-x,
        OU=.cc-ra-la.s430-2.ca.example.com,O=.ca.example.com</dsig:X509IssuerName>
      <dsig:X509SerialNumber>6992</dsig:X509SerialNumber>
    </Signer>
    <RequiredExtensions>
      <KDMRequiredExtensions xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-1/2006/KDM">
        <Recipient> 9
          <X509IssuerSerial>
            <dsig:X509IssuerName>dnQualifier=wBz3yptkPxbHI/\+LUUeH5R6rQfI=,CN=.cc-admin-x,
              OU=.cc-ra-la.s430-2.ca.serverco.com,O=.ca.serverco.com</dsig:X509IssuerName>
            <dsig:X509SerialNumber>8992</dsig:X509SerialNumber> 10
          </X509IssuerSerial>
          <X509SubjectName>dnQualifier=83R40icxCejFRR6Ij6iwdf2faTY=,CN=SM.x_Mastering,
            OU=.cc-ra-la.s430-2.ca.example.com,O=.ca.example.com</X509SubjectName> 11
        </Recipient>
        <CompositionPlaylistId> 12
          urn:uuid:20670ba3-d4c7-4539-ac3e-71e874d4d7d1
        </CompositionPlaylistId>
        <ContentTitleText>Perfect Movie</ContentTitleText> 13
        <ContentKeysNotValidBefore>2007-07-24T17:42:54-00:00</ContentKeysNotValidBefore> 14
        <ContentKeysNotValidAfter>2007-08-23T17:42:54-00:00</ContentKeysNotValidAfter> 15
        <AuthorizedDeviceInfo>
          <DeviceListIdentifier>urn:uuid:d47713b9-cde1-40a9-98fe-22ef172723d0</DeviceListIdentifier>
          <DeviceList> 16
            <CertificateThumbprint>jk4Z8haFhqCGAVbClW65jVSOib4=</CertificateThumbprint> 17
          </DeviceList>
```

```

</AuthorizedDeviceInfo>
<KeyIdList> 18
  <TypedKeyId>
    <KeyType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type">MDIK</KeyType> 19
    <KeyId>urn:uuid:15e929b3-1d86-40eb-875e-d21c916fdd3e</KeyId> 20
  </TypedKeyId>
  <TypedKeyId>
    <KeyType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type">MDAK</KeyType>
    <KeyId>urn:uuid:ca8f7756-8c92-4e84-a8e6-8fab898934f8</KeyId>
  </TypedKeyId>
[remaining key IDs omitted for brevity]
</KeyIdList>
<ForensicMarkFlagList>
  <ForensicMarkFlag> 21
    http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-audio-disable
  </ForensicMarkFlag>
</ForensicMarkFlagList>
</KDMRequiredExtensions>
</RequiredExtensions>
<NonCriticalExtensions/>
</AuthenticatedPublic>

```

### KDM AuthenticatedPublic area descriptions

- 1 XML Declaration. This specifies the version of the XML standard to which the document conforms, and the character encoding of the document.
- 2 The root DCinemaSecurityMessage element. This element contains the XML namespace declaration for a KDM as specified in [SMPTE-430-1].
- 3 The beginning of the AuthenticatedPublic section of the KDM.
- 4 The Unique Universal ID (UUID) of the KDM. This is used to uniquely identify the asset map.
- 5 The type of message, in this case a KDM.
- 6 An annotation text describing the contents or purpose of the KDM.
- 7 The date the KDM was issued.
- 8 The portion of the KDM that holds information about the certificate used to sign the KDM.
- 9 The portion of the KDM that contains information about the recipient (target) certificate.
- 10 The serial number of the recipient certificate.
- 11 The Subject Name information from the recipient certificate.
- 12 The UUID of the CPL used to create the KDM.
- 13 The ContentTitleText from the CPL used to create the KDM.
- 14 The starting validity date of the KDM.
- 15 The ending validity date of the KDM.
- 16 Device list. This list contains the list of certificates thumbprints authorized for use with at least a portion of the KDM.
- 17 A certificate thumbprint in the device list.
- 18 The list of KeyIDs and their associated type.
- 19 The type of key represented by the KeyID.
- 20 The KeyID.
- 21 This flag determines whether forensic marking is enabled or disabled. The ForensicMarkFlagList may contain multiple instances of ForensicMarkFlag.

### Example 3.7. KDM - AuthenticatedPrivate area

```

<AuthenticatedPrivate Id="ID_AuthenticatedPrivate"> 1
  <enc:EncryptedKey xmlns:enc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 2
  <enc:EncryptionMethod
    Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"> 3
  <ds:DigestMethod xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
    Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
  </enc:EncryptionMethod>
  <enc:CipherData>

```

```

<enc:CipherValue> 4
[ 256 Byte long encrypted cipherdata block omitted]
</enc:CipherValue>
</enc:CipherData>
</enc:EncryptedKey><enc:EncryptedKey xmlns:enc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgflp">
<ds:DigestMethod xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
</enc:EncryptionMethod>
<enc:CipherData>
<enc:CipherValue>
[ 256 Byte long encrypted cipherdata block omitted]
</enc:CipherValue>
</enc:CipherData>
</enc:EncryptedKey>
<enc:EncryptedKey xmlns:enc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgflp">
<ds:DigestMethod xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
</enc:EncryptionMethod>
<enc:CipherData>
<enc:CipherValue>
[ 256 Byte long encrypted cipherdata block omitted]
</enc:CipherValue>
</enc:CipherData>
</enc:EncryptedKey><enc:EncryptedKey xmlns:enc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<enc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgflp">
<ds:DigestMethod xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
</enc:EncryptionMethod>
<enc:CipherData>
<enc:CipherValue>
[ 256 Byte long encrypted cipherdata block omitted]
</enc:CipherValue>
</enc:CipherData>
</enc:EncryptedKey>
[additional EncryptionKey entries omitted]
</AuthenticatedPrivate>

```

### KDM AuthenticatedPrivate area descriptions

- 1 The start of the AuthenticatedPrivate section of the KDM.
- 2 The EncryptedKey element indicates there is data encrypted with an RSA public key algorithm.
- 3 The algorithm used to encrypt the data in the CipherData element.
- 4 A 256 Byte long block of RSA encrypted data.

### Example 3.8. KDM - Signature area

```

<dsig:Signature xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 1
  <dsig:SignedInfo>
    <dsig:CanonicalizationMethod
      Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments"/> 2
    <dsig:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/> 3
    <dsig:Reference URI="#ID_AuthenticatedPublic"> 4
      <dsig:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/> 5
      <dsig:DigestValue>cnn8M41NR4jQF+9GOZiNJTlfl+C/l8lBF1juCuq9lQE=</dsig:DigestValue> 6
    </dsig:Reference>
    <dsig:Reference URI="#ID_AuthenticatedPrivate"> 7
      <dsig:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
      <dsig:DigestValue>TEW7tPwML2iOkIpK2/4rZbJbKggnXjAtJwe9OJSe8u4=</dsig:DigestValue>
    </dsig:Reference>
  </dsig:SignedInfo>
  <dsig:SignatureValue>uH41s9odRPXzFz+BF3dJ/myG09cLSE9cLzf2C7f2Fm49P9C53T5RSeEIyqt6p511 8

```

```

z1H2q3ZJRZcZuV5VA7UkIb4z6U4CGUTU51D81L/anY1glLFddjUiDU/0nmC4uAsH
rzWQgzOTZmZd2eLo0N70DBtNhTcJZftKUN2O2ybHZaJ7Q/aBxAiCK3h/fRW/b7zM
bcbsD9/VfJFI7VQCOLYwTxq643Exj7sYGKISrjuN+MLAubG50hu74YLOtA/dmGB1
G4VeXkBBR/BEjOEoxyfFpXbZwkdoI18/Qd1JF32xpE1PlTLrJoRyjrX/6qkm9OJ
X9GyFNd8jVxdYNI4s1JCnQ==</dsig:SignatureValue>
  <dsig:KeyInfo>❶
<dsig:X509Data>
<dsig:X509IssuerSerial>
<dsig:X509IssuerName>dnQualifier=wBz3yptkPxbHI/\+LUUeH5R6rQfI=,
  CN=.cc-admin-x,OU=.cc-ra-la.s430-2.ca.example.com,O=.ca.example.com</dsig:X509IssuerName>
<dsig:X509SerialNumber>6992</dsig:X509SerialNumber>
</dsig:X509IssuerSerial>
<dsig:X509Certificate> ❷
  [PEM encoded certificate omitted]
</dsig:X509Certificate>
</dsig:X509Data>
<dsig:X509Data>
<dsig:X509IssuerSerial>
<dsig:X509IssuerName>dnQualifier=808W8oYHlf97Y8n0kdAgMU7/jUU=,
  CN=.s430-2,OU=.ca.example.com,O=.ca.example.com</dsig:X509IssuerName>
<dsig:X509SerialNumber>50966</dsig:X509SerialNumber>
</dsig:X509IssuerSerial>
<dsig:X509Certificate>
  [PEM encoded certificate omitted]
</dsig:X509Certificate>
</dsig:X509Data>
<dsig:X509Data>
<dsig:X509IssuerSerial>
<dsig:X509IssuerName>dnQualifier=808W8oYHlf97Y8n0kdAgMU7/jUU=,
  CN=.s430-2,OU=.ca.example.com,O=.ca.example.com</dsig:X509IssuerName>
<dsig:X509SerialNumber>13278513546878383468</dsig:X509SerialNumber>
</dsig:X509IssuerSerial>
<dsig:X509Certificate>
  [PEM encoded certificate omitted]
</dsig:X509Certificate>
</dsig:X509Data>
</dsig:KeyInfo>
</dsig:Signature>
</DCinemaSecurityMessage>

```

### KDM Signature area descriptions

- ❶ Start of the signature section of the KDM.
- ❷ The canonicalization algorithm of the signature.
- ❸ Specifies the signature algorithm (RSA) and the digest algorithm (SHA-256) of the signature.
- ❹ The AuthenticatedPublic reference element.
- ❺ The method used to create the digest of the AuthenticatedPublic portion of the KDM.
- ❻ The digest of the AuthenticatedPublic portion of the KDM.
- ❼ The AuthenticatedPrivate reference element.
- ❽ The RSA encrypted form of the two digests.
- ❾ The section of the signature portion that contains the singer certificate and its certificate chain.
- ❿ The certificate used to sign the KDM.

Since the KDM carries encrypted data, a tool that can decrypt the encrypted portions of the KDM has been provided in Section C.1. **kdm-decrypt** takes two arguments, a KDM and the RSA private key that corresponds to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, and displays the contents of the encrypted section. Here is an example of **kdm-decrypt** and the resulting output:

### Example 3.9. kdm-decrypt Usage and Output

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

```
CipherDataID: f1dc124460169a0e85bc300642f866ab 1  
SignerThumbprint: q50qr6GkfG6W2HzcBTee5m0Qjzw= 2  
  CPL Id: 119d8990-2e55-4114-80a2-e53f3403118d 3  
  Key Id: b6276c4b-b832-4984-aab6-250c9e4f9138 4  
  Key Type: MDIK 5  
  Not Before: 2007-09-20T03:24:53-00:00 6  
  Not After: 2007-10-20T03:24:53-00:00 7  
  Key Data: 7f2f711f1b4d44b83e1dd1bf90dc7d8c 8
```

### kdm-decrypt output descriptions

- 1 The CipherData ID. This value is defined in [SMPTE-430-1].
- 2 Thumbprint of the certificate that signed the KDM.
- 3 The UUID of the CPL associated with this KDM.
- 4 The KeyID that corresponds to the key contained in this EncryptedKey cipherblock.
- 5 The type of key contained in this EncryptedKey cipherblock.
- 6 The beginning of validity period of the key.
- 7 The end of validity period of the key.
- 8 The encryption key.

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 3.3. ETM Features

### 3.3.1. ETM Structure

#### Objective

Verify that the ETM portion of the KDM validates against the ETM schema in [SMPTE-430-3].

#### Procedures

To verify that the ETM defined elements of the KDM are well formed, validate the KDM against the ETM schema in [SMPTE-430-3], use the procedure described in Section 1.4, i.e.,

```
$ schema-check smpte-430-3.xsd <input-file>
schema validation successful
```

If the KDM is not valid or well formed, the program will report an error. A reported error is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Equipment
schema-check
Text Editor



### 3.3.2. ETM Validity Date Check

#### Objective

Verify that the signer's certificate chain was valid at the date specified in the <IssueDate> element in the <AuthenticatedPublic> area of the KDM.

#### Procedures

1. Extract each of the certificates in the signer's certificate chain from the KDM using a text editor, then, using the process described in Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation, validate the certificate chain. Validation failure of the certificate chain is cause to fail this test.
2. Once the certificate chain has been successfully validated, view the signer certificate in text form using the openssl command as described in Example 2.1: D-Cinema Certificate. Locate the Validity section of the certificate as indicated by 6 in the example certificate.
3. Using a text editor, view the contents of the KDM and locate the <IssueDate> element as shown in 7 of Example 3.6: KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area.
4. Compare the Not Before and Not After values of the signer certificate to the date in the <IssueDate> element of the KDM and confirm that it is within the date range. An <IssueDate> value outside the date ranges of the certificate is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8

Test Equipment
Text Editor openssl

### 3.3.3. ETM Signer Element

#### Objective

Verify that the certificate chain in the <Signer> element of the KDM is valid.

#### Procedures

1. Extract each of the certificates in the signer's certificate chain from the KDM using a text editor as described in Section 1.4.
2. Using the process described in Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation, validate the certificate chain. Validation failure of the certificate chain is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor openssl

### 3.3.4. ETM EncryptionMethod Element

#### Objective

Verify that the Algorithm attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> for the encrypted key has the value "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsaoaep-mgf1p".

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the Algorithm attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> element in the <AuthenticatedPrivate> element for each of the encrypted keys, as indicated by **3** in the example KDM, is "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsaoaep-mgf1p". Any other value in this attribute is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.3.5. ETM AnnotationText Language

#### Objective

Verify that the content of the `<AnnotationText>` element is in a human-readable language. If the optional `xml:lang` attribute is present, the language must match. If the `xml:lang` attribute is not present, the language must be English.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the `<AnnotationText>` element as indicated by 6 in the Example 3.6: KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area is a human-readable language. The presence of non-human-readable data or text in a language other than English without that language's corresponding `xml:lang` value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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### 3.3.6. ETM ReferenceList Element

#### Objective

Verify that the <ReferenceList> element of the <EncryptedKey> element is not present.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that, for each instance of the <EncryptedKey> element, the <ReferenceList> element is not present. The presence of the <ReferenceList> element indicates that the KDM is malformed and is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.3.7. ETM SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod Element

#### Objective

Verify that the value of the Algorithm attribute of the <CanonicalizationMethod> element of the <SignedInfo> element in the <Signature> area of the KDM is "http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments".

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the value of the Algorithm attribute of the <CanonicalizationMethod> of the <SignedInfo> element of the <Signature> element is "http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments", as shown in 2 of Example 3.8: KDM - Signature area. Any other value in this attribute is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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### 3.3.8. ETM Signature Reference Elements

#### Objective

Verify that the <SignedInfo> element of the <Signature> area of the KDM contains at least two child <Reference> elements. The value of the URI attribute of each <Reference> element must correspond to the respective ID attribute of the digested element. Verify that the URI attribute of one of the <Reference> element identifies the AuthenticatedPublic portion of the KDM. Verify that the URI attribute of one of the <Reference> element identifies the AuthenticatedPrivate portion of the KDM.

#### Procedures

1. Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <SignedInfo> element of the <Signature> area of the KDM has at least two child <Reference> elements as shown in **4** and **7** of Example 3.8: KDM - Signature area. The presence of fewer than two <Reference> elements is cause to fail this test.
2. Confirm that the URI attribute of one of the <Reference> element matches the value of the ID attribute of the AuthenticatedPublic element, as shown by **4** in Example 3.8: KDM - Signature area and **3** in Example 3.6: KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area. The absence of this association in the KDM is cause to fail this test.
3. Confirm that the URI attribute of one of the <Reference> element matches the value of the ID attribute of the AuthenticatedPrivate element, as shown by **7** in Example 3.8: KDM - Signature area and **1** in Example 3.7: KDM - AuthenticatedPrivate area. The absence of this association in the KDM is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

### 3.3.9. ETM SignatureMethod Element

#### Objective

Verify that the <SignatureMethod> element of the <SignedInfo> element of the <Signature> area of the KDM contains the URI value " http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256".

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <SignatureMethod> element of the <SignedInfo> element of the <Signature> section of the KDM contains the URI value " http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256", as shown in 3 of Example 3.8: KDM - Signature area. Any other value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION



### 3.3.10. ETM Signature Transforms Field

#### Objective

Verify that <Reference> elements of the <SignedInfo> element in the <Signature> section of the KDM do not contain a Transforms attribute.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <Reference> elements of the <SignedInfo> element in the <Signature> section of the KDM do not contain a Transforms attribute. The presence of the Transforms attribute is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

ARCHIVE  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.3.11. ETM Signature DigestMethod Element

#### Objective

Verify that the value of the Algorithm attribute of the <DigestMethod> element of each of the <Reference> elements in the <SignedInfo> element of the <Signature> section of the KDM is " http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256".

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the value of the Algorithm attribute of the <DigestMethod> element of each of the <Reference> elements is " http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256", as shown in **5** of Example 3.8: KDM - Signature area. Any other value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

ARCHIVE  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.3.12. ETM Signature Validity

#### Objective

Verify that the signature is properly formed, i.e., the <Signature> element is properly encoded, all digests are properly formed, the <SignatureMethod> and <CanonicalizationMethod> in the <SignedInfo> element are correct, and the <Reference> values are correct. Verify that the signature is valid.

#### Procedures

Verifying that the signature is well formed (the XML structure is correct) and that the signature is valid (is properly encoded) can be done by verifying the signature XML against the schema using a validating XML parser, then validating the signature.

1. Using the schema validating tool **schema-check**, validate the KDM against the schema found in [SMPTE-430-3] as described in Section 1.4, i.e.,

```
$ schema-check <input-file> smpte-430-3.xsd
schema validation successful
```

If the KDM is not valid or well formed, the program will report an error. A reported error is reason to fail this test.

2. Using the **checksig** program, verify that there is a signature included in the KDM and that it is valid. A missing or invalid signature is cause to fail this test. Note: Depending on the order of the certificates contained in the log report, the **dsig-cert.py** program may need to be used to re-order the certificates for the **checksig** program.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor schema-check checksig dsig_cert.py

## 3.4. KDM Features

### 3.4.1. KDM MessageType Element

#### Objective

Verify that the <MessageType> element of the KDM contains the string "http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type"

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <MessageType> element of the KDM contains the string "http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type" as shown in **5** of Example 3.6: KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area. Any other value in this element is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-1]	9.8

Test Equipment
Text Editor

### 3.4.2. KDM SubjectName Element

#### Objective

Verify that the Subject Name of the recipient X.509 certificate (target certificate) is identical to the value of the <SubjectName> element of the <Recipient> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element in the KDM.

#### Procedures

Comparison of the Subject Name of the certificate against the content of the SubjectName element can be achieved by viewing the text version of the certificate and comparing it to the KDM element to verify they are the same.

1. Using the method described in Example 2.1: D-Cinema Certificate, view the text information of the certificate and identify the X.509 subject name as shown in [9](#).
2. Using a text editor, view the contents of the KDM and identify the <SubjectName> of the <Recipient> element as shown in [11](#).
3. Confirm that the value of the <SubjectName> element is the same as the Subject Name of the certificate. Differing values are cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-2]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor
openssl

### 3.4.3. KDM ContentAuthenticator Element

#### Objective

Verify that, when present, the <ContentAuthenticator> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element of the KDM contains one of the certificate thumbprints of one of the certificates in the chain of the signer of the CPL.

#### Procedures

If the element exists in the KDM:

1. Using *Text Editor*, view value of the <ContentAuthenticator> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element of the KDM. If the element is not present, this test is considered passed and the remaining procedure steps are not performed.
2. Extract the certificates from the CPL signature. Note: This may be accomplished using the **dsig-extract.py** program.
3. Using *dc-thumbprint*, calculate the thumbprint each of the certificates:

```
$ dc-thumbprint <certificate.pem>
```

4. Confirm that the <ContentAuthenticator> value matches one of the thumbprints of the certificate chain of the signer certificate.

Presence of the <ContentAuthenticator> with a value that does not match one of the thumbprints is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-429-7]	
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
dc-thumbprint
Text Editor

### 3.4.4. KDM Signer Certificate Presence

#### Objective

Verify that the certificate that signed the KDM is present in one of the <X509Data> elements of the <KeyInfo> elements in the signature portion of the KDM.

#### Procedures

Testing that the certificate that signed the KDM is present in an <X509Data> element can be achieved by validating the signature. If the validation is successful then the certificate that signed the KDM is present. The signature can be validated using the **dsig\_cert.py** and **checksig** commands:

Example:

```
$ dsig-cert.py <kdm-file.kdm.xml> > tmp.xml
$ checksig tmp.xml
```

A KDM that causes **checksig** to display errors indicates that the signature did not validate and shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor checksig dsig_cert.py

### 3.4.5. KDM KeyIdList/TypedKeyId Field

#### Objective

Verify that <TypedKeyId> element of the <KeyIdList> element in the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element is well formed. Verify that the element contains one of the following values: MDIK, MDAK, MDSK, FMIK, or FMAK.

#### Procedures

To complete this test, validate the KDM against the schema in [SMPTE-430-1], then verify that one of the required values is present in the element.

1. Validate the KDM against the schema in [SMPTE-430-1] using the procedure described in Section 1.4, i.e.,

```
$ schema-check <kdm-file.kdm.xml> smpte-430-1.xsd
schema validation successful
```

If the KDM is not valid or well formed, the program will report an error. A reported error is cause to fail this test.

2. Using a text editor, view the value of the <TypedKeyId> element, and verify that the element contains one of: MDIK, MDAK, MDSK, FMIK, or FMAK, as shown in [19](#) of Example 3.6. Any other value in this element is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor schema-check



### 3.4.6. KDM ForensicMarkFlagList Element

#### Objective

Verify that, if present, the <ForensicMarkFlagList> element contains a list of one or both of the following two URIs:

- <http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-picture-disable>
- <http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-audio-disable>

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm the presence of the <ForensicMarkFlagList> element. The absence of the element is cause to pass this test and the remainder of this procedure can be skipped. If present, the element must contain one or both of the following URI values:

- <http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-picture-disable>
- <http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-audio-disable>

as shown by **21** of Example 3.6. The presence of the element with any other value, or no value, is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

### 3.4.7. KDM EncryptedData Element

#### Objective

Verify that element <EncryptedData> is not present.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <EncryptedData> element is not present. The presence of the element is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.4.8. KDM KeyInfo Element

#### Objective

If present, verify that the values of each <KeyInfo> element of all <EncryptedKey> elements in the <AuthenticatedPrivate> section of the KDM are identical.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and, if present, confirm that the <KeyInfo> values are identical in all instances of <EncryptedKey> elements. The absence of <KeyInfo> elements is cause to pass this test. The presence of differing <KeyInfo> values in <EncryptedKey> elements is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.4.9. KDM DeviceListDescription Element

#### Objective

Verify that when present, the value of the <DeviceListDescription> element is in a human-readable language. If the optional `xml:lang` attribute is present, the language must match. If the `xml:lang` attribute is not present, the language must be English.

#### Procedures

See Objective.

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <DeviceListDescription> element is either absent or is present and contains human-readable text. The presence of non-human-readable data or text in a language other than English without that language's corresponding `xml:lang` value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

### 3.4.10. KDM ContentTitleText Language Attribute

#### Objective

Verify that value of the <ContentTitleText> element is in a human-readable language. If the optional `xml:lang` attribute is present, the language must match. If the `xml:lang` attribute is not present, the language must be English.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <ContentTitleText> element as indicated by 13 in the Example 3.6 is a human-readable language. The presence of non-human-readable data or text in a language other than English without that language's corresponding `xml:lang` value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.4.11. KDM KeyType Scope Attribute

#### Objective

Verify that the optional `scope` attribute of the `<TypedKeyId>` element of the `<KeyIdList>` element is absent or contains the value `http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type`.

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the `scope` attribute of the `<TypedKeyId>` element is either not present or is present and contains the value `http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type`, as shown in 19 of Example 3.6. Presence of the `scope` attribute with any other value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	


Test Equipment
Text Editor

### 3.4.12. KDM EncryptionMethod

#### Objective

Verify that the Algorithm attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> element of the <EncryptedKey/> element has the value "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p".

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the Algorithm attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> of the <EncryptedKey/> element contains the value http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p, as shown in  of Example 3.7: KDM - AuthenticatedPrivate area. Presence of the Algorithm attribute with any other value is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor openssl

### 3.4.13. KDM CompositionPlaylistId Element

#### Objective

Verify that the value of the <CompositionPlaylistId> element in the KDM matches the value in the RSA protected <EncryptedKey> structure, and that these values match the value of the <Id> element in the respective composition playlist.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

Verify that the <CompositionPlaylistId> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element in the plaintext portion of the KDM contains the same value as the CPL ID present in the RSA protected <EncryptedKey> structure. Non-identical values shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-429-7]	
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor kdm-decrypt



### 3.4.14. KDM Validity Fields

#### Objective

Verify that value of the <ContentKeysNotValidBefore> and <ContentKeysNotValidAfter> elements match their counterparts in the RSA protected <EncryptedKey> structure and that the values are in UTC format.

#### Procedures

The information in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

Verify that the <ContentKeysNotValidBefore> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element has the same value as the corresponding field inside the RSA protected EncryptedKey structure, and that it is in UTC format as specified in [RFC-3339]. Non-identical values shall be cause to fail this test.

Verify that the <ContentKeysNotValidAfter> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element has the same value as the corresponding field inside the RSA protected EncryptedKey structure, and that it is in UTC format as specified in [RFC-3339]. Non-identical values shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[RFC-3339]	
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor
openssl

### 3.4.15. KDM KeyIdList Element

#### Objective

Verify that each of the KeyID values in the <KeyIdList> element of the <KDMRequiredExtensions> element matches a KeyID in the RSA protected <EncryptedKey> structure and that there are no KeyIDs without corresponding <EncryptedKey> structures, nor <EncryptedKey> structures with KeyIDs that are not present in the KeyIdList.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

Compare the list of KeyIDs to the KeyIDs in the RSA protected EncryptedKey structures and verify that each of the KeyIDs in the list correspond to a KeyID in an RSA protected EncryptedKey structure. The presence of KeyIDs in the KeyIdList that do not correspond to a KeyID in an RSA protected EncryptedKey structure shall be cause to fail this test. The presence of a KeyID in an RSA protected EncryptedKey structure that is not also present in the KeyIdList shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
kdm-decrypt
Text Editor

### 3.4.16. KDM CipherData Structure ID

#### Objective

Verify that the value of the CipherData Structure ID in the RSA protected <EncryptedKey> structure is f1dc124460169a0e85bc300642f866ab.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

Verify that the plaintext value of the CipherData Structure ID is f1dc124460169a0e85bc300642f866ab. Any other value shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
kdm-decrypt

### 3.4.17. KDM CipherData Signer Thumbprint

#### Objective

Verify that the thumbprint of the signer's certificate in the RSA protected <EncryptedKey> element matches the thumbprint of the certificate that signed the KDM.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

A certificate thumbprint can be calculated using the **dc-thumbprint** tool included in Section C.1. Calculate the thumbprint with **dc-thumbprint**, i.e.,

```
$dc-thumbprint <certificate.pem>
```

Identify the certificate used to sign the KDM and calculate its thumbprint. Compare this thumbprint against the thumbprint decrypted from the <EncryptedKey> element and confirm that they are the same. Non-identical values shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-1] [SMPTE-430-2]	9.8

Test Equipment
dc-thumbprint kdm-decrypt Text Editor

### 3.4.18. KDM CipherData Validity

#### Objective

Verify that the two CipherData validity fields contain UTC format time values.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

Verify that the plaintext representation of the <EncryptedKey> element contains two validity time stamps in UTC format. Time stamps that are not present or that are not in UTC format shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor
kdm-decrypt

### 3.4.19. KDM CipherData CPL ID

#### Objective

Verify that the CipherData Composition Playlist ID is identical to the value of the <CompositionPlaylistId> element in the other portions of the KDM.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

Verify that the decrypted plaintext value of the CompositionPlaylistID the same as the <CompositionPlaylistId> element in the AuthenticatedPublic area of the KDM. Mismatching composition playlist IDs shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor
openssl

### 3.4.20. KDM EncryptedKey KeyType

#### Objective

Verify that the key types in the <EncryptedKey> elements of the KDM use only the allowed key types (MDIK, MDAK, MDSK, FMIK and FMAK), and that they match the plaintext fields in the <TypedKeyId> element values for the KeyIDs in the <KeyIdList> element.

#### Procedures

The data in the encrypted portion of the KDM can be viewed using the **kdm-decrypt** tool included in Section C.1. To view the data contained in the encrypted section of the KDM, run the command specifying the KDM and the RSA private key corresponding to the certificate to which the KDM was targeted, i.e.,

```
$ kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <rsa-private-key.pem>
```

For each <EncryptedKey> element, verify that the plaintext representation contains a key type that is one of MDIK, MDAK, MDSK, FMIK or FMAK, and that the key type is identical to the key type for the corresponding KeyID in the KeyIDList. A key type that is not either MDIK, MDAK, MDSK, FMIK or FMAK shall be cause to fail this test. A key type in the <EncryptedKey> element that does not match the key type for the corresponding KeyID in the KeyIDList shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor kdm-decrypt

### 3.4.21. KDM Recipient X509IssuerName

#### Objective

Verify that the Distinguished Name value in the <X509IssuerName> element is compliant with [RFC-2253].

#### Procedures

Using a text editor, view the KDM and confirm that the <X509IssuerName> element as shown below **8** of Example 3.6: KDM - AuthenticatedPublic area. Verify that any special characters are properly escaped, and the sequence is correct and valid. Improperly escaped characters or sequences that do not conform to [RFC-2253] shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[RFC-2253]	
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor



## 3.5. KDM Decoder Behavior

The procedures in this section test the behavior of a KDM decoding device, such as a Security Manager (SM) or a KDM authoring device. The procedures use a generic syntax to instruct the test operator to cause the Test Subject to decode a KDM.

In the case of an SM, the text "Perform an operation..." should be interpreted to mean "Assemble and play a show with *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*...".

In the case of a KDM authoring device, the text "Perform an operation..." should be interpreted to mean "Perform a KDM read or ingest operation...".

### Note

Some of the procedures in this section require test content that is specifically malformed. In some implementations, these malformations may be caught and reported directly by the SMS without involving the SM. Because the purpose of the procedures is to assure that the SM demonstrates the required behavior, the manufacturer of the Test Subject may need to provide special test programs or special SMS testing modes to allow the malformed content to be applied directly to the SM.

### 3.5.1. KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element

#### Objective

Verify that a decoding device does not reject a KDM when the <NonCriticalExtensions> element is present and not empty.

#### Procedures

Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with non-empty NonCriticalExtensions*, a KDM that contains the <NonCriticalExtensions> element with child content. Verify that the operation is successful. A failed operation shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Material
KDM with non-empty NonCriticalExtensions DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

### 3.5.2. ETM IssueDate Field Check

#### Objective

- Verify that the Test Subject verifies that the signer's certificate is valid at the time when the KDM was issued.
- Verify that the Test Subject verifies that the KDM validity does not extend beyond the ending validity period of the certificate.

#### Procedures

For each of the malformations below, perform an operation on the Test Subject using the test material that has that malformation. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation is cause to fail this test.

1. KDM in which the certificate that signed the KDM has an ending validity date prior to the KDM issue date (*KDM with expired Signer certificate*).
2. KDM in which the certificate that signed the KDM has a starting validity date after the KDM issue date (*KDM issued before certificate valid*).
3. KDM in which the validity period extends beyond the end of the signing certificate's validity period (*KDM validity exceeds signer validity*).

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-1] [SMPTE-430-3]	9.8, 9.4.3.5

Test Material
KDM with expired Signer certificate KDM issued before certificate valid KDM validity exceeds signer validity DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

### 3.5.3. Maximum Number of DCP Keys

#### Objective

Verify that the system supports compositions with up to 256 different essence encryption keys.

#### Procedures

##### Note

The KDM specified to be used in this test additionally has one of each type of forensic marking keys FMIK and FMAK. Receiving devices shall process such keys in accordance with the individual implementation, in a manner that will not affect the requirements related to the maximum number of content keys (MDIK and MDAK).

Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)*, a KDM that contains 256 keys. Verify that the operation is successful. A failed operation shall be cause to fail this test.

Note: When performing this test on an SM, use the composition *128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)*.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5, 9.7.7
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Material
128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted) KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)

### 3.5.4. Structure ID Check

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject checks the validity of the CipherData Structure ID as specified in [SMPTE-430-1] and rejects the KDM if the Structure ID is incorrect.

#### Procedures

Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with corrupted CipherData block*, a KDM with an invalid CipherData Structure. Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Material
KDM with corrupted CipherData block DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

### 3.5.5. Certificate Thumbprint Check

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject checks that the thumbprint of the signer's certificate matches the signer of the KDM and rejects the KDM if it does not.

#### Procedures

Perform an operation on the Test Subject using the KDM with a signer's certificate whose thumbprint does not match the thumbprint of the certificate used to sign the KDM (*KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint*). Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Material
KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

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### 3.5.6. Deleted Section

The section "Certificate Presence Check" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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### 3.5.7. KeyInfo Field Check

#### Objective

Verify that when KeyInfo elements are present in the <EncryptedKey> elements of the <AuthenticatedPrivate> area of the KDM, the Test Subject verifies that they all match, and that the Test Subject rejects the KDM if they do not match.

#### Procedures

Perform an operation on the Test Subject using the KDM with KeyInfo element values that do not match (*KDM with KeyInfo mismatch*). Verify that the operation fails. A successful operation is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	

Test Material
KDM with KeyInfo mismatch DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.5.8. KDM Malformations

#### Objective

Verify that the SM checks that the KDM is well formed and labeled with the correct namespace name.

#### Procedures

1. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with invalid XML*, which contains XML that is not well-formed. If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
2. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with invalid MessageType*, which contains an incorrect ETM <MessageType> value. If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
3. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with expired Signer certificate*, which contains a KDM whose signing certificate has expired. If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
4. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with incorrect namespace name value*, which contains an incorrect ETM namespace name. If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
5. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with empty TDL*, which contains a TDL with no entries. If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
6. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the KDMKeysReceived events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. For the log record produced by the operation using *KDM with invalid MessageType*, verify that the value of the SignerID parameter contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the signing certificate of *KDM with invalid MessageType*. Verify that ReferencedIDs element contains a KeyDeliveryMessageID parameter with a value that is the MessageId of *KDM with invalid MessageType*. Failure of any verification shall be cause to fail this test.
  - c. For the log record produced by the operation using *KDM with expired Signer certificate*, verify that the contentId element contains the Id of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Verify that the value of the SignerID parameter contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the signing certificate of *KDM with expired Signer certificate*. Verify that ReferencedIDs element contains a CompositionID parameter with a value that is the Id of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and KeyDeliveryMessageID parameter with a value that is the MessageId of *KDM with expired Signer certificate*. Failure of any verification shall be cause to fail this test.
  - d. Confirm the presence of a KDMFormatError exception in each KDMKeysReceived log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing KDMFormatError exception in any of the associated KDMKeysReceived log records shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.8, 9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	



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Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-3] [SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Material
KDM with empty TDL KDM with expired Signer certificate KDM with invalid XML KDM with invalid MessageType KDM with incorrect namespace name value DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 3.5.9. KDM Signature

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject checks that the KDM signature is valid, including checking that the certificate that signed the KDM is included in the KDM and rejecting the KDM if it is not.

#### Procedures

1. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with incorrect message digest*. The KDM *KDM with incorrect message digest* is invalid (wrong signature/hash error). If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
2. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint*. The KDM *KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint* is invalid (wrong signature identity). If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
3. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM without signer certificate*. The KDM *KDM without signer certificate* is invalid (broken certificate chain). If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `KDMKeysReceived` events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Verify that the `contentId` element contains the Id of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Verify that `ReferencedIDs` element contains a `CompositionID` parameter with a value that is the Id of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and `KeyDeliveryMessageID` parameter with a value that is the `MessageId` of the KDM used. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. For the log records produced by the operation using *KDM with incorrect message digest* and *KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint*, verify that the value of the `SignerID` parameter contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the signing certificate of the KDM.
  - c. Confirm the presence of a `SignatureError` exception in each `KDMKeysReceived` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `SignatureError` exception in any of the associated `KDMKeysReceived` log records shall be cause to fail this test.
5. Perform an operation on the Test Subject using *KDM signed with incorrect signer certificate format*. The KDM *KDM signed with incorrect signer certificate format* is invalid (wrong signer certificate format). If the operation succeeds this is cause to fail this test.
6. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `KDMKeysReceived` event associated with the above step and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Verify that the `contentId` element contains the Id of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Verify that `ReferencedIDs` element contains a `CompositionID` parameter with a value that is the Id of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and `KeyDeliveryMessageID` parameter with a value that is the `MessageId` of the KDM used. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `CertFormatError` exception in the `KDMKeysReceived` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `CertFormatError` exception in the associated `KDMKeysReceived` log record shall be cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

<b>Reference Document ID</b>	<b>Reference Document Section(s)</b>
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

<b>Test Material</b>
KDM with incorrect message digest
KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint
KDM without signer certificate
KDM signed with incorrect signer certificate format
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

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# Chapter 4. Digital Cinema Packaging

The DCP is the file format for d-cinema content. Entire suites of standards documents from SMPTE define this format, most notably the 428 and 429 multi-part documents. In addition, many IETF documents and some ISO documents are referenced from the SMPTE works. Reading and understanding all of these documents is a substantial task, but it is essential knowledge for accurate and efficient analysis of d-cinema files.

In the following procedures, simple tools are used to display the contents of d-cinema files. Example output from these tools is shown with descriptions of the features that will be interesting to the Test Operator. In addition to the tools used in this text, the Test Operator may use more sophisticated methods so long as the results obtained are equivalent to the procedures presented here. The reader should also note that a programmer's text editor and a binary viewer or editor are essential tools for direct inspection of data.

## 4.1. Asset Map

D-cinema track files and composition playlists are identified by unique, embedded identifiers. These identifiers, called *UUIDs*, are defined by [RFC-4122]. d-cinema XML files use UUIDs to refer to other d-cinema XML files and MXF files (assets). When d-cinema assets are written to a filesystem (*e.g.*, a disk volume), a mechanism is needed to relate the UUID values to filename values in the filesystem. An Asset Map is an XML document that provides a mapping from UUID values to filesystem paths. When a d-cinema package is written to a volume, an Asset Map is created that includes the size and location of every file in the package.<sup>1</sup> Along with the Asset Map, each volume has a Volume Index file. The Volume Index file is used to differentiate volumes in a multiple-volume distribution. Both Asset Maps and Volume Indexes are XML files (as described in Section 3.1). The formats of the Asset Map file and the Volume Index file are specified in [SMPTE-429-9].

### Example 4.1. Asset Map

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 1
<AssetMap xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/429-9/2007/AM"> 2
  <Id>urn:uuid:425e93f7-bca2-4255-b8ec-8c7d16fc8881</Id> 3
  <Creator> Packaging Tools v1.0 </Creator> 4
  <VolumeCount>1</VolumeCount> 5
  <IssueDate>2007-07-06T18:25:42-00:00</IssueDate>6
  <Issuer>user@host</Issuer> 7
  <AssetList> 8
    <Asset> 9
      <Id>urn:uuid:034b95b0-7424-420f-bbff-a875a79465a5</Id> 10
      <PackingList>true</PackingList> 11
      <ChunkList> 12
        <Chunk> 13
          <Path>perfect_movie_domestic_51.pkl.xml</Path> 14
          <VolumeIndex>1</VolumeIndex> 15
          <Offset>0</Offset> 16
          <Length>14366</Length> 17
        </Chunk>
      </ChunkList>
    </Asset>
  </AssetList>
  <Asset>
    <Id>urn:uuid:4f89a209-919b-4f21-a1d6-21ad32581115</Id>
    <ChunkList>
      <Chunk>
        <Path>perfect_movie_j2c_r01.mxf</Path>
        <VolumeIndex>1</VolumeIndex>
        <Offset>0</Offset>
        <Length>342162304</Length>
      </Chunk>
    </ChunkList>
  </Asset>
</AssetMap>
```

<sup>1</sup>Or packages; volumes can contain multiple DCPs.

```

    </ChunkList>
  </Asset>
  <Asset>
    <Id>urn:uuid:e522f7b6-6731-4df5-a80e-8cfd74f82219</Id>
    <ChunkList>
      <Chunk>
        <Path>perfect_movie_wav_r01.mxf</Path>
        <VolumeIndex>1</VolumeIndex>
        <Offset>0</Offset>
        <Length>34591246</Length>
      </Chunk>
    </ChunkList>
  </Asset>

  [additional assets omitted for brevity]
  ...
</AssetList>
</AssetMap>

```

### Assetmap descriptions

- 1 XML Declaration. This specifies the version of the XML standard to which the document conforms, and the character encoding of the document.
- 2 The root Assetmap element. This element contains the XML namespace declaration for an Assetmap as specified in [SMPTE-429-9].
- 3 The Unique Universal ID (UUID) of the asset map. This is used to uniquely identify the asset map.
- 6 The date the asset map was issued.
- 7 The organization or entity that issued the asset map.
- 4 The person, software, or system that generated the asset map.
- 5 The Volume count indicates the total number of volumes that are referenced by the asset map.
- 8 The AssetList contains all of the assets in the asset map. Each asset is described in an Asset sub-element of the AssetList.
- 9 The Asset element contains all the data about an asset necessary to locate it in the filesystem.
- 10 The Asset UUID is the unique ID of a particular asset in the asset map.
- 11 The Packinglist element identifies whether or not the asset being described is a Packing List document.
- 12 The Chunklist contains the list of chunks that comprise the complete asset.
- 13 The Chunk element.
- 14 The asset chunk path is the path and filename, in the file system, of the file that contains the asset data.
- 15 The chunk volume index indicates the volume number on which the chunk resides.
- 16 The chunk offset is the number of bytes from the beginning of the complete asset file that this chunk begins. A chunk that is either a complete file or that is the beginning of a file will have an offset of 0.
- 17 The chunk length is the length, in bytes, of the chunk of the asset.

### Example 4.2. Volume Index

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 1
<VolumeIndex xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/429-9/2007/AM"> 2
  <Index>1</Index> 3
</VolumeIndex>

```

### Volume Index descriptions

- 1 XML Declaration. This specifies the version of the XML standard to which the document conforms, and the character encoding of the document.
- 2 The root Assetmap element. This element contains the XML namespace declaration for an Assetmap as specified in [SMPTE-429-9].
- 3 The index number of the volume.

### 4.1.1. Asset Map File

#### Objective

Verify that the Asset Map file is in the root of the volume, and that it is named ASSETMAP.xml. Verify that the Asset Map validates against the schema defined in [SMPTE-429-9].

#### Procedures

1. Mount the media that contains the volume with a computer, and obtain a directory listing of the root of the filesystem. The absence of the file ASSETMAP.xml is cause to fail this test.
2. Using the **schema-check** software utility, validate the file ASSETMAP.xml against the schema in [SMPTE-429-9]. Failure to correctly validate is cause to fail this test. For more information on schema validation see Section 1.4: Conventions and Practices

E.g.:

```

$ cd /
$ ls -F
ASSETMAP.xml
PKL_c2434860-7dab-da2b-c39f-5df000eb2335.xml
J2K_a13c59ec-f720-1d1f-b78f-9bdea4968c7d_video.mxf
WAV_22d190bd-f43b-a420-a12e-2bf29a737521_audio.mxf
...
$
$ schema-check ASSETMAP.xml smpte-429-9.xsd
schema validation successful
$
    
```

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.5.2.1
[SMPTE-429-9]	

Test Equipment
schema-check

## 4.1.2. Volume Index File

### Objective

Verify that the Volume Index file is in the root of the volume and that it is named `VOLINDEX.xml`. Verify that the Volume Index file validates against the schema defined in [SMPTE-429-9].

### Procedures

1. Mount the media that contains the volume with a computer, and obtain a directory listing of the root of the filesystem. The absence of the file `VOLINDEX.xml` is cause to fail this test.
2. Using the **schema-check** software utility, validate the file `VOLINDEX.xml` against the schema in [SMPTE-429-9]. Failure to correctly validate is cause to fail this test. For more information on schema validation see Section 1.4: Conventions and Practices.

E.g.:

```
$ cd /
$ ls -F
VOLINDEX.xml
PKL_c2434860-7dab-da2b-c39f-5df000eb2335.xml
J2K_a13c59ec-f720-1d1f-b78f-9bdea4968c7d_video.mxf
WAV_22d190bd-f43b-a420-a12e-2bf29a737521_audio.mxf
...
$
$ schema-check VOLINDEX.xml smpte-429-9.xsd
schema validation successful
$
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.5.2.1
[SMPTE-429-9]	

Test Equipment
schema-check



## 4.2. Packing List

The Packing List (PKL) is an XML document (see Section 3.1) that specifies the contents of a d-cinema Package. It contains the UUID, file type (MXF track file, CPL, etc.), and a message digest of each file in the DCP. This information is used to ensure that all of the expected files have been included and have not been modified or corrupted in transit. The format of the Packing List file is specified by [SMPTE-429-8].

### Example 4.3. Packing List

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?> ❶
<PackingList xmlns="http://www.smp-te-ra.org/schemas/429-8/2007/PKL"> ❷
  <Id>urn:uuid:59430cd7-882d-48e8-a026-aef4b6253dfc</Id> ❸
  <AnnotationText>Perfect Movie DCP</AnnotationText> ❹
  <IssueDate>2007-07-25T18:21:31-00:00</IssueDate> ❺
  <Issuer>user@host</Issuer> ❻
  <Creator>Packaging Tools v1.0</Creator> ❼
  <AssetList> ❽
    <Asset> ❾
      <Id>urn:uuid:24d73510-3481-4ae5-b8a5-30d9eeced9c1</Id> ❿
      <Hash>AXufMKY7NyZcfSXQ9sCZ1s5dSyE=</Hash> ⓫
      <Size>32239753</Size> ⓬
      <Type>application/mxf</Type> ⓭
    </Asset>
    <Asset>
      <Id>urn:uuid:456e547d-af92-4abc-baf3-c4d730bbcd65</Id>
      <Hash>kAAo0kXYVDBJUpHID89zauv50w=</Hash>
      <Size>86474446</Size>
      <Type>application/mxf</Type>
    </Asset>
    <Asset>
      <Id>urn:uuid:e4a4e438-63ec-46cb-b9aa-43acee787d79</Id>
      <Hash>kt5bP8y4zmHNAY1qVnujItAb4sY=</Hash>
      <Size>12163</Size>
      <Type>text/xml</Type>
    </Asset>
    <Asset>
      <Id>urn:uuid:3d445456-54d5-42bc-a7cc-a8c00b20ffb7</Id>
      <Hash>AQWMKCxxMv001zTS3Y30j8M+d9s=</Hash>
      <Size>62500144</Size>
      <Type>application/mxf</Type>
    </Asset>

    [Remaining assets and signature omitted for brevity]
  </AssetList>
  [Signature omitted for brevity]
</PackingList>
```

### Packing List descriptions

- ❶ XML Declaration. This specifies the version of the XML standard to which the document conforms.
- ❷ The root packing list element. This element contains the XML namespace declaration for the packing list as specified in [SMPTE-429-8].
- ❸ The Unique Universal ID (UUID) of the packing list.
- ❺ The date the packing list was issued.
- ❻ The organization or entity that issued the packing list.
- ❼ The person, software, or system that generated the packing list.
- ❹ The Annotation text is a plain text, human readable language description of the packing list's contents.

- 8** The assetlist contains all of the assets in the packing list.
- 9** The Asset element contains all the metadata necessary to identify the file.
- 10** The Asset UUID is the unique ID of a particular asset in the packing list.
- 11** The asset hash is a message digest of the asset file.
- 12** The asset size is the size, in bytes, of the asset's file in the filesystem.
- 13** The asset type contains the mime type of the asset, which is a generic description of the file format. It also contains an attribute that specifies the specific kind of type, such as a CPL, Picture, or Sound file.

## 4.2.1. Packing List File

### Objective

- Verify that the Packing List is an XML document and that it validates against the schema defined in [SMPTE-429-8].
- Confirm that if the `language` attribute of the `<AnnotationText>` element is not present, or present with a value of "en", that the Annotation text is in human-readable English.
- Verify that the Packing List contains urn:uuid values as specified in [RFC-4122].
- Verify that the listed file sizes match those for each of the referenced assets.

### Procedures

In the following procedures, the callout numbers refer to Example 4.3: Packing List

1. Using the **schema-check** software utility, validate the XML file structure against the schema in [SMPTE-429-8]. Failure to correctly validate is cause to fail this test. For more information on schema validation see Section 1.4: Conventions and Practices.

```
$ schema_check.py <input-file> smpte-429-8.xsd
schema validation successful
$
```

2. Open the Packing List file in a text editor and verify that if the "language" attribute of the `<AnnotationText>` element is not present, or present with a value of "en", that the contents of the `<AnnotationText>` element is human readable English. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.

```
$ vi <input-file>
...
  <AnnotationText>Perfect Movie Reel #1 Picture</AnnotationText>
...
  <AnnotationText language="en">Perfect Movie Reel #1 Sound</AnnotationText>
...
:q
$
```

3. Supply the filename of the Packing List file as an argument to the **uuid\_check.py** software utility. Examine the output for error messages that identify expected UUID values that do not conform to the format specified in [RFC-4122]. One or more occurrences is cause to fail this test.

```
$ uuid_check.py <input-file>
all UUIDs conform to RFC-4122
```

\$

4. To verify that the real file sizes of the referenced assets are equal to the values of the related XML elements, the path to those assets must be known. The following procedure may be used if the ASSETMAP.xml file is available, otherwise the tester will need to devise a method for locating the relevant assets. For each of the <Asset> 9 elements contained in the Packing List, compare the contents of the child <Id> 10 element with the contents of the ASSETMAP.xml file to discover the path to the asset. List the file size of the referenced asset and verify that it is identical to the value of the child <Size> 12 element inside the <Asset> 9 element. One or more failures to verify the file sizes is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.2
[SMPTE-429-8]	

Test Equipment
schema-check uuid_check.py Text Editor

ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 4.2.2. Packing List Signature Validation

### Objective

Verify that the Packing List is signed and that the signature validates.

### Procedures

Using the **checksig** software utility, verify that there is a signature included in the Packing List and that it is valid. If the signature is missing or invalid, this is cause to fail this test. Note: Depending on the order of the certificates contained in the log report, the **dsig-cert.py** program may need to be used to re-order the certificates for the **checksig** program.

Example:

```
$ dsig-cert.py <pk1-file.pkl.xml> > tmp.xml
$ checksig tmp.xml
The supplied signature is valid
$
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.5.2.3, 5.5.3.2
[PKCS-1]	
[RFC-3174]	
[SMPTE-429-8]	

Test Equipment
checksig
dsig_cert.py

## 4.3. Composition Playlist

The Composition Playlist (CPL) is an XML document (see Section 3.1) that contains the information necessary to reproduce a composition. It contains metadata about the composition such as the title and the rating, and references to the track files that contain the composition's essence. The format of the Composition Playlist file is specified by [SMPTE-429-7].

### Example 4.4. Composition Playlist

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no" ?> 1
  <CompositionPlaylist xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/429-7/2006/CPL"> 2
    <Id>urn:uuid:20670ba3-d4c7-4539-ac3e-71e874d4d7d1</Id> 3
    <IssueDate>2007-07-25T00:35:03-00:00</IssueDate> 4
    <Issuer>user@host</Issuer> 5
    <Creator> Packaging Tools v1.0 </Creator> 6
    <ContentTitleText>Perfect Movie</ContentTitleText> 7
    <ContentKind>feature</ContentKind> 8
    <ContentVersion> 9
      <Id>urn:uuid:e5alb4dc-faf3-461b-a5e2-9d33088b1b28</Id> 10
      <LabelText>Perfect Movie - Domestic - US 5.1 </LabelText> 11
    </ContentVersion>
    <RatingList/> 12
    <ReelList> 13
      <Reel> 14
        <Id>urn:uuid:f62cffe9-2da7-4d28-b73e-f21c816ab02f</Id> 15
        <AssetList> 16
          <MainPicture>17
            <Id>urn:uuid:93270dd0-8675-42fa-9ce8-34b61c963997</Id>18
            <EditRate>24 1</EditRate>19
            <IntrinsicDuration>480</IntrinsicDuration>20
            <EntryPoint>0</EntryPoint>21
            <Duration>480</Duration>22
            <FrameRate>24 1</FrameRate>23
            <ScreenAspectRatio>1998 1080</ScreenAspectRatio>24
          </MainPicture>25
          <MainSound>26
            <Id>urn:uuid:e33b7b37-da90-4429-88af-5c5b63506017</Id>
            <EditRate>24 1</EditRate>
            <IntrinsicDuration>2880</IntrinsicDuration>
            <EntryPoint>120</EntryPoint>
            <Duration>2760</Duration>
          </MainSound>
        </AssetList>
      </Reel>
    </ReelList>
    [Additional reel data and CPL Signature omitted for brevity]
  </CompositionPlaylist>
```

### Composition Playlist descriptions

- 1 The XML version of the XML standard to which the document conforms, the character encoding of the document, and whether the document relies on external declarations or parameter entities.
- 2 The Root Composition Playlist element. This element contains the XML namespace declaration for the Composition Playlist as specified in [SMPTE-429-7].
- 3 The Unique Universal ID (UUID) of the composition playlist.
- 4 The date the CPL was issued.
- 5 The organization or entity that issued the CPL.
- 6 The person, software, or system that generated the CPL.
- 7 A descriptive string that describes the composition and is displayed to the user.
- 8 The kind of presentation the CPL represents, such as a feature, trailer, or advertisement.

- 9 The version of the content represented by the composition playlist. This element contains sub-elements that contain a descriptive label and UUID of the content.
- 10 The unique ID of the version of the content represented by the CPL (as opposed to the unique ID of the CPL).
- 11 A text description of the version of the content represented in the CPL.
- 12 The list of ratings applied to the content represented by the CPL. In compositions that contain rating information, the <RatingList> element contains at least one instance of the <Rating> element, which in turn contains two elements, <Agency>, that contains a URI that represents the agency that issued the rating, and <Label>, that contains the rating.
- 13 The list of reels that comprise the composition.
- 14 A reel of the composition.
- 15 The unique ID of the reel.
- 16 The list of assets that comprise the reel.
- 17 The element in the reel that contains the information required to produce images onscreen.
- 18 The unique ID of the MXF track file that contains the picture essence (the picture track file) to be reproduced onscreen.
- 19 The edit rate, or the number of editable units of content, per second, of the picture track file.
- 20 The total number of frames in the track file, inclusive of frames not intended for reproduction onscreen.
- 21 The first frame of the track file to be reproduced onscreen.
- 22 The number of frames of the track file to be reproduced onscreen. When a picture track file is present in a composition, its duration is effectively the duration of the reel.
- 23 The rate, in frames-per-second, at which the essence in the track file will be reproduced.
- 24 The aspect ratio of the essence in the picture track file. This is represented in the CPL as a ratio of two numbers separated by a space.
- 25 The closing tag of the reel's MainPicture element.
- 26 The element in the reel that contains the information required to reproduce sound essence through the primary speaker system. The parameters of a MainSound track file are the same as those of a picture track file.

### 4.3.1. Composition Playlist File

#### Objective

Verify that the Composition Playlist is an XML document and that it validates against the schema defined in [SMPTE-429-7].

#### Procedures

Using the **schema-check** software utility, validate the XML file structure against the schema in [SMPTE-429-7]. Failure to correctly validate is cause to fail this test.

```
$ schema-check <input-file> smpte-429-7.xsd
schema validation successful
$
```

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-429-7]	5.2.3, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 9.7.7, 5.4.3.2, 5.4.3.3, 5.4.3.4

Test Equipment
schema-check

## 4.3.2. Composition Playlist Signature Validation

### Objective

Verify that the Composition Playlist is signed and that the signature validates.

### Procedures

Using the **checksig** software utility, verify that there is a signature included in the Composition Playlist List and that it is valid. If the signature is missing or invalid, this is cause to fail this test. Note: Depending on the order of the certificates contained in the log report, the **dsig-cert.py** program may need to be used to re-order the certificates for the **checksig** program.

Example:

```
$ dsig-cert.py <cpl-file.cpl.xml> > tmp.xml
$ checksig tmp.xml
The supplied signature is valid
$
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.2.3, 5.4.3.6, 5.4.4, 9.7.5

Test Equipment
dsig_cert.py checksig

### 4.3.3. Composition Playlist Key Usage

#### Objective

An encrypted Asset is associated with a Decryption Key that is effective for a period of time equal to one Reel. Only one Decryption Key shall be associated with a specific encrypted Asset. Each unique Decryption Key shall be associated with only one encrypted Asset.

- Verify that for each encrypted Asset present in the Composition Playlist, only one <KeyId> value is listed. If an Asset Id occurs more than once in the CPL, verify that the same <KeyId> is utilized throughout.
- Verify that each <KeyId> is associated with only one Asset Id.

#### Procedures

1. Use a text editor to view the Composition Playlist. For all encrypted Assets (those that have a <KeyId> value) make a list of all Asset Id values and the associated <KeyId> values.
2. Examine the list to determine that each Asset Id has exactly one <KeyId>. If Asset Ids are repeated in the CPL, the same <KeyId> should be associated for that Asset every time. Any deviation is cause to fail this test.
3. Examine the list to determine that each <KeyId> is associated with exactly one Asset Id (i.e. a particular Decryption Key should only be associated with one, unique Asset). Any deviation is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.3.1.7
Test Equipment	
Text Editor	



## 4.4. Track Files

A Track File is a container for encoded essence. In the d-cinema system, each Track File contains a single track of a single type of essence<sup>2</sup>. For example, a Track File may contain images or sound or timed text, but never more than one type of essence.

D-cinema Track Files are based on the Material eXchange Format (MXF). MXF is a file metaformat, *i.e.*, a file format for creating file formats. While the various d-cinema Track File formats represent different methods of encoding essence data, the arrangement of metadata within the files is syntactically similar. This section will provide an overview of MXF as used for d-cinema applications. Readers looking for more detailed technical information are referred to [SMPTE-377-1].

### 4.4.1. MXF Internals

#### 4.4.1.1. Overview

Before diving head-first into examining MXF files, it is important to understand the structure of the files. This section will briefly describe the contents of some example MXF files by displaying the files' header metadata using the **klvwalk** software utility from the free ASDCPLib software package.

Briefly, an MXF file [SMPTE-377-1] contains a sequence of Key-Length-Value (KLV) packets. Some packets carry essence and some carry metadata. MXF files are divided into *partitions*. Each partition is comprised of a set of KLV packets. The first KLV packet in each partition is a Partition Pack.

The number of partitions in a digital cinema sound or picture Track File is usually three (Timed Text Track Files may have more than three partitions). The first partition in an MXF file contains the metadata which describe the coding parameters of the essence and the MXF file itself. The second partition contains the essence data as a sequence of KLV-wrapped frames. The final partition contains the index table.

To display the metadata in the header partition of an MXF file `testfile.mxf`, use **klvwalk** like so:

```
$ klvwalk -r testfile.mxf
...
```

The following sections illustrate the expected output.

#### 4.4.1.2. MXF Header Partition

As shown in Example 4.5, the first structure to be output is the Partition Pack of the Header Partition. This structure documents the MXF version that the file conforms to and provides a description of the general architecture to be found inside.

##### Example 4.5. MXF Partition Header

```
06.0e.2b.34.02.05.01.01.0d.01.02.01.01.02.04.00 len: 120 (ClosedCompleteHeader) I
MajorVersion      = 1
MinorVersion      = 2
KAGSize           = 1
ThisPartition     = 0
```

<sup>2</sup> Strictly speaking, a Timed Text Track File may contain font and image resources in addition to the XML timed text data, but these resources are considered integral to the timed text essence.

```

PreviousPartition = 0
FooterPartition  = 218362864
HeaderByteCount  = 16244
IndexByteCount   = 0
IndexSID         = 0
BodyOffset       = 0
BodySID          = 1
OperationalPattern = 060e2b34.0401.0101.0d010201.10000000 ❷
Essence Containers: ❸
  060e2b34.0401.0103.0d010301.027f0100
  060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020b0100

```

### MXF Partition Header

- ❶ This is an MXF Partition Pack structure. The Universal Label (UL) value indicates that the file is "Closed and Complete".
- ❷ The Operational Pattern UL indicates that the file conforms to OP Atom [SMPTE-390].
- ❸ Essence Container labels indicate the type of essence and the wrapping format. This example shows two container labels: the JPEG 2000 container [SMPTE-422] and the Generic Container [SMPTE-379-1] (the file contains encrypted JPEG 2000 essence).

The following table gives the list of valid Essence Container ULs for d-cinema Track Files.

**Table 4.1. Essence Container UL Values for D-Cinema**

UL Value	Container Type
060e2b34.0401.0101.0d010301.02060100	Linear PCM Audio [SMPTE-429-3], [SMPTE-382]
060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020c0100	JPEG 2000 Images [SMPTE-429-4]
060e2b34.0401.010a.0d010301.02130101	Timed Text [SMPTE-429-5]
060e2b34.0204.0101.0d010301.027e0100	Encrypted Essence [SMPTE-429-6]

#### 4.4.1.3. File Package

An MXF file may contain zero or more continuous segments of essence data. Each segment is described by a Source Package structure. Per [SMPTE-429-3], MXF files for digital cinema must contain exactly one top-level Source Package (thus one segment of essence), referred to in MXF jargon as a File Package. Example 4.6 shows a Source Package structure that points to JPEG 2000 essence data.

#### Example 4.6. Source Package structure

```

06.0e.2b.34.02.53.01.01.0d.01.01.01.01.01.37.00 len: 294 (SourcePackage) ❶
  InstanceUID = 42b5a376-c740-42e2-99f1-4ec782c4837e
  PackageUID = [060a2b34.0101.0105.01010f20],13,00,00,00,
               [b4f492cd.b89b.0f65.490c35ec.5f6340b7] ❷
  Name = File Package: SMPTE 429-4 frame wrapping of JPEG 2000 codestreams
  PackageCreationDate = 2007-03-21 07:42:04.000
  PackageModifiedDate = 2007-03-21 07:42:04.000
  Tracks: ❸
  9227a330-7e64-4c90-b4ef-d057ed6ef159
  0de983e3-255b-4d26-bde7-f33c530c077d
  54e13d93-abcfc-4869-b008-c59573b8d01d
  Descriptor = c6a35640-d6d8-433c-82c9-23df2eae9311 ❹

```

#### Source Package structure

- ❶ This is a Source Package structure [SMPTE-377-1].

- 2 A Unique Material Identifier (UMID) value which identifies the essence in the file. It has a UUID component which is the value that external entities (e.g. Packing Lists and Composition Playlists) use to refer to the essence in the file. See [SMPTE-429-3] for details about how d-cinema UMIDs are formed.
- 3 The list of tracks that appear in the file. There is only one essence track, but it is accompanied by a virtual timecode track and, optionally, a descriptive metadata track that gives cryptographic information (see Section 4.4.1.4 below).
- 4 This value gives the internal ID of a data set that describes the essence encoding. This set is called an Essence Descriptor. Two examples of essence descriptors are given below in Section 4.4.1.5 and Section 4.4.1.6.

#### 4.4.1.4. Encrypted Essence

If the MXF file contains encrypted essence, the header metadata will contain one Cryptographic Framework set with a link to a single Cryptographic Context set (defined in [SMPTE-429-6]). These structures are shown in Example 4.7.

#### Example 4.7. Cryptographic Framework and Cryptographic Context

```
06.0e.2b.34.02.53.01.01.0d.01.04.01.02.01.00.00 len: 40 (CryptographicFramework) 1
    InstanceUID = b98ca683-2e49-4e6a-88ff-af33910ba334
    ContextSR = 8dcd2f7b-fd0b-4602-bae7-806c82dcfd94

06.0e.2b.34.02.53.01.01.0d.01.04.01.02.02.00.00 len: 120 (CryptographicContext) 2
    InstanceUID = 8dcd2f7b-fd0b-4602-bae7-806c82dcfd94
    ContextID = 3472d593-e9ff-4b2e-84ca-5303b5ce53f7
    SourceEssenceContainer = 060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020c0100 3
    CipherAlgorithm = 060e2b34.0401.0107.02090201.01000000 4
    MICAlgorithm = 060e2b34.0401.0107.02090202.01000000 5
    CryptographicKeyID = c030f37a-bf84-496b-bdc2-81744205a944 6
```

#### Cryptographic Framework and Cryptographic Context

- 1 This is a Cryptographic Framework structure [SMPTE-429-6].
- 2 This is a Cryptographic Context structure [SMPTE-429-6].
- 3 A UL that identifies the type of essence inside the encrypted container. It should be a JPEG 2000 or PCM audio descriptor.
- 4 A UL that identifies the type of encryption used. This value should always be 060e2b34.0401.0107.02090201.01000000.
- 5 A UL that identifies the algorithm used to calculate the Message Integrity Check value in each Encrypted KLV (EKLV) packet. When present, this value should always be 060e2b34.0401.0107.02090202.01000000.
- 6 A UUID value that identifies the 16-byte symmetric key (stored externally) that is required to decrypt the essence data. The key is usually delivered to a system via a Key Delivery Message (see Chapter 3).

#### 4.4.1.5. Essence Descriptor for JPEG 2000

If the MXF file contains image essence for DCI-compliant digital cinema, the header metadata will contain an RGBA Essence Descriptor (defined in [SMPTE-377-1]), with a strong link to a JPEG 2000 Picture SubDescriptor (defined in [SMPTE-422]). These structures are shown in Example 4.8

#### Example 4.8. Essence Descriptor for JPEG 2000

```
06.0e.2b.34.02.53.01.01.0d.01.01.01.01.01.29.00 len: 169 (RGBAEssenceDescriptor) 1
    InstanceUID = 18a47da5-53d1-4785-a91e-41155753a02f
    Locators:
    SubDescriptors:
    05f80258-beb2-4769-b99a-af4d6c3895da
```



```

ChannelCount = 6 5
QuantizationBits = 24 6
    DialNorm = 0
    BlockAlign = 18 7
SequenceOffset = 0
    AvgBps = 144000

```

### Essence Descriptor for PCM Audio

- 1** This is a Wave Audio Descriptor structure [SMPTE-382].
- 2** The frame rate of the underlying essence. The essence may be sampled on a finer scale, but this value is the smallest temporal increment than can be accessed in the file.
- 3** The number of frames in the file. Divide this value by the SampleRate to get the duration as a time value in seconds.
- 4** The base sample rate of the essence.
- 5** The number of channels in the file. Each frame of essence will have the same number of channels, multiplexed in the same order.
- 6** The number of bits used to encode a sample of a single channel.
- 7** The size, in bytes, of a set of samples for all channels in a single sample period. This value should be equal to  $(QuantizationBits / 8) * ChannelCount$ .

#### 4.4.1.7. Random Index Pack (R.I.P.)

All d-cinema Track Files end with a Random Index Pack (RIP). The RIP provides a lookup table that gives the location of all partitions in the file for easy random access. The number of partitions shown by the RIP should be three if the MXF file is a sound or picture Track File, and may be more than three for a Timed Text Track File.

#### Example 4.10. MXF Random Index Pack (RIP)

```

06.0e.2b.34.02.05.01.01.0d.01.02.01.01.11.01.00 len:      40 (RandomIndexMetadata) 1
0      : 0
1      : 16384
0      : 110688380

```

#### MXF Random Index Pack (RIP)

- 1** The Random Index Pack (RIP) maps the location of each partition in an MXF file. This example shows three partitions.

## 4.4.2. Image and Audio Packaging Standard

### Objective

- Verify that sound and image essence are wrapped in files conforming to Material Exchange Format (MXF) as defined by [SMPTE-377-1], and further constrained by [SMPTE-379-1], [SMPTE-429-3], and [SMPTE-429-4], [SMPTE-422] for image, or [SMPTE-382] for sound.
- If the Essence Container is encrypted, verify that this conforms to [SMPTE-429-6].

### Procedures

1. Using the **klvwalk** software utility, produce a listing of the MXF KLV Header Metadata Structure. Error free completion of the command confirms the validity of the MXF structure. Any other result is cause to fail the test.
2. Examine the listing for the MXF Partition Pack structure with a ClosedCompleteHeader Universal Label (UL) value: `060e2b34.0205.0101.0d010201.01020400` as shown in Example 4.5: MXF Partition Header item **1**. Absence of this value is cause to fail this test.
3. Examine the listing for the OperationalPattern value: `060e2b34.0401.0102.0d010201.10000000`, as shown in Example 4.5 item **2**. Absence of this value is cause to fail this test.
4. Examine the listing for the Essence Container values as shown in Example 4.5 item **3**. There are three valid possibilities for the data in this field:
  - a. If two values are present, and they are:  
`060e2b34.0401.0103.0d010301.027f0100` and  
`060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020c0100`,  
 then the file is an Image file. For more information see Section 4.4.1.5: Essence Descriptor for JPEG 2000.
  - b. If two values are present, and they are:  
`060e2b34.0401.0103.0d010301.027f0100` and  
`060e2b34.0401.0101.0d010301.02060100`,  
 then the file is an Sound file. For more information see Section 4.4.1.6: Essence Descriptor for PCM Audio.
  - c. If two values are present, and they are:  
`060e2b34.0401.0103.0d010301.027f0100` and  
`060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020b0100`,  
 the Essence is ciphertext and an additional procedure, listed below, must be carried out.  
 Failure to meet exactly one of the valid possibilities is cause to fail this test.
5. Examine the listing and locate the EssenceContainerData set, UL value: `060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01012300`. This should contain exactly one LinkedPackageUID value. Verify that there is only one SourcePackage set, UL value: `060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01013700` and that the PackageUID value exactly matches the LinkedPackageUID value of the EssenceContainerData set. Failure of any of the above conditions is cause to fail this test.
6. Only for the case of Encrypted Essence, the SourcePackage set, UL value: `060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01013700`, should contain a third Track UID that matches the InstanceUID value of a single StaticTrack set, UL value:

060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01013a00.

The StaticTrack set should have a Sequence value that matches the InstanceUID of a Sequence set, UL value:

060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01010f00.

The found Sequence set should have a StructuralComponents value that matches the InstanceUID of a single DMSEgement set, UL value:

060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01014100.

The DMSEgement set should have a DMFramework value that matches a single CryptographicFramework set, UL value:

060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010401.02010000.

The CryptographicFramework set should have a ContextSR value that matches the InstanceUID of a single CryptographicContext set, UL value:

060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010401.02020000.

The CryptographicContext set has a SourceEssenceContainer value, which should contain either the UL value:

060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020c0100

for an Image file, or:

060e2b34.0401.0101.0d010301.02060100

for a Sound file. For more information see Section 4.4.1.4: Encrypted Essence. Failure of any of the above conditions is cause to fail this test.

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.2.2.2, 5.2.2.3, 5.2.2.4, 5.2.2.5, 5.2.2.6, 5.3.1, 5.3.2
[SMPTE-377-1]	
[SMPTE-379-1]	
[SMPTE-382]	
[SMPTE-422]	
[SMPTE-429-2]	
[SMPTE-429-3]	
[SMPTE-429-4]	
[SMPTE-429-6]	

Test Equipment
klvwalk

### 4.4.3. Timed Text Track File Format

#### Objective

- Verify that timed text essence is wrapped in files conforming to Material Exchange Format (MXF) as defined by [SMPTE-377-1] and [SMPTE-410], and further constrained by [SMPTE-379-1] and [SMPTE-429-5].
- Verify that timed text essence is encoded according to {ref-SMPTE-428-7}.
- If the Essence Container is encrypted, verify that this conforms to [SMPTE-429-6].

#### Procedures

1. Using the **klvwalk** software utility, produce a listing of the MXF KLV Header Metadata structure. Error free completion of the command confirms the validity of the MXF structure. Any other result is cause to fail the test.
2. Examine the listing for the MXF Partition Pack structure with a ClosedCompleteHeader Universal Label (UL) value: 060e2b34.0205.0101.0d010201.01020400 as shown in Example 4.5: MXF Partition Header item **1**. Absence of this value is cause to fail this test.
3. Examine the listing for the OperationalPattern value: 060e2b34.0401.0102.0d010201.10000000, as shown in Example 4.5 item **2**. Absence of this value is cause to fail this test.
4. Examine the listing for the Essence Container values as shown in Example 4.5 item **3**. There are two valid possibilities for the data in this field:
  - a. If two values are present, and they are:  
060e2b34.0401.0103.0d010301.027f0100 and  
060e2b34.0401.010a.0d010301.02130101,  
then the file is a Timed Text file. For more information see Section 4.4.1.5: Essence Descriptor for JPEG 2000.
  - b. If two values are present, and they are:  
060e2b34.0401.0103.0d010301.027f0100 and  
060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020b0100,  
the Essence is ciphertext and an additional procedure, listed below, must be carried out.  
Failure to meet exactly one of the valid possibilities is cause to fail this test.
5. Examine the listing and locate the EssenceContainerData set, UL value:  
060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01012300.  
This should contain exactly one LinkedPackageUID value. Verify that there is only one SourcePackage set, UL value:  
060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01013700  
and that the PackageUID value exactly matches the LinkedPackageUID value of the EssenceContainerData set.  
Failure of any of the above conditions is cause to fail this test.
6. Only for the case of Encrypted Essence, execute sub-procedure #6 as given in Section 4.4.2. In this case the SourceEssenceContainer value within the CryptographicContext set contain the UL value:  
060e2b34.0401.010a.0d010301.02130101  
to indicate a Timed Text file. Failure of any of the above conditions is cause to fail this test.



**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.3.4
[SMPTE-428-7]	
[SMPTE-429-5]	
[SMPTE-429-6]	

Test Equipment
klvwalk

NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 4.4.4. Track File Length

#### Objective

For each Track File, verify that the minimum duration is a number of frames which is greater or equal to one second of content playback at the specified edit rate. This means that each image Track File needs to contain at least 24 (at 24 fps frame rate) or 48 (at 48 fps frame rate) frames, and that each audio Track File needs to contain at least 48,000 (at 48kHz sampling rate) or 96,000 (at 96 kHz sampling rate) audio samples.

#### Procedures

This may be accomplished by using the *asdcp-test* software utility to provide information about the file and confirming that the reported ContainerDuration value is equal or greater than the SampleRate value. Failure to meet the above conditions is cause to fail this test.

E.g.

```
$ asdcp-test -i -v <input-file>
...
SampleRate: 24/1
...
ContainerDuration: 528
...
$
```

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.3.1.3

Test Equipment
asdcp-test

## 4.4.5. Image Track File Frame Boundary

### Objective

- Image Track Files must begin and end with complete frames that allow for splicing. Verify that both the first and the last JPEG2000 image in a sequence are completely contained within the Image Track File, i.e., no other Track Files are needed for complete decoding or displaying of the first and the last frame.
- Each complete Frame of Image Data must be wrapped within the KLV structure according to [SMPTE-336] and [SMPTE-422].

### Procedures

1. Determine the number of frames contained in the Track File. This will be used in the next step to extract the last frame in the file. This can be achieved by using the **asdcp-test** software utility, and subtracting one from the ContainerDuration value, as shown below.

```

$ asdcp-test -i -v PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
File essence type is JPEG 2000 pictures.
  ProductUUID: 43059a1d-0432-4101-b83f-736815acf31d
  ProductVersion: Unreleased 1.1.13
  CompanyName: DCI
  ProductName: asdcplib
  EncryptedEssence: No
  AssetUUID: 0e676fb1-951b-45c4-8334-ed2c59199815
  Label Set Type: SMPTE
  AspectRatio: 2048/1080
  EditRate: 24/1
  StoredWidth: 2048
  StoredHeight: 1080
  Rsize: 3
  Xsize: 2048
  Ysize: 1080
  XOsize: 0
  YOsize: 0
  XTsize: 2048
  YTsize: 1080
  XTOsize: 0
  YTOsize: 0
  ContainerDuration: 240
Color Components:
  11.1.1
  11.1.1
  11.1.1
Default Coding (16): 01040001010503030000778888888888
Quantization Default (33): 227f187f007f007ebc76ea76ea76bc6f4c6f4c6f645803580358455fd25fd25f61

```

2. Using the **asdcp-test** software utility, extract the first and the last frames of content from the Track File.

```

$ asdcp-test -x first -d 1 -f 0 PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
$ asdcp-test -x last -d 1 -f 239 PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
$ ls
first000000.j2c
last000239.j2c
PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf

```

3. Verify that the first and the last frames of content decode completely, and without errors. Failure to correctly decode either frame is cause to fail this test. This can be achieved by using JPEG 2000 decoding software. An example is shown below. (Note that the output of the **j2c-scan** program is long and has been truncated here for brevity. Please see Section C.5 for a detailed example.)

```
$ j2c-scan frame000000.j2c
digital cinema profile: none
rsiz capabilities: standard
pixel offset from top-left corner: (0, 0)
tile width/height in pixels: (2048, 1080)
image width/height in tiles: (1, 1)
tile #1
  coding style: 1
  progression order: Component-Position-Resolution-Layer
  POC marker flag: 0
  number of quality layers: 1
    rate for layer #1: 0.0
  multi-component transform flag: 1
...
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-336] [SMPTE-422]	5.3.3.2

Test Equipment
asdcg-test j2c-scan

## 4.4.6. Audio Track File Frame Boundary

### Objective

The Audio Track File is required to begin and end with complete frames that are associated with its Image Track File to allow for a clean transition between reels. The audio data within the Track File shall be wrapped using KLV on an image frame boundary.

### Procedures

Verify that exactly the expected number of Audio bytes are embedded within each KLV encoded triplet for each frame of the Audio Track File. This can be achieved by using the software command **klvwalk** to display the length of every WAVEssence set (UL value 060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101) and checking that each frame contains the appropriate number of bytes. The expected number of Audio Bytes per frame can be calculated by using the formula  $len=BPS*Ch*SPF$ , where BPS is the number of Bytes Per Sample (BPS=3), Ch is the number of Audio Channels in the DCP, and SPF is the number of Samples Per Frame value taken from Table 4.2.

If any frame has an actual `len` that differs from the expected value, calculated from the formula, this is cause to fail this test.

The example below shows eight frames of a composition containing six channels of 48kHz samples at 24fps, completely wrapped in KLV triplets ( $3 * 6 * 2000 = 36000$ ).

```
$klvwalk PerfectMovie-pcm-pt.mxf
...
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
060e2b34.0102.0101.0d010301.16010101 len: 36000 (WAVEssence)
...
```

The possible values for the Samples/Frame are shown in table below.

**Table 4.2. Audio Samples Per Frame**

FPS	Sample Rate	Samples/Frame
24	48 kHz	2000
24	96 kHz	4000
48	48 kHz	1000
48	96 kHz	2000

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.3.4.2

<b>Test Equipment</b>
klvwalk

**NOT CURRENT VERSION**  
**ARCHIVED**

## 4.5. Essence

### 4.5.1. Image Structure Container and Image Container Format

#### Objective

- Verify that the images contained in the Track Files conform to an Image Structure Container that consists of either 4K (4096x2160) (Operational Level 1) or 2K (2048x1080) (Operational Level 2 and 3). It is expected that the image structure shall use one of the two containers such that either the horizontal or vertical resolution is filled.
- Verify that both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the image structure container are divisible by four for Level 1, or two for Level 2 and 3 image structures. This ensures that the image can be centered correctly.
- Verify that the bit depth for each code value for a color component shall be 12 bits. This yields 36 bits per pixel.

#### Procedures

1. Using the software command **klvwalk**, locate the **RGBAEssenceDescriptor** set and record the **StoredWidth**, **StoredHeight**, and **AspectRatio** values within. The failure to meet any of the following conditions is cause to fail this test:
  - a. Verify that the first number (numerator) of the **AspectRatio** field is the same as the **StoredWidth** value.
  - b. Verify that the second number (denominator) of the **AspectRatio** field is the same as the **StoredHeight** value.
  - c. Verify that exactly one of the **StoredWidth** or **StoredHeight** values are equal to the **Maximum Horizontal Pixels** or **Maximum Vertical Pixels** values from Table 4.3: Image Structure Operational Levels below.
  - d. Verify that both the **StoredWidth** and **StoredHeight** values are equal to, or less than, the **Maximum Horizontal Pixels** or **Maximum Vertical Pixels** values, respectively, from Table 4.3 below.
  - e. Verify that both the **StoredWidth** and **StoredHeight** values are exactly divisible by two for a 2K file, and four for a 4K file.

An example of the **RGBAEssenceDescriptor** set is shown below:

```
$ klvwalk -r PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
...
060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01012900 len: 169 (RGBAEssenceDescriptor)
    InstanceUID = 82141918-celb-47a5-ac13-c47cfb2e51a7
    GenerationUID = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
    Locators:
    SubDescriptors:
    92e96e5e-6bef-4985-8117-7dfa541f96fa
        LinkedTrackID = 2
        SampleRate = 24/1
        ContainerDuration = 240
        EssenceContainer = 060e2b34.0401.0107.0d010301.020c0100
        Codec = 060e2b34.0401.0109.04010202.03010103
        FrameLayout = 0
        StoredWidth = 2048
        StoredHeight = 1080
        AspectRatio = 2048/1080
        ComponentMaxRef = 4095
        ComponentMinRef = 0
```

...

The valid Image Structure Container values are shown in table below.

**Table 4.3. Image Structure Operational Levels**

Operational Level	Maximum Horizontal Pixels	Maximum Vertical Pixels	Frames per Second
1	4096	2160	24
2	2048	1080	48
3	2048	1080	24

- Using the software commands **asdcp-test** and **j2c-scan**, extract an image frame from the file and verify that the bit depth for each component is 12 bits. A component bit-depth value other than 12 shall be cause to fail this test.

An example of this operation is shown below:

```
$ asdcp-test -d 1 -x frame j2c/PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
$ j2c-scan frame_000001.j2c
coding parameters
digital cinema profile: none
rsiz capabilities: standard
pixel offset from top-left corner: (0, 0)
tile width/height in pixels: (2048, 1080)
image width/height in tiles: (1, 1)
...
```

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.2.1.2, 3.2.1.3, 3.2.1.7
[SMPTE-428-1]	

Test Equipment
klvwalk asdcp-test j2c-scan




## 4.5.2. Image Compression Standard & Encoding Parameters

### Objective

Verify that the image encoding parameters in a Picture Track File conform to [SMPTE-429-4].

### Procedures

1. Verify that the UL value in the PictureEssenceCoding field of the MXF RGBAEssenceDescriptor (see  in Example 4.8) is one of:  
060e2b34.0401.0109.04010202.03010103 (for 2K images) or  
060e2b34.0401.0109.04010202.03010104 (for 4K images).

If the UL value does not match one of those listed above, or is the wrong value for the contained essence, this is cause to fail the test.

2. Using a software command such as **asdcp-test**, extract all the frames in the Track File to a directory. An example is shown below.

```
$ asdcp-test -x frame j2c/PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
$ ls j2c
frame000000.j2c      frame000057.j2c      frame000124.j2c      frame000191.j2c
frame000001.j2c      frame000058.j2c      frame000125.j2c      frame000192.j2c
frame000002.j2c      frame000059.j2c      frame000126.j2c      frame000192.j2c
frame000003.j2c      frame000060.j2c      frame000127.j2c      frame000194.j2c
...
```

3. Verify that every frame is correctly JPEG 2000 encoded as described in [ISO-15444-1]. Verify that the proper JPEG 2000 encoding parameters as specified in [ISO-15444-1-AMD-1] were used. The Codestream Specifications for 2K and 4K distributions are listed in [DCI-DCSS-1-2], section 4.4. This can be achieved by using JPEG 2000 decoding software. An example is shown below. (Note that the output of the **j2c-scan** program is long and has been truncated here for brevity. Please see Section C.5 for a detailed example.) If any frame fails to correctly decode or does not conform to the appropriate Codestream Specifications, this is cause to fail the test.

```
$ j2c-scan frame000000.j2c
digital cinema profile: none
rsiz capabilities: standard
pixel offset from top-left corner: (0, 0)
tile width/height in pixels: (2048, 1080)
image width/height in tiles: (1, 1)
tile #1
coding style: 1
progression order: Component-Position-Resolution-Layer
POC marker flag: 0
number of quality layers: 1
rate for layer #1: 0.0
multi-component transform flag: 1
...
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.2.1.5, 4.2, 4.4

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[ISO-15444-1] [ISO-15444-1-AMD-1] [SMPTE-429-4]	

Test Equipment
asdcp-test OpenJPEG

**ARCHIVED**  
**NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 4.5.3. Audio Characteristics

#### Objective

Sound Track Files shall conform to the specifications given in [SMPTE-428-2] and [SMPTE-428-3], and be constrained as specified in [SMPTE-429-2]. A Sound Track File shall contain linear PCM audio sampled at 48000 or 96000 samples per second, 24 bits per sample. The file shall contain no more than 16 channels of audio.

#### Procedures

Using the software command **klvwalk**, locate the WaveAudioDescriptor set which starts with the Universal Label (UL) of 060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01014800. An example is shown below.

```
$ klvwalk -r PerfectMovie-pcm-pt.mxf
...
060e2b34.0253.0101.0d010101.01014800 len: 134 (WaveAudioDescriptor)
InstanceUID = e1c4c755-2c3e-4274-a3bf-581aadd63a4b
GenerationUID = 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
Locators:
SubDescriptors:
LinkedTrackID = 2
SampleRate = 24/1
ContainerDuration = 480
EssenceContainer = 060e2b34.0401.0101.0d010301.02060100
Codec = 00000000.0000.0000.00000000.00000000
AudioSamplingRate = 48000/1
Locked = 0
AudioRefLevel = 0
ChannelCount = 6
QuantizationBits = 24
DialNorm = 0
BlockAlign = 18
SequenceOffset = 0
AvgBps = 144000
...
```

Verify the following:

1. The EssenceContainer field has a value of 060e2b34.0401.0101.0d010301.02060100. Any other value is cause to fail this test.
2. The ChannelAssignment field is not present, or, if present, has a value from the set of UL values defined in [SMPTE-429-2], Appendix A, "Audio Channel Assignment Label". Any other value in the ChannelAssignment field is cause to fail this test.
3. The AudioSamplingRate field has a value of either 48000/1 or 96000/1. Any deviation from these values is cause to fail this test.
4. The ChannelCount field has a value of no fewer than six (6) and no greater than sixteen (16). Any deviation from these values is cause to fail this test.
5. The QuantizationBits field has a value of 24. Any other value is cause to fail this test.
6. The BlockAlign field is exactly the value of ChannelCount \* 3. Any other value is cause to fail this test.

7. The AvgBps field is exactly the value of the AudioSamplingRate \* ChannelCount \* 3. Any other value is cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.3.2.2, 3.3.4.1
[SMPTE-428-2]	
[SMPTE-428-3]	
[SMPTE-429-2]	

Test Equipment
klvwalk

NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 4.5.4. Timed Text Resource Encoding

### Objective

- Verify that timed text descriptions in XML conform to [SMPTE-428-7].
- Verify that font resources conform to [ISO-144496].
- Verify that sub-picture resources conform to [ISO-15948].

### Procedures

1. Extract the Timed Text Resource and any Ancillary Resources from the Track File.
2. Verify that the Timed Text Resource is an XML document that can be validated using the schema from [SMPTE-428-7]. If the XML validation produces errors, this is cause to fail this test.

```
$ schema-check testfile.xml S428-7-2007.xsd
$
```

3. Verify that any font resources are valid according to [ISO-144496]. If the font validation produces errors, this is cause to fail this test.

```
$ ftlint 1 font_file.otf
font_file.otf: OK.
$
```

4. Verify that any subpicture resources are valid according to [ISO-15948]. The subpicture must be of PNG format, decode without errors, and the size (geometry) must be smaller than, or equal to, that of the main picture. If the png file causes **identify** to report errors, or if the geometry of the PNG is greater than that of the main picture, this is cause to fail this test.

```
$ identify -verbose subpicture_0001.png
Image: subpicture_0001.png
Format: PNG (Portable Network Graphics)
Geometry: 120x420
Class: DirectClass
Colorspace: RGB
Type: GrayscaleMatte
Depth: 8 bits
...
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.4.2.2, 4.4.3.2, 3.4.3.4
[ISO-144496]	
[ISO-15948]	

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-428-7]	

Test Equipment
schema-check ftlint identify

NOT CURRENT VERSION  
 ARCHIVED

## 4.6. Digital Cinema Package

### 4.6.1. DCP Integrity

#### Objective

- Verify that the Volume Asset Map is present, correctly formatted, and correctly located in the filesystem.
- Verify that for all the Packing Lists found in the Asset Map file, all of the assets referenced in each Packing List are present and are valid (i.e., each Referenced Asset's file size and Message Digest are correct).

File Integrity will be guaranteed by applying the SHA-1 hashing algorithm [RFC-3174] to each asset included in the DCP. The resulting message digest is Base64 encoded and included in the Packing List file.

- Verify that for all the Composition Playlists found in each Packing List, the Referenced Assets exist in the Packing List file.

#### Procedures

1. Validate the Format of the Volume Asset Map file by executing the test procedure Section 4.1.1: Asset Map File.
2. Validate the Format of the Volume Index file by executing the test procedure Section 4.1.2: Volume Index File.
3. Validate the Format of each Packing List file by executing the test procedure Section 4.2.1: Packing List File.
4. Validate the Signature of each Packing List file by executing the test procedure Section 4.2.2: Packing List Signature Validation.
5. For each Packing List file (e.g. PerfectMovie.pkl.xml) in the Asset Map:
  - a. Open the Packing List and for each Asset Id contained within:
    - i. Locate the Referenced Asset in the filesystem and compare its file size with the value listed in the <Size> element of the <Asset> element. Inconsistency is cause to fail this test.
    - ii. Calculate the Message Digest of the Referenced Asset and encode the result in Base64. Compare the result with the value listed in the <Hash> element of the <Asset> element. Inconsistency is cause to fail this test. The following is an example using the **asdcp-test** software utility:

```
$ asdcp-test -t PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf  
t0MirEHOVFF4MilIP0iYVjrVb14= PerfectMovie-j2c-pt.mxf
```

6. Validate the Format of each Composition Playlist file by executing the test procedure Section 4.3.1: Composition Playlist File.
7. Validate the Signature of each Composition Playlist file by executing the test procedure Section 4.3.2: Composition Playlist Signature Validation.
8. For each Composition Playlist (e.g. PerfectMovie.cpl.xml) in the Asset Map:
  - a. Open the Composition Playlist and for each Asset Id contained within:

- i. Locate the Asset Id in the Packing List file. Any missing Asset Ids are cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [PKCS-1] [RFC-3174] [SMPTE-429-8]	5.2.2.6, 5.3.1.9, 5.5.2.3, 5.5.3.2, 9.7.5

Test Equipment
asdcv-test

ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION



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# Chapter 5. Common Security Features

This chapter contains test procedures of security features that apply to more than one type of device. Procedures are given for Type 1 and Type 2 Secure Processing Block (SPB) physical security requirements, Intra-theater communications, and security log reporting.

## 5.1. SPB Security Features

The test procedures in this section apply to any device or component that is classified as a Type 1 or Type 2 SPB.

### 5.1.1. SPB Digital Certificate

#### Objective

*This following applies only if the Test Subject is an SPB*

Verify that the Test Subject carries the correct number of leaf certificates conforming to [SMPTE-430-2].

Verify that the roles contained in the Common Name field of the Test Subject certificate(s) are consistent with the combinations of Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], and Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], and accurately reflect the security functions of the Test Subject.

Verify that the exterior surface of the device containing the Test Subject is labeled with information traceable to the Common Name of the Test Subject.

#### Procedures

If and only if the Test Subject is a MB using a dual certificate implementation, as defined in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]:

1. Obtain the Test Subject leaf certificates from the manufacturer:
  - a. Failure to present exactly two leaf certificates is cause to fail this test.
  - b. Having two leaf certificates with identical Subject DnQualifier values is cause to fail this test.
  - c. Verify that the Subject Common Name of exactly one of the certificates presented minimally includes the SM role listed in Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], and does not contain any of the role combination listed in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]. Failure to verify both these requirements is cause to fail the test.
  - d. Verify that the Key Usage constraints field of the SM role certificate identified in the previous step includes "Key Encipherment. The "Digital Signature" flag shall not be set. Failure to verify both these requirements is cause to fail the test.
  - e. Verify that the Subject Common Name of the other certificate presented minimally includes the LS role listed in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2] and does not contain any role or role combination other than that listed in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
  - f. Verify that the Key Usage constraints field of the LS role certificate identified in the previous step includes "Digital Signature. The "Key Encipherment" flag shall not be set. Failure to verify both these requirements is cause to fail the test.

2. Using manufacturer-supplied documentation, compile the list of expected role identifiers corresponding to the security functions of the Test Subject -- see [SMPTE-430-2], and Sections 9.5.1.1 and 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2] for lists of roles.
  - a. Verify that any role identifiers, additionally included in the Subject Common Name of the certificate that contains the SM role, correspond to listed security functions implemented by the Test Subject. Any role designation that does not match a security function is cause to fail the test.
  - b. Verify that the LS role identifier, is not contained in the Subject Common Name of the certificate that contains the SM role. Failure to verify this requirement is cause to fail the test.
  - c. Verify that, if the Test Subject implements Link Encryption, the LE role identifier, is included in the Subject Common Name of the certificate that contains the LS role and is not contained in the Subject Common Name of the certificate that contains the SM role. Failure to verify both these requirements is cause to fail the test.
3. Verify that the Subject Common Name field of both the certificates collected in step 1 contains the serial number of the Test Subject. Additional identifying information may be present. Failure of this verification for either certificate is cause to fail the test.
4. Verify that information identifying the make and model of the Test Subject is carried in the Subject field of both the certificates collected in step 1. Additional identifying information may be present. Failure of this verification for either certificate is cause to fail the test.
5. Verify that either the make, model and serial number of the Test Subject, or information that is unambiguously traceable by the manufacturer to the Subject field of both certificates collected in step 1, is clearly placed on the exterior of the device containing the Test Subject. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.

For any other SPB:

1. Obtain the Test Subject leaf certificate from the manufacturer:
  - a. Failure to present exactly one leaf certificate is cause to fail this test.
  - b. Verify that the Subject Common Name of the certificate presented minimally includes at least one the role combinations listed in Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2] and does not contain any of the role combination listed in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]. Failure to verify both these requirements is cause to fail the test.
2. Using manufacturer-supplied documentation, compile the list of expected role identifiers corresponding to the security functions of the Test Subject -- see [SMPTE-430-2], and Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2] for lists of roles. Verify that any role identifiers, additionally included in the Subject Common Name of the certificate, correspond to listed security functions implemented by the Test Subject. Any role designation that does not match a security function is cause to fail the test.
3. Verify that the Subject Common Name field of the certificate collected in step 1 contains the serial number of the Test Subject. Additional identifying information may be present. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
4. Verify that information identifying the make and model of the Test Subject is carried in the Subject field of the certificate collected in step 1. Additional identifying information may be present. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
5. Verify that either the make, model and serial number of the Test Subject, or information that is unambiguously traceable by the manufacturer to the Subject field of the certificate collected in step 1, is clearly placed on the exterior of the device containing the Test Subject. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.1, 9.5.1.1, 9.5.1.2
[SMPTE-430-2]	

**ARCHIVED**  
**NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 5.1.2. Deleted Section

The section "SPB Type 2 Security Perimeter" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

**ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 5.1.3. Deleted Section

The section "SPB Type 2 Secure Silicon" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

**ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION**

## 5.2. Intra-Theater Communication

The procedures in this section apply to devices which can initiate or respond to TLS session requests using TCP port 1173.

### 5.2.1. TLS Session Initiation

#### Objective

- Verify that once started, the Security Manager (SM) establishes a TLS session with all SPB devices it is configured to recognize. Verify that each TLS session is persistent until commanded to terminate.
- Verify that once started, a Remote Type 1 SPB responds to the Security Manager's (SM's) initiatives in establishing a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session. Verify that each TLS session is persistent until commanded to terminate.
- Verify that mutual authentication takes place by exchange of device certificates or complete certificate chains. Verify that the Test Subject successfully connects in both cases.

#### Procedures

#### Note

This test can involve the use of more than one *asm-responder* simulator program, each with its own device certificate. This places special emphasis on preparing and selecting the correct KDM for a stage of the test. The KDM's TDL needs to be populated with the appropriate certificate thumbprints for the device or combination of devices intended.

If the Test Subject is a Security Manager device:

1. Configure the Test Subject to recognize as many remote SPBs as the system will allow. Record this value.
2. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator, providing only a single device certificate for authentication. Use the `--requester-certificate-file-dump` option to capture the certificate(s) supplied by the Test Subject during authentication.

```
$ ls -l /home/asm/pem_dir
total 16
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1606 2009-04-20 04:20 certificate.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1675 2009-04-20 04:20 privatekey.pem

$ asm-responder \
--pem-path /home/asm/pem_dir/ \
--requester-certificate-file-dump foo.pem
```

There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.

3. From an unpowered state, power up the Test Subject. Verify that for each responder, the SM establishes a TLS session after startup.
4. Record whether the connection succeeds. Failure to connect successfully is cause to fail this test.
5. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator, providing the full certificate chain for authentication. Use the `--requester-certificate-file-dump` option to capture the certificate(s) supplied by the Test Subject during authentication.

```

$ ls -l /home/asm/pem_dir
total 16
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1606 2009-04-20 04:20 certificate.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6258 2009-04-20 04:20 chain.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1675 2009-04-20 04:20 privatekey.pem

$ asm-responder \
--pem-path /home/asm/pem_dir/ \
--requester-certificate-file-dump foo.pem

```

There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.

6. From an unpowered state, power up the Test Subject. Verify that for each responder, the SM establishes a TLS session after startup. Record the time reported as each session is established.
7. Record whether the connection succeeds. Failure to connect successfully is cause to fail this test.
8. Verify that leaf certificates are exchanged by both sides during TLS initialization and that the certificates are valid per [SMPTE-430-2]. Signing certificates may also be present. If a complete certificate chain is not issued by the Test Subject, obtain the remainder of the chain from the manufacturer. Verify that the Test Subject's chain is complete and valid.
  - a. If the Test Subject is a *MB using dual certificate implementation*, verify that the leaf certificate of the Test Subject is a Log Signer Certificate (LS Cert), as defined in Section 9.5.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
9. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)* and *KDM KDM for 2K StEM Sequence (Encrypted)*.
10. Verify that for each responder, the TLS session remains connected for the duration of the presentation. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
11. Leave the Test Subject and responder powered up until at least 24 hours have elapsed from the time recorded in Step 6, or until the TLS session is noticed to have ended, whichever happens first.
12. Examine the output from each responder for the first occurrence of the TLS session disconnecting. Record the time reported and calculate the duration of the TLS session by subtracting the value recorded in Step 6. A duration exceeding 24 hours without the TLS session closing is cause to fail this test.
13. Verify that each responder reports re-establishment of a new TLS session after a previous session is terminated. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
14. For each successfully connected responder, disconnect the responder from the test network long enough to cause the SM to close the connection (use manufacturer-supplied documentation to determine the appropriate delay).
15. Reconnect the disconnected responder. Verify that the SM re-establishes a TLS session within the time specified by the manufacturer. Failure to re-establish a TLS session is cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is a Remote Type 1 SPB:

1. Configure the Test Subject to accept connections from an *asm-requester* simulator.
2. Command the *asm-requester* to connect to the Test Subject, providing only a single device certificate for authentication. Use the `--responder-certificate-file-dump` option to capture the certificate(s) supplied by the Test Subject during authentication.

```
$ ls -l /home/asm/pem_dir
total 16
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1606 2009-04-20 04:20 certificate.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1675 2009-04-20 04:20 privatekey.pem

$ asm-requester --responder-address 192.168.1.100 \
--pem-path /home/asm/pem_dir/ \
--responder-certificate-file-dump foo.pem
```

3. Record whether the connection succeeds. Failure to connect successfully is cause to fail this test.
4. Command the *asm-requester* to connect to the Test Subject, providing the full certificate chain for authentication. Use the `--responder-certificate-file-dump` option to capture the certificate(s) supplied by the Test Subject during authentication.

```
$ ls -l /home/asm/pem_dir
total 16
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1606 2009-04-20 04:20 certificate.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 6258 2009-04-20 04:20 chain.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1675 2009-04-20 04:20 privatekey.pem

$ asm-requester --responder-address 192.168.1.100 \
--pem-path /home/asm/pem_dir/ \
--responder-certificate-file-dump foo.pem
```

5. Record whether the connection succeeds. Failure to connect successfully is cause to fail this test.
6. Verify that leaf certificates are exchanged by both sides during TLS initialization and that the certificates are valid per [SMPTE-430-2]. Signing certificates may also be present. If a complete certificate chain is not issued by the Test Subject, obtain the remainder of the chain from the manufacturer. Verify that the Test Subject's chain is complete and valid.
  - a. If the Test Subject is an *LDB* and is *not permanently married to the Projector SPB*, verify that the Test Subject's chain is that of the LDB and not that of the married Projector SPB (see Section 9.4.3.6.5 in [DCI-DCSS-1-2]). Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.3.6.2, 9.4.5.2.3, 9.4.3.6.5, 9.5.1, 9.4.5.3.2
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM Sequence (Encrypted)



## 5.2.2. Auditorium Security Messages

Auditorium Security Messages (ASM) are used to communicate runtime security information between a Security Manager (SM) and a remote Link Decryptor Block (LDB). The following test procedures apply to any device which can initiate (TLS client) or terminate (TLS server) a TLS session.

To test a device which implements ASM, it will be necessary to use an ASM simulator program or any suitably instrumented peer device. To simplify the descriptions in the procedures below, the language assumes the use of an ASM simulator. A detailed description of a reference ASM simulator is given in Appendix D: *ASM Simulator*.

### 5.2.2.1. Auditorium Security Message Support

#### Objective

Verify that Auditorium Security Messages (ASM) are implemented on TCP port number 1173 per [SMPTE-430-6]. Verify that the ASM QuerySPB message is implemented.

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Security Manager device:

1. Set up and start an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Turn on the Test Subject. Verify that the Test Subject establishes a TLS session with the responder after startup.
3. Verify that the Test Subject issues a TCP open request on TCP port 1173.
4. Verify that a leaf certificate for the Test Subject is received by the *asm-responder* simulator during TLS initialization and that the certificate is valid per [SMPTE-430-2]. Signing certificates may also be present. If a complete certificate chain is not issued by the Test Subject, obtain the remainder of the chain from the manufacturer. Verify that the Test Subject's chain is complete and valid.
5. Verify that a QuerySPB message is sent by the Test Subject no later than 30 seconds after TLS startup (as reported by the responder).
6. Failure to verify all conditions above is cause to fail this test.
7. Re-start the responder using the **--damage-queryspb** option (causes the program to issue malformed QuerySPB responses).
8. Re-start the Test Subject. Verify that the Test Subject establishes a TLS session with the responder after startup. The Test Subject may report ASM errors and may ultimately fail in establishing the session. Failure of the Test Subject to attempt to establish a TLS session is cause to fail this test.
9. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the ASM `LinkException` events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `ASMMessageError` exception in the `LinkException` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `ASMMessageError` exception in any of the associated `LinkException` log records shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is a remote SPB device:

1. Turn on the Test Subject. Allow the device to come to an idle state. Confirm that there are no conditions present that would cause the device to respond to a QuerySPB request with an error or security alert.
2. Set up and start an *asm-requester* simulator. Verify that the requester establishes a TLS session with the Test Subject after startup.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

3. Verify that the Test Subject accepts the respective TCP open request on TCP port 1173.
4. Verify that a leaf certificate for the Test Subject is received by the *asm-requester* simulator during TLS initialization and that the certificate is valid per [SMPTE-430-2]. Signing certificates may also be present. If a complete certificate chain is not issued by the Test Subject, obtain the remainder of the chain from the manufacturer. Verify that the Test Subject's chain is complete and valid.
5. Cause the requester to issue the QuerySPB message.
6. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6] with a successful General Response element and a Response Status other than Security Alert.
7. Failure to verify all conditions above is cause to fail this test.
8. Re-start the requester using the **--damage-queryspb** option (causes the program to issue malformed QuerySPB requests). Allow the program to run for ten (10) seconds then stop it (using [Ctrl-C]).
9. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the ASM LinkException events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a ASMMessageError exception in the LinkException log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing ASMMessageError exception in any of the associated LinkException log records shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.5.2.3, 9.4.5.3
[SMPTE-430-2]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

## 5.2.2.2. ASM Failure Behavior

### Objective

- Verify that an ASM requester continues to operate normally when it receives a ResponderBusy response.
- Verify that an ASM responder provides a response within the recommended delay interval specified in [SMPTE-430-6].
- Verify that an ASM responder provides appropriate security alert response codes for significant security events.

### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Set up and configure an *asm-responder* simulator. Command the responder to return all ASM requests (except QuerySPB) with ResponderBusy.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...) \
  --respond-with "Busy"
```

2. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and the responder.
3. Set up and play a show using the DCP and KDM contained in *DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)* and *KDM for 2K StEM Sequence (Encrypted)* (valid DCP). Start of playout of the show shall be cause to fail this test (the SM has not yet collected logs and loaded link keys).
4. Command the responder to respond normally to all ASM requests. Verify that the Test Subject can begin playout of the show without requiring a system restart. Failure to play the show is cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* and the Test Subject.
2. Command the requester to issue an arbitrary sequence of requests (e.g. LEKeyLoad, LEKeyQuery, ...) and to monitor QuerySPB status.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) \
  --messagetype <message-type>
```

Verify that for each command, the Test Subject responds within the two (2) second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6]. A response delay greater than two seconds shall be cause to fail this test.

3. For Test Subjects which have field-operable perimeter access, open an access panel and verify that the Subject then responds to all QuerySPB requests with the Security Alert status value and the success General Response value. Failure to report Security Alert status is cause to fail this test.
4. For Test Subjects which can participate in marriage to a companion device and be accessed via ASM in the divorced state, place the device in the "divorced" state and verify that the Subject then responds to all QuerySPB requests with the Security Alert status value and the success General Response value. Failure to report Security Alert status is cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.3.2
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM Sequence (Encrypted)

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### 5.2.2.3. ASM "RRP Invalid"

#### Objective

Verify that an ASM "RRP Invalid" response is supported.

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Configure the Test Subject (a MB) to use the *asm-responder* simulator program instead of a normal projector.
2. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and the responder, configured to respond normally to all commands.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

3. Set up and begin playing a show using the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
4. Before the show finishes playing, command the responder to return all ASM requests with a General Response Element `RRP Invalid` (consult the documentation for the *asm-responder* software for detailed information).
5. The Test Subject is required to terminate and prevent further playback not more than 32 seconds after Step 4 is executed. Failure to verify this requirement is cause to fail the test. Note: 32 seconds is the aggregate of the 30 second maximum time allowed between successive `QuerySPB` requests and the 2 second maximum time for response to an ASM command.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-6]	9.4.5, 9.4.3.5(9a), 9.4.3.5(15)

Test Equipment
asm-responder

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

### 5.2.2.4. ASM "GetTime"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the `GetTime` command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a `GetTime` request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to implement the `GetTime` command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the requester to issue a `GetTime` request. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.
4. Record the difference measured between the time value returned and real time as reported by the reference clock.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder
asm-requester
Accurate Real-Time Clock

### 5.2.2.5. ASM "GetEventList"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the `GetEventList` command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a `GetEventList` request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to implement the `GetEventList` command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject, and command the *asm-requester* simulator to issue a `GetEventList` request.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

### 5.2.2.6. ASM "GetEventID"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the `GetEventID` command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

Each `GetEventID` procedure call returns an XML document with a top-level element `LogRecord`. See Example 5.2 for more information about this data type.

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a `GetEventID` request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to issue the `GetEventID` command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the requester to issue a `GetEventID` request. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder
asm-requester



### 5.2.2.7. ASM "LEKeyLoad"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the LEKeyLoad command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and the *asm-responder* simulator program.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a LEKeyLoad request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the *asm-responder* simulator program without error.
3. Examine the output of the *asm-responder* simulator program and verify the Expire Time for each key loaded is 21600 seconds (6 hours). Any delivered LE Key with an Expire Time other than 21600 shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Failure of the device to issue the LEKeyLoad command is cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the *asm-requester* simulator program and the Test Subject, specifying the LEKeyLoad command.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) \  
--messagetype LEKeyLoad
```

2. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Command the simulator to flood the Test Subject with LEKeyLoad messages. Verify that the Subject responds to overflow with an appropriate error.
4. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder

<b>Test Equipment</b>
asm-requester

**NOT CURRENT VERSION  
ARCHIVED**

### 5.2.2.8. ASM "LEKeyQueryID"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the LEKeyQueryID command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a LEKeyQueryID request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to implement the LEKeyQueryID command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the simulator to issue an LEKeyLoad request for a new random key. Verify that the Test Subject responds with success within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Command the simulator to issue an LEKeyQueryID request for the key loaded in Step 2. Verify that the Test Subject responds with success within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
4. Command the simulator to issue an LEKeyQueryID request for a known bogus key ID. Verify that the Test Subject responds with failure within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
5. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-6]	9.4.5

Test Equipment
asm-responder asm-requester

### 5.2.2.9. ASM "LEKeyQueryAll"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the LEKeyQueryAll command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and a *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a LEKeyQueryAll request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to implement the LEKeyQueryAll command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the requester to issue a LEKeyQueryAll request. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

### 5.2.2.10. ASM "LEKeyPurgeID"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the LEKeyPurgeID command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a LEKeyPurgeID request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to implement the LEKeyPurgeID command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the requester to issue a LEKeyPurgeID request. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder
asm-requester

### 5.2.2.11. ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll"

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject implements the LEKeyPurgeAll command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is an ASM requester:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a LEKeyPurgeAll request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.
3. Failure of the device to implement the LEKeyPurgeAll command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an ASM responder:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the requester to issue a LEKeyPurgeAll request. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].
3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

### 5.2.2.12. ASM "GetProjCert"

#### Objective

Only applies to a MB that uses Link Encryption (ASM requester) or an LDB (ASM responder).

Verify that the Test Subject implements the GetProjCert command per [SMPTE-430-6].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a MB that uses Link Encryption:

1. Initiate an ASM session between the Test Subject and an *asm-responder* simulator.

```
$ asm-responder (... standard options ...)
```

2. Cause the Test Subject to issue a GetProjCert request. This can occur during normal operation of the Test Subject or may require the operator to perform a specific set of instructions. Consult with the system manufacturer to determine requirements. Observe that the request is accepted by the responder without error.

3. Failure of the device to implement the GetProjCert command is cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB:

1. Initiate an ASM session between an *asm-requester* simulator and the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...)
```

2. Command the requester to issue a GetProjCert request. Verify that the Test Subject responds within the 2 second maximum delay period recommended by [SMPTE-430-6].

3. Failure to verify the conditions above is cause to fail the test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.3.6.5, 9.4.5.2.4
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder
asm-requester

## 5.2.3. TLS Exception Logging

### Objective

Verify that a `CertFormatError` exception is recorded in the `LinkOpened` security log record in the case that the signing certificate of the device certificate at the other end of the TLS link is of an incorrect format.

Verify that a `TLSError` exception is recorded in the `LinkOpened` security log record in the case that the link fails to open due to an error in the underlying TLS connection.

Verify that a `TLSError` exception is recorded in the `LinkClosed` security log record in the case that an error is detected in the underlying TLS connection.

### Procedures

#### Note

This test can involve the use of more than one *asm-responder* simulator program, each with its own device certificate. This places special emphasis on preparing and selecting the correct KDM for a stage of the test. The KDM's TDL needs to be populated with the appropriate certificate thumbprints for the device or combination of devices intended.

If the Test Subject is a Security Manager device:

1. Configure the Test Subject to recognize as many remote SPBs as the system will allow. Record this value.
2. Perform the following procedures:
  - a. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator using device certificates that do not conform to [SMPTE-430-2] (e.g. device certificates with SHA1 signatures). There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.
  - b. From an unpowered state, power up the Test Subject. Verify that for each responder, the SM does not establish a TLS session after startup. If the SM connects to any responder this is cause to fail this test.
  - c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `LinkOpened` event associated with the above steps and:
    - i. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
    - ii. Confirm the presence of a `CertFormatError` exception in the `LinkOpened` log records. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `CertFormatError` exception in any of the associated `LinkOpened` log records shall be cause to fail this test.
3. Perform the following procedures:
  - a. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator set to offer an incorrect cyphersuite type to the Test Subject during negotiation. There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.
  - b. From an unpowered state, power up the Test Subject. Verify that for each responder, the SM does not establish a TLS session after startup. If the SM connects to any responder this is cause to fail this test.



- c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `LinkOpened` event associated with the above steps and:
    - i. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
    - ii. Confirm the presence of a `TLSError` exception in the `LinkOpened` log records. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `TLSError` exception in any of the associated `LinkOpened` log records shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Perform the following procedures:
- a. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator. There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.
  - b. From an unpowered state, power up the Test Subject. Verify that for each responder, the SM establishes a TLS session after startup.
  - c. Command each *asm-responder* to inject random data into the raw TLS stream (consult the documentation for the *asm-responder* software for detailed information).
  - d. Verify that the Test Subject disconnects from each *asm-responder* after the injection of the random data. Failure to close the TLS connection shall be cause to fail this test.
  - e. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `LinkClosed` event associated with the above steps and:
    - i. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
    - ii. Confirm the presence of a `TLSError` exception in the `LinkClosed` log records. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `TLSError` exception in any of the associated `LinkClosed` log records shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is a Remote Type 1 SPB:

- 1. Perform the following procedures:
  - a. Configure the Test Subject to accept connections from an *asm-requester* simulator.
  - b. Command the *asm-requester* to connect to the Test Subject, using a device certificate that does not conform to [SMPTE-430-2] (e.g. device certificate with SHA1 signature).
  - c. Verify that the *asm-requester* does not successfully connect to the Test Subject. If the connection opens this is cause to fail this test.
  - d. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `LinkOpened` event associated with the above steps and:
    - i. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
    - ii. Confirm the presence of a `CertFormatError` exception in the `LinkOpened` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `CertFormatError` exception in the associated `LinkOpened` log record shall be cause to fail this test.

2. Perform the following procedures:

- a. Command the *asm-requester*, set to offer an incorrect cyphersuite type during negotiation to connect to the Test Subject.
- b. Verify that the *asm-requester* does not successfully connect to the Test Subject. If the connection opens this is cause to fail this test.
- c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `LinkOpened` event associated with the above steps and:
  - i. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - ii. Confirm the presence of a `TLSError` exception in the `LinkOpened` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `TLSError` exception in the associated `LinkOpened` log record shall be cause to fail this test.

3. Perform the following procedures:

- a. Command the *asm-requester* to connect to the Test Subject. If the Test Subject does not successfully open the connection this is cause to fail this test
- b. Command each *asm-requester* to inject random data into the raw TLS stream (consult the documentation for the *asm-requester* software for detailed information).
- c. Verify that the Test Subject disconnects from each *asm-requester* after the injection of the random data. Failure to close the TLS connection shall be cause to fail this test.
- d. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `LinkClosed` event associated with the above steps and:
  - i. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - ii. Confirm the presence of a `TLSError` exception in the `LinkClosed` log records. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `TLSError` exception in any of the associated `LinkClosed` log records shall be cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.3.6.2, 9.4.5.2.3
[SMPTE-430-2]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-requester
asm-responder

## 5.3. Event Logs

Secure Processing Block (SPB) modules are required to provide event log reports on demand. The log reports are XML documents (see Section 3.1) having a structure defined by [SMPTE-430-4]. This section will describe the report format and present procedures for testing general operational requirements for event logging.

### Note

The method of generating a log report will vary between implementations. Consult the manufacturer's documentation for log report generation instructions.

### 5.3.1. Log Report Format

Standard d-cinema log reports are encoded as XML documents per [SMPTE-430-4]. The reports consist of a preamble, which identifies the device that created the report, and a sequence of log records. In log reports which contain security events (Security Event Logs), some of the log records may contain XML Signature elements. The report format includes many unique security features; the reader should study [SMPTE-430-4] in detail to understand how log authentication works.

The following subsections detail the major features of a log report.

#### 5.3.1.1. Log Report

A collection of one or more log records is presented as an XML document having a single `LogReport` element as the top-level element. The log report begins with `reportDate` and `reportingDevice` elements. The contents of the elements identify the time the log was created and the device that created the log.

#### Example 5.1. Log Report Example

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<LogReport 1
  xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/" 2
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  <reportDate>2007-05-04T09:30:47-08:00</reportDate> 3

  <reportingDevice> 4
    <dcml:DeviceIdentifier idtype="CertThumbprint">YmVsc3dpY2tAZW50ZXJ0ZWNoLmNvbQ==
    </dcml:DeviceIdentifier>
    <dcml:DeviceTypeID
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes#DeviceTypeTokens"
    >SM</dcml:DeviceTypeID>
    <dcml:AdditionalID>vnqteTcB2Gji\+1Hl23sxxgOqvwE=</dcml:AdditionalID> 5
    <dcml:DeviceSerial>000000042</dcml:DeviceSerial> 6
    <dcml:ManufacturerCertID>rlpve6MSncWouNIpFcTShk6w2A=</dcml:ManufacturerCertID>
    <dcml:DeviceCertID>9czqa+0orIADHDIYxAkn/IcmZ3o=</dcml:DeviceCertID> 7
    <dcml:ManufacturerName>Acme Digital Cinema Inc.</dcml:ManufacturerName>
    <dcml:DeviceName>Mojo Media Block</dcml:DeviceName>
    <dcml:ModelNumber>MB-3000</dcml:ModelNumber>
    <dcml:VersionInfo>
      <dcml:Name>Bootloader</dcml:Name>
      <dcml:Value>1.0.0.0</dcml:Value>
      <dcml:Name>Security Module</dcml:Name>
      <dcml:Value>3.4.2.1</dcml:Value>
    </dcml:VersionInfo>
  </reportingDevice>
```

## Log Report Description

- 1 The LogReport element is the root element of a log report document.
- 2 The LogRecord and DCML namespaces are used.
- 3 This value gives the date on which this report document was generated.
- 4 This structure identifies the device that generated this report.
- 5 For log reports generated by an SM that implements dual certificates (see Section 9.5.1.2 at [DCI-DCSS-1-2]), the AdditionalID element is present and contains a thumbprint of the SM Log Signer digital certificate.
- 6 The serial number of reporting device.
- 7 The certificate thumbprint (per [SMPTE-430-2]) of the reporting device.

### 5.3.1.2. Log Record

Each event contained in the log report is encoded as a LogRecordElement element. This element type has three major sub-elements: LogRecordHeader, LogRecordBody, and LogRecordSignature. The first two are shown in the example below, the last is the subject of the next section.

#### Note

The log record element defined in [SMPTE-430-4] is known by two names. The correct name to use depends on context. Testing a candidate document against the LogRecord schema will verify correct use. When a log record (defined as the complex type logRecordType in the LogRecord schema) appears as a sub-element of a LogReport element, the record element name is LogRecordElement. When a log record appears as the root element of an XML document, the record element name is LogRecord.

LogRecord elements are used directly (without a containing LogReport parent element) as the return value from an ASM GetEventID procedure (see Section 5.2.2.6.) Because ASM procedures are executed exclusively via TLS with a trusted peer, the LogRecordSignature element is not required for that particular use.

#### Example 5.2. Log Report Record Example

```
<LogRecordElement 1
  xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/">
  <LogRecordHeader>
    <EventID>urn:uuid:8a221dfc-f5c6-426d-a2b8-9f6ff1cc6e31</EventID> 2
    <TimeStamp>2005-12-17T10:45:00-05:00</TimeStamp> 3
    <EventSequence>1000003</EventSequence> 4
    <DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">kkqiVpDUAggQDHHz0x9cDcsseU=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </DeviceSourceID>
    <EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430.5/2007/SecurityLog/</EventClass> 5
    <EventType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430.5/2007/SecurityLog/#EventTypes">Key</EventType> 6
    <contentId>urn:uuid:733365c3-2d44-4f93-accd-43cb39b0cedf</contentId> 7
    <previousHeaderHash>9czqa+0orIADHDIYxAkn/IcmZ3o=</previousHeaderHash> 8
    <recordBodyHash>9czqa+0orIADHDIYxAkn/IcmZ3o=</recordBodyHash> 9
  </LogRecordHeader>
  <LogRecordBody>
    <EventID>urn:uuid:8a221dfc-f5c6-426d-a2b8-9f6ff1cc6e31</EventID>
    <EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430.5/2007/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-key">
      KDMKeysReceived
    </EventSubType> 10
    <Parameters> 11
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>SignerID</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">rlpve6MSncWouNIpFcTShk6w2A=</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
```

```

</Parameters>
<Exceptions> 12
  <dcml:Parameter>
    <dcml:Name>KDMFormatError</dcml:Name>
    <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">XML validation failed on line 36</dcml:Value>
  </dcml:Parameter>
</Exceptions>
<ReferencedIDs> 13
  <ReferencedID>
    <IDName>CompositionID</IDName>
    <IDValue>urn:uuid:64bb6972-13a0-1348-a5e3-ae45420ea57d</IDValue>
  </ReferencedID>
  <ReferencedID>
    <IDName>KeyDeliveryMessageID</IDName>
    <IDValue>urn:uuid:64bb6972-13a0-1348-a5e3-ae45420ea57d</IDValue>
  </ReferencedID>
</ReferencedIDs>
</LogRecordBody>
</LogRecordElement>

```

### Log Record Record Description

- 1** The LogRecordElement element contains a single log record, corresponding to a single system event. If the log record is the root element of an XML document, the element name will be LogRecord.
- 2** A UUID value that uniquely identifies this event. This ID must be the same wherever this event appears (*i.e.*, if the event appears in more than one report, the ID will be the same.)
- 3** The time and date at which the event occurred.
- 4** The sequence number of this event in the report. This element should not be used in a stand-alone LogRecord element.
- 5** The event *Class* (*e.g.*, Security.)
- 6** The event *Type* (*e.g.*, Key.)
- 7** Gives the UUID most closely associated with the content element that was being handled when the event occurred. This element should not be used in a stand-alone LogRecord element.
- 8** The SHA-1 message digest of the Header element in the record that preceded this one in the report. This element should not be used in a stand-alone LogRecord element.
- 9** The SHA-1 message digest of the Body element contained within the same parent LogRecordElement or LogRecord element.
- 10** Describes the event *Sub-type* (*e.g.*, KDMKeysReceived.)
- 11** A list of parameters which augment the event sub-type.
- 12** If an exception (an error) occurred during the procedure that generated the event, this element will contain a list of tokens which describe the error.
- 13** A list of important identifiers that existed in the procedure context when the event occurred.

#### 5.3.1.3. Log Record Signature

An XML Signature is used to create a tamper-proof encoding. The signature is made over the contents of the RecordAuthData element as shown in the following example. The RecordAuthData element contains the digest of the containing record's LogRecordHeader element. Consult [SMPTE-430-4] for details on extending the signature's proof of authenticity to preceding records via the contents of the header's previousHeaderHash element.

#### Example 5.3. Log Report Signature Example

```

<LogRecordSignature> 1
  <HeaderPlacement>stop</HeaderPlacement>
  <SequenceLength>2</SequenceLength>

```

```

<RecordAuthData Id="ID_RecordAuthData"> ❷
  <RecordHeaderHash>SG93IE1hbnkgTW9yZSBSZXZpc2lvdnM/ </RecordHeaderHash> ❸
  <SignerCertInfo> ❹
    <ds:X509IssuerName>CN=DistCo-ca,OU=DistCo-ra,O=DistCo-ra,
dnQualifier=vnqteTcB2Gji\+1Hl23sxxgOqvWE=</ds:X509IssuerName>
    <ds:X509SerialNumber>16580</ds:X509SerialNumber>
  </SignerCertInfo>
</RecordAuthData>
<Signature> ❺
  <ds:SignedInfo>
    <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
      Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
    <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha256"/>
    <ds:Reference URI="#ID_RecordAuthData">
      <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
      <ds:DigestValue>VGhpcyBvbnx5IHRvb2sgdHdvIHllYXJz</ds:DigestValue>
    </ds:Reference>
  </ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>
Vqe6MS0pHovkfqhHlkt/NNEI1GGchCW/EyqxOccSenuzNQC63qL+VIQoIJCcwgnE0i/w/8bIgjfB
PrsOW5M3z1R0eAZc7tt6f7q50taNmC+O2wfATVXqEE8KC32qO//NQHuOL6bLLH+12oqgR5fS/mlI
/wpn8s/pAtGA9lAXDRp03EVOvzwq0m9AjzOxIbgzGg6AIY0airJlgecTlqccblzGQjB81pr3ctlp
ECchubtSCqh+frRn4CZc4ZRMLhjnax/zwHIG4ExiMCEKbwaz7DwN8zVlyoPUzut9ik7X0EyFRilv
F3piQoLeeFcFrkfNwYyyhTX8iHTO4Cz8YfGNYw==</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo>
  <ds:X509Data>
    <ds:X509IssuerSerial>
      <ds:X509IssuerName>Sample Issuer Name</ds:X509IssuerName>
      <ds:X509SerialNumber>1234567</ds:X509SerialNumber>
    </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
    <!-- X509 certificate value as block of Base64 encoded characters, -->
    <!-- truncated for brevity -->
    <ds:X509Certificate>
      QSBZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSB3b3VsZCBiZSBsb25nZXIgdGhhbiB0aGlz</ds:X509Certificate>
    </ds:X509Data>
  <ds:X509Data>
    <ds:X509IssuerSerial>
      <ds:X509IssuerName>Sample Issuer Name 2</ds:X509IssuerName>
      <ds:X509SerialNumber>123456789</ds:X509SerialNumber>
    </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
    <!-- X509 certificate value as block of Base64 encoded characters, -->
    <!-- truncated for brevity -->
    <ds:X509Certificate>TG9uZ2VyIHRoYW4gdGhpcyB0b28sIGZvciBzdXJl</ds:X509Certificate>
    </ds:X509Data>
  </ds:KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</LogRecordSignature>

```

### Log Record Signature Description

- ❶ The LogRecordSignature contains the signature of a log record.
- ❷ The RecordAuthData element is the content that is actually signed for the signature. This element is identified for the signature processor by the Id attribute value.
- ❸ A message digest value calculated over the sibling Header element.
- ❹ This information identifies the creator of the XML Signature (the document's signer.).
- ❺ A standard XML Signature element.

#### 5.3.1.4. Log Report Signature Validation

XML Signatures on log reports can be checked using the procedure in Section 3.1.3.

#### 5.3.1.5. Log Record Proxy

As specified in Section 9.4.6.3.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], the Image Media Block SM collects source log record from all remote SPBs in the suite it enables and includes (proxies) them in log reports it generates. In order to ensure that information is preserved during the proxy process, the following requirements apply:

- The namespace of all elements shall remain identical between source and proxied record, regardless of the presence or absence of default namespace, choice of namespace prefixes and scope of namespace declarations. A namespace declaration in the source record that is not used by any element may be omitted in the proxied record.
- Unless otherwise required, all elements present in the source event shall be present and unaltered in the proxied event. Examples of elements expected to be omitted or altered are `recordBodyHash` (which may change due to changes in namespace declarations), `EventSequence` (as the sequence will necessarily change in the log report), `TimeStamp` (as the compensation of remote SPB time offset by the SM using the `ASM GetTime` request may cause this value to change), `LogRecordSignature` and its children elements (as a new signature will apply to the log report). Elements that are proprietary in nature, e.g. an unrecognized "Parameter" name/value pair, shall always be preserved.
- All element attributes that exist in the source events shall be present in the relevant elements in the proxied events.
- The `TimeStamp` local timezone representation in the source events shall not be changed in the proxied events, i.e. the requirements of Section 7.1.2 in [SMPTE-430-4] are the responsibility of the remote SPB for that event and shall not be modified further on producing the proxied events in the log report.
- The `EventID` element values shall not be altered.

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## 5.3.2. Event Log Operations

### 5.3.2.1. Log Structure

#### Objective

- Verify that a Log Report or stand-alone Log Record is an XML document and that it validates against the XML schemas defined with [SMPTE-430-4] and [SMPTE-433].
- Verify that a Log Report or stand-alone Log Record contains urn:uuid values as specified in [RFC-4122].

#### Procedures

1. Using the *schema-check* software utility, validate the XML file structure against the XML schemas in [SMPTE-430-4] and [SMPTE-433]. Failure to correctly validate is cause to fail this test. For more information on schema validation see Section 3.1.2: XML Schema.

```
$ schema-check <input-file> smpte-433.xsd smpte-430-4.xsd
schema validation successful
$
```

2. Supply the filename of the Log Report or Log Record file as an argument to the *uuid\_check.py* software utility. Examine the output for error messages that identify expected UUID values that do not conform to the format specified in [RFC-4122]. One or more occurrences is cause to fail this test, unless the non-conforming value is derived from an external source (i.e., a DCP or KDM). Examples of fields that record external values are the parameters "KeyDeliveryMessageID", "CompositionID" and "TrackFileID", and the header element "contentId".

```
$ uuid_check.py <input-file>
all UUIDs conform to RFC-4122
$
```

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.2
[RFC-4122]	
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-433]	

Test Equipment
schema-check
uuid_check.py



### 5.3.2.2. Log Records for Multiple SPBs

#### Objective

Only applies to an MB Security Manager (SM) which can be configured to use more than one remote SPB.

Verify that in the case of reports covering the use of multiple remote SPBs, proxied log records are correctly identified with the source SE's identity.

#### Procedures

#### Note

This test involves the use of more than one *asm-responder* simulator program, each with its own device certificate. This places special emphasis on preparing and selecting the correct KDM for a stage of the test. The KDM's TDL needs to be populated with the appropriate certificate thumbprints for the device or combination of devices intended.

1. Configure the Test Subject to recognize as many remote SPBs as the system will allow. Record this value.
2. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator. There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.
3. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with the KDM *KDM for DCI 2K StEM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation* (KDM containing a TDL listing the certificate thumbprints required by the Test Subject to enable playback of the special auditorium situation identified in Step 1). Failure to play the show completely shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Retrieve a log report from the SM covering the time period during which steps 1 - 3 were performed. Verify that the log report contains at least one `ASM LinkOpened` record, with a `DeviceSourceID` element that contains the certificate thumbprint of the respective responder device, for each configured responder. Failure to locate a `LinkOpened` record from each responder shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

Test Equipment
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K StEM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation

### 5.3.2.3. Log Sequence Numbers

#### Objective

Verify that the security manager (SM) maintains a secure and persistent counter to provide a unique sequential `EventSequence` number to each log record it creates. Verify that this `EventSequence` number appears in the Header node of each log record in a report.

#### Procedures

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
2. Extract a security log report from the Test Subject.
3. Examine the log report using a text editor. Verify that the header in each record contains an `EventSequence` value that is one greater than the value in the previous record.
4. Failure to correctly sequence log records in a report shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1, 9.4.6.3.4
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

### 5.3.2.4. Log Collection by the SM

#### Objective

Verify that the SM collects log information from all remote SPBs in the suite it enables, at the earliest equipment idle time.

Verify that TLS sessions are not terminated prior to collection of all remote SPB log data.

#### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject (a MB) to use the *asm-responder* simulator program.
2. Set up and begin playing a show using the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
3. Before the show finishes playing, configure the *asm-responder* to respond to `GetEventList` and `GetEventID` requests with a Busy General Response code.
4. Before the show finishes playing, command the *asm-responder* to create an `SPBCLockAdjust` log record with a `TimeStamp` value corresponding to the current time. Note: No actual time adjustment is intended to be made as a result of this step, the value of the `TimeOffset` element in the resulting log record is expected to be zero, or close to zero.
5. After completion of the playback allow 5 minutes to elapse.
6. Confirm that the *asm-responder* is receiving `GetEventList` or `GetEventID` messages from the Test Subject.
7. Configure the *asm-responder* to respond normally to `GetEventList` and `GetEventID` requests.
8. Leave the system idle for 5 minutes, then extract a security log report from the Test Subject. Indication from *asm-responder* that the TLS session was terminated anytime between the completion of the playback and the transmission of log records to the Test Subject is cause to fail this test.
9. Using a *Text Editor*, locate the `SPBCLockAdjust` record created in step 4 by the *asm-responder* during the payout. Absence of the record is is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

<b>Test Material</b>
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

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**ARCHIVED**

### 5.3.2.5. General Log System Failure

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM requires that the secure logging subsystem is operating as a prerequisite to playback.
- Verify that the SM will not enable for playback any remote SPB for which it has not collected, or cannot collect log records, or where there is any indication that the remote SPB will not record and report log records as required.

#### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject (a MB) to use the *asm-responder* simulator program.
2. Set up and begin playing a show using the DCP and KDM contained in *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)* (valid DCP).
3. Before the show finishes playing, configure the ASM responder to respond to `GetEventList` and `GetEventID` requests with a Busy General Response code.
4. After completion of the playback allow 5 minutes to elapse.
5. Attempt to set up and play the show created in step 2.
6. If the SM allows playout, this shall be cause to fail this test.
7. Configure the ASM responder to respond normally to `GetEventList` and `GetEventID` requests.
8. Attempt to set up and play the show created in step 2.
9. If the SM does not allow playout, this shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

Test Equipment
asm-responder

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

### 5.3.2.6. Log Report Signature Validity

#### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject provides log event information in the form of Log Reports

Verify that all Log Records within a Log Report are properly authenticated as specified in [SMPTE-430-4] and [SMPTE-430-5].

Verify that the Log Report is signed by the SM.

Verify that EventID for a given event is maintained across collections.

#### Procedures

*If the Test Subject uses a single certificate implementation as defined in Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]:*

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
2. Extract a Log Report from the Test Subject covering the time period during which Step 1 was performed.
3. Leave the system idle for no less than 1 minute, then extract a second security Log Report from the Test Subject covering the time period during which Step 1 was performed.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, locate in each of the Log Reports extracted in Steps 2 and 3 the `CPLStart` record. Failure for the records in the two reports to have the same `EventID` value is cause to fail this test. *Note: The following steps shall use the Log Report extracted in Step 2.*
5. Using a *Text Editor*, verify that the root element of the Log Report is `LogReport`. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
6. Using a *Text Editor*, identify all individually signed Log Records and sequences of Log Records, as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Failure for any Log Record to either be signed individually or be part of a sequence is cause to fail this test.
7. Authenticate each individually signed Log Record identified in Step 4 as specified in [SMPTE-430-4] and [SMPTE-430-5], including:
  - a. Validating the `recordBodyHash` elements as specified in Section 6.1.1.5 of [SMPTE-430-5]; and
  - b. Validating the `LogRecordSignature` element as specified in Sections 7.3 of [SMPTE-430-4] and 6.1.3 of [SMPTE-430-5].Failure to authenticate any individually signed Log Record is cause to fail the test.
8. Authenticate each sequence of Log Records identified in Step 4 as specified in Section 9 of [SMPTE-430-4], including:
  - a. Validating the `previousHeaderHash` (unless the Log Record is the first of a sequence) and `recordBodyHash` elements as specified in Section 6.1.1.5 of [SMPTE-430-5];
  - b. Validating the authenticated chain as specified in Section 9 of [SMPTE-430-4]; and
  - c. Validating the `LogRecordSignature` element as specified in Sections 7.3 of [SMPTE-430-4] and 6.1.3 of [SMPTE-430-5].

Failure to authenticate any sequence of Log Records is cause to fail the test.

9. Using a *Text Editor*, locate one `LogRecordSignature` element. Using its `X509IssuerName` and `X509SerialNumber` from the `SignerCertInfo` element, locate elements that match in one of the `KeyInfo` elements and extract the device certificate from its `X509Certificate` element. Absence of a device certificate or mismatched `X509IssuerName` and `X509SerialNumber` values shall be cause to fail the test.
10. Obtain the SM certificate of the Test Subject.
11. Using *openssl*, compare the certificate obtained in Step 10 to the device certificate obtained in Step 9. Mismatch between the two certificates shall be cause to fail the test.

If the Test Subject uses a dual certificate implementation as defined in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]:

1. Perform Steps 1-9 above.
2. Obtain the SM and LS certificates of the Test Subject.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, verify that the `LogReport` element contains a single `reportingDevice` child element as defined in [SMPTE-430-4]. Failure of this verification is cause to fail this test.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, verify that the `reportingDevice` element meets the following requirements. Failure to meet any of these requirements is cause to fail this test.
  - a. The `DeviceCertID` element shall also be present and shall contain the certificate thumbprint of the SM Certificate.
  - b. If the `idtype` attribute of the `DeviceIdentifier` element is equal to "DeviceUID", it shall contain the device UUID of the Test Subject.
  - c. If the `idtype` attribute of the `DeviceIdentifier` element is equal to "CertThumbprint", it shall contain the certificate thumbprint of the SM Certificate of the Test Subject.
  - d. The `AdditionalID` element shall be present and its value set to the certificate thumbprint of the LS Certificate, encoded as an `ds:DigestValueType` type.
5. Using *openssl*, compare the LS certificate obtained in Step 2 to the device certificate obtained in Step 9 above. Mismatch between the two certificates shall be cause to fail the test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1, 9.4.6.3.3, 9.4.6.3.7, 9.5.1.1, 9.5.1.2
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-433]	

Test Equipment
Text Editor openssl

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

<b>Test Material</b>
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

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### 5.3.3. SM Proxy of Log Events

#### 5.3.3.1. SM Proxy of Log Events

##### Objective

Verify that an SM can proxy (for a remote SPB) log records which contain an unknown class or type of information.

##### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). Configure the *asm-responder* to return the set of proprietary test messages. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...) \
  --preload-log-event Prop1.xml \
  --preload-log-event Prop2.xml \
  --preload-log-event Prop3.xml
```

*Note: The "proprietary" test messages are valid [SMPTE-430-4] log records that contain class or type information not defined in a standard document.*

*Note: The timestamp of the preloaded events must be set to a value that will occur after the time the ASM connection is established and before the time that the composition finishes playing. This ensures that the preloaded events are in a time period that is expected to be collected by the SM during the operations of this test.*

2. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
3. After completion of the playback, wait until the Test Subject collects the security logs (as evidenced by `GetEventList` and `GetEventID` ASM requests).
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record each of Class `Debug`, Type `Info`, Event Subtype `Prop1`, `Prop2`, and `Prop3`.
6. Verify that each event identified in the previous step has correctly formatted parameters as defined in Appendix D and preserves source record information as specified in Section 5.3.1.5.
7. Failure to correctly record each of the proprietary events shall be cause to fail this test.

##### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

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### 5.3.3.2. SM Proxy of Security Operations Events

#### Objective

Verify that an SM can proxy (for a remote SPB) log records which contain correctly coded Security Operations events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). Configure the *asm-responder* to return the set of Operations test messages. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...) \
--preload-log-event SPBOpen.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBClose.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBMarriage.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBDivorce.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBShutdown.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBStartup.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBClockAdjust.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBSoftware.xml \
--preload-log-event SPBSecurityAlert
```

*Note: The timestamp of the preloaded events must be set to a value that will occur after the time the ASM connection is established and before the time that the composition finishes playing. This ensures that the preloaded events are in a time period that is expected to be collected by the SM during the operations of this test.*

2. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
3. After completion of the playback, wait until the Test Subject collects the security logs (as evidenced by *GetEventList* and *GetEventID* ASM requests).
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record each of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes *SPBOpen*, *SPBClose*, *SPBMarriage*, *SPBDivorce*, *SPBShutdown*, *SPBStartup*, *SPBClockAdjust*, *SPBSoftware*, and *SPBSecurityAlert*.
6. Verify that each event identified in the previous step has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5] and preserves source record information as specified in Section 5.3.1.5.
7. Failure to correctly record each of the Operations events shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-5] [SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

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### 5.3.3.3. SM Proxy of Security ASM Events

#### Objective

Verify that an SM can proxy (for a remote SPB) log records which contain correctly coded Security ASM events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). Configure the *asm-responder* to return the set of ASM test messages.. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...) \
  --preload-log-event LinkOpened.xml \
  --preload-log-event LinkClosed.xml \
  --preload-log-event LinkException.xml \
  --preload-log-event LogTransfer.xml \
  --preload-log-event KeyTransfer.xml \
  --preload-log-event BogusLogFormat.xml
```

*Note: The timestamp of the preloaded events must be set to a value that will occur after the time the ASM connection is established and before the time that the composition finishes playing. This ensures that the preloaded events are in a time period that is expected to be collected by the SM during the operations of this test.*

2. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
3. After completion of the playback, wait until the Test Subject collects the security logs (as evidenced by *GetEventList* and *GetEventID* ASM requests).
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record each of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtypes *LinkOpened*, *LinkClosed*, *LinkException*, *LogTransfer*, and *KeyTransfer*.
6. Verify that each event identified in the previous step has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5] and preserves source record information as specified in Section 5.3.1.5. Failure to correctly record each of the ASM events shall be cause to fail this test.
7. Verify the presence of one *LogTransfer* event that contains an *ASMLogRequestFailed* exception caused by the *BogusLogFormat.xml* *LogRecord*. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing *ASMLogRequestFailed* exception in the associated *LogTransfer* log record shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 5.3.3.4. Remote SPB Time Compensation

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM uses the `GetTime` ASM command information to calculate the difference between true time (the SM's time) and time in remote SPBs, and remove the difference in reporting remote SPB event data.
- Verify that the SM tracks the time difference between remote SPB clocks and its internal clock by issuance of the `GetTime` ASM command at least once per day.

#### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject to recognize as many remote SPBs as the system will allow. Record this value.
2. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration:
  - a. Advance the system clock of the *Computer with POSIX OS* that will run the *asm-responder* simulator by 15 minutes.
  - b. Set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator. There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.
3. Set up a show containing the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)* if the number of remote SPBs recorded in Step 1 is one, or *KDM for 2K StEM with Device Specific Special Auditorium TDL* if more than one.
4. Play the show and record the UTC time as provided by an *Accurate Real-Time Clock* at the start of playback.
5. After completion of the playback, wait until the Test Subject collects the security logs (as evidenced by `GetEventList` and `GetEventID` ASM requests).
6. Examine the output from the *asm-responder* for the presence of a `GetTime` ASM request. Absence of a `GetTime` ASM message is cause to fail this test.
7. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
8. Identify the type `<Key>`, subtype `<KeyTransfer>` `LogRecords` from each remote SPB which were collected in Step 5. This can be accomplished by locating the string "Event recorded by asm-responder" that is recorded as the value of the `<Name>` element of a `<Parameter>` element contained in the `<KeyTransfer>` events from the *asm-responder*.
9. Verify that for each remote SPB, one or more events of type `<Key>`, subtype `<KeyTransfer>` exist that have `<TimeStamp>` elements with values that differ by no more than +/- two seconds from the `<TimeStamp>`s of the corresponding events recorded by the Test Subject. *Note: Use the time recorded in Step 4 to locate the payout of the show in the security log. The Test Subject will record <KeyTransfer> events before this time. The corresponding <KeyTransfer> events recorded by the remote SPBs will be collected after the show finished playback. Failure to identify <TimeStamp>s corrected to within +/- two seconds shall be cause to fail this test.*
10. Allow the Test Subject, in an idle state, to remain connected to the *asm-responder* for 24 hours. Verify that the `GetTime` ASM command is issued at least once every 24 hours. If the `GetTime` command is not received at least once every 24 hours, this shall be cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

<b>Reference Document ID</b>	<b>Reference Document Section(s)</b>
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.5, 9.4.6.3.1
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

<b>Test Equipment</b>
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder Accurate Real-Time Clock

<b>Test Material</b>
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM with Device Specific Special Auditorium TDL

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NOT CURRENT VERSION



## 5.4. Security Log Events

Secure Processing Blocks (SPB) are required to record Security Log Events (defined in [SMPTE-430-5]) upon the occurrence of certain operational states. The procedures in this section should cause the Test Subject to record the respective events.

### 5.4.1. Playback, Validation and Key Events

#### 5.4.1.1. FrameSequencePlayed Event

##### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded `FrameSequencePlayed` events per [SMPTE-430-5].

##### Procedures

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the playback is started.
2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class *Security*, Type *Playback*, Event Subtype *FrameSequencePlayed*.
4. Verify that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
5. Failure to correctly record a `FrameSequencePlayed` shall be cause to fail this test.

##### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-4] [SMPTE-430-5]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8

Test Equipment
DCI Projector Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.1.2. CPLStart Event

#### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded CPLStart events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the playback is started.
2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type *Playout*, Event Subtype *CPLStart*.
4. Verify that the *CPLStart* record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
5. Failure to correctly record a *CPLStart* event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
DCI Projector
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.1.3. CPLend Event

#### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded CPLend events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the playback is started.
2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type *Playout*, Event Subtype *CPLend*.
4. Verify that the *CPLend* record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
5. Failure to correctly record a *CPLend* event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
DCI Projector
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.1.4. PlayoutComplete Event

#### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded `PlayoutComplete` events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the playback is started.
2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class *Security*, Type *Playout*, Event Subtype *PlayoutComplete*.
4. Verify that the `PlayoutComplete` record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
5. Failure to correctly record a `PlayoutComplete` shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-4] [SMPTE-430-5]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8

Test Equipment
DCI Projector Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.1.5. CPLCheck Event

#### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded CPLCheck events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. If present, delete the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* from the Test Subject.
2. Ingest the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the ingest is started.
3. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 2, less one minute. Verify that the log contains at least one record of *Class Security*, *Type Validation*, *Event Subtype CPLCheck*.
6. Verify that the CPLCheck record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record a CPLCheck event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
DCI Projector
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.1.6. KDMKeysReceived Event

#### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded KDMKeysReceived events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Delete from the Test Subject any existing KDMs for the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
2. Ingest the KDM *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the ingest is started.
3. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events near or after the time recorded in Step 2. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class *Security*, Type *Key*, Event Subtype *KDMKeysReceived*.
6. Verify that the *KDMKeysReceived* record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record a *KDMKeysReceived* event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
DCI Projector
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.1.7. KDMDeleted Event

#### Objective

Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded KDMDeleted events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the playback is started.
2. Delete from the Test Subject any KDMs for the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
3. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. Successful playback shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events near or after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Key, Event Subtype KDMDeleted.
6. Verify that the KDMDeleted record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record a KDMDeleted event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
DCI Projector
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

## 5.4.2. ASM and Operations Events

### 5.4.2.1. LinkOpened Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded LinkOpened events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded LinkOpened events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block that supports ASM:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...)
```

2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Step was carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtype LinkOpened.
4. Verify that the LinkOpened record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
5. Failure to correctly record a LinkOpened event shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Step was carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1, less 1 minute. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtype LinkOpened.
4. Verify that the LinkOpened record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
5. Failure to correctly record a LinkOpened event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8



Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 5.4.2.2. LinkClosed Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded LinkClosed events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded LinkClosed events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block that supports ASM:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). Start the *asm-responder*. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...)
```

2. From the idle state, power down the Test Subject using the procedure recommended by the manufacturer. *Note: If the procedure is to interrupt line power, this Step is operationally equivalent to Step 4.*
3. Power up the Test Subject, wait for the system to become idle. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.
4. Interrupt line power to the Test Subject. *Note: If applicable, make sure that the projector lamp is off when interrupting power.*
5. Power up the Test Subject, wait for the system to become idle. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.
6. Cause the *asm-responder* to disconnect from the Test Subject (e.g. quit the program).
7. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
8. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the Test Subject. Verify that these events include at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtypes LinkClosed, for each period
  - a. between the times recorded in Step 1 and Step 3; and
  - b. between the times recorded in Step 3 and Step 5; and
  - c. after the time recorded in Step 5.
9. Verify that each LinkClosed record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
10. Failure to correctly record a LinkClosed event shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. Command *asm-requester* to initiate a TLS session with the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-requester*.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. From the idle state, power down the Test Subject using the procedure recommended by the manufacturer. *Note: If the procedure is to interrupt line power, this Step is operationally equivalent to Step 4.*
3. Power up the Test Subject, wait for the system to become idle. Command *asm-requester* to initiate a TLS session with the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-requester*.
4. Interrupt line power to the Test Subject. *Note: If applicable, make sure that the projector lamp is off when interrupting power.*
5. Power up the Test Subject, wait for the system to become idle. Command *asm-requester* to initiate a TLS session with the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-requester*.
6. Cause the *asm-requester* to disconnect from the Test Subject (e.g. quit the program).
7. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
8. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the Test Subject. Verify that these events include at least one record of Class *Security*, Type *ASM*, Event Subtypes *LinkClosed*, for each period:
  - a. between the times recorded in Step 1 and Step 3; and
  - b. between the times recorded in Step 3 and Step 5; and
  - c. after the time recorded in Step 5.
9. Verify that each *LinkClosed* record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
10. Failure to correctly record a *LinkClosed* event shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS
asm-responder
asm-requester
Accurate Real-Time Clock

<b>Test Equipment</b>
Text Editor

**ARCHIVED**  
**NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 5.4.2.3. LinkException Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded LinkException events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded LinkException events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block that supports ASM:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...)
```

2. From the idle state, disconnect the ASM communication channel ( *i.e.*, the Ethernet) to the *asm-responder*.
3. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*. Playback shall not occur. Successful playback shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtype LinkException.
6. Verify that the LinkException record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record a LinkException event shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. From the idle state, disconnect the ASM communication channel ( *i.e.*, the Ethernet) to the *asm-requester*.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtype LinkException.
5. Verify that the LinkException record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record a LinkException event shall be cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

<b>Reference Document ID</b>	<b>Reference Document Section(s)</b>
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

<b>Test Equipment</b>
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

<b>Test Material</b>
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 5.4.2.4. LogTransfer Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded LogTransfer events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded LogTransfer events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block that supports ASM:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...)
```

2. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
3. After completion of the playback, wait until the Test Subject collects the security logs (as evidenced by *GetEventList* and *GetEventID* ASM requests).
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class *Security*, Type *ASM* and Event Subtype *LogTransfer* generated by the Test Subject. Note: LogTransfer records generated by the *asm-responder* can be identified by the presence of a *Parameter* with a *Name* element containing the concatenation of the string "Event recorded by *asm-responder*" and the certificate thumbprint of the *asm-responder*.
6. Verify that the LogTransfer record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record a LogTransfer event shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Command the *asm-requester* to send a *GetEventList* command to the Test Subject for a date range in which the time recorded in Step 1 is included. E.g:

```
Please enter the desired start and stop times ("YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss/YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss") :  
(press 'x' to return to the previous menu).
```

```

Press control-C to quit.
2009-01-01T00:00:00/2009-05-01T00:00:00
2009-04-09T18:35:26Z For request no. 0
  Retrieved 2 items from the list: [0, 1]
  General response status: successful
    
```

3. Command the *asm-requester* to send a GetEventID command to the Test Subject for an event ID that was returned from the previous Step. E.g:

```

Please enter the desired event ID:
(press 'x' to return to the previous menu).
Press control-C to quit.
1
2009-04-09T18:38:30Z For request no. 1
  General response status: successful
[Returned LogRecord omitted for brevity]
    
```

4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtype LogTransfer.
6. Verify that the LogTransfer record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record a LogTransfer shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-responder Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)



### 5.4.2.5. KeyTransfer Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded KeyTransfer events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded KeyTransfer events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block that supports ASM:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-responder* program as a remote SPB (a virtual LDB). With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the Test Subject connects to the *asm-responder*.

```
$ asm-responder (...standard options...)
```

2. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type ASM, Event Subtype KeyTransfer.
5. Verify that the KeyTransfer record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record a KeyTransfer shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Command the *asm-requester* to send a LEKeyLoad command to the Test Subject. E.g:

```
Please enter the key ID, hexadecimal key, validity period,
      and AES decrypt seed separated by tabs or spaces:
(press 'x' to return to the previous menu).
Press control-C to quit.
      01 9337555bb1121e0d284f3968cbe22fef 36000 42
2009-04-08T18:07:08Z For request no. 0
      the request fit within the confines of the LDB key buffer
General response status: successful
```

3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class `Security`, Type `ASM`, Event Subtype `KeyTransfer`.
5. Verify that the `KeyTransfer` record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record a `KeyTransfer` shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS
asm-responder
asm-requester
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

### 5.4.2.6. SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBStartup and SPBShutdown events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBStartup and SPBShutdown events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block:

1. Power up the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied.
2. Wait for the system to become idle.
3. Power down the Test Subject using the procedure recommended by the manufacturer. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the shutdown procedure is initiated.
4. Wait for the system to power down completely.
5. Power up the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied.
6. Wait for the system to become idle.
7. Interrupt line power to the Test Subject and associated suite equipment. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is removed. *Note: If applicable, make sure that the projector lamp is off when interrupting power.*
8. Wait for the system to power down completely.
9. Power up the Test Subject and associated suite equipment, wait for the system to become idle.
10. Extract a security log report from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above steps were carried out.
11. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events recorded by the Test Subject. Verify that these events include at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBStartup and SPBShutdown, for each of (a) between the times recorded in step 1 and step 5 and (b) after the time recorded in step 5.
12. Verify that the SPBStartup and SPBShutdown records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
13. Failure to correctly record SPBStartup and SPBShutdown events shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Power up the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied.

2. Wait for the system to become idle.
3. Power down the Test Subject using the procedure recommended by the manufacturer. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the shutdown procedure is initiated.
4. Wait for the system to power down completely.
5. Power up the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied.
6. Wait for the system to become idle.
7. Interrupt line power to the Test Subject. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is removed. *Note: If applicable, make sure that the projector lamp is off when interrupting power.*
8. Wait for the system to power down completely.
9. Power up the Test Subject and associated suite equipment, wait for the system to become idle.
10. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

11. Extract security log records from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above steps was carried out.
12. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log records for events recorded by the Test Subject. Verify that these events include at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBStartup and SPBShutdown, for each of (a) between the times recorded in step 1 and step 5 and (b) after the time recorded in step 5.
13. Verify that the SPBStartup and SPBShutdown records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
14. Failure to correctly record SPBStartup and SPBShutdown events shall be cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

### 5.4.2.7. SPBOpen and SPBClose Events

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM of a Media Block, integrated or married to a projector, can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBOpen and SPBClose events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB (LDB), integrated or married to a projector, can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBOpen and SPBClose events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block integrated or married with a Projector:

1. Power up the Test Subject and associated suite equipment, with an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied. Wait for the system to become idle.
2. Open a secure perimeter access door. Wait one minute, close the access door.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBOpen and SPBClose.
5. Verify that the SPBOpen and SPBClose records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record SPBOpen and SPBClose events shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB (remote SPB) integrated or married with a Projector:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Open a secure perimeter access door. Wait one minute, close the access door.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBOpen and SPBClose.
5. Verify that the SPBOpen and SPBClose records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record SPBOpen and SPBClose events shall be cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

<b>Reference Document ID</b>	<b>Reference Document Section(s)</b>
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

<b>Test Equipment</b>
Computer with POSIX OS asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

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**NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 5.4.2.8. SPBClockAdjust Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBClockAdjust events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBClockAdjust events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block:

1. Power up the Test Subject and associated suite equipment, with an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied. Wait for the system to become idle.
2. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, adjust the clock of the Test Subject.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBClockAdjust.
5. Verify that the SPBClockAdjust records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record a SPBClockAdjust event shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, adjust the clock of the Test Subject.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Step was carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtype SPBClockAdjust.
5. Verify that the SPBClockAdjust record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
6. Failure to correctly record a SPBClockAdjust event shall be cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

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### 5.4.2.9. SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM of a Media Block, married to a projector, can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB (LDB), married to a projector, can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block married with a Projector:

1. Power up the Test Subject and associated suite equipment, with an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied. Wait for the system to become idle.
2. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, divorce the Media Block from its Projector SPB2.
3. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, remarry the Media Block to its Projector SPB2.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce.
6. Verify that the SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
7. Failure to correctly record SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce events shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB (remote SPB) married with a Projector:

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, divorce the LDB from its Projector SPB2.
3. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, remarry the LDB to its Projector SPB2.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events occurring after the time recorded in Step 1. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce.
6. Verify that the SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].

7. Failure to correctly record SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce events shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock Text Editor

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 5.4.2.10. SPBSoftware Event

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBSoftware events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that a remote SPB can produce log records which contain correctly coded SPBSoftware events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a Media Block:

1. Power up the Test Subject and associated suite equipment, with an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the power is applied. Wait for the system to become idle.
2. Perform the following procedures:
  - a. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, perform a software installation on the Test Subject.
  - b. Return the Test Subject to the idle state (reboot after software installation is acceptable).
  - c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
  - d. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the above steps. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBSoftware.
  - e. Verify that the SPBSoftware records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
  - f. Failure to correctly record a SPBSoftware event shall be cause to fail this test.
3. Perform the following procedures:
  - a. Attempt a software installation on the Test Subject using a procedure that will cause the update to fail in some fashion (e.g. provide wrong signer for the update, incorrect message digest in module, consult with the manufacturer for additional assistance).
  - b. Return the Test Subject to the idle state.
  - c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
  - d. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the above steps. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBSoftware.
  - e. Verify that the SPBSoftware records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - f. Confirm the presence of a SoftwareFailure exception in the SPBSoftware log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing SoftwareFailure exception in the associated SPBSoftware log record shall be cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is an LDB or LD/LE (remote SPB):

1. Configure the Test Subject to use the *asm-requester* program as a virtual SM. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment the *asm-requester* connects to the Test Subject.

```
$ asm-requester (...standard options...)
```

2. Perform the following procedures:

- a. Using the manufacturer's documented procedure, perform a software installation on the Test Subject.
- b. Return the Test Subject to the idle state (reboot after software installation is acceptable).
- c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Step was carried out.
- d. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the above steps. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtype SPBSSoftware.
- e. Verify that the SPBSSoftware record has correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
- f. Failure to correctly record a SPBSSoftware event shall be cause to fail this test.

3. Perform the following procedures:

- a. Attempt a software installation on the Test Subject using a procedure that will cause the update to fail in some fashion (e.g. provide wrong signer for the update, incorrect message digest in module, consult with the manufacturer for additional assistance).
- b. Return the Test Subject to the idle state.
- c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
- d. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the above steps. Verify that the log contains at least one record of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBSSoftware.
- e. Verify that the SPBSSoftware records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
- f. Confirm the presence of a SoftwareFailure exception in the SPBSSoftware log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing SoftwareFailure exception in the associated SPBSSoftware log record shall be cause to fail this test.

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS

<b>Test Equipment</b>
asm-requester
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

**NOT CURRENT VERSION**  
**ARCHIVED**

### 5.4.2.11. SPBSecurityAlert Event

#### Objective

The following does not apply to a Test Subject that is a Projector SPB.

- Verify that, where the SM can produce SPBSecurityAlert log events, the respective log records contain correctly coded SPBSecurityAlert events per [SMPTE-430-5].
- Verify that, where the remote SPB can produce SPBSecurityAlert log events, the respective log records contain correctly coded SPBSecurityAlert events per [SMPTE-430-5].

#### Procedures

#### Note

A SPBSecurityAlert record indicates an event that is not described by one of the other event record types defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Each Test Subject must be evaluated to determine what conditions may result in a SPBSecurityAlert event being logged. Detailed instructions must be provided by the manufacturer, including any test jigs or applications that may be required to perform the test.

1. Following the manufacturer's documented procedure, for each separately identified condition, configure the Test Subject and perform actions that will result in the logging of a SPBSecurityAlert event recording the condition.
2. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Step 1 was carried out.
3. Using a *Text Editor*, examine the log report for events corresponding to the above Step 1. Verify that the log contains the expected number of records of Class Security, Type Operations, Event Subtypes SPBSecurityAlert. Verify that the SPBSecurityAlert records have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
4. For each type of SPBSecurityAlert record, provide an explanation of the condition and any parameters that are recorded.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8, 9.4.6.3.8
[SMPTE-430-4]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Equipment
Computer with POSIX OS
asm-requester
Accurate Real-Time Clock
Text Editor

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# Chapter 6. Media Block

The Media Block (MB) is a Type 1 SPB comprising a Security Manager (SM) and the Media Decryptors (MD) for all essence types, plus, as required, Forensic Marker (FM) for image or sound, a Link Encryptor (LE) and a Timed Text rendering engine (alpha-channel overlay).

## 6.1. Security Manager (SM)

### Note

Some of the procedures in this section require test content that is specifically malformed. In some implementations, these malformations may be caught and reported directly by the SMS without involving the SM. Because the purpose of the procedures is to assure that the SM demonstrates the required behavior, the manufacturer of the Test Subject may need to provide special test programs or special SMS testing modes to allow the malformed content to be applied directly to the SM.

### 6.1.1. Image Integrity Checking

#### Objective

- Verify that the SM detects and logs playback restarts.
- Verify that the SM processes image essence integrity pack metadata, to detect and log deviations from the intended image file (Track File ID) and the intended frame sequence.
- Record whether the SM performs a real-time check of the image frame hash (HMAC).

Note that an image frame hash (HMAC) check is encouraged to be performed by the SM, but optional.

#### Procedures

1. Using manufacturer-supplied documentation and by inspection, record a list of means by which playback of a particular composition can be interrupted and restarted. Such means may include command pairs such as pause/play, stop/play, etc. For each of these means:
  - a. Select for playback the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
  - b. Start playback, interrupt playback and restart playback
  - c. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor* and identify the events associated with the playback.
  - d. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - e. Confirm that there are at least 2 `FrameSequencePlayed` records for each track file included in the composition and that the `FirstFrame` and `LastFrame` parameter values reflect the interrupted playback.
  - f. Confirm that there is no `PlayoutComplete` event associated with the interrupted playback.
2. Start playback of the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and interrupt line power to the Test Subject before playback of the composition ends. Power up the Test Subject, wait for the

system to become idle. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*. Identify the events associated with the playback and:

- a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm that there are at least 2 `FrameSequencePlayed` records for each track file included in the composition and that the `FirstFrame` and `LastFrame` parameter values reflect the interrupted playback.
  - c. Confirm that there is no `PlayoutComplete` event associated with the interrupted playback.
3. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)*. The associated image track file contains two picture frames that have been swapped. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
- a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `FrameSequenceError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the image track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.
4. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted)*. The associated image track file contains one frame in which the `TrackFile ID` in the integrity pack has been replaced with a different value. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
- a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `TrackFileIDError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the image track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.
5. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*. The associated image track file contains one frame in which the `Check Value` has been malformed. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
- a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `CheckValueError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the image track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.

Failure of any of the above conditions is cause to fail this test.

6. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*. The associated image track file contains one frame in which the `HMAC` value has been malformed. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
- a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `FrameMICError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the image track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.



## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-429-6] [SMPTE-430-5]	9.4.3.5

Test Equipment
DCI Projector Text Editor

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted) DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted) KDM for DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted) DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted) KDM for DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted) DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) KDM for DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted) KDM for DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

## 6.1.2. Sound Integrity Checking

### Objective

- Verify that the SM processes sound essence integrity pack metadata, to detect and log deviations from the intended sound file (Track File ID) and the intended frame sequence.
- Verify that the SM performs a real-time check of the sound frame hash (HMAC).

### Procedures

1. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)*. The associated audio track file contains two sound frames that have been swapped. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `FrameSequenceError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the audio track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.
2. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted)*. The associated audio track file contains one frame in which the `TrackFile ID` in the integrity pack has been replaced with a different value. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `TrackFileIDError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the audio track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.
3. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*. The associated audio track file contains one frame in which the HMAC value has been malformed. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `FrameMICError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the audio track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.
4. Play back the composition *DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)*. The associated audio track file contains one frame in which the Check Value has been malformed. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the playback and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.

- b. Confirm the presence of a `CheckValueError` exception in the `FrameSequencePlayed` log record for the sound track file. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception.

Failure of any of the above conditions is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

Test Material
DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

NOT CURRENT VERSION

### 6.1.3. Deleted Section

The section "Restriction of Keying to Monitored Link Decryptors" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

**ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION**

## 6.1.4. Restriction of Keying to MD Type

### Objective

Verify that keys are issued only to a Media Decryptor (MD) matching the key type as specified in the KDM per [SMPTE-430-1].

### Procedures

1. Load the KDM *KDM with mismatched keytype*, which contains a valid decryption key for image, but the Key Type is mismatched.
2. Load and attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Successful playback shall be cause to fail this test.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the events associated with the operation and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of an associated `FrameSequencePlayed` log record that contains a `KeyTypeError` exception. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. Failure to produce correct log records shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Material
KDM with mismatched keytype
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

## 6.1.5. Restriction of Keying to Valid CPLs

### Objective

Verify that the SM validates CPLs and logs results as a prerequisite to preparing the suite for the associated composition playback.

### Procedures

1. Supply the CPL *DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted)*, keyed with KDM for DCI *Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted)*, to the SM. Verify that the SM rejects the CPL. If the SM accepts the CPL, this is cause to fail this test.
2. Attempt to start playback and verify that it is not possible. If playback starts, this is cause to fail this test.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `CPLCheck` event associated with the above operation and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Verify that the `contentId` element contains the `Id` of the CPL. Verify that the value of the `SignerID` parameter contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the certificate used to sign the CPL. Verify that `ReferencedIDs` element contains a `CompositionID` parameter with a value that is the `Id` of the CPL. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `AssetHashError` exception in the `CPLCheck` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `AssetHashError` exception shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Supply the CPL *DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted)*, keyed with KDM for DCI *Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted)* to the SM. Verify that the SM rejects the CPL. If the SM accepts the CPL, this is cause to fail this test.
5. Attempt to start playback and verify that it is not possible. If playback starts, this is cause to fail this test.
6. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `CPLCheck` event associated with the above operation and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Verify that the `contentId` element contains the `Id` of the CPL. Verify that `ReferencedIDs` element contains a `CompositionID` parameter with a value that is the `Id` of the CPL. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `SignatureError` exception in the `CPLCheck` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `SignatureError` exception shall be cause to fail this test.
7. Supply the CPL *DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted)*, keyed with KDM for DCI *Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted)* to the SM. Verify that the SM rejects the CPL. If the SM accepts the CPL, this is cause to fail this test.
8. Attempt to start playback and verify that it is not possible. If playback starts, this is cause to fail this test.
9. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `CPLCheck` event associated with the above operation and:

- a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Verify that the `contentId` element contains the Id of the CPL. Verify that the value of the `SignerID` parameter contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the certificate used to sign the CPL. Verify that `ReferencedIDs` element contains a `CompositionID` parameter with a value that is the Id of the CPL. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `AssetMissingError` exception in the `CPLCheck` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `AssetMissingError` exception shall be cause to fail this test.
10. Supply the CPL *DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted)* to the SM. Verify that the SM rejects the CPL. If the SM accepts the CPL, this is cause to fail this test.
  11. Attempt to start playback and verify that it is not possible. If playback starts, this is cause to fail this test.
  12. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `CPLCheck` event associated with the above operation and:
    - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
    - b. Confirm the presence of a `CPLFormatError` exception in the `CPLCheck` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `CPLFormatError` exception shall be cause to fail this test.
  13. Supply the CPL *DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted)* to the SM. Verify that the SM rejects the CPL. If the SM accepts the CPL, this is cause to fail this test.
  14. Attempt to start playback and verify that it is not possible. If playback starts, this is cause to fail this test.
  15. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `CPLCheck` event associated with the above operation and:
    - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Verify that the `contentId` element contains the Id of the CPL. Verify that `ReferencedIDs` element contains a `CompositionID` parameter with a value that is the Id of the CPL. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
    - b. Confirm the presence of a `CertFormatError` exception in the `CPLCheck` log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `CertFormatError` exception shall be cause to fail this test.

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-5]	9.4.3.5
Test Material	
DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted)	

<b>Test Material</b>
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted)

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## 6.1.6. Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring

### Objective

The SM must continuously monitor and log the integrity status of all remote SPBs to detect failures during normal operation. The following conditions must be satisfied:

- Verify that the SM issues the QuerySPB command at least once every 30 seconds.
- Verify that the SM creates at least one (1) security log record for each contiguous set of identical QuerySPB responses having a general response value that is not `success`.
- Verify that the SM creates at least one (1) security log record for each contiguous set of identical QuerySPB responses having a status value that is `Security Alert`.
- Verify that the SM continues playout if QuerySPB responses are not received.
- Verify that the SM creates at least one (1) security log record for each contiguous set of unreceived QuerySPB responses.

### Procedures

1. Configure the Test Subject to recognize as many remote SPBs as the system will allow. Record this value.
2. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration, set up and start a corresponding *asm-responder* simulator. There shall be one responder for every remote SPB the Test Subject can be configured to use simultaneously.
3. If not already present, load the composition *DCI 2K StEM*.
4. For each remote SPB included in the Test Subject's configuration:
  - a. Verify that the Test Subject sends a QuerySPB command to the respective *asm-responder* at least once every thirty (30) seconds.
  - b. Play the test content *DCI 2K StEM*.
  - c. One minute into playback, disconnect the responder from the Test Subject. Record the UTC time, as provided by an Accurate Real-Time Clock, at which this event occurred (Time A). Verify that the show continues to play. Failure to keep playing is cause to fail this test.
  - d. Wait 5 minutes, reconnect the responder to the Test Subject. Record the time at which this event occurred (Time B). Verify that the show continues to play. Failure to keep playing is cause to fail this test.
  - e. Command the responder to answer QuerySPB messages with the `success` general response value and the `Security Alert` status value. Record the time at which this event occurred (Time C). Verify (i) that the Test Subject stops playback and (ii) that, when stopped, playback cannot be restarted. Failure to stop playback or allowing playback to be restarted once stopped are both cause to fail this test.
  - f. Command the responder to answer QuerySPB messages with `success` general response value and `Not Playing` status value. Observe that the Test Subject returns to normal operation ( *i.e.* allows playout). Failure to return to normal operation is cause to fail this test.

- g. Play the test content *DCI 2K StEM*.
- h. Command the responder to answer QuerySPB messages with the `success` general response value and the `Security Alert` status value. Record the time at which this event occurred (*Time D*). Verify (i) that the Test Subject stops playback and (ii) that, when stopped, playback cannot be restarted. Failure to stop playback or allowing playback to be restarted once stopped are both cause to fail this test.
- i. Command the responder to answer QuerySPB messages with `success` general response value and `Playing` status value. Observe that the Test Subject returns to normal operation ( *i.e.* allows playout). Failure to return to normal operation is cause to fail this test.
- j. For each of the non-zero ASM General Response values ( `RRP Failed`, 1), ( `RRP Invalid`, 2) and ( `Responder Busy`, 3):
- i. Play the test content *DCI 2K StEM*.
  - ii. Command the respective responder to answer QuerySPB messages with the General Response value. Verify (i) that the Test Subject stops playback and (ii) that, when stopped, playback cannot be restarted. Record the time at which this event occurred (*Time En*, where *n* is the response value). Failure to stop playback or allowing playback to be restarted once stopped are both cause to fail this test.
  - iii. Command the responder to answer QuerySPB messages with `success` General Response value and observe that the Test Subject returns to normal operation. Failure to return to normal operation is cause to fail this test.
- k. Retrieve a log report from the SM covering the time period between *Time A* and *Time E3*. Verify the following:
- i. The log report contains at least one ASM `LinkException` record corresponding to the period between *Time A* and *Time B*. The record contains a `QuerySPBError` exception.
  - ii. The log report contains at least one ASM `LinkException` record corresponding to *Time C*. The record contains a `QuerySPBAlert` exception.
  - iii. The log report contains at least one ASM `LinkException` record corresponding to *Time D*. The record contains a `QuerySPBAlert` exception.
  - iv. The log report contains at least one ASM `LinkException` record corresponding to *Time E1*.
  - v. The log report contains at least one ASM `LinkException` record corresponding to *Time E2*.
  - vi. The log report contains at least one ASM `LinkException` record corresponding to *Time E3*. Failure to verify the presence of each log record listed above shall be cause to fail this test.

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-6]	

Test Equipment
asm-responder

<b>Test Equipment</b>
Accurate Real-Time Clock

<b>Test Material</b>
DCI 2K StEM

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## 6.1.7. SPB Integrity Fault Consequences

### Objective

- Verify that, after authentication and/or an ASM QuerySPB Command, the SM responds to SPB substitutions by terminating and re-establishing TLS sessions (and re-authenticating the suite).
- Verify that, after authentication and/or an ASM QuerySPB Command, the SM responds to SPB substitutions by terminating and re-establishing suite playability conditions (KDM prerequisites, SPB queries and key loads).

### Procedures

#### Note

This test involves the use of more than one **asm-responder** simulator program, each with their own device certificate. This places special emphasis on preparing and selecting the correct KDM for a stage of the test. The KDM's TDL needs to be populated with the appropriate cert thumbprints for the device or combination of devices intended.

To complete this test, two KDMs are required to be created and ingested. The Trusted Device List (TDL) must contain the thumbprint of the appropriate Projector/LD device certificate for each of the two responders.

1. Configure two **asm-responder** simulator programs to respond on the same TCP/IP address that the Test Subject is configured to connect to its Projector. Do not connect either ASM responder at this time. Each instance of ASM Responder shall have a different Projector/LD device certificate. The two responders shall be referred to as "Responder A" and "Responder B" respectively.
2. Connect Responder A to the Test Subject. Observe the opening of the TLS session and any commands received.
3. Verify that the QuerySPB request is being issued at least every 30 seconds. Failure of this requirement is cause to fail this test.
4. Ingest *KDM with a TDL including Responder A* for Responder A.
5. Set up and begin playing a show using the composition contained in *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM with a TDL including Responder A*.
6. Record the values of all LE keys that were received up to the time playback started.
7. Two minutes into playback, disconnect Responder A from the Test Subject.
8. Verify that the show continues to play. Failure to keep playing is cause to fail this test.
9. Connect Responder B to the Test Subject.
10. Verify that the show stops playback as soon as TLS authentication is reported on Responder B. Failure to stop playing is cause to fail this test.
11. After TLS completes authentication, observe any commands received. If TLS authentication fails this is cause to fail this test.
12. Attempt to set up and play the show from Step 5. If the show starts playing this is cause to fail this test.
13. Ingest *KDM with a TDL including Responder B* for Responder B.

14. Attempt to set up and play the show from Step 5. If the show does not start playing this is cause to fail this test.
15. Record the values of all LE keys that were received up to the time playback started.
16. Compare the LE key values from Step 6 with those from Step 15. If any value is repeated this is cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

Test Equipment
asm-responder
asm-responder

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM with a TDL including Responder A
KDM with a TDL including Responder B

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## 6.1.8. Content Key Extension, End of Engagement

### Objective

Verify that to avoid end of engagement issues, composition playout may extend beyond the end of the KDM's playout time window, if started within the KDM playout time window, by a maximum of 6 hours.

### Procedures

#### Note

This test will require KDMs that contain `ContentKeysNotValidAfter` elements set to a time in the near future. It is recommended that fresh KDMs be generated that will expire 30-60 minutes after beginning the test procedures. Refer to information provided in the relevant step to ensure that the applicable KDM is being used at the appropriate absolute time the step of the test is carried out.

#### Note

The Test Operator is required to take into account any timezone offsets that may apply to the locality of the Test Subject and the representation of the `ContentKeysNotValidAfter` element of the KDM. For clarity it is recommended that a common representation be used.

#### Note

The Security Manager's (SM) clock must be accurately set, to the extent possible, for successful execution of this test.

1. Using a *Text Editor*, open the KDM *KDM for Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)* and note the value of the timestamp contained in the `<ContentKeysNotValidAfter>` element (i.e. the KDM's end of validity timestamp). *Note: Steps 2 and 3 must be commenced before the time recorded in this step.*
2. Load the composition *End of Engagement - Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)*. *End of Engagement - Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)* is a composition which is 6 hours and 11 minutes in length.
3. Within 5 minutes prior to the timestamp recorded in step 1, attempt to start playing *End of Engagement - Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)*. Because the complete show extends beyond the 6 hours end of engagement extension window, the composition should not start playback. If the composition starts to playback, this is cause to fail this test.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, open the KDM *KDM for Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)* and note the value of the timestamp contained in the `<ContentKeysNotValidAfter>` element (i.e. the KDM's end of validity timestamp). *Note: Steps 5 and 6 must be commenced before the time recorded in this step.*
5. Load the composition *End of Engagement - Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)*. *End of Engagement - Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)* has a duration of 5 hours, 59 minutes and 30 seconds.
6. Within 5 minutes prior to the timestamp recorded in step 4, attempt to start playing *End of Engagement - Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)*. The composition should start to playback and continue playing in its entirety. If the show fails to start or fails to playout completely, this is cause to fail this test.

*Note: The test operator does not have to be present for the entire playback. Sufficient proof of successful playback can be observed by examining the security log for complete `FrameSequencePlayed`, `CPLEnd` and `PlayoutComplete` events.*

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

Test Equipment
Text Editor

Test Material
End of Engagement - Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)
End of Engagement - Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)
KDM for Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)
KDM for Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)

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## 6.1.9. ContentAuthenticator Element Check

### Objective

- Verify that the Test Subject checks that one of the certificates in the certificate chain supplied with the CPL has a certificate thumbprint that matches the value of the KDM <ContentAuthenticator> element.
- Verify that the Test Subject checks that such certificate indicates only a “Content Signer (CS) role.

### Procedures

For each of the malformations below, load the indicated CPL and KDM on to the Test Subject. Verify that the the KDM is not used to enable playback. A successful playback is cause to fail this test.

1. Use the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and supply the KDM *KDM with invalid ContentAuthenticator*. The KDM contains a <ContentAuthenticator> element having a certificate thumbprint value that does not match the thumbprint of one of the signer certificates in the certificate chain that signed the associated CPL.
2. Use the composition *DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted)* and supply the KDM *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted)*. The KDM contains a <ContentAuthenticator> element having a certificate thumbprint value that matches the thumbprint of one of the signer certificates in the certificate chain that signed the associated CPL but that certificate has no role.
3. Use the composition *DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted)* and supply the KDM *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted)*. The KDM contains a <ContentAuthenticator> element having a certificate thumbprint value that matches the thumbprint of one of the signer certificates in the certificate chain that signed the associated CPL but that certificate has a bad role (SM).
4. Use the composition *DCI Malformed Test 18: CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted)* and supply the KDM *KDM for DCI Malformed Test 18: KDM for CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted)*. The KDM contains a <ContentAuthenticator> element having a certificate thumbprint value that matches the thumbprint of one of the signer certificates in the certificate chain that signed the associated CPL but that certificate has an extra role.
5. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `FrameSequencePlayed` events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of `FrameSequencePlayed` log records that contain `ContentAuthenticatorError` exceptions. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `ContentAuthenticatorError` exception in any of the associated `FrameSequencePlayed` log records shall be cause to fail this test.  
Only for the operation associated with step 2, a correctly recorded `CPLCheck` log record with a `CertFormatError` exception is an allowable substitute for a `FrameSequencePlayed` log record to satisfy the requirements of this step of the test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5



Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-429-7]	
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-2]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM with invalid ContentAuthenticator
DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted)
DCI Malformed Test 18: CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI Malformed Test 18: KDM for CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted)

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## 6.1.10. KDM Date Check

### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject checks that the playout date is within the time period defined by the KDM `ContentKeysNotValidBefore` and `ContentKeysNotValidAfter` elements.

### Procedures

1. Load the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and KDM *KDM that has expired*, which contains a valid decryption keys, but the KDM has expired.
2. Attempt to play the *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* composition and record the result. Verify that the composition cannot be played. Successful playout is cause to fail this test.
3. Load the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and the KDM *KDM with future validity period*, which contains a valid decryption keys, but the KDM has is not yet valid.
4. Attempt to play the *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* composition and record the result. Verify that the composition cannot be played. Successful playout is cause to fail this test.
5. Load the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and KDM *KDM that has recently expired*, which contains a valid decryption keys, but the KDM has expired.
6. Attempt to play the *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* composition and record the result. Verify that the composition cannot be played. Successful playout is cause to fail this test.
7. Load the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and the KDM *KDM with future validity period*, which contains a valid decryption keys, but the KDM has is not yet valid.
8. Attempt to play the *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* composition and record the result. Verify that the composition cannot be played. Successful playout is cause to fail this test.
9. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the `FrameSequencePlayed` events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a `FrameSequencePlayed` log record that contains a `ValidityWindowError` exception. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing `ValidityWindowError` exception in any of the associated `FrameSequencePlayed` log records shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

<b>Test Material</b>
KDM with future validity period
KDM that has recently expired
KDM that has expired
KDM with future validity period
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

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## 6.1.11. KDM TDL Check

### Objective

*The following does not apply if a Special Auditorium Situation is enabled.*

Verify that the Test Subject checks that the set of SPBs configured for playout is consistent with the TDL (AuthorizedDeviceInfo element) in the controlling KDM.

### Procedures

If the Test Subject is a *Media Block that is a Companion SPB and is married (physically and electrically) to a Projector SPB*, perform each of the following steps. Before each step, delete all KDMs residing in the Test Subject. After completing the steps, extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*:

- Identify the `FrameSequencePlayed` record associated with the image track file produced during each step, and confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
- If successful playback start is expected, confirm that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record contains a `Parameter` element with a `Name` equal to `DownstreamDevice` and a `Value` equal to the certificate thumbprint of the projector SPB.
- If failed playback start is expected, confirm that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record contains a `TDLException` exception. Record all parameters associated with the exception.

Failure to produce correct log records, including missing required elements or incorrect parameters, shall be cause to fail this test.

1. Load the *KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry*, which is a KDM that carries only the "assume trust" certificate thumbprint. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.
2. Load the *KDM with Assume Trust and random TDL entries*, which is KDM with a TDL that carries the "assume trust" certificate thumbprint and a single, randomly generated device list entry. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail this test.
3. Load the *KDM with random TDL entry*, which contains a single, randomly generated device list entry. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail this test.
4. Load the *KDM with the SM alone on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains only the certificate thumbprint of the SM Certificate of the Test Subject. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail the test.
5. Load the *KDM with the projector alone on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains only the certificate thumbprint of the Projector SPB certificate. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is a *Media Block that is permanently married to a Projector SPB*, perform each of the following steps. Before each step, delete all KDMs residing in the Test Subject. After completing the steps, extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*:

- Identify the `FrameSequencePlayed` record associated with the image track file produced during each step, and confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].

- If successful playback start is expected, confirm that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record does not contain a `Parameter` element with a `Name` equal to `DownstreamDevice`.
- If failed playback start is expected, confirm that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record contains a `TDLException` exception. Record all parameters associated with the exception.

Failure to produce correct log records, including missing required elements or incorrect parameters, shall be cause to fail this test.

1. Load the *KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry*, which is a KDM that carries only the "assume trust" certificate thumbprint. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.
2. Load the *KDM with random TDL entry*, which contains a single, randomly generated device list entry. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.
3. Load the *KDM with the SM alone on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains only the certificate thumbprint of the SM Certificate of the Test Subject. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.

If the Test Subject is a *Media Block that supports Link Encryption*, perform each of the following steps. Before each step, delete all KDMs residing in the Test Subject. After completing the steps, extract a security log from the Test Subject and, using a *Text Editor*:

- Identify the `FrameSequencePlayed` record associated with the image track file produced during each step, and confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5].
- If successful playback start is expected, confirm that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record contains two `Parameter` elements with a `Name` equal to `DownstreamDevice`, the first having a `Value` equal to the certificate thumbprint of the LDB married to the Projector and the second having a `Value` equal to the certificate thumbprint of Projector SPB.
- If failed playback start is expected, confirm that the `FrameSequencePlayed` record contains a `TDLException` exception. Record all parameters associated with the exception.

Failure to produce correct log records, including missing required elements or incorrect parameters, shall be cause to fail this test.

1. Load the *KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry*, which is a KDM that carries only the "assume trust" certificate thumbprint. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.
2. Load the *KDM with Assume Trust and random TDL entries*, which is KDM with a TDL that carries the "assume trust" certificate thumbprint and a single, randomly generated device list entry. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail this test.
3. Load the *KDM with random TDL entry*, which contains a single, randomly generated device list entry. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail this test.
4. Load the *KDM with the SM alone on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains only the certificate thumbprint of the SM Certificate of the Test Subject. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail this test.
5. Load the *KDM with the projector alone on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains only the certificate thumbprint of the Projector SPB certificate. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail the test.

6. Load the *KDM with the LDB alone on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains only the certificate thumbprint of the certificate of the LDB married to the Projector SPB. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail the test.
7. Load the *KDM with the projector and LDB on the TDL*, which is a KDM with a TDL that contains the certificate thumbprint of the certificates of both the Projector SPB and its married LDB. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5, 9.4.3.6.1, 9.4.3.6.5, 9.4.3.6.6
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Material
KDM with Assume Trust and random TDL entries
KDM with the SM alone on the TDL
KDM with the projector alone on the TDL
KDM with the LDB alone on the TDL
KDM with the projector and LDB on the TDL
KDM with random TDL entry
KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

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## 6.1.12. Maximum Number of DCP Keys

### Objective

Verify that the system supports playback of two compositions with up to 256 different essence encryption keys each.

### Procedures

#### Note

The KDMs specified to be used in this test additionally have one of each type of forensic marking keys FMIK and FMAK. Receiving devices shall process such keys in accordance with the individual implementation, in a manner that will not affect the requirements related to the maximum number of content keys (MDIK and MDAK).

1. Load the compositions *128 Reel Composition, "A" Series* and *128 Reel Composition, "B" Series* on to the Test Subject.
2. Create a show that contains *128 Reel Composition, "A" Series* and *128 Reel Composition, "B" Series*. Each composition contains 128 reels of plaintext picture and sound.
3. Play the show. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment playback started. Failure to play the complete show shall be cause to fail this test.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which Step 3 was carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, locate the first CPLStart and last CPLend records that occurred after the time recorded in Step 3. Let *Plaintext Time* be the absolute difference between the TimeStamp values of the two records.
6. Load the compositions *128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)* and *128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)* on to the Test Subject.
7. Load the KDMs *KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)* and *KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)* on to the Test Subject.
8. Create a show that contains *128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)* and *128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)*. Each composition contains 128 reels of encrypted picture and sound.
9. Play the show. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment playback started. Failure to play the complete show shall be cause to fail this test.
10. The presence of any observable artifacts in the reproduced picture and/or sound shall be cause to fail this test.
11. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which Step 9 was carried out.
12. Using a *Text Editor*, locate the first CPLStart and last CPLend records that occurred after the time recorded in Step 9. Let *Ciphertext Time* be the absolute difference between the TimeStamp values of the two records.
13. An absolute difference of more than 1 second between *Ciphertext Time* and *Plaintext Time* is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.7.7

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[SMPTE-430-1]	

Test Material
128 Reel Composition, "A" Series
128 Reel Composition, "B" Series
128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)
128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)
KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)
KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)

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## 6.1.13. CPL Id Check

### Objective

Verify that the Test Subject checks that the KDM <CompositionPlaylistId> element matches the value of the CompositionPlaylistID field of KDM CipherData structure as specified in [SMPTE-430-1]

### Procedures

1. Load *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
2. Load *KDM with bad CipherData CompositionPlaylistId value*, a KDM in which (i) the value of the CompositionPlaylistID field of the CipherData structure does not match the value of the <Id> element of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and (ii) the value of the <CompositionPlaylistId> element matches the value of the CompositionPlaylist <Id> element of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Successful playback is cause to fail this test.
3. Delete *KDM with bad CipherData CompositionPlaylistId value*.
4. Load *KDM with bad CompositionPlaylistId value*, a KDM in which (i) the value of the CompositionPlaylistID field of the CipherData structure matches the value of the <Id> element of *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and (ii) the value of the <CompositionPlaylistId> element does not match the value of the CompositionPlaylist <Id> element in *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Attempt to play *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. Successful playback is cause to fail this test.
5. Extract a security log from the Test Subject and using a *Text Editor*, identify the KDMKeysReceived events associated with the above steps and:
  - a. Confirm that all required elements have correctly formatted parameters as defined in [SMPTE-430-5]. Missing required elements or incorrect parameters shall be cause to fail this test.
  - b. Confirm the presence of a KDMFormatError exception in the KDMKeysReceived log record. Record any additional parameters associated with the exception. A missing KDMFormatError exception in any of the associated KDMKeysReceived log records shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.8, 9.4.3.5
[SMPTE-430-1]	
[SMPTE-430-3]	
[SMPTE-430-5]	

Test Material
KDM with bad CipherData CompositionPlaylistId value
KDM with bad CompositionPlaylistId value
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

## 6.2. Link Encryption (LE)

*This section is only applicable to systems that use Link Encryption.*

### 6.2.1. Deleted Section

The section "LDB Trust" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 6.2.2. Special Auditorium Situation Operations

### Objective

*The following applies only to a Test Subject that supports Special Auditorium Situations.*

- Verify that the SM enables Special Auditorium Situations only when the SM receives a KDM whose TDL contains only the identities of the remote SPBs identified during TLS authentication.
- Verify that the SM shall not support the use of more than one image processor remote SPB (LD/LE) for any LDB/projector configuration.
- Verify that the SM authenticates each remote SPB against the TDL using a dedicated TLS session.
- Verify that the SM keys each remote SPB for Link Encryption operation using standardized Intra-Theater Security (ASM) Messaging.

### Procedures

#### Note

This test involves the use of more than one *asm-responder* simulator program, each with its own device certificate configuration. This places special emphasis on preparing and selecting the correct KDM for a stage of the test. The KDM's TDL needs to be populated with the appropriate certificate thumbprints for the device or combination of devices intended.

1. If not already on the system, ingest the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
2. Using supplied documentation (system manuals) and/or with the assistance of the manufacturer, list the possible Special Auditorium Situations that the Test Subject can support (e.g. 2 LDB/projectors, 1 LD/LE 1 LDB/projector, 2 LD/LE 2 LDB/projectors, 1 MB/projector 1 LDB/projector).
3. For each of the Special Auditorium Situations recorded in Step 2, set up and start corresponding *asm-responder* simulators using device certificates that are appropriate for each *asm-responder's* role in the Special Auditorium Situation (e.g. LD and PR (projector that utilizes electronic marriage), LD/PR (permanently married projector) or LD/LE (image processor) and perform the following Steps:
  - a. Power up the part of the system that contains the MB and observe that all the TLS connections become established.
  - b. Create the KDM *KDM* with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and an additional device certificate.
  - c. Create the KDM *KDM* with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation.
  - d. Create the KDM *KDM* with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and the "assume trust" thumbprint.
  - e. Create the KDM *KDM* with a TDL that contains one more LD/LE device thumbprints than there are LD/projector thumbprints in the special auditorium situation.
  - f. Create the KDM *KDM* with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation.

- g. Delete any KDMs already existing in the Test Subject. Ingest the KDM *KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and an additional device certificate*. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, the system should prevent playback. If the system plays the content, this shall be cause to fail this test.
- h. Delete any KDMs already existing in the Test Subject. Ingest the KDM *KDM with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation*. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, the system should prevent playback. If the system plays the content, this shall be cause to fail this test.
- i. Delete any KDMs already existing in the Test Subject. Ingest the KDM *KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and the "assume trust" thumbprint*. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, the system should prevent playback. If the system plays the content, this shall be cause to fail this test.
- j. Delete any KDMs already existing in the Test Subject. Ingest the KDM *KDM with a TDL that contains one more LD/LE device thumbprints than there are LD/projector thumbprints in the special auditorium situation*. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, the system should prevent playback. If the system plays the content, this shall be cause to fail this test.
- k. Delete any KDMs already existing in the Test Subject. Ingest the KDM *KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry*. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, the system should prevent playback. If the system plays the content, this shall be cause to fail this test.
- l. Delete any KDMs already existing in the Test Subject. Ingest the KDM *KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation*. Attempt to play the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, the system should successfully complete playback. If the system does not successfully play the content, this shall be cause to fail this test.
- m. Examine the output from the *asm-responder* simulators with an LD role. Failure for any simulator with an LD role to have received at least one LE key from the Test Subject using Auditorium Security Messages shall be cause to fail this test.

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.4.1, 9.4.3.5

Test Equipment
asm-responder

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted) KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and an additional device certificate KDM with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation

<b>Test Material</b>
<p>KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and the "assume trust" thumbprint</p> <p>KDM with a TDL that contains one more LD/LE device thumbprints than there are LD/projector thumbprints in the special auditorium situation</p> <p>KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry</p> <p>KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation</p>

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### 6.2.3. LE Key Usage

#### Objective

Verify that a fresh Link Encryption key is used for each movie showing.

#### Procedures

Using a suitable utility (e.g. a diagnostic program for the link decrypting device) to display the unique identifier (LE KeyID or other suitable identifier) of the LE session key that is currently in use by the LDB, perform the following procedures:

1. Setup and play the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
2. Record the LE key identifier reported by the utility to be in use during the playback.
3. Repeat Step 1.
4. Record the LE key identifier reported by the utility to be in use during the playback. If a new session key is not selected this is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-6]	9.4.4

Test Equipment
LDB Monitor

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

## 6.2.4. MB Link Encryption

### Objective

The following applies to a Test Subject that is a MB that provides one or more link encrypted image interfaces.

Verify that Link Encryption is applied to every image output that is capable of delivering d-cinema content to a remote SPB (link decryptor).

Verify that Link Encryption is applied for both plaintext and ciphertext compositions.

Verify that for playback of content that is not encrypted (therefore no KDM or TDL for this content exists) the SM automatically assumes "trust" in the LDB and projector SPBs for purposes of keying the LDB and enabling playback.

### Procedures

#### Note

This test can involve the use of more than one *DCI Projector* or *asm-responder* simulator programs, each with its own device certificate. This places special emphasis on preparing and selecting the correct KDM for a stage of the test. The KDM's TDL needs to be populated with the appropriate certificate thumbprints for the device or combination of devices intended.

#### Note

Steps 2d and 2g of this test require verification that the link encryption applied to every interface can be correctly decoded. If the Test Subject uses identical LE keys on all image interfaces, and does not require a "Special Auditorium Situation" for more than one image interface to be active, a single *DCI Projector* may be used to check each interface in turn. If the Test Subject keys the interfaces with different LE keys, or requires a "Special Auditorium Situation", one of the following strategies may be employed to allow the objective to be confirmed:

- i. If the Testing Organization has access to as many *DCI Projectors* as there are image interfaces, the test may be carried out with multiple projectors.
- ii. If there are less *DCI Projectors* available than image interfaces, an *asm-responder*, with unique LD (and PR if appropriate) device certificates, shall be substituted for each *DCI Projector* required by the configuration. Each *asm-responder* shall be responsible for capturing the LE key(s) delivered for each respective of the image interface configured in the Special Auditorium Situation. A single *DCI Projector* is used to verify that each of the image outputs is delivering a valid link encrypted signal, by connecting to the respective image interface and using an *asm-requester* configured to connect to the *DCI Projector* to send the LE key(s) captured by the *asm-responder* corresponding to that image interface.

1. With the assistance of the manufacturer, list the image interfaces present on the Test Subject that are capable of delivering d-cinema content to a remote SPB (link decryptor).
2. For each of the interfaces identified in the previous step, perform the following procedures:
  - a. Attach a suitable monitor to the interface that connects the LD and the Media Block (MB) without disrupting the LE to LD connection ( *i.e.*, "tap" the connection; this may require soldering a special test adapter).
  - b. Remove and restore power to the equipment containing the MB. This forces fresh TLS sessions to the remote SPBs and ensures that fresh LE keys are generated.

- c. Setup and play a show using *DCI 2K StEM* This test material contains a plaintext composition.
- d. Verify that the image is displayed properly on the projection screen. Failure to observe a correctly displayed image is cause to fail this test
- e. Verify that only a scrambled signal is seen on the monitor. A non-scrambled image on the monitor is cause to fail this test.
- f. Setup and play a show using *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, or if the Test Subject requires use of a "Special Auditorium Situation" type TDL to enable playback, *KDM for 2K StEM with Device Specific Special Auditorium TDL*. This test material contains an encrypted composition.
- g. Verify that the image is displayed properly on the projection screen. Failure to observe a correctly displayed image is cause to fail this test
- h. Verify that only a scrambled signal is seen on the monitor. A non-scrambled image on the monitor is cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	8.2.2.10, 8.4.2, 8.4.3.1, 9.4.4

Test Equipment
Dual-Link Monitor Bridge Tap Connector DCI Projector asm-responder asm-requester

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted) KDM for 2K StEM with Device Specific Special Auditorium TDL



## 6.3. Clocks and Time

This section describes general requirements concerning the time awareness of the projection system and its individual components. All procedures are applicable to the Security Manager, with the notable exception of section 6.3.2, which is applicable to all SPBs of type 1.

### 6.3.1. Clock Adjustment

#### Objective

- Verify that in order to maintain synchronization between auditoriums, exhibitors are able to adjust a SM's time by a maximum of +/- 6 minutes within any calendar year.
- Verify that the SM time adjustments are logged events.

#### Procedures

#### Note

The following procedures are likely to fail if the Test Subject has had its time adjusted since manufacture. The current time may not be centered on the adjustment range zero point. Any such adjustments, however, will be evidenced in the security log and by examining the relevant `TimeOffset` elements, the zero point can be derived and the time set accordingly. If necessary, contact the manufacturer for assistance in determining and setting the time to the center of the range of adjustment for the current calendar year.

1. Select for playback the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
2. Play back the composition and at the moment the last frame of picture is reproduced, record the UTC time as provided by an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*.
3. Attempt to advance the time of the SM by 6 minutes. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. Failure to successfully adjust the time is cause to fail this test.
4. Repeat Steps 1 and 2.
5. Attempt to advance the time of the SM by 5 seconds. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. If the time can be successfully adjusted, this is cause to fail this test.
6. Return the time to the zero point, i.e. retard by the total amount successfully advanced in Steps 3 and 5.
7. Attempt to retard the time of the SM by 6 minutes. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. Failure to successfully adjust the time is cause to fail this test.
8. Repeat Steps 1 and 2.
9. Attempt to retard the time of the SM by 5 seconds. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. If the time can be successfully adjusted, this is cause to fail this test.
10. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.

11. Locate a `FrameSequencePlayed` event caused by Step 2. Subtract the value of the time recorded in Step 2 (UTC time) from the `TimeStamp` from the `LogRecord` (System time). Record this time as the delta of System time to UTC time for the unadjusted state.
12. Locate the `SPBClockAdjust` event from Step 3 and confirm that the `TimeStamp` contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 3 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 11 + 6 minutes.
13. Locate the `SPBClockAdjust` event from Step 7 and confirm that the `TimeStamp` contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 7 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 11 - 6 minutes.
14. Locate the `SPBClockAdjust` event from Step 5 and confirm the presence of an Exception with a name of `AdjustmentRangeError`. Confirm that the `TimeStamp` contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 5 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 11. The value of the `TimeOffset` parameter shall be ignored.
15. Locate the `SPBClockAdjust` event from Step 9 and confirm the presence of an Exception with a name of `AdjustmentRangeError`. Confirm that the `TimeStamp` contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 5 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 11. The value of the `TimeOffset` parameter shall be ignored.
16. Locate a `FrameSequencePlayed` event caused by Step 4. Confirm that the `TimeStamp` contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 4 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 11 + 6 minutes.
17. Locate a `FrameSequencePlayed` event caused by Step 8. Confirm that the `TimeStamp` contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 8 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 11 - 6 minutes.
18. Incorrect or missing `LogRecord` elements for Steps 11 through 17 shall be cause to fail this test. *Note: The `TimeStamp` values will have an accuracy that depends on various factors such as system responsiveness, test operator acuity, etc, and are essentially approximate. The intent is to verify that the `TimeStamp` values indeed reflect the time adjustments.*

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

Test Equipment
Accurate Real-Time Clock

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

## 6.3.2. SPB Type 1 Clock Battery

### Objective

Verify that the Type 1 SPB clock's battery is changeable without losing track of proper time.

### Procedures

The phrase "record synchronized accurate time" used below means that the Test Operator records the value of the *Accurate Real-Time Clock* so as to determine a range of predictable deltas between the value of the *Accurate Real-Time Clock* and the timestamp in the log record that corresponds to an event. It is not important that the two times be equal, but that the difference be predictable to within a range that accommodates both variances in the responsiveness of the Test Subject for time stamping the logged operation and the accuracy of the Test Operator. Note: Each end of the range of the deltas is extended by an additional 2 seconds to allow for minor resolution inaccuracies of the testing methodology.

1. Perform the following actions:
  - a. Adjust the clock of the Test Subject +2 seconds, record synchronized accurate time.
  - b. Adjust the clock -2 seconds, record synchronized accurate time.
2. Repeat step 1 four times.
3. Perform the battery replacement procedure per the manufacturer's instructions.
4. Perform the following actions:
  - a. Adjust the clock +2 seconds, record synchronized accurate time.
  - b. Adjust the clock -2 seconds, record synchronized accurate time.
5. Extract a log report, or transfer the log records over ASM, for a time period that includes the times during which steps 1-4 were performed.
6. The absence of a log record for any of the clock adjustments made by the above steps shall be cause to fail this test.
7. For each of the five repetitions of step 1a, subtract 2 seconds from the event timestamp to compensate for the 2 seconds added to the SM clock. Compute the delta, in seconds, between the recorded synchronized accurate time and the logged time for the event. Assign the label of  $Ia_{min}$  to the minimum delta in the set. Assign the label of  $Ia_{max}$  to the maximum delta in the set.
8. For each of the five repetitions of step 1b, compute the delta, in seconds, between the recorded synchronized accurate time and the logged time for the event. No adjustment to the event timestamps is required as the clock has been returned to its original setting. Assign the label of  $Ib_{min}$  to the minimum delta in the set. Assign the label of  $Ib_{max}$  to the maximum delta in the set.
9. For the event in step 4a, subtract 2 seconds from the event timestamp to compensate for the 2 seconds added to the SM clock. Compute the delta, in seconds, between the recorded synchronized accurate time and the logged time for the event and record the value as  $4a$ . A value of  $4a$  that is less than  $Ia_{min} - 2$  seconds is cause to fail the test. A value of  $4a$  that is greater than  $Ia_{max} + 2$  seconds is cause to fail the test.
10. For the event in step 4b, compute the delta, in seconds, between the recorded synchronized accurate time and the logged time for the event and record the value as  $4b$ . A value of  $4b$  that is less than  $Ib_{min} - 2$  seconds is cause to fail the test. A value of  $4b$  that is greater than  $Ib_{max} + 2$  seconds is cause to fail the test.

**Supporting Materials**

<b>Reference Document ID</b>	<b>Reference Document Section(s)</b>
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

<b>Test Equipment</b>
Accurate Real-Time Clock

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### 6.3.3. Clock Resolution

#### Objective

Verify that the SM clock has a resolution to one second.

#### Procedures

1. Setup and play back a show containing the composition *64 Reel Composition, 1 Second Reels (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 64 1 second reel Composition (Encrypted)*. This composition contains 64 reels of encrypted essence, each with a duration of one (1) second.
2. Examine the log records produced by the above playback. If the time stamps of the log entries are recorded to one (1) second resolution, it can be deduced that the SM clock has a resolution of at least one second. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

Test Material
64 Reel Composition, 1 Second Reels (Encrypted) KDM for 64 1 second reel Composition (Encrypted)

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## 6.4. Forensic Marking (FM)

### 6.4.1. FM Application Constraints

#### Objective

- Verify that FM is not applied to non-encrypted audio or image content.
- Verify that FM is not applied to Track Files that are not encrypted in case portions of a composition are encrypted and other portions are not.
- Verify that event log records reflect the FM state.

#### Procedures

1. Play back the *DCP 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted)* and present the reproduced image and each of the 16 channels of sound to the appropriate Forensic Marking (FM) detector. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment playback is started. This package has a CPL that selects between encrypted and plaintext, image and sound track files in a specific order.
2. Verify that the FM detectors report the following status for the presentation: Note: Each segment of the presentation is approximately 35 minutes long and contains slates at the head and tail.
  - a. The first segment of the presentation should indicate both image FM and sound FM are absent.
  - b. The second segment of the presentation should indicate image FM is present and sound FM is absent.
  - c. The third segment of the presentation should indicate image FM is absent and sound FM is present.
  - d. The last segment of the presentation should indicate both image FM and sound FM are present. Any discrepancy between the expected and reported FM states is cause to fail this test.
3. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which step 1 was carried out.
4. Using a *Text Editor*, locate the `FrameSequencePlayed` records that correspond to the encrypted track files played during the presentation segments and:
  - a. Verify there are no `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the first segment of the presentation (plaintext track files do not generate these records).
  - b. Verify that `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the second segment of the presentation contain values of the `ImageMark` parameter equal to "true" and do not contain an `AudioMark` parameter.
  - c. Verify that `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the third segment of the presentation contain values of the `AudioMark` parameter equal to "true" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.
  - d. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the last segment of the presentation:
    - i. Verify that records associated with image track files contain one `ImageMark` parameter with value "true" and do not contain an `AudioMark` parameter; and
    - ii. verify that records associated with audio track files contain one `AudioMark` parameter with value "true" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.

Failure of any these verifications is cause to fail this test.

Note: the equipment manufacturer is required to provide a suitable FM decoder (i.e., software and hardware).

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.2

Test Equipment
FM Detector Accurate Real-Time Clock

Test Material
2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted) KDM for 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted)

NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 6.4.2. Granularity of FM Control

### Objective

- Verify that "No FM mark" states are capable of being independently controlled, for audio and image, via appropriate use of the `ForensicMarkFlagList` element of the KDM for audio and image Track Files.
- Verify that the `ForensicMarkFlagList` element of the KDM and thus the "no FM mark" state applies to the entire CPL/composition, according to the associated KDM.
- Verify that the "no FM mark" state does not apply to any other composition, even if the other composition is part of the same showing (i.e., same Show Playlist).
- Verify that event log records reflect the FM state.

### Procedures

1. Build a show playlist out of the following four compositions, in the order listed:
  - *2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)*.
  - *2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)*.
  - *2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)*.
  - *2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)*.
2. Play back the show, and present the reproduced image and each of the 16 channels of sound to the appropriate Forensic Marking (FM) detector. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment playback is started.
3. Verify that the FM detectors report the following status for the presentation:
  - a. *2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)*: No image FM and no audio FM for the whole composition.
  - b. *2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)*: Image FM present, but no audio FM, for the whole composition.
  - c. *2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)*: No image FM, but audio FM present, for the whole composition.
  - d. *2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)*: Image FM and audio FM present for the whole composition.Any discrepancy between the expected and reported FM states is cause to fail this test.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which step 2 was carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, locate `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback and:
  - a. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback of *2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)*:



- i. Verify that records associated with image track files contain one ImageMark parameter with value "false" and do not contain an AudioMark parameter; and
  - ii. verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "false" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.
- b. For the FrameSequencePlayed records corresponding to the playback of *2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)*:
- i. Verify that records associated with image track files contain one ImageMark parameter with value "true" and do not contain an AudioMark parameter; and
  - ii. verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "false" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.
- c. For the FrameSequencePlayed records corresponding to the playback of *2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)*:
- i. Verify that records associated with image track files contain one ImageMark parameter with value "false" and do not contain an AudioMark parameter; and
  - ii. verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "true" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.
- d. For the FrameSequencePlayed records corresponding to the playback of *2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)*:
- i. Verify that records associated with image track files contain one ImageMark parameter with value "true" and do not contain an AudioMark parameter; and
  - ii. verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "true" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.

Failure of any these verifications is cause to fail this test.

Note: the equipment manufacturer is required to provide a suitable FM decoder (i.e., software and hardware).

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-1]	9.4.6.2

Test Equipment
FM Detector Accurate Real-Time Clock

Test Material
2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted) 2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)

<b>Test Material</b>
2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)
2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)

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**NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 6.4.3. FM Payload

#### Objective

- Verify that the Forensic Marking data payload is a minimum of 35 bits, and contains both time stamp and location data.
- Verify that every 15 minutes, 24 hours per day, 366 days/year are time stamped (will repeat annually).
- Verify that 16 bits (enough values for all the possible 35,136 time stamps) are allocated for the time stamp.
- Verify that 19 bits (524,288 possible locations/serial numbers) are allocated for location (serial number) information.
- Verify that all 35 bits are included in each five minute segment.
- Verify that recovery is possible with a 30-minute content sample for positive identification.

#### Procedures

1. Setup and play a show using the composition *2K FM Payload (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K FM Payload (Encrypted)*.
2. Play a section 30 minutes in length and use appropriate image and audio FM detectors to extract the data payload of the Forensic Marking.
3. Verify that the Forensic Marking decoder indicates that a "positive identification" has been made.
4. Verify that at least the following data is contained within both image and each of the 16 audio channels:
  - a. 16 bit time stamp.
  - b. 19 bit location ID.
5. Verify that two or three sequential time stamps have been recovered during the 30 minute content sample.

Failure to verify any of the above conditions shall be cause to fail this test.

To verify that all possible time stamps are generated would prove impractical, as testing would need to continue for a full calendar year. Design review is necessary to verify this assertion.

An assessment of whether all 35 bits are included in each 5 minute segments may be made if the Forensic Marking decoder is capable of providing data before "positive identification" is confirmed. This does not fully cover the objective, however, which can only be verified by design review.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.1

Test Equipment
FM Decoder

Test Material
2K FM Payload (Encrypted)

<b>Test Material</b>
KDM for 2K FM Payload (Encrypted)

**NOT CURRENT VERSION**  
**ARCHIVED**

## 6.4.4. FM Audio Bypass

### Objective

- Verify that the Media Block does not alter the audio content essence when forensic marking is disabled using the KDM `ForensicMarkFlagList` “no FM mark” or “selective audio FM mark” commands.

### Procedures

1. Load and playback in their entirety the following CPLs using the associated KDM. For each, capture all 16 audio channels output from the Media Block using a *Digital Audio Recorder* in such a way that the captured audio signal is bit-for-bit identical to the output audio signal.
  - a. *Binary Audio Forensic Marking Bypass Test (Encrypted)* and *KDM for Binary Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted)*
  - b. *Binary Audio Forensic Marking Bypass Test (Encrypted)* and *KDM for Binary Selective Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted)*
2. Using *Sound Editor* or equivalent software, verify that, for each audio channel captured in Step 1.a, the sequence of captured audio samples is bit-for-bit identical to a continuous sequence of an equal number of audio samples from the corresponding audio channel from the source sound track file. Any discrepancy is cause to fail this test.
3. Using *Sound Editor* or equivalent software, verify that, for each of audio channels 7-16 captured in Step 1.b, the sequence of captured audio samples is bit-for-bit identical to a continuous sequence of an equal number of audio samples from the corresponding audio channel from the source sound track file. Any discrepancy is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.2

Test Equipment
Digital Audio Recorder

Test Material
Binary Audio Forensic Marking Bypass Test (Encrypted)
KDM for Binary Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted)
KDM for Binary Selective Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted)

## 6.4.5. Selective Audio FM Control

### Objective

- Verify that the forensic marking "selective audio FM mark" and "no FM mark" states can be commanded by the `ForensicMarkFlagList` element of the KDM that enables playback.
- Verify that when commanded, the "no FM mark" state shall apply to the entire encrypted DCP. The "no FM mark" state shall not apply to any other DCP, even if the other DCP is part of the same showing (i.e., same Show Playlist).
- Verify that if both the "no FM mark" and "selective audio FM mark" are present in the KDM used to enable the selective audio FM mark command, the "selective audio FM mark" will override the "no FM mark" command.
- Verify that only one `ForensicMarkFlagList` URI of the form `http://www.dcmovies.com/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-audio-disable-above-channel-XX` (where XX is a value in the set {01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 ... 99}) is allowed in the KDM used to enable the selective audio FM mark command.

### Procedures

1. Build a show playlist out of the following four compositions, keyed with their KDMs, in the order listed
  - *Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*
  - *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)*
  - *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)*
  - *Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*

Note: The KDM *KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)* contains both a "selective audio FM mark" and a "no FM mark" URI in the `ForensicMarkFlagList`.
2. Play back the show, and present the reproduced sound to the appropriate Forensic Marking (FM) detector. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment playback is started.
3. Verify that the FM detectors report the following status for the presentation:
  - a. *Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*: No audio FM for any of the 16 audio channels, for the whole composition.
  - b. *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)*: Audio FM present on channels 1 through 6 inclusive, and absent on channels 7 through 16 inclusive, for the whole composition.
  - c. *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)*: Audio FM present on channels 1 through 8 inclusive, and absent on channels 9 through 16 inclusive, for the whole composition.
  - d. *Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*: Audio FM present, on all 16 channels, for the whole composition. Any discrepancy between the expected and reported FM states is cause to fail this test.
4. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which step 2 was carried out.
5. Using a *Text Editor*, locate `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback and:

- a. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one `AudioMark` parameter with value "false" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.
  - b. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one `AudioMark` parameter with value "true" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.
  - c. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one `AudioMark` parameter with value "true" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.
  - d. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one `AudioMark` parameter with value "true" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.
- Failure of any these verifications is cause to fail this test.
6. Build a show playlist out of the following four compositions, keyed with their KDMs, in the order listed
    - *Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*
    - *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)*
    - *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)*
    - *Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*

Note: The KDM *KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)* contains both a "selective audio FM mark" and a "no FM mark" URI in the `ForensicMarkFlagList`.
  7. Play back the show, and present the reproduced sound to the appropriate Forensic Marking (FM) detector. With an *Accurate Real-Time Clock*, note the UTC time at the moment playback is started.
  8. Verify that the FM detectors report the following status for the presentation:
    - a. *Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*: Audio FM present, on all 16 channels, for the whole composition.
    - b. *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)*: Audio FM present on channels 1 through 10 inclusive, and absent on channels 11 through 16 inclusive, for the whole composition.
    - c. *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)*: Audio FM present, on all 16 channels, for the whole composition.
    - d. *Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*: No audio FM for any of the 16 audio channels, for the whole composition.

Any discrepancy between the expected and reported FM states is cause to fail this test.
  9. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which step 7 was carried out.
  10. Using a *Text Editor*, locate `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback and:
    - a. For the `FrameSequencePlayed` records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one `AudioMark` parameter with value "true" and do not contain an `ImageMark` parameter.

- b. For the FrameSequencePlayed records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "true" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.
  - c. For the FrameSequencePlayed records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "true" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.
  - d. For the FrameSequencePlayed records corresponding to the playback of *Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)*: Verify that records associated with audio track files contain one AudioMark parameter with value "false" and do not contain an ImageMark parameter.
- Failure of any these verifications is cause to fail this test.

- 11. Set up a show using the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with the KDM *KDM with two selective audio FM mark URIs*.
- 12. Attempt to start playback and record the result. Successful start of playback is cause to fail this test.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.2

Test Equipment
FM Decoder

Test Material
Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)
Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)
Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)
Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)
Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)
Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)
KDM for Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)
KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)
KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)
KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)
KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)



<b>Test Material</b>
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KDM with two selective audio FM mark URIs
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**NOT CURRENT VERSION**  
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## 6.5. Image Reproduction

### 6.5.1. Playback of Image Only Material

#### Objective

Verify that all projection systems are capable of playing back content that consists of image only, i.e., has no corresponding audio or other track.

#### Procedures

Play back the DCP *DCI NIST Frame no sound files*. This package comprises image only. Verify that the image is displayed correctly. Failure to display the image is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.3.1.3

Test Material
DCI NIST Frame no sound files

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NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 6.5.2. Decoder Requirements

### Objective

- Verify that the image decoder meets all requirements for JPEG 2000 image decoder presented in [DCI-DCSS-1-2] Sec. 4.3.2.
- Verify that the decoder decodes each color component at 12 bits per sample, with equal color/component bandwidth, and does not subsample chroma (i.e., does not generate any 4:2:2 signal or similar), except as permitted by [DCI-DCSS-1-2] Sec. 2.1.1.4.
- For 2K decoders, verify that it shall decode 2K data for every frame in a 4K distribution.
- For 4K decoders, verify that it shall decode 4K data for every frame in a 4K distribution.

### Procedures

1. Verify that the decoder output conforms to the following image specifications:

- a. 2K = 2048 x 1080 at 24 fps
- b. 2K = 2048 x 1080 at 48 fps
- c. 4K = 4096 x 2160 at 24 fps

To verify this, build and play a single show containing the compositions *DCI 2K Sync Test (2K@24fps)*, *DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps) (2K@48fps)* and *4K Sync Test (4K@24fps)*. Verify that playback is successful and that image and audio are properly reproduced as described below.

The test images used in the referenced compositions are similar for each of the 2K and 4K variants. In many cases, the features as they appear in the 2K image are simply scaled to create the 4K image. The description of the features of the 2k variant follows. Note that failure language declared in the 2k variant description will be modified later in this procedure to describe compliant display of the image on 24 fps 4K and 48 fps 2K displays.

In the image descriptions that follow, the term "source pixel" is used to define the respective image feature in terms of the input signal. The display may have a different resolution than the image, in which case a given input -- the source pixel -- may be mapped to some number of display pixels other than one, and may also contribute to shading on adjacent pixels. For example, a line that is one source pixel in width in the 2K image should appear two pixels in width on a 4K display. Similarly, a line that is one source pixel in width in the 4K image will likely appear diminished -- perhaps significantly -- on a 2K display, and will perhaps not be centered on a particular line of the display's pixels.


- i. For the *DCI 2K Sync Test* composition (2K@24fps), locate and confirm the appearance of the following features of the test image:
  - A. A yellow reticle defines the area of the 1:1.85 aspect ratio (1998 x 1080). The lines comprising the reticle are one source pixel in width. Small, outward facing arrows of matching color indicate the reticle position for the case where some occlusion prevents display of the horizontal lines (i.e., the top-most or bottom-most lines of the image.) Failure to display the full reticle shall be cause to fail the test.
  - B. A green reticle defines the area of the 1:2.39 aspect ratio (2048 x 858). The lines comprising the reticle are one source pixel in width. Small, outward facing arrows of matching color indicate the reticle position for the case where some occlusion prevents display of the vertical lines (i.e., the left-most or right-most lines of the image.) Failure to display the full reticle shall be cause to fail the test.

- C. A non-antialiased circle is placed in the center of the image. The source pixels comprising the circle are either ref-white or background-gray. The circle should appear to have equal height and width. Distortion of the circle geometry shall be cause to fail the test.
- D. To the left of the circle are six patches, in two rows of three. From left to right, top to bottom, the patches are designated P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6. (See Figure 6.1 below for a graphical definition of the panel designations.)
- Pattern P1 is a pair of grayscale concentric squares having two different luminances. The outer square is dark gray (12-bit X'Y'Z' code values 122,128,125). The inner square is absolute black (12-bit X'Y'Z' code values 0,0,0).
  - Pattern P2 is a set of sixty (60) horizontal lines, each line being one source pixel in height, alternating red-green-blue, from top to bottom. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P3 is a set of thirty (30) horizontal lines, each line being two source pixels in height, alternating red-green-blue, from top to bottom. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P4 is a 60 x 60 "checkerboard" array of black and white areas. The size of each black or white area is one source pixel. Failure to display the pattern with uniform color, contrast and area size shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P5 is a set of sixty (60) vertical lines, each line being one source pixel in width, alternating red-green-blue, from left to right. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P6 is a set of thirty (30) vertical lines, each line being two source pixels in width, alternating red-green-blue, from left to right. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
- E. To the right of the circle are six patches, in two rows of three. From left to right, top to bottom, the patches are designated P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12.
- Pattern P7 is a set of thirty (30) horizontal lines, each line being two source pixels in height, alternating black-white, from top to bottom. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P8 is a set of sixty (60) horizontal lines, each line being one source pixel in height, alternating black-white, from top to bottom. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P9 is a pair of grayscale concentric squares having two different luminances. The outer square is reference white (12-bit X'Y'Z' code values (3794, 3960, 3890)). The inner square is absolute white (12-bit X'Y'Z' code values (4095,4095,4095)). Note that the square having absolute white color will have red hue.
  - Pattern P10 is a set of thirty (30) vertical lines, each line being two source pixels in width, alternating black-white, from left to right. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - Pattern P11 is a set of sixty (60) vertical lines, each line being one source pixel in width, alternating black-white, from left to right. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.

- f. Pattern P12 is a 30 x 30 "checkerboard" array of black and white areas. The size of each black or white area is two source pixels square. Failure to display the pattern with uniform color and area size shall be cause to fail the test.
- F. Below the circle is a set of twenty (20) rectangular grayscale patches, in two centered horizontal rows of ten (10) patches each. Each patch has a distinct luminance, which are defined in [SMPTE-431-2]. No two adjacent patches should appear to have the same luminance. Failure to display twenty distinct patches shall be cause to fail the test.
- ii. For the *4K Sync Test* composition (4K@24fps), locate and confirm the appearance of the features of the test image as described for the *DCI 2K Sync Test* composition, with the following exceptions:
- A. Pattern P2 is a set of one hundred twenty (120) horizontal lines, each line being one source pixel in height, alternating red-green-blue, From top to bottom. When displayed on a 2K display, no pass/fail criteria shall be applied. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - B. Pattern P3 is a set of sixty (60) horizontal lines, each line being two source pixels in height, alternating red-green-blue, From top to bottom. When displayed on a 2K display, this feature will appear as pattern P2 in the 2K test frame. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - C. Pattern P4 is a 120 x 120 "checkerboard" array of black and white areas. The size of each black or white area is one source pixel. When displayed on a 2K display, this feature will appear as a uniform (but perhaps variegated) gray field. Failure to display the pattern with uniform color, contrast and area size shall be cause to fail the test.
  - D. Pattern P5 is a set of one hundred twenty (120) vertical lines, each line being one source pixel in width, alternating red-green-blue, From left to right. When displayed on a 2K display, no pass/fail criteria shall be applied. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - E. Pattern P6 is a set of sixty (60) vertical lines, each line being two source pixels in width, alternating red-green-blue, from left to right. When displayed on a 2K display, this feature will appear as pattern P5 in the 2K test frame. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - F. Pattern P7 is a set of sixty (60) horizontal lines, each line being two source pixels in height, alternating black-white, from top to bottom. When displayed on a 2K display, this feature will appear as pattern P8 in the 2K test frame. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - G. Pattern P8 is a set of one hundred twenty (120) horizontal lines, each line being one source pixel in height, alternating black-white, from top to bottom. When displayed on a 2K display, no pass/fail criteria shall be applied. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - H. Pattern P10 is a set of sixty (60) vertical lines, each line being two source pixels in width, alternating black-white, from left to right. When displayed on a 2K display, this feature will appear as pattern P11 in the 2K test frame. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - I. Pattern P11 is a set of one hundred twenty (120) vertical lines, each line being one source pixel in width, alternating black-white, from left to right. When displayed on a 2K display, no pass/fail criteria shall be applied. Failure to display the correct colors and number of lines shall be cause to fail the test.
  - J. Pattern P12 is a 60 x 60 "checkerboard" array of black and white areas. The size of each black or white area is two source pixels square. Failure to display the pattern with uniform color and area size shall be cause to fail the test.
- iii. For the *DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps)* composition (2K@48fps), locate and confirm the appearance of the features of the test image as described for the *DCI 2K Sync Test* composition, with the following exceptions:

- A. In the case where the MB provides image data to the projector via dual 1.5 Gb/s (or single 3 Gb/s) SDI link, [DCI-DCSS-1-2] Sec. 2.1.1.4 allows chroma subsampling on 48 fps images (i.e. 4:2:2). In this case, patches P2 and P5 of the 2K test image are expected to be displayed with chroma blending. Patch P3 may display chroma blending, depending on the coincidence of the 2X horizontal source pixels and the subsampling algorithm. Patch P6 is expected to be reproduced discretely, with no visible chroma blending. No blending shall be visible for any of the patches P7, P8, P10 and P11. The number of lines displayed in each pattern shall be sixty (60). Failure to display the correct number of lines, or appearance of chroma blending deviating from the above shall be cause to fail the test.
2. Verify that the decoder outputs 12-bit X'Y'Z' color:
- To test for 12 bit color reproduction play back the composition *DCI 2K Moving Gradient*. This clip contains a special moving pattern to reveal usage of all 12 bits. The pattern contains three vertical bands, each 250 horizontal pixels in width, corresponding to 12, 11 and 10 bit representations of a sine wave that advances in value by 1 degree per pixel. The bands are labeled with the 12 bit region on the left, 11 bit region in the center and 10 bit region on the right of the screen. Examine the image for artifacts such as contouring or vertical striations. Any such noticeable artifacts in the 12 bit region of the pattern is cause to fail this test. The 11 and 10 bit regions are provided for reference.
3. To test for X'Y'Z' color reproduction: Using a *DCI Projector*, properly calibrated for Luminance and Color Calibration and a *Spectroradiometer*, perform the following steps:
- For each of the 12 Color Accuracy color patch code values referenced in [SMPTE-431-2], Table A.4, display the given X'Y'Z' code values. This may be achieved by displaying a suitable test file or by delivering the appropriate signal to an external interface (e.g. Dual-Link HD-SDI). Measure the and record the displayed Luminance and Color Coordinates for each of the Color Accuracy patches.
  - Play back the composition *Color Accuracy Series* and measure and record the displayed Luminance and Color Coordinates for each of the Color Accuracy patches.
  - For each of the the corresponding reference and decoded values recorded in steps i and ii, calculate the delta  $E^*ab$  values and record them.
- If any of the values recorded in step iii is  $>4.0$  this is cause to fail this test.
4. For 4K decoders, verify that it shall decode 4K data for every frame in a 4K distribution, or for 2K decoders, verify that it shall decode 2K data for every frame in a 4K distribution. To test this perform the following procedure:
- Play back the composition *2K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)*. This composition contains a codestream at the maximum allowable bitrate of an image with a burned in counter, incremented by one with every frame. The projected image must be filmed with a suitable camera and then be viewed in slow motion to verify that no counter numbers are skipped. Failure to observe all the numbered frames shall be cause to fail this test. Verify that the projected image contains a clearly visible, regular pattern that does not change over time (except for the burned in counter). If any other artifacts are noted (e.g. flickering or similar) this is cause to fail this test.
  - Play back the composition *4K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 4K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)*. This composition contains a codestream at the maximum allowable bitrate of an image with a burned in counter, incremented by one with every frame. The projected image must be filmed with a suitable camera and then be viewed in slow motion to verify that no counter numbers are skipped. Failure to observe all the numbered frames shall be cause to fail this test. Verify that the projected image contains a clearly visible, regular pattern that does not change over time (except for the burned in counter). If any other artifacts are noted (e.g. flickering or similar) this is cause to fail this test.

Figure 6.1. Standard Frame Panel Designations



**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-428-1] [SMPTE-431-2]	4.3.2, 2.1.1.4

Test Equipment
48 fps Camera

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test
DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps)
4K Sync Test
DCI 2K Moving Gradient
Color Accuracy Series
2K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)
4K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)
KDM for 4K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)

## 6.6. Audio Reproduction

### 6.6.1. Digital Audio Interfaces

#### Objective

Verify that the Media Block has a digital audio output interface with the capacity for delivering 16 channels of digital audio at 24-bit 48 kHz or 96 kHz, and follows the [AES3-2003] recommended practice for serial transmission format for two-channel linearly represented digital audio data.

#### Procedures

1. Play the composition *DCI 1-16 Numbered Channel Identification* which contains spoken identification for each of the 16 audio channels and verify correct output. Failure to confirm correct reproduction on any channel is cause to fail this test.
2. Play the composition *DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise* which contains 16 channels of Pink Noise at 48kHz sample rate and verify:
  - a. 48kHz AES3 signal at all outputs.
  - b. Pink noise bandwidth to 22kHz.
  - c. 24 active bits on analyzer.

Failure to confirm above conditions a, b and c, is cause to fail this test.

3. Play the composition *DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise (96 kHz)* which contains 16 channels of Pink Noise at 96kHz sample rate and verify:
  - a. 96kHz AES3 signal at all outputs.
  - b. Pink noise bandwidth to 44kHz.
  - c. 24 active bits on analyzer.

Failure to confirm above conditions a, b and c, is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[AES3-2003]	
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.5.4.3, 7.5.6.1, 7.5.6.2

Test Equipment
AES3 Audio Analyzer

Test Material
DCI 1-16 Numbered Channel Identification



<b>Test Material</b>
DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise
DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise (96 kHz)

**NOT CURRENT VERSION**  
**ARCHIVED**

## 6.6.2. Audio Sample Rate Conversion

### Objective

Verify that the system has the capability of performing Sample Rate Conversion (SRC) when needed.

### Procedures

1. Play back the DCP *DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs, 96kHz)*. Enable SRC on the system, select an output rate of 48kHz. With an AES analyzer, confirm that each of the AES-3 outputs are producing an AES signal with a 48kHz sample rate. Any other measured output sample rate is cause to fail this test.
2. Play back the DCP *DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs)*. Enable SRC on the system, select an output rate of 96kHz. With an AES analyzer, confirm that each of the AES-3 outputs are producing an AES signal with a 96kHz sample rate. Any other measured output sample rate is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.3.2.3

Test Equipment
AES3 Audio Analyzer

Test Material
DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs)
DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs, 96kHz)

### 6.6.3. Audio Delay Setup

#### Objective


Verify that the system provides a method for adjusting the delay of the audio signal relative to the image. It must be possible to offset audio +/-200 ms in 10 ms increments.

#### Procedures

1. Connect channel 1 of the oscilloscope to the analog center channel output of the sound equipment.
2. Connect channel 2 of the oscilloscope to a photodiode that is placed in front of the projection screen, where the flashing rectangle is located.
3. Perform the following steps:
  - a. Play back the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test*. This composition contains short beeps (one frame in length) and a white flashing rectangle at the bottom of the screen, synchronized to the beeps.
  - b. Measure the delay between the light pulse and the audio pulse. This will depend on a combination of many factors such as the image processing delay of the display device, sound processing delay in the sound equipment, and digital signal transmission delays (buffering of data). Record the timing with zero offset applied to the unit under test. Use this nominal figure as the reference point for the following steps.
  - c. Set the offset to -200 ms and verify that the delay observed at the oscilloscope corresponds is consistent with the nominal figure minus 200 ms. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
  - d. Set the offset to +200 ms and verify that the delay observed at the oscilloscope corresponds is consistent with the nominal figure plus 200 ms. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
  - e. Set the offset to -190 ms and verify that the delay observed at the oscilloscope corresponds is consistent with the nominal figure minus 190 ms. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
  - f. Set the offset to +190 ms and verify that the delay observed at the oscilloscope corresponds is consistent with the nominal figure plus 190 ms. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
  - g. Set the offset to -10 ms and verify that the delay observed at the oscilloscope corresponds is consistent with the nominal figure minus 10 ms. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
  - h. Set the offset to +10 ms and verify that the delay observed at the oscilloscope corresponds is consistent with the nominal figure plus 10 ms. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
4. Repeat the above test, but this time for 48 fps (use the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps)*). Record the results obtained.

The image below shows what a typical measurement is expected to look like. The upper trace shows the light output of the projector, measured by means of the photo diode. The photo diode signal is shown inverted, i.e., low means high light output. The lower trace shows the analog center channel output of the Media Block after D/A conversion from the AES-EBU signal.

Figure 6.2. Audio Delay Timing



Warning: the optical flashes generated during this test can cause physiological reactions in some people. People who are sensitive to such optical stimuli should not view the test material.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.4.1.8

Test Equipment
Oscilloscope Photodiode

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps)

## 6.6.4. Click Free Splicing of Audio Track Files

### Objective

Verify that the playback system allows click free splicing of the audio track files.

### Procedures

Play back the DCP *DCI Malformed Test 3: Sound Splice Tests*. This package has a CPL that causes a 400 Hz sine wave tone to be spliced repeatedly, in a way that will ensure an amount of phase discontinuity at the splice point. Record any occurrence of audible snaps, crackles or pops, the reproduced audio should have no evidence of unpleasant artifacts at the splice points.

Note: Playback of this test must be done in a properly equipped and set up movie theater, at reference level, i.e., fader setting 7.0 for Dolby and compatibles or fader setting 0 dB for Sony and compatibles. A single channel of pink noise at -20dBFS should produce a Sound Pressure Level (SPL) of 85dBc, from any of the front loudspeakers, at the monitoring position. Monitoring by means of smaller monitor boxes or headphones is not sufficient.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	5.3.1.6

Test Equipment
Sound System

Test Material
DCI Malformed Test 3: Sound Splice Tests

## 6.7. Timed Text Reproduction

### 6.7.1. Media Block Overlay

#### Objective

In the case that the Media Block implements an alpha channel overlay module, a subpicture renderer (a module that converts the subpicture file into a baseband image file with an alpha channel) and a Timed Text renderer (a module that converts Timed Text data into a baseband image file with an alpha channel), verify that assets are rendered and displayed correctly by the system.

#### Procedures

1. Using a digital cinema projector that does not provide an internal subtitle rendering capability (or one in which subtitle rendering capability is disabled), load and play the compositions *Subtitle Test Part 1*, *Subtitle Test Part 2* and *Subtitle Test Part 3*.
2. Failure by any overlay image to appear as specified by the background (burned-in) image is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.5.4.2.5, 7.5.4.2.6, 7.5.4.2.7
[SMPTE-429-2]	

Test Equipment
DCI Projector

Test Material
Subtitle Test Part 1
Subtitle Test Part 2
Subtitle Test Part 3

### 6.7.2. Deleted Section

The section "Timed Text Synchronization" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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NOT CURRENT VERSION**

### 6.7.3. Deleted Section

The section "Support for Multiple Captions" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 6.7.4. Default Timed Text Font

### Objective

Verify that a timed-text rendering system provides a default font to be used in the case where no font files are supplied with the DCP.

### Procedures

1. Load and play the composition *DCI Malformed Test 8: DCP with timed text and a missing font*.
2. Verify that the timed text instances contain multiple lines of text.
3. Failure to correctly display multiple lines of text shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	3.4.3
[SMPTE-428-7]	
[SMPTE-429-5]	

Test Material
DCI Malformed Test 8: DCP with timed text and a missing font

### 6.7.5. Deleted Section

The section "Support for Subpicture Display" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 6.7.6. Timed Text Decryption

### Objective

Verify that an SM can play a composition that contains encrypted timed text essence.

### Procedures

1. Load the composition *DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted)* and KDM *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test with Subtitles (Encrypted)*.
2. Play the composition *DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted)*.
3. Verify that the timed text appears on screen as indicated by the main picture.
4. Failure to correctly display multiple lines of text shall be cause to fail the test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-428-7] [SMPTE-429-5]	9.7.2, 9.4.3.6.3, 9.4.3.5

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted) KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test with Subtitles (Encrypted)

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# Chapter 7. Projector

The Projector is a Type 2 SPB comprising a light processing system, including electronic and optical components, and a companion SPB. The projector may be stand-alone, in which case the companion SPB will be a Link Decryptor (LD), or else the companion SPB will be a Media Block (MB). The projector may include a Timed Text rendering engine (alpha-channel overlay).

## 7.1. Projector Test Environment for Image Measurements

When making image measurements on a Test Subject, the following environmental conditions must exist:

The Test Subject (projector) must be turned on (including the lamp) and allowed to thermally stabilize for 20 to 30 minutes prior to all measurements. All required setup and calibration procedures, as recommended by the manufacturer, shall be carried out or verified prior to all measurements. The projector's color management system must be configured such that incoming code values are interpreted in accordance with [SMPTE-428-1].

Stray light on the screen must be minimized. The room lights in screening rooms must be turned off, with the exception of the minimal lighting provided for working or safety reasons. For a theatrical environment room, the room lights must be the normal theatrical lighting environment. The ambient light level of a mastering environment reflected by the screen must be less than  $0.01 \text{ Cd/m}^2$  (.0029 ft-L), that of a theatrical environment less than  $0.03 \text{ Cd/m}^2$  (.01 ft-L). The use of black non-reflective surfaces with recessed lighting is encouraged. Safety regulations and the placement of exit lights or access lights can result in a higher ambient light level.

The screen must be non-specular and equally reflective over the entire visible spectrum. The screen should have variable black masking, adjustable to tightly frame the projected image (at a minimum, this should include the 1.85:1 and 2.39:1 image formats).

All image parameters must be measured off of the screen from the center of the normal seating area in an exhibition theater. All measurements must be done according to [SMPTE-431-1], [SMPTE-431-2].

Section 7.5.13 describes measuring the test environment. Measurements recorded from Section 7.5.5 through Section 7.5.12 should be interpreted in consideration of the measured test environment.

## 7.2. SPB Type 2

### 7.2.1. Projector Physical Protection

#### Objective

- Verify that the projector's companion SPB (LDB or MB) and its plaintext image interfaces is physically inside of, or otherwise mechanically connected to, the Projector SPB.
- Verify that SPB type 2 protection is provided by the Projector SPB.

#### Procedures

1. By physical examination, determine the physical perimeter that provides the SPB Type 2 protection for the Projector.
2. Locate and for each of any removable access covers and/or doors of the SPB Type 2, record whether they are protected by either:
  - a. Pick resistant mechanical locks employing physical or logical keys, or
  - b. Tamper-evident seals (e.g. evidence tape or holographic seals).
 The absence of one or more sorts of protection listed above on any of the access covers or doors comprising part of the SPB Type 2 perimeter is cause to fail this test.
3. By physical examination and using documentation provided by the manufacturer, locate the companion SPB's output image essence signal. Verify that:
  - a. these signals are not be accessible via (i) the removable access covers and doors located in Step 2 and (ii) ventilation holes or other openings; and
  - b. access to these signals and circuits would cause permanent and easily visible damage.
 Failure of any of these verifications is cause to fail this test.
4. By physical examination, locate the Companion SPB of the Projector (either a Media Block (MB) or a Link Decryptor Block (LDB)).
5. Verify that the Companion SPB is entirely enclosed within, or mechanically connected to, the Projector's SPB Type 2 enclosure. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.2.2, 9.4.3.6.1, 9.5.2.4

## 7.2.2. Projector Access Door

### Objective

Verify that the projector SPB implements a "projector SPB access door open" event signal to the companion SPB. Verify that playback is not permitted and terminates if the projector SPB access door is open.

### Procedures

Carefully examine the projector SPB for access doors. If any are found, execute the following steps for each one and record the results.

1. Play back the DCP *DCI 2K StEM*.
2. Open the projector access door and observe that playback terminates. If playback does not terminate, this is cause to fail this test.
3. Attempt to start playback with the door open. If playback starts, this is cause to fail this test.
4. Examine the logs from the projector's companion SPB and verify that a "door open" event was created for each time a door was opened. If any log record is missing, this is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.1
Test Material	
DCI 2K StEM	

### 7.2.3. Deleted Section

The section "SPB2 Requirements" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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#### **7.2.4. Deleted Section**

The section "SPB2 Secure Silicon Requirements" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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### 7.2.5. Deleted Section

The section "SPB2 Tamper Evidence" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 7.2.6. SPB2 Secure Silicon Field Replacement

### Objective

Verify that the secure silicon device, contained within a SPB Type 2, is not field serviceable (though it may be field replaceable). Verify that it is not accessible during normal SPB Type 2 operation or non-security-related servicing.

### Procedures

By careful optical and physical examination, verify that the secure silicon device contained within a SPB Type 2

1. is not field serviceable (but may be field replaceable), *i.e.*, there are no provisions for direct access to the SPB Type 2 secure silicon circuitry.
2. is not accessible during normal SPB Type 2 operation or non-security-related servicing, *i.e.*, is mounted in a special compartment separated from areas accessible during operations or normal servicing. If the SPB2 secure silicon device is accessible during non-security servicing or normal operations, this shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.3

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### 7.2.7. Systems without Electronic Marriage

#### Objective

Verify that in the configuration of a permanently married companion SPB (MB or LDB), the companion SPB is not field replaceable and requires the projector SPB and companion SPB system to both be replaced in the event of an SPB failure.

#### Procedures

Verify that the companion SPB type 1 (MB if no link encryption is used or LDB if link encryption is used) is not field-replaceable. Careful optical and physical inspection is necessary for this. Any deviation from these requirements is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.6

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## 7.2.8. Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining

### Objective

Verify that breaking the marriage between the projector and its companion SPB (LDB or MB) does not zeroize the projector SPB type 2 long term identity keys (RSA private keys).

### Procedures

(Only applies to systems that implement an Electronic Marriage, i.e., those that have field replaceable LDBs or MBs.)

1. Using procedures and tools provided by the manufacturer of the Projector, obtain the device certificate representing the identity of the SPB type 2 in PEM encoded format.
2. Using the procedure illustrated in Section 2.1.11, record the public key thumbprint of the certificate obtained in the above step.
3. Intentionally break the marriage and remarry the systems (this may require support by the manufacturer).
4. Using the same procedure as described in steps 1 and 2, verify that the public key in the certificate supplied by the projector is the same as before the remarriage. Mismatching public key thumbprints are cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.1

NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 7.3. Companion SPB Type 1

### 7.3.1. Deleted Section

The section "Projector Companion SPB Location" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 7.3.2. Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage

### Objective

This test only applies to field replaceable companion SPBs (MB or LDB) that implement electronic marriage functions.

- Verify that as part of the installation, or reinstallation, (i.e., mechanical connection to the projector and electrical initiation) an electrical and logical marriage of the companion SPB (MB or LDB) with the projector SPB is performed.
- Verify that upon initiation of the marriage a "SPBMarriage" log record is written (per [SMPTE-430-5]) and that the record contains all required data.
- Verify that upon break of the marriage a "SPBDivorce" log record is written (per [SMPTE-430-5]) and that the record contains all required data.

### Procedures

1. Verify system is functional prior to breaking the marriage. This can be achieved by loading and successfully playing the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test*.
2. Power down the system, locate the field-replaceable companion SPB (MB or LDB), break the marriage by disconnecting and/or removing the SPB.
3. Replace and reconnect the companion SPB, power up the system, examine the logs and verify that a "SPBDivorce" log record has been written. Absence of this entry is cause to fail this test.
4. Verify the following are contained in the SPBDivorce record:
  - a. The `DeviceSourceID` element contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the companion SPB.
  - b. The `DeviceConnectedID` element contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the projector SPB2.
  - c. The log entry contains an `AuthID` record.Failure to meet requirements a, b and c above is cause to fail this test.
5. Setup a show with composition from Step 1. Verify that the system does not play the composition. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
6. Perform the marriage installation procedure and repeat Step 1 to verify that the system is now capable of payout. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
7. Examine the logs and verify that a "SPBMarriage" log entry has been written. Absence of this entry is cause to fail this test.
8. Verify the following are contained in the SPBMarriage record:
  - a. The `DeviceSourceID` element contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the companion SPB.
  - b. The `DeviceConnectedID` element contains the Certificate Thumbprint of the projector SPB2.
  - c. The log entry contains an `AuthID` record.Failure to meet requirements a, b and c above is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-5]	9.4.3.6.1, 9.4.3.6.2, 9.4.3.6.3

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test

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### 7.3.3. Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining

#### Objective

- Verify that breaking the marriage between the Media Block (MB) companion SPB (type 1) and the projector SPB (type 2) does not zeroize the MB's long term identity keys (RSA private keys).
- Verify that breaking the marriage between the Link Decryptor Block (LDB) companion SPB (type 1) and the projector SPB (type 2) does not zeroize the LDB's long term identity keys (RSA private keys).

#### Procedures

##### Note

This section only applies to systems that implement an Electronic Marriage, i.e., those that have field replaceable companion SPBs (MBs or LDBs).

In the case of an MB that is married to a Projector SPB and *implements dual certificates* as defined in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]:

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.
2. Extract a signed [SMPTE-430-5] security log report from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above step was carried out.
3. Using the procedures illustrated in Section 3.1.3, use the **checksig** program to verify the signature of the log report collected in step 2. Note: Depending on the order of the certificates contained in the log report, the **dsig\_cert.py** program may need to be used to re-order the certificates for the **checksig** program.
4. Using the procedures illustrated in Section 3.1.3.1, extract the certificates in the signing chain of the log report collected in step 2. Note: This may be accomplished using the **dsig\_extract.py** program.
5. Using the procedures illustrated in Section C.2, use the **dc-thumbprint** program to calculate the thumbprint of the Log Signer Certificate that signed the log report collected in step 2. Record the value of the calculated thumbprint.
6. Intentionally break the marriage and remarry the companion SPB and the projector SPB (this may require support by the manufacturer).
7. Repeat steps 1 and 2 using the same composition and KDM as before. Failure to successfully play content or retrieve a log report after remarriage is cause to fail this test.
8. Repeat step 3 using the log report collected after remarriage. Failure to successfully verify the signature is cause to fail this test.
9. Repeat steps 4 and 5 using the log report collected after remarriage. Confirm that the Log Signer Certificate public key thumbprint calculated after remarriage matches the one from step 5. Mismatching Log Signer Certificate public key thumbprints are cause to fail this test.

In the case of an MB that is married to a Projector SPB and *implements a single certificate* as defined in Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]:

1. Set up and play a show using the composition *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*.

2. Extract a signed [SMPTE-430-5] security log report from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above step was carried out.
3. Using the procedures illustrated in Section 3.1.3, use the **checksig** program to verify the signature of the log report collected in step 2. Note: Depending on the order of the certificates contained in the log report, the **dsig\_cert.py** program may need to be used to re-order the certificates for the **checksig** program.
4. Using the procedures illustrated in Section 3.1.3.1, extract the certificates in the signing chain of the log report collected in step 2. Note: This may be accomplished using the **dsig\_extract.py** program.
5. Using the procedures illustrated in Section C.2, use the **dc-thumbprint** program to calculate the thumbprint of the certificate that signed the log report collected in step 2. Record the value of the calculated thumbprint.
6. Intentionally break the marriage and remarry the companion SPB and the projector SPB (this may require support by the manufacturer).
7. Repeat steps 1 and 2 using the same composition and KDM as before. Failure to successfully play content or retrieve a log report after remarriage is cause to fail this test.
8. Repeat step 3 using the log report collected after remarriage. Failure to successfully verify the signature is cause to fail this test.
9. Repeat steps 4 and 5 using the log report collected after remarriage. Confirm that the certificate thumbprint calculated after remarriage matches the one from step 5. Mismatching public key thumbprints are cause to fail this test.

In the case of an LDB married to a Projector SPB:

1. Using an ASM requester simulator, initiate a TLS session with the companion SPB (LDB) and capture the certificate supplied by the companion SPB in PEM encoded format.
2. Using the procedure illustrated in Section 2.1.11, record the public key thumbprint of the certificate captured in the above step.
3. Intentionally break the marriage and remarry the systems (this may require support by the manufacturer).
4. Verify that, after remarriage, the system is able to re-establish a TLS session. Failure to establish a TLS session after remarriage is cause to fail this test.
5. Using the same procedure as described in steps 1 and 2, verify that the public key in the certificate supplied by the companion SPB upon initialization is the same as before the remarriage. Mismatching public key thumbprints are cause to fail this test.

## Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2, 9.4.3.6.3, 9.5.1.2

Test Equipment
asm-requester

Test Material
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

## 7.3.4. Remote SPB Clock Adjustment

### Objective

- Verify that in order to maintain synchronization between auditoriums, exhibitors are able to adjust a remote SPB's clock offset a maximum of +/- 15 minutes within any calendar year.
- Verify that the remote SPB clock offset time adjustments are logged events.

### Procedures

#### Note

The following procedures are likely to fail if the Test Subject has had its time adjusted since manufacture. The current time may not be centered on the adjustment range zero point. Any such adjustments, however, will be evidenced in the security log and by examining the relevant <TimeOffset> elements, the zero point can be derived and the time set accordingly. If necessary, contact the manufacturer for assistance in determining and setting the time to the center of the range of adjustment for the current calendar year.

1. Configure an *asm-requester* to communicate with the Test Subject and initialize the connection.
2. Issue a `LEKeyLoad` ASM command and record the UTC time as provided by an *Accurate Real-Time Clock* at the moment the command is sent.
3. Attempt to advance the time of the remote SPB by 15 minutes. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. Failure to successfully adjust the time is cause to fail this test.
4. Repeat Step 2.
5. Return the time to the zero point (retard 15 minutes).
6. Attempt to retard the time of the remote SPB by 15 minutes. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. Failure to successfully adjust the time is cause to fail this test.
7. Repeat Step 2.
8. Return the time to the zero point (advance 15 minutes).
9. Attempt to adjust the time more than + 15 minutes. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. If the time can be successfully adjusted more than 15 minutes this is cause to fail this test.
10. Attempt to adjust the time more than - 15 minutes. Record whether the adjustment was successful and the UTC time at the moment of adjustment. If the time can be successfully adjusted more than 15 minutes this is cause to fail this test.
11. Extract a security log from the Test Subject that includes the range of time during which the above Steps were carried out.
12. Locate a `LEKeyLoad` event caused by Step 2. Subtract the value of the time recorded in Step 2 (UTC time) from the `TimeStamp` from the `LogRecord` (System time). Record this time as the delta of System time to UTC time for the unadjusted state.

13. Locate the SPBClockAdjust event from Step 3 and confirm that the TimeStamp contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 3 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 12 + 15 minutes.
14. Locate the SPBClockAdjust event from Step 6 and confirm that the TimeStamp contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 6 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 12 - 15 minutes.
15. Locate the SPBClockAdjust event from Step 9 and confirm the presence of an Exception with a name of "AdjustmentRangeError".
16. Locate the SPBClockAdjust event from Step 10 and confirm the presence of an Exception with a name of "AdjustmentRangeError".
17. Locate a LEKeyLoad event caused by Step 4. Confirm that the TimeStamp contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 4 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 12 + 15 minutes.
18. Locate a LEKeyLoad event caused by Step 7. Confirm that the TimeStamp contains a value which is the time recorded in Step 6 (UTC time) + the delta from Step 12 - 15 minutes.
19. Incorrect or missing LogRecords for Steps 12 through 18 shall be cause to fail this test. *Note: The TimeStamp values will have an accuracy that depends on various factors such as system responsiveness, test operator acuity, etc, and are essentially approximate. The intent is to verify that the TimeStamps indeed reflect the +/- 15 minute adjustments.*

*Note: If the Test Subject's method of adjusting the time constrains the adjustment before passing the request to the remote SPB, the required security log entries from Steps 15 and 16 will not be produced. In this case, the manufacturer will need to provide a method or software tool which allows the remote SPB to receive out-of-range adjustment commands.*

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

Test Equipment
asm-requester Accurate Real-Time Clock

## 7.4. Link Decryptor Block

The Link Decryptor Block (LDB) is a Type 1 SPB that is used to receive encrypted signals into a Type 2 SPB companion device (such as a projector).

### 7.4.1. Deleted Section

The section "LDB without Electronic Marriage" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

**ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION**

## 7.4.2. LDB TLS Session Constraints

### Objective

Verify that LDBs do not establish security communications with more than one SM at a time.

### Procedures

1. Configure a system comprising the Test Subject and two (2) *asm-requesters*. The requesters shall have unique device certificates and IP addresses and shall be on the same subnet as the Test Subject. The two requesters shall be referred to as "Requester A" and "Requester B" respectively.
2. Using Requester A, start a TLS session to the Test Subject . Observe that the Test Subject accepts the connection. Failure to successfully connect is cause to fail this test.
3. Using Requester B, attempt to open a second TLS session with the Test Subject, confirm that the Test Subject does not accept connections. Deviation from this behavior is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2

Test Equipment
asm-requester

### 7.4.3. LDB Time-Awareness

#### Objective

Verify that the LDB contains a UTC reference clock which is backed up by battery and operative for time stamping log events under powered and unpowered conditions.

#### Procedures

1. Make sure the system has been fully operational (i.e., initialized) at least once before this test.
2. Note down the system clock relative to an external digital reference clock, thus making calculation of the relative clock offset possible.
3. Power off the system.
4. Open the projector SPB 2 door and note down the external reference clock time at which this happened.
5. Power up the system again.
6. Examine the log records and verify that the opened SPB door has been logged at the right time. This can be verified because the offset of the internal clock relative to the external reference clock is known, so the expected internal clock time of the open door event can be calculated. An incorrect time stamp is cause to fail this test.
7. While powered, open the projector door and verify that an according log entry is written with the correct time. An incorrect time stamp is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2

Test Equipment
Accurate Real-Time Clock

#### **7.4.4. Deleted Section**

The section "LDB ASM Conformity" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

**ARCHIVED  
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## 7.4.5. LDB Key Storage

### Objective

Verify that the LDB accepts and stores LD keys and associated parameters provided by the SM. Verify that the LDB has the capacity to store at least 16 key/parameter sets.

### Procedures

1. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, initiate a TLS session with the LDB and issue an `LEKeyPurgeAll` command.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyPurgeAll
```

2. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue an `LEKeyQueryAll` command. The response should indicate an empty LE key list. A non-empty list shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll
list size: 0
```

3. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue sixteen (16) `LEKeyLoad` commands. Verify that the LE key list contains sixteen keys by executing an `LEKeyQueryAll` command. An LE key list size other than sixteen shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 1
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 2
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 3
...
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll
list size: 16
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2

Test Equipment
asm-requester

## 7.4.6. LDB Key Purging

### Objective

- Verify that the LDB purges LD keys upon expiration of the SM-designated validity period.
- Verify that the LDB purges LD keys upon receipt of a LEKeyPurgeAll command from the SM.

### Procedures

1. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, initiate a TLS session with the LDB and issue an LEKeyPurgeAll command.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyPurgeAll
```

2. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue an LEKeyQueryAll command. The response should indicate an empty LE key list. A non-empty list shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll
list size: 0
```

3. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue an LEKeyLoad command with a validity period of one minute. Verify that the LE key list contains one (1) key by executing an LEKeyQueryAll command. An LE key list size other than one shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad \
--messagetype-id 4
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll
list size: 1
```

4. Wait one minute. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue an LEKeyQueryAll command. The response should indicate an LE key list with zero (0) keys. An LE key list or a size greater than zero (0) shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll
list size: 0
```

5. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue six (6) LEKeyLoad commands. Verify that the LE key list contains six keys by executing an LEKeyQueryAll command. An LE key list size other than six (6) shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 1
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 2
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 3
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 4
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 5
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyLoad --messagetype-id 6
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll
list size: 6
```

6. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, execute an LEKeyPurgeAll command.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyPurgeAll
```

7. Using an *asm-requester* simulator, issue an LEKeyQueryAll command. The response should indicate an LE key list with zero (0) keys. An LE key list or a size greater than zero (0) shall be cause to fail this test.

```
$ asm-requester (... standard options ...) --messagetype LEKeyQueryAll  
list size: 0
```

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2

Test Equipment
asm-requester

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### 7.4.7. Deleted Section

The section "LDB Logging" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 7.5. Projector Image Reproduction

### 7.5.1. Projector Overlay

#### Objective

In the case that the Projector implements an alpha channel overlay module, a subpicture renderer (a module that converts the subpicture file into a baseband image file with an alpha channel) and a Timed Text renderer (a module that converts Timed Text data into a baseband image file with an alpha channel), verify that assets are rendered and displayed correctly by the system.

#### Procedures

1. Using a digital cinema server that does not provide an internal subtitle rendering capability (or one in which subtitle rendering capability is disabled), load and play the compositions *Subtitle Test Part 1*, *Subtitle Test Part 2* and *Subtitle Test Part 3*.
2. Failure by any overlay image to appear as specified by the background (burned-in) image is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.4.4.2.5, 7.5.4.2.6, 7.5.4.2.7
[SMPTE-429-2]	

Test Equipment
DCI Server

Test Material
Subtitle Test Part 1
Subtitle Test Part 2
Subtitle Test Part 3

## 7.5.2. Deleted Section

The section "Projector Lens" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

**ARCHIVED  
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### 7.5.3. Projector Pixel Count/Structure

#### Objective

Verify that the sampling structure of the displayed picture array (pixel count of the projector) is equal that of the respective specified image containers (either 4096 x 2160 or 2048 x 1080).

#### Procedures

Note: Prior to performing the following procedures, it is necessary to verify that any electronic rescaling of the image is fully disabled. This may include turning off resizing, keystone correction, filters and/or other related processes.

- For 2K Projectors: Display the test composition *Pixel Structure Pattern S 2k*. Verify that the complete set of 16x16 and 8x8 pixel blocks is displayed.
- For 4K Projectors: Display the test pattern *Pixel Structure Pattern S 4k*. Verify that the complete set of 16x16 pixel blocks is displayed.

Deviation from the expected image is cause to fail this test.

The figures below illustrate the features of the pixel array test pattern. The 2k pattern consists of a 128 x 67 grid of 16 x 16 pixel blocks as illustrated in Figure 7.1. A single-pixel white border surrounds the pattern. Each 16 x 16 block contains a horizontal and vertical location index encoded as a 8-bit binary ladder, with the MSb being at the top or left side of the vertical and horizontal ladders, respectively. The example below shows a block with index  $X = 81$ ,  $Y = 37$ . The pixel at location 0,0 in the block is located at pixel  $x = 1296 = X * 16$ ,  $y = 592 = Y * 16$  on the display. The bottom 8 pixels of the 2k pattern consist of similar, un-indexed 8 x 8 patterns as illustrated in Figure 7.2.

The 4k pattern consists of a 256 x 135 grid of 16 x 16 pixel arrays. A single-pixel white border surrounds the pattern.

Within each block, color-coded bands mark pixel positions. The bands may have North, South, East or West orientation (the example blocks have South orientation). Pixel positions are coded left to right (top to bottom for East and West orientations) with the following color sequence: brown, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, gray.

Note: North, South, East and West orientations are provided in the test materials set to support investigation of anomalies.

**Figure 7.1. Pixel Structure 16 x 16 Array**



**Figure 7.2. Pixel Structure 8 x 8 Array**



Warning: the patterns displayed during this test can cause vertigo in some people. People who are sensitive to such optical stimuli should not view the test material.

**Supporting Materials**

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	8.2.2.6, 8.2.2.7

Test Material
Pixel Structure Pattern N 2k
Pixel Structure Pattern S 2k
Pixel Structure Pattern E 2k
Pixel Structure Pattern W 2k
Pixel Structure Pattern N 4k
Pixel Structure Pattern S 4k
Pixel Structure Pattern E 4k
Pixel Structure Pattern W 4k

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## 7.5.4. Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion

### Objective

Verify that the native display resolution, spatial conversions (where necessary), scaling and frame rates are according to the DCI Specification.

### Procedures

1. Verify that the display has a native resolution of either 4096 x 2160 or 2048 x 1080.
2. In case the native resolution is 4096 x 2160, verify that the projector performs up-conversion of 2048 x 1080 signals, i.e., that the screen is filled as it would be with a 4K image.
3. Verify that all spatial conversions are done at an exact ratio of 2:1 in each axis.
4. In case scaling is used for supporting constant height or constant width projection, visually verify that this scaling does not introduce any visible image artifacts.
5. Verify that image material with frame rates different from the projection system's native refresh rate is converted by the Projector to the Projector's native refresh rate, i.e., the image is displayed properly.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	8.2.2.7, 8.2.2.8

NOT CURRENT VERSION

## 7.5.5. White Point Luminance and Uniformity

### Objective

- Verify that the peak white luminance measured at the screen center is 48 cd/m<sup>2</sup> as specified according to [SMPTE-431-1].
- Verify that luminance uniformity is as specified according to [SMPTE-431-1].

### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

Display the "full white" test pattern ( $X'=3794$ ,  $Y'=3960$ ,  $Z'=3890$ ) contained in the DCP *Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence*. Align the light source to minimize luminance fall-off from center to corners. The test pattern may already be stored in the Projector for easy setup. In case it is not stored internally it must be provided by means of an external signal source.

1. Adjust the lamp focus or lamp current to a light level of 48 cd/m<sup>2</sup> measured at the screen center. Record the measured light level and any quantitative values of adjustable parameters from the projection system (e.g. lamp power, x/y/x lamp position etc).
2. Measure the luminance at the four sides. Record the measured light levels.
3. In the case of review rooms, measure the luminance at the four corners. Record the measured light levels.

Note: All measurements shall be done as described in [SMPTE-431-1]. Measurement criteria like Projector conditions, measurement locations on the screen, and measurement locations in the auditorium are given in [SMPTE-431-1].

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-431-1]	8.3.4.3, 8.3.4.4

Test Equipment
Photometer

Test Material
Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence

## 7.5.6. White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity

### Objective

- Verify that white point chromaticity is as specified according to [SMPTE-431-1].
- Verify that chromaticity uniformity of the Projection System is as specified according to [SMPTE-431-1].

### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

Display the "full white" test pattern ( $X'=3794$ ,  $Y'=3960$ ,  $Z'=3890$ ) contained in the DCP *Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence*. The test pattern may already be stored in the projector for easy setup. In case it is not stored internally it must be provided by means of an external signal source.

1. Measure the white point chromaticity coordinates at the center of the screen with a spectroradiometer. Record the measured chromaticity values.
2. Measure white point chromaticity uniformity by measuring the chromaticity coordinates at the four corners with a spectroradiometer. Record the measured chromaticity values.

*Note: All measurements shall be done as described in [SMPTE-431-1]. Measurement criteria like Projector conditions, measurement locations on the screen, and measurement locations in the auditorium are given in [SMPTE-431-1].*

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-431-1]	8.3.4.5, 8.3.4.6

Test Equipment
Spectroradiometer

Test Material
Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence

### 7.5.7. Sequential Contrast

#### Objective

Measure the sequential contrast ratio of the Projector.

#### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

1. Measure the luminance at the center of the screen for the "full black" test pattern contained in the DCP *Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence*.
2. Measure the luminance at the center of the screen for the "full white" test pattern contained in the DCP *Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence*.
3. Compute the sequential contrast ratio by dividing the white luminance value by the black luminance value.
4. Record the calculated value.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	8.3.4.7
<b>Test Equipment</b>	
Photometer	
<b>Test Material</b>	
Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence	

## 7.5.8. Intra-frame Contrast

### Objective

Measure the intra-frame contrast ratio of the Projector.

### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

1. Display the checkerboard test pattern *Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence*.
2. Measure the luminance level at each of the patches in the checkerboard test pattern.
3. Calculate the average value of the luminance of the white patches and divide by the average value of the luminance of the black patches.
4. Record the calculated value.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-431-2]	8.3.4.8

Test Equipment
Photometer

Test Material
Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence

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## 7.5.9. Grayscale Tracking

### Objective

Using the black-to-white gray and the black-to-dark gray step-scale test patterns, verify that the entire step-scale appears neutral without any visible color non-uniformity or non-monotonic luminance steps in the test pattern.

### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

1. With the Projector powered down or douser closed, use a Spectroradiometer to measure and record the Luminance of the ambient light reflected from the screen.
2. With the Projector powered up, douser open and displaying no image or black code values, use a Spectroradiometer to measure and record the Luminance of the light reflected from the screen.
3. Play back the DCP DCI White Steps (black-to-white gray step-scale test pattern).
4. For each of the ten steps of the pattern listed in Table A-2 of [SMPTE-431-2], measure and record the Output Luminance and Chromaticity Coordinates with a Spectroradiometer.
5. The entire step-scale should appear neutral without any visible color non-uniformity or non-monotonic luminance steps in the test pattern. Record the presence of any perceived deviation from a neutral scale.
6. Play back the DCP DCI Gray Steps (black-to-dark gray step-scale test pattern).
7. For each of the ten steps of the pattern listed in Table A-3 of [SMPTE-431-2], measure and record the Luminance and Chromaticity Coordinates with a Spectroradiometer.
8. The entire step-scale should appear neutral without any visible color non-uniformity or non-monotonic luminance steps in the test pattern. Record the presence of any perceived deviation from a neutral scale.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	8.3.4.9
[SMPTE-431-2]	

Test Equipment
Spectroradiometer

Test Material
DCI White Steps
DCI Gray Steps

## 7.5.10. Contouring

### Objective

Verify that no contouring can be observed.

### Procedures

1. Play back the composition *DCI 2K Moving Gradient*. This clip contains a special moving pattern to reveal usage of all 12 bits. The pattern contains three vertical bands, each 250 horizontal pixels in width, corresponding to 12, 11 and 10 bit representations of a sine wave that advances in value by 1 degree per pixel. The bands are labeled with the 12 bit region on the left, 11 bit region in the center and 10 bit region on the right of the screen. Examine the image for artifacts such as contouring or vertical striations. Record the presence of any such noticeable artifacts in the 12 bit region of the pattern. The 11 and 10 bit regions are provided for reference.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-431-2]	8.3.3

Test Material
DCI 2K Moving Gradient

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## 7.5.11. Transfer Function

### Objective

Verify that the correct encoding transfer function is being used by the projector.

### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

1. With the projector powered down or douser closed, use a spectroradiometer to measure and record the luminance of the ambient light reflected from the screen.
2. With the projector powered up, douser open and displaying no image or black code values, use a spectroradiometer to measure and record the luminance of the light reflected from the screen.
3. Play back the DCP DCI White Steps (black-to-white gray step-scale test pattern).
4. For each of the ten steps of the pattern listed in Table A-2 of [SMPTE-431-2], measure and record the output luminance and chromaticity coordinates with a spectroradiometer.
5. For each of the measured Output luminance values, calculate the percentage deviation from the target value and record those results.
6. Play back the DCP DCI Gray Steps (black-to-dark gray step-scale test pattern).
7. For each of the ten steps of the pattern listed in Table A-3 of [SMPTE-431-2], measure and record the Output luminance and chromaticity coordinates with a spectroradiometer.
8. For each of the measured Output luminance values, calculate the percentage deviation from the target value and record those results.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-431-2]	8.3.4.11

Test Material
DCI White Steps DCI Gray Steps



## 7.5.12. Color Accuracy

### Objective

Verify that all colors are accurately reproduced within the tolerances as specified in [SMPTE-432-1].

### Procedures

*Note: Prior to taking measurements, ensure that the projector setup and test environment requirements detailed in Section 7.1 have been performed.*

1. With the Projector powered down or douser closed, use a Spectroradiometer to measure and record the Luminance of the ambient light reflected from the screen.
2. With the Projector powered up, douser open and displaying no image or black code values, use a Spectroradiometer to measure and record the Luminance of the light reflected from the screen.
3. Play back the DCP *Color Accuracy Series*.
4. For each of the twelve color patches listed in Table A-4 of [SMPTE-431-2], measure and record the Output Luminance and Chromaticity Coordinates with a Spectroradiometer.
5. For each of the measured sets of Color Coordinates and Output Luminance values, derive the L\*a\*b\* equivalent values and record them.
6. For each of the reference sets of Color Coordinates and Output Luminance values, derive the L\*a\*b\* equivalent values and record them.
7. Using the formula  $\Delta E^*_{ab} = [(\Delta L^*)^2 + (\Delta a^*)^2 + (\Delta b^*)^2]^{1/2}$ , for each pair of values from steps 5 and 6, calculate the delta E\*ab value. Record each such value and indicate whether it is  $\leq 4.0$ . Eab\_Calc.py, a tool to perform this calculation, is available in Section C.6.

Note: See Annex L of [SMPTE-432-1] for an example of how to convert xyY values to L\*a\*b\* values.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-431-2] [SMPTE-432-1]	8.3.4.13

Test Equipment
Spectroradiometer eab_calc.py

Test Material
Color Accuracy Series

## 7.5.13. Projector Test Environment

### Objective

Record information about the test environment in which the reported projector measurements were made.

### Procedures

1. Record the distance between the front of the projector lens and the center of the screen.
2. Record the approximate vertical angle of incidence of the front of the projector lens to the center of the screen.
3. Record the approximate horizontal angle of incidence of the front of the projector lens to the center of the screen.
4. Record the distance between the front of the colorimeter lens and the center of the screen.
5. Record the approximate vertical angle of incidence of the front of the colorimeter lens to the center of the screen.
6. Record the approximate horizontal angle of incidence of the front of the colorimeter lens to the center of the screen.
7. Record the size of the screen.
8. Record the approximate gain of the screen.
9. Record the perforation configuration of the screen.
10. With the projector lamp switched off (or doused), record the luminance at the center of the screen in units of  $\text{Cd/m}^2$ .

### Supporting Materials

None

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# Chapter 8. Screen Management System

A Screen Management System (SMS) (or Theater Management System (TMS)) is responsible for providing the operator's interface for ingest, scheduling, reporting, etc. In this document the term SMS will be used exclusively, although the same test procedures can apply to a TMS that is able to directly manage a suite of equipment for a screen.

The SMS is not hosted on secure hardware (*i.e.*, it is not required to be within an SPB).

## 8.1. Ingest and Storage

### 8.1.1. Storage System Ingest Interface

#### Objective

Verify that the system provides an interface to the storage system, for DCP ingest, that is Ethernet, 1Gb/s or better, over copper (1000Base-T) or fiber (1000Base-FX), as described in [IEEE-802-3], running the TCP/IP protocol.

#### Procedures

1. Use a computer with the appropriate interface cards, e.g., 1000Base-T copper Ethernet and network analysis tools such as Wireshark installed, to tap the ingest interface.
2. Ingest *DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)* and verify that the packets can be read by the computer that runs the network analysis tools. Failure to observe the packets contained in the DCP is cause to fail this test.
3. Verify that the data packets read are valid TCP/IP data packets. Use of any other protocol to ingest the DCP is cause to fail this test.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [IEEE-802-3]	6.2.3

Test Equipment
Network Analyzer

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)

## 8.1.2. Storage System Capacity

### Objective

Verify that the storage system available to the SMS has a capacity of at least 1TByte of content.

### Procedures

Verify that the storage system has the capacity to hold at least 1TByte of content. This can be done in three ways:

1. Verify by using the specification of the manufacturer.
2. Examine the capacity of the file system representing the storage system, and verify that there is enough available storage to hold 1 TByte of content data. Use appropriate file system tools to perform this task.
3. Measure the storage capacity by copying 1TByte of content to the storage and verifying that no content has been purged by playing back all content.

If the capacity of the storage system is less than 1TByte, this is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.2.3.11

### 8.1.3. Storage System Redundancy

#### Objective

Verify that the storage system available to the SMS provides redundancy in the case of hard disk failure.

#### Procedures

Verify the existence and functionality of an appropriate RAID configuration by performing the following:

1. Ingest the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* i.e., load it into the storage system.
2. Power down the system.
3. Disconnect one hard drive of the RAID configuration.
4. Re-power the system.
5. Set up and play a show that contains the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and verify that playback is successful, i.e., playback can be started, is not interrupted and does not show any picture or sound artifacts. Unsuccessful playback is cause to fail this test.
6. Power down the system and reconnect the hard drive that was disconnected in step 3.
7. Repower the system and perform any necessary manufacturer-specified procedures to restore the RAID configuration to normal.
8. Repeat steps 2 through 7 for all other drives contained in the storage system.

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.5.3.2

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

## 8.1.4. Storage System Performance

### Objective

Verify that the storage system available to the SMS is able to sustain a minimum peak data rate of 307 MBit/sec to allow for uninterrupted digital cinema playback.

### Procedures

1. Setup and play the composition *2K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for 2K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)*. This composition starts with a count to check synchronization between picture and sound. 10 minutes of an image with minimal compression and 16 audio channels (each 24 bit per sample, 96 kHz) follows, then a second synchronization count. The content between the synchronization counts will require the maximum allowable data rate for successful reproduction.
2. Verify that playback is successful, i.e., playback can be started, is not interrupted and does not show any picture or sound artifacts. Unsuccessful playback is cause to fail this test.
3. Extract the logs from the Test Subject and examine the associated `FrameSequencePlayed` and `PlayoutComplete` events recorded during the playback for complete and successful reproduction. Any exceptions or missing `FrameSequencePlayed` or `PlayoutComplete` events are cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.5.3.3, 7.5.3.4, 7.5.3.6

Test Material
2K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted) KDM for 2K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)

## 8.2. Screen Management System

### 8.2.1. Deleted Section

The section "Screen Management System" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 8.2.2. Show Playlist Creation

### Objective

- Verify that the SMS provides the necessary functions for managing Composition Play Lists (CPLs) and for assembling them into shows (SPL creation).
- Verify that the SMS allows only authorized persons to build a Show Playlist (SPL).

### Procedures

1. Ingest the composition *DCI 2K StEM* into the system.
2. Using the system, locate the composition *DCI 2K StEM*.
3. Create a new Show Play List (SPL) and add *DCI 2K StEM* twice to the show. The two instances of *DCI 2K StEM* are herein referred to as *DCI 2K StEM X* and *DCI 2K StEM Y*.
4. Ingest the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and the KDM *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)* into the system.
5. Using the system, locate the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*.
6. Append the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* to the end of the show.
7. In the show, move the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* in between *DCI 2K StEM X* and *DCI 2K StEM Y*.
8. Ingest *DCI Black Spacer - 5 seconds* and insert it between each of the compositions in the show.
9. Start playback and verify that the presentation proceeds as expected and the inserted black frames and silence are presented correctly.
10. Attempt to delete each of the compositions *DCI 2K StEM*, *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* and *DCI Black Spacer - 5 seconds* from system storage. The system is required to warn that the content is part of a current show and not allow deletion.
11. Wait until playback is completed.
12. Remove *DCI 2K StEM X* from the show.
13. Attempt to delete *DCI 2K StEM* from storage. It is expected that the SMS warns the user that this composition is part of an SPL.
14. Delete the show then delete *DCI 2K StEM* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*. It is expected that this operation succeeds.
15. Verify that the aforementioned compositions have been removed.
16. Verify that the above functions for assembling content into an SPL are executable with an easy to use graphical user interface.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.2.3.5, 7.2.3.7, 7.3.4, 7.4.1.1, 7.4.1.2, 7.4.1.3, 7.4.1.4, 7.4.1.5, 7.4.1.6



<b>Test Material</b>
DCI 2K StEM
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)
DCI Black Spacer - 5 seconds

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### 8.2.3. Show Playlist Format

#### Objective

Verify that the SMS supports the required Show Playlist Format.

#### Procedures

1. Export the Show Playlist (SPL) to external media.
2. Use the software command *schema-check* to verify that the SPL exported in the above step is well formed XML. XML format errors are cause to fail this test. An example is shown below.

```
$ schema-check <input-file>
schema validation successful
```

#### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.3, 7.4.1.6

Test Equipment
schema-check

#### **8.2.4. Deleted Section**

The section "KDM Validity Checks" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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## 8.2.5. Automation Control and Interfaces

### Objective

Verify that the SMS supports theater automation interface via any one or more of:

- contact closures (general purpose I/O)
- serial data interface
- network (e.g., Ethernet)

### Procedures

1. Configure an automation test setup that allows the Test Subject to signal an event using a visible state change (e.g. an L.E.D.), and allows the Test Subject to be signalled via external stimulus (e.g., an SPST switch).
2. Verify that the Test Subject can change the state of the event indicator at pre-determined times using the playlist. Failure to meet this requirement shall be cause to fail this test.
3. Verify that playback of a playlist on the Test Subject can be started by external stimulus. Failure to meet this requirement shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.3.4, 7.4.1.6, 7.4.1.7, 7.5.7.2

Test Equipment
DCI Projector GPIO Test Fixture

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence

## 8.2.6. Interrupt Free Playback

### Objective

Verify that the system can play a sequence of CPLs (a Show Playlist) without noticeable interruptions such as unexpected pauses or visual or audible artifacts.

### Procedures

To verify that playback is possible without any interruptions:

1. Assemble a show containing the compositions *4K DCI NIST Frame with silence*, *DCI 5.1 Channel Identification DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test with Subtitles (Encrypted)* and *KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)*
2. Play back the show. Verify that playback succeeds and is completed without any image or sound distortions and without any interruption. Incomplete or interrupted playback or the presence of distortions or artifacts shall be cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.4.1.8

Test Material
4K DCI NIST Frame with silence
DCI 5.1 Channel Identification
DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted)
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test with Subtitles (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

## 8.2.7. Artifact Free Transition of Image Format

### Objective

Verify artifact free transition between differing pixel array sizes.

### Procedures

To verify that mode transitions do not cause any artifacts:

1. Assemble a Show that contains 3 repetitions of the following 2 compositions *DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Flat)*, which contains two reels of 1.85:1 content, followed by *DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Scope)*, which contains two reels of 2.39:1 content.
2. Start playback and observe the projected image. Transitions between reels and compositions are announced visually by means of a burned-in counter. Verify that for all transitions, no visible artifacts, e.g., rolling, flashes, distorted images etc, are visible, and that every frame is displayed correctly on each outgoing and incoming transition. If any visible artifact is present or any incoming or outgoing frame is not displayed, this is cause to fail the test. *Note: Use of a camera to shoot the display off screen to confirm display of all frames can be helpful in this test.*

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.4.1.6

Test Material
DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Flat)
DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Scope)

## 8.2.8. Restarting Playback

### Objective

Verify that power failures cause the system to enter a stable stop/idle condition and that the system provides the ability to restart playback at a point prior to a power interruption.

### Procedures

1. Load *DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted)* and *KDM for DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted)*, then assemble and start a show.
2. Interrupt the presentation by interrupting the Test Subject's power supply. If possible, the projector power supply should not be interrupted as this may cause overheating and damage the projector.
3. Re-establish power and verify that the system enters a stable stop/idle state. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
4. Verify that the system notifies the user that the last playback was abnormally interrupted, and offers the possibility of restarting the show. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.
5. Attempt to restart the presentation at a point prior to the power interruption and verify that the restart was successful. Failure to meet this requirement is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.2.3.13, 7.4.1.2, 7.4.1.8

Test Material
KDM for DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted) DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted)

## 8.2.9. SMS User Accounts

### Objective

Verify that the SMS supports multiple levels of user accounts.

### Procedures

1. Study the user manual to discover factory-created account names and passwords.
2. If required by the system, create the necessary operating accounts.
3. Return the system to the "logged out" state.
4. For each account, log on to the system using the account information and note the privileges available to the account user (e.g., run show, load content, create account, etc.). Failure of the system to provide privilege separation using distinct user accounts is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.4.1.3



## 8.2.10. SMS Operator Identification

### Objective

Verify that the security system requires the SMS and SMS operator to be identified to the Security Manager.

### Procedures

1. List all the methods available to the Test Subject that can cause playback of a composition or show. This could include any preset or created user accounts/logins to the SMS/TMS, direct command, *e.g.*, by front panel controls or automation inputs and events initiated by an automatic scheduler. Manufacturer-supplied documentation, including manuals, may be consulted to assist with this step.
2. For each of the cases from the list created in Step 1, cause the composition *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, or a show that contains it, to play back. Record the time of day at the end of each playback.
3. Retrieve the audit logs from the system.
4. By using the time values recorded in Step 2, for each of the cases from the list created in Step 1:
  - a. Locate the corresponding `FrameSequencePlayed` playout events.
  - b. Verify that there is a `FrameSequencePlayed` event for both audio and image and that they each contain a parameter named `AuthId` with a value that is not absent.
  - c. Record each `AuthId` value. Any missing `AuthId` parameter or any `AuthId` parameter that has a value that is unpopulated is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.1.1

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)
KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

## 8.2.11. SMS Identity and Certificate

### Objective

Verify that the SMS carries a [SMPTE-430-2] compliant digital certificate to identify the SMS entity to the SM. Verify that the SMS certificate indicates only the SMS role unless the SMS is contained within an SPB meeting the protection requirements for any other designated roles.

### Procedures

1. Obtain the SMS certificate (and chain if available):
  - If the SMS communicates with the SM via a network accessible to test equipment, use network analysis tools ( *e.g.*, Wireshark) to monitor the packets exchanged between the SMS and SM and extract the leaf certificate and, if present, the associated signing certificate(s). If signing certificates are not present, obtain them from the manufacturer.
  - If network monitoring is not possible, obtain the complete certificate chain from the manufacturer.
2. Extract the Subject Common Name field from the leaf certificate collected in step 1. Failure for the Common Name to include the SMS role is cause to fail the test.
3. Verify that the Subject Common Name field of the leaf certificate collected in step 1 contains the serial number of the Test Subject. Additional identifying information may be present. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
4. Verify that information identifying the make and model of the Test Subject is carried in the Subject field of the certificate collected in step 1. Additional identifying information may be present. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.
5. Verify that either the make, model and serial number of the Test Subject, or information that is unambiguously traceable by the manufacturer to the Subject field from the leaf certificate obtained in step 1, is clearly placed on the exterior of the device containing the Test Subject. Failure of this verification is cause to fail the test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.2.5, 9.5.1

Test Equipment
Network Analyzer openssl

## 8.2.12. Content Keys and TDL check

### Objective

- Verify that the SMS, working with the security infrastructure, checks that, prior to initiating playback of a Show Playlist (scheduled exhibition), (i) all content keys required for the playback of the Show Playlist are available and valid, and (ii) the suite equipment to be used or the playback of the Show Playlist is included on the TDL.
- Verify that the SMS does this check for every composition individually.

### Procedures

With the test materials specified below, perform the following procedures:

1. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)* without providing a KDM. If playback begins this is cause to fail this test.
2. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM with incorrect message digest* in that order. The KDM *KDM with incorrect message digest* is invalid (wrong signature/hash error). If playback begins this is cause to fail this test.
3. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM that has expired* which contains an expired time window. If playback begins this is cause to fail this test.
4. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM with future validity period* which contains a time window in the future. If playback begins this is cause to fail this test.
5. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM with invalid XML* which contains an XML malformation. If playback begins this is cause to fail this test.
6. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM with empty TDL*, which is a KDM that does not list any trusted devices in its TDL. If playback begins this is cause to fail this test.
7. Try to assemble and play a show using *DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)* and *DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)*, keyed with *KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry*, which is a KDM that carries only the "assume trust" empty-string thumbprint. Attempt to play the composition and record the result. If playback does not begin this is cause to fail this test.

### Supporting Materials

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2] [SMPTE-430-1]	9.4.3.2

Test Material
DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)

<b>Test Material</b>
DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)
KDM with incorrect message digest
KDM that has expired
KDM with future validity period
KDM with invalid XML
KDM with empty TDL
KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry

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## Part II. Design Evaluation Guidelines

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# Chapter 9. FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB

Type 1 Secure Processing Blocks (SPB) are required by DCI to conform to the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) document *FIPS 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules* (See <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf>). Testing for compliance with FIPS 140-2 is performed by independent laboratories certified by NIST.

The testing program, known as the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), is a joint effort of NIST's Computer Systems Laboratory (CSL) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of the Government of Canada. More information about CMVP can be found on the NIST web site at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/>. To be compliant with the DCI System Specification, a Type 1 SPB device must be tested by an accredited laboratory, the resulting documentation must be submitted to NIST/CSE for examination, and a validation certificate must be issued by NIST/CSE. Throughout this document, the term "FIPS 140-2 testing" will refer to this entire process.

FIPS 140-2 testing is very thorough but also very selective. To determine whether Type 1 SPB meets the DCI requirements, the documents prepared for and presented to the FIPS testing lab by the manufacturer must be reviewed by an examiner as guided by the requirements presented in this chapter. This chapter will briefly explain the FIPS testing process and the documentation that is produced. A procedure will be presented that will guide the examiner through the task of evaluating a FIPS 140-2 test report and determining the DCI compliance status of the respective Test Subject.

## 9.1. FIPS Testing Procedures

This section will explain the process of obtaining a FIPS 140-2 validation certificate from NIST/CSE. This information is intended to guide the examiner in understanding the documentation that will be produced in that process. This information is not exhaustive and is not intended to guide a manufacturer in obtaining a validation certificate. The following sub-sections illustrate the tasks in a typical validation process.

### Accredited Laboratory

FIPS 140-2 testing is performed by an accredited laboratory. This Cryptographic Modules Testing (CMT) laboratory will assist the manufacturer in preparing the required documentation and will test sample devices for conformance to the documentation. The CMT laboratory may help the manufacturer resolve compliance issues in the design, but this help is limited to comments on proposed designs, actual design participation may not occur. The documentation and test reports may be submitted to NIST/CSE by the CMT laboratory or the manufacturer.

NIST makes available the list of accredited CMT laboratories on the agency web site (see [http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/testing\\_labs/index.html](http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/testing_labs/index.html)). Any of the laboratories can be used, but some restrictions may apply. For example, a laboratory that is owned by the Test Subject manufacturer or one that contributed to the design of the Test Subject will be disqualified from testing that Test Subject. More information about CMT laboratories and laboratory selection can be found in *Frequently Asked Questions for the Cryptographic Module Validation Program* (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/CMVPFAQ.pdf>).

#### Note

The FIPS 140-2 validation test report prepared by the CMT laboratory is a proprietary and closely controlled document. The manufacturer must ensure that it has permission to disclose the test report to the DCI Testing Organization.

## Standards and Supporting Documentation

The manufacturer must obtain and understand all of the NIST documentation that is relevant to the FIPS 140-2 testing process. In addition to the documentation about the validation process itself, the manufacturer will also need documentation which addresses the requirements for particular algorithms implemented in the device.

## Security Element Documentation

All design elements which are addressed by FIPS 140-2, *e.g.*, cryptographic algorithms and Critical Security Parameters (CSP), must be documented and tested according to CMT procedures. The manufacturer must work with the testing lab to identify all such design features and prepare the required documentation. A checklist summarizing the documentation requirements of the standard is found in FIPS PUB 140-2 Appendix A.

## Design Modification

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and CMVP validation testing processes may require design modifications to the cryptographic module hardware, software, firmware, or documentation. The CMT laboratory performing the validation testing identifies the compliance issues, but does not design or redesign the cryptographic module with the manufacturer, or for the manufacturer.

### Note

The manufacturer is responsible for implementing a compliant design, and submitting required testing evidence to the CMT laboratory for review and testing.

## Test Subject Instrumentation

Where it is not possible to test a particular subsystem from outside the module (*e.g.*, the seed method for a random number generator), the manufacturer must provide the instrumentation necessary to allow the laboratory to test the subsystem. A simulator may be used, for example, to prove the correct functioning of microcode for an ASIC or FPGA.

Additionally, the manufacturer may be required to develop test jigs to facilitate the error injection process; for example, to simulate tamper events and other hardware failures.

## Operational Testing

The CMT lab exercises the cryptographic module through all major states, including error states, while monitoring all external ports and interfaces using manufacturer testing tools and equipment. This may require the ability to manipulate program execution and record the contents of memory, thus requiring instrumentation as described above.

For FIPS 140-2 Level 3, a minimum of five production grade samples of the cryptographic module will be physically attacked and destroyed by the CMT lab during the validation testing process.

## Report Submission

Upon successful completion of the validation testing (no failed test assertions exist), the CMT laboratory submits a FIPS 140-2 validation report to the CMVP for certification. CMVP personnel examine the submission for correctness, sending any necessary requests for clarification to the CMT laboratory. The submission may be rejected, in which case the manufacturer and laboratory must work to resolve the issue(s) raised and re-submit the validation report. Once the submission is accepted by CMVP, a certificate is issued for the cryptographic module.



The CMVP maintains a list of all cryptographic modules validated to FIPS 140-2 requirements. This list is published online at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html>. The CMVP also maintains a list of cryptographic modules currently undergoing FIPS 140-2 testing (a listing on the CMVP pre-validation website does not equate to having a FIPS 140-2 validation). The pre-validation list is at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/inprocess.html>.

## Maintenance

Changes to the module design require re-validation. The effort required to validate an updated design may be small if the design changes are minor.

## 9.2. Submitted Materials

The CMT laboratory will review and analyze design materials during the validation testing process. A checklist that summarizes the documentation requirements of the standard is found in FIPS PUB 140-2, Appendix A. The following list shows the documents generally expected to be submitted.

- Master Components List (bill of materials); All items submitted as test evidence to the CMT laboratory (*e.g.*, software, firmware, hardware, source code, documentation, etc.) must be specified on the Master Components List, along with a unique identifier and version
- Production grade samples of the cryptographic module (minimum of five for Level 3)
- Security policy
- Data sheets for hardware components
- Listing of all significant information flows
- Finite state model
- Clearly annotated source code
- Functional specifications
- Block diagrams
- Schematics
- VHDL for custom components
- Software design documentation (such as an API or developers guide)
- Mechanical drawings & assembly drawings (approximately to scale)
- Printed circuit board layout drawings
- Cryptographic Key and Critical Security Parameter documentation
- Delivery and operations procedures
- Cryptographic Officer & User guidance
- Configuration management specification
- Operational testing plan(s), and associated testing equipment

- Rationale for exclusion of any components from the security requirements of FIPS 140-2
- Proof of conformance to FCC Part 15, Subpart B Class A requirements
- CAVP Algorithm validation certificates for all implemented Approved cryptographic algorithms
- Documentation detailing the correspondence of all security rules to the implementation

### 9.3. Test Lab Reports

A FIPS 140-2 validation test report is created by CMT laboratory engineers for submission to CMVP. The report details the documentation received and the test engineer's evaluation of the implementation's fidelity to the documentation and FIPS 140-2 requirements.

The report consists of the following documents (as described in <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf>).

- Non-proprietary Security Policy; reference FIPS 140-2 DTR and IG 14.1 for requirements; the non-proprietary security policy shall not be marked as proprietary or copyright without a statement allowing copying or distribution
- CRYPTIK v5.5 (or higher) reports; the validation report submission must be output from the NIST provided Cryptik tool (Cryptik is a proprietary CMVP tool available only to accredited CMT laboratories)
- Physical Test Report (mandatory at Levels 2-4); the laboratory's physical testing report with photos, drawing, etc. as applicable
- Revalidation change summary (if applicable)
- Section Summaries (optional); briefly describes design methods used to meet FIPS 140-2 requirements.

### 9.4. Interpreting FIPS Test Reports

The CMT laboratory assessments contained within a FIPS 140-2 validation test report address each of the applicable "TE" requirements corresponding to the eleven areas specified in the FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements (DTR). These requirements instruct the tester as to what he or she must do in order to test the cryptographic module with respect to the given assertion (which is a statement that must be true for the module to satisfy the requirement of a given area at a given level).

For each applicable FIPS 140-2 "TE", the tester's assessment includes:

- A statement that the tester verified the requirement was satisfied, or that the requirement is not applicable.
- Details on how the tester verified the requirement (*e.g.* through documentation review, source code analysis, physical attack, operational testing, etc.).
- References to supporting design documentation and other test evidence.
- References to algorithm standards and CAVP validation certificates as applicable.

The DCI Testing Organization must obtain an official copy of the FIPS 140-2 validation test report directly from the CMT lab that performed the testing. The Test Operator must verify that the name of the cryptographic module and version (software, hardware, firmware) under review are identical to the versions reviewed for the FIPS 140-2 validation certificate, and supporting CAVP algorithm validation certificate(s).

To confirm whether the cryptographic module satisfies the DCI requirements, the Test Operator must review the "TE" assessments (and associated references as needed) that are relevant to corresponding DCI requirements (the specific

assessments are located below with the respective DCI requirements. The functionality described must be consistent with the observed implementation.

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## 9.5. DCI Requirements for FIPS Modules

Each of the subsections below describes a DCI requirement that must be proven by examining the FIPS 140-2 validation report. For each requirement, observe the design of the respective system element (with the aid of the Test Subject Representative) and record whether or not the design meets the requirement.

### 9.5.1. SM Operating Environment

Verify that the Security Manager (SM) operating environment is limited to the [FIPS-140-2] "limited operational" environment category; "a static non-modifiable virtual operational environment with no underlying general purpose operating system."

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.2.4, 9.5.2.5, 9.5.2.7
[FIPS-140-2]	

### 9.5.2. LE Key Generation

Verify the following:

1. That, for a Test Subject implementing a Link Encryptor (LE), the Test Subject supports keying of the Link Encryptor (LE) by generating unpredictable keys and having a controlled usage validity period.
2. That, for a Test Subject implementing a Link Encryptor (LE) or Link Decryptor (LD) SE,
  - a. Link Encryptor (LE) keys are 112 bits in length for TDES or 128 bits in length for AES, and that those keys are generated according to the requirements of the [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.7.6 and [FIPS-140-2] level 3 "cryptographic module specification" specifications (per the requirements of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.5.2.5).
  - b. Link Encryption is implemented according to [SMPTE-rdd-20]
  - c. Link Encryption keys are distributed using the appropriate Standardized Security Messages of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.4.5.2.4 and, specifically, not distributed using in-band techniques.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.4, 9.5.2.5, 9.7.6
[FIPS-140-2]	
[SMPTE-rdd-20]	

### 9.5.3. SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness

Verify the following:

1. That SPBs with access doors or removable covers are monitored 24/7 to assure that in the event of intrusion via such openings the SPB terminates all activity and zeroizes all Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) (see [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.5.2.6).
2. That if the SPB requires a power source to accomplish tamper detection and response, it must zeroize its CSPs prior to any situation arising where such power source may not be available.

3. That log records are not purged in the event of intrusion or other tamper detection.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2, 9.4.3.6.2.1, 9.4.3.6.3, 9.5.2.2, 9.5.2.5, 9.5.2.6
[FIPS-140-2]	

### 9.5.4. Security Design Description Requirements

Verify that equipment suppliers define and describe their respective security designs surrounding the use of port 1173 per the requirements of [FIPS-140-2] "Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces" and the [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.5.2.5.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3, 9.5.2.5
[FIPS-140-2]	

### 9.5.5. Deleted Section

The section "SPB1 Tamper Resistance" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

### 9.5.6. SPB1 FIPS Requirements

Verify the following: The device meets and is certified for the requirements of [FIPS-140-2] Level 3 in all areas except those subject to the exceptions or additional notes as specified in the [DCI-DCSS-1-2], section 9.5.2.5.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.5
[FIPS-140-2]	

### 9.5.7. Deleted Section

The section "SPB1 Secure Silicon FIPS Requirements" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

## 9.5.8. Asymmetric Key Generation

Verify that keys are generated as specified in [RFC-3447] and per the requirements of [FIPS-140-2] "Cryptographic Key Management" and the [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.5.2.5.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.5, 9.7.6
[RFC-3447]	

## 9.5.9. Critical Security Parameter Protection

Verify that the following Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) receive Secure Processing Block (SPB) type 1 protection, whenever they exist outside of their originally encrypted state, in accordance with [FIPS-140-2] and the requirements of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.5.2.5:

1. Device Private Keys - RSA private key that devices use to prove their identity and facilitate secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications.
2. Content Encryption Keys - Key Delivery Message (KDM) AES keys that protect content.
3. Content Integrity Keys - HMAC-SHA-1 keys that protect the integrity of compressed content (integrity pack check parameters).
4. Control Message Encryption and Integrity Keys - AES, HMAC-SHA-1/SHA-256 keys/parameters that protect the privacy and/or integrity of Composition Play Lists, Track File Lists, Key Delivery Messages and other Extra Theatre Messages (ETMs).
5. Link Encryption Keys - Keys that protect the privacy and integrity of uncompressed content for link encryption.
6. TLS secrets - These are transient keys/parameters used or generated in support of TLS and Auditorium Security Messaging (ASM).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.5, 9.5.2.6
[FIPS-140-2]	

## 9.5.10. Deleted Section

The section "SPB 1 Firmware Modifications" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

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# Chapter 10. DCI Requirements Review

Like the previous chapter, this chapter contains procedures for evaluating system design for fidelity to DCI requirements that cannot be tested by direct examination of a finished product. These requirements are different though, because they are not proven by the FIPS 140-2 certification process. The process of proving these requirements is the same, however. Documentation must be produced and Test Subjects must be instrumented to give the examiner all necessary information to evaluate the design. Manufacturers must produce proof in the form of design documentation for each of the relevant Requirements listed in Section 10.4. (To see which requirements are relevant to a particular type of device, consult the Design Review section of the Consolidated Test sections: Section 13.3: Server Design Review, Section 14.3: Projector Design Review and Section 15.3: Projector with MB Design Review.

To complete a compliance evaluation using the requirements in this section, the examiner must be presented with the documentation detailed below. The examiner must also have access to a Test Sample (a production-grade sample of the system, conforming to the operational capabilities of the Design Review sequence being used). Wherever possible, the examiner should confirm that the documentation matches the Test Sample.

## 10.1. Type 1 SPB Documentation

For a Type 1 SPB, it should be possible to validate the requirements in this chapter using much of the test material produced for the FIPS 140-2 test. It may be necessary for the manufacturer to provide additional information in the case where a requirement is not provable using documentation prepared with only the FIPS 140-2 test in mind. Manufacturers are encouraged to consider the objectives of this chapter when preparing material for the FIPS 140-2 test of a Type 1 SPB.

The following documents (repeated from Chapter 9) are examples of the types of documentation that will be useful when proving compliance with the requirements presented in this chapter:

- Master Components List (bill of materials); All items submitted as test evidence to the Testing Organization (*e.g.*, software, firmware, hardware, source code, documentation, etc.) must be specified on the Master Components List, along with a unique identifier and version
- Security policy
- Data sheets for hardware components
- Listing of all significant information flows
- Finite state model
- Clearly annotated source code
- Functional specifications
- Block diagrams
- Schematics
- Software design documentation (such as an API or developers guide)
- Mechanical drawings & assembly drawings (approximately to scale)
- Printed circuit board layout drawings
- Cryptographic Key and Critical Security Parameter documentation
- Delivery and operations procedures

- Cryptographic Officer & User guidance
- Configuration management specification
- Operational testing plan(s), and associated testing equipment
- Documentation detailing the correspondence of all security rules to the implementation

## 10.2. Type 2 SPB Documentation

For a Type 2 SPB, it is necessary to produce documentation to validate the requirements in this chapter. Because a Type 2 SPB is not required to undergo FIPS 140-2 testing, this documentation will be produced only for the purpose of this DCI compliance test. Note that the documentation need not cover aspects of the design that are not the subject of the requirements.

The following documentation must be supplied:

- Block diagrams showing chassis partitions, major components, locations of security components, security parameters and security related information flows.
- Descriptions and functions of all electronic interfaces and user interfaces, for both security and non-security operations. (Proprietary details of non-security related interfaces are not required, however enough information must be supplied to allow the examiner to prove that all security-related interfaces have been fully documented).
- User and maintenance manual information relating to security, *i.e.* installation and operation details including user and maintenance roles for electronic access and detailed declarations of capabilities for each role. Also include check lists or instructions from user or maintenance documentation that contain information suggesting security-related instructions, recommended practices, etc. for users and maintenance personnel.
- Analysis of user and maintenance role capabilities reconciled against DCI requirements for "non-security" vs. "security" related access and maintenance.
- Finite state model, limited to SPB-2 security functional operation (including interaction with the companion type-1 SPB, as applicable).

In addition to the above, any documentation that can be used to prove that the design meets a particular requirement should be provided.

## 10.3. Forensic Mark IP Disclosure

For a Test Subject which implements Forensic Marking (FM), it will be necessary to provide, in addition to the documentation listed above, an intellectual property disclosure statement which describes any claims on intellectual property that the manufacturer intends to make on the FM algorithm.



## 10.4. DCI Requirements for Security Modules

Each of the subsections below describes a DCI requirement that must be proven by examining the manufacturer's documentation.

### 10.4.1. Theater System Reliability

- Record the calculated Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for the design. There are no Pass/Fail criteria for this value.
- Record the calculated Mean Time to Repair (MTR) for the design (value does not include transit, *i.e.*, all parts and tools are assumed to be immediately at hand). There are no Pass/Fail criteria for this value.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.2.3.1, 7.2.3.2

### 10.4.2. Theater System Storage Security

Verify that image and audio essence on storage devices retains the original AES encryption, if present during ingest. It is required that decrypted plaintext (image or audio) essence is never stored on the storage system.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	7.5.3.8

### 10.4.3. Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities

Verify that (to the extent possible) all security devices are designed with self-test capability to announce failures and take themselves out of service.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.1

### 10.4.4. Security Entity Physical Protection

Verify that all functional Security Entities (SE) (except the SMS) are contained within Type 1 SPBs.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.1.1

### 10.4.5. Secure SMS-SM Communication

Verify that the SMS communicates with the SM under its control in a secure fashion (*i.e.*, under TLS). Verify that the TLS channel uses a TCP port other than 1173.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.1.1

## 10.4.6. Location of Security Manager

- Verify that there is only one Security Manager (SM).
- Verify that the SM is contained within the Media Block (MB).
- Verify that no SM functions, as defined in [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Sections 9.4.3.5, 9.6.1 and 9.6.1.2, are implemented outside of the secure environment of the MB.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.2.4, 9.4.3.5, 9.6.1, 9.6.1.2

## 10.4.7. Deleted Section

The section "SM Usage of OS Security Features" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

## 10.4.8. SM Secure Communications

Verify that the only security communication with systems (processors) external to the Security Manager's (SM) Secure Processing Block (SPB) is by Transport Layer Security (TLS) over a network interface per [DCI-DCSS-1-2], Section 9.4.5.1.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.2.4, 9.4.5.1

## 10.4.9. Playback Preparation

Verify that the SM prepares the security system for playout within 30 minutes prior to showtime.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

## 10.4.10. Special Auditorium Situation Detection

*The following applies only to a Test Subject that is a Media Block.*

If the Test Subject supports Special Auditorium Situations, verify that the Test Subject enables Special Auditorium Situation during the auditorium security network TLS session establishment and if and only if one or two of the following conditions are met:

- The use of (i) more than one remote LDB/projector pair with a single MB, or (ii) an LD/LE image processor SPB inserted between the MB and one or more remote LDB/projector pair(s); or
- The use of an integrated and married MB/projector pair, where the MB also outputs a Link Encrypted image signal to one or more remote LDB/projector pair(s). The MB shall simultaneously meet all requirements for both integrated and non-integrated projector system implementations.

Unless a Special Auditorium Situations is enabled, verify that the Test Subject supports suite playback for exactly one projector.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.4.1

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### 10.4.11. Prevention of Keying of Compromised SPBs

Verify that the SM precludes delivery of keys or content to, or play back on, devices reporting a Security Alert or remote SPBs not listed on the KDM TDL.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

### 10.4.12. SPB Authentication

Verify that the Security Manager (SM) performs remote Secure Processing Block (SPB) authentication through Transport Layer Security (TLS) session establishment, and maintain the certificate lists collected.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

### 10.4.13. TLS Session Key Refreshes

Verify that the Security Manager (SM) maintains open Transport Layer Security (TLS) sessions for not more than 24 hours between complete restarts (i.e., forces periodic fresh TLS keys).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

### 10.4.14. LE Key Issuance

Verify that the SM supports keying of the Link Encryptor (LE) by transferring LE keys only to an authenticated and trusted Link Decryptor Block (LDB) and companion SPB (i.e., the projector). Verify that LE keys are not issued to the LDB unless the LDB certificate and, where applicable, companion SPB certificate, are listed on the TDL of the enabling KDM.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

### 10.4.15. Maximum Key Validity Period

Note: Only applicable where external MDs or FMs are used.

Verify that the key usage validity period is six (6) hours. Verify that the six hour period does not extend beyond the playback time window specified in the KDM. An exception to this requirement may be made when playout is started within the KDM playout time window, but the playout time window expires before the end of playout. In this case the show may playout beyond the playout time window by a maximum of six (6) hours.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5, 9.4.5.3.2

### 10.4.16. KDM Purge upon Expiry

Verify that the Security Manager (SM) deletes from its storage a Key Delivery Message (KDM) (and associated keys) no later than 10 minutes after its playout time window has expired (passed), unless playout is started within the KDM playout time window but the playout time window expires before the end of playout. In the latter case, verify that the SM deletes from its storage the KDM (and associated keys) no later than 10 minutes after (i) the end of the show or (ii) the end of the six (6) hour period following the end of the KDM playout time window, whichever comes first.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

### 10.4.17. Key Usage Time Window

Verify that the Security Manager (SM) enforces the playback time window specified in the Key Delivery Message (KDM) by delivering content keys to Media Decryptors (MD) along with usage periods fully contained within the KDM validity time window. An exception to this requirement may be made when playout is started within the KDM playout time window, but the playout time window expires before the end of playout. In this case the show may playout beyond the playout time window by a maximum of six (6) hours.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.5

### 10.4.18. Projector Secure Silicon Device

Verify that the projector SPB includes a secure silicon host device (see Sections 9.4.3.6.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]) that contains the SPB's digital certificate.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.1

### 10.4.19. Access to Projector Image Signals

Verify that the Projector SPB design does not allow physical access to signals running between the companion SPB and the projector SPB without breaking the marriage.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.1

### 10.4.20. Systems with Electronic Marriage

Verify that an electronic marriage is planned upon installation of a MB or LDB projector pair. Verify that this physical/electrical connection is battery-backed and monitored 24/7 by the companion SPB and, if broken, shall require a reinstallation (re-marriage) process.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.1

### 10.4.21. Systems Without Electronic Marriage

Verify that in the configuration of a permanently married companion SPB (MB or LDB) the companion SPB is not field replaceable and require the projector SPB and companion SPB system to both be replaced in the event of an SPB failure.

If the companion SPB is an LDB or the companion SPB is a *MB with single certificate implementation* as defined in Section 9.5.1.1 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], verify that the system contains exactly one leaf certificate.

If the companion SPB is a *MB with dual certificate implementation* as defined in Section 9.5.1.2 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2], verify that the system contains exactly two leaf certificates.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.6, 9.5.1.1, 9.5.1.2

### 10.4.22. Clock Date-Time-Range

Verify that the MB clock has a Date-Time range of at least 20 years.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

### 10.4.23. Clock Setup

Verify that the SM clock is set by the manufacturer to within one second of UTC by means of a national time standard (such as WWV).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

### 10.4.24. Clock Stability

If the device is an SM, verify that the clock stability requirement of +/- 30 seconds per month is met. If the device is a remote SPB, verify that the clock stability requirement of +/- 60 seconds per month is met.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

### 10.4.25. Repair and Renewal of SPBs

Verify that an SPB cannot be repaired or renewed without direct manufacturer action.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.3

## 10.4.26. SPB2 Protected Devices

Verify that Type 2 SPB surrounds the following sub-systems:

- a. a security environment consisting of a secure silicon chip; input/output signals to the secure silicon chip and the projector SPB; perimeter access panel monitoring
- b. the projector image signal processing environment

Verify through physical inspection that a sample device contains the above listed sub-systems in a manner consistent with the documentation.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.4

## 10.4.27. Clock Continuity

Verify that the clock is tamper-proof and thereafter may not be reset.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

## 10.4.28. TLS Endpoints

Verify that all TLS end points are within the physical protection perimeter of the associated SPB.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.1

## 10.4.29. Deleted Section

The section "Implementation of RRP" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

## 10.4.30. SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer

Verify that the authentication of the TLS sessions between the SM and remote SPB or SMS utilizes digital certificates as defined by [SMPTE-430-2], which facilitate a cryptographic process that identifies each SPB device to the SM.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.1
[RFC-2246]	

### 10.4.31. Idempotency of ITM RRP

Verify that transactions are "idempotent" (such a transaction may be repeated without changing its outcome).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.1

### 10.4.32. RRP Synchronism

Verify that RRP protocols are synchronous: each pairing must opened and closed before a new RRP is opened between any two devices. Nested transactions (in which one end point must communicate with another end point while the first waits) are allowed.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3

### 10.4.33. TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition

Verify that except where noted in the [DCI-DCSS-1-2], non-TLS security communications are not used, and that production Digital Cinema security equipment has no provisions for performing security functions in a TLS "bypass" mode.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3

### 10.4.34. RRP Broadcast Prohibition

Verify that no broadcast RRP commands are used or required.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3

### 10.4.35. Implementation of Proprietary ITMs

Verify that any proprietary ITM implemented by equipment suppliers do not communicate over TCP or UDP port 1173, and that such ITMs do not communicate information that is the subject of any [SMPTE-430-6] commands.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3
[SMPTE-430-6]	

### 10.4.36. RRP Initiator

Verify that, except where noted, only the SMS or SM initiate RRP.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3



### 10.4.37. Deleted Section

The section "SPB TLS Session Partners" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

### 10.4.38. Deleted Section

The section "SM TLS Session Partners" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

### 10.4.39. RRP "Busy" and Unsupported Types

Verify that unless otherwise noted, an RRP response is allowed to be busy or an unsupported message type and that such a response is not an error event.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.3

### 10.4.40. RRP Operational Message Ports

Verify that Category 1 messages (see Table 15 p.123 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2]) are not transported over TCP port 1173, but another port using TLS. Verify that the SM and SMS both conduct their intra-theater messaging under TLS protection (see [RFC-2246]).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.4

### 10.4.41. Deleted Section

The section "FM Generic Inserter Requirements" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

## 10.4.42. FM Algorithm General Requirements

For a Forensic Marking (FM) embedder:

1. Verify that single distribution inventory is supported by the FM algorithm.
2. Verify by examination of the FM embedder intellectual property disclosure that the terms and conditions of use for the FM algorithm are reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND).
3. Verify that detection can be performed by the manufacturer or the Rights Owner at the Rights Owner's premises.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.1

## 10.4.43. FM Insertion Requirements

Verify that FM insertion is a real-time (i.e., show playback time), in-line process performed in the associated MB, and has a reasonable computational process.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.1

## 10.4.44. IFM Visual Transparency

Verify that IFM is visually transparent to the critical viewer in butterfly tests for motion image content.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.2

## 10.4.45. IFM Robustness

Verify that IFM resists/survives video processing attacks (such as digital-to-analog conversions, including multiple D-A/A-D conversions), re-sampling and re-quantization (including dithering and recompression), common signal enhancements to image contrast and color, resizing, letterboxing, aperture control, low-pass filtering, anti-aliasing, brick wall filtering, digital video noise reduction filtering, frame-swapping, compression, arbitrary scaling (aspect ratio is not necessarily constant), cropping, overwriting, addition of noise and other transformations. Verify that IFM survives collusion (the combining of multiple videos in the attempt to make a different fingerprint or to remove it), format conversion, the changing of frequencies and spatial resolution (among, for example, NTSC, PAL and SECAM, into another and vice versa), horizontal and vertical shifting and camcorder capture and low bit rate compression (e.g., 500 Kbps H264, 1.1 Mbps MPEG-1).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.2

### 10.4.46. AFM Inaudibility

Verify that AFM is inaudible in critical listening A/B tests.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.3

### 10.4.47. AFM Robustness

Verify that AFM resists/survives multiple D/A and A/D conversions, radio frequency or infrared transmissions within the theater, any combination and down conversion of captured channels, re-sampling of channels, time compression/expansion with pitch shift and pitch preserved, linear speed changes within 10% and pitch-invariant time scaling within 4%. Verify that AFM resists/survives data reduction coding, nonlinear amplitude compression, additive or multiplicative noise frequency response distortion such as equalization, addition of echo, band-pass filtering, flutter and wow and overdubbing.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.1.3

### 10.4.48. FM Control Instance

Verify that the SM is solely responsible for control of FM marking processes (i.e., "on/off") for the auditorium it is installed in and command and control of this function is only via the KDM indicator per [SMPTE-430-1].

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.2
[SMPTE-430-1]	

### 10.4.49. Deleted Section

The section "SE Time Stamping" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

### 10.4.50. SE Log Authoring

Verify that an SE authors its own log records, or utilizes the services of a proxy within the same secure SPB.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

### 10.4.51. SPB Log Storage Requirements

Verify that log records stored in SPBs are stored in non-volatile memory and are not purge-able. Verify that data is overwritten beginning with the oldest data as new log data is accumulated. Verify that no log records are overwritten unless collected by the SM.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

### 10.4.52. Remote SPB Log Storage Requirements

Verify that remote SPBs have sufficient secure storage to hold log data to accommodate at least two days worth of typical operation.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

### 10.4.53. MB Log Storage Capabilities

Verify that the SM is capable of storing at least 12 months of typical log data accumulation for the auditorium in which it is installed, including log data collected from the associated remote SPBs.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

### 10.4.54. Logging for Standalone Systems

Verify that the logging subsystem implementations do not affect the ability of Exhibition to operate their projection systems in a standalone fashion.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.1

### 10.4.55. Logging of Failed Procedures

Verify that failure or refusal of logged events is also a logged event (as applicable).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.7, 9.4.6.3.8, 9.4.6.3.10

### 10.4.56. SPB Log Failure

Verify that behavior of security devices (SPB or SE) is specified and designed to immediately terminate operation, and requires replacement, upon any failure of its secure logging operation.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.10

### 10.4.57. Log Purging in Failed SPBs

Verify that resident log records in failed SPBs (and their contained SEs) are not purge-able except by authorized repair centers, which are capable of securely recovering such log records.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.6.3.10

### 10.4.58. MB Tasks

Verify that the MB performs Media Decryption for image essence, performs Forensic Marking for image essence. Verify that after image decryption and FM (and other non-security plain text functions as appropriate by design), the image signal is passed to the projector SPB or LDB, as appropriate. Verify that, if included as part of the MB SPB design, streaming media decryption and streaming forensic marking for audio is performed and that the audio essence is passed to external components.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.3

### 10.4.59. Private Keys outside Secure Silicon

Verify that device private keys, whether encrypted or not, do not exist outside of the secure silicon device.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.2

### 10.4.60. Image Keys outside Secure Silicon

In case keys decrypted from the KDM have to be stored externally (off-secure-chip memory is used for key caching within a Media Decryptor), verify that 2048 bit RSA, 128 bit AES or 112 bit TDES are used for encryption.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.2

### 10.4.61. Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability

Verify that SPBs of Type 1 are not field serviceable (e.g., SPB type 1 maintenance access doors shall not be open-able in the field).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.3

### 10.4.62. Use of Software Protection Methods

Verify that software protection methods are not used to protect CSPs or content essence.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.2

### 10.4.63. TMS Role

Verify that in the event that Exhibition command and control designs include the TMS as a device that interfaces with the SMS, such a TMS is viewed by the security system as an SMS, and carries a digital certificate and follows all other SMS behavior, TLS and ITM communications requirements.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.2.5

### 10.4.64. D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection

Verify that the following Digital Cinema Security Parameters (DCSPs) receive SPB type 1 protection, whenever they exist outside of their originally encrypted state:

1. Watermarking or Fingerprinting command and control - Any of the parameters or keys used in a particular Forensic Marking process.
2. Logged Data - All log event data and associated parameters constituting a log record or report.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.6

### 10.4.65. RSA Key Entropy

Verify that the mechanism used to generate RSA key pairs must have at least 128-bits of entropy (unpredictability).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.7.6

### 10.4.66. Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy

Verify that AES or TDES symmetric keys pre-loaded into a device are generated with a high quality random number generator with at least 128 bits of entropy (112 bits for TDES).

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.7.6

### 10.4.67. MD Caching of Keys

Verify that the Media Decryptor is capable of securely caching at least 512 keys.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.7.7

### 10.4.68. SPB 1 Firmware Modifications

Verify the following:

1. The device is designed such that the firmware cannot be modified without the knowledge and permission of the original manufacturer.
2. The device's firmware modification procedure requires a digital certificate per [SMPTE-430-2] that identifies the authority figure responsible for making the firmware change.
3. The device logs firmware change information including timestamp, version and operator identity.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.7

### 10.4.69. SPB1 Log Retention

Verify that log records are not purged from a Type 1 SPB in the event of intrusion or other tamper detection.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.2.1, 9.4.3.6.3, 9.4.6.3.10

### 10.4.70. ASM Get Time Frequency

Verify that the SM executes the ASM GetTime command immediately after power-up initialization and at least once every 24 hours of operation.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

### 10.4.71. Deleted Section

The section "SPB2 Log Memory Availability" was deleted. The section number is maintained here to preserve the numbering of subsequent sections.

### 10.4.72. SPB Secure Silicon Requirements

Verify that Secure Processing Block (SPB):

1. Is of the type designed to resist physical and logical attacks, and ensure that a physical attack destroys Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) prior to exposure.
2. Is of the type that provides CSP protection in both powered and unpowered states.
3. Meets "secure silicon" level of protection per [FIPS-140-2] level 3 row (area) 5: "physical security requirements".

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.5.2.2

### 10.4.73. SPB Type 1 Battery Life

- Verify that the Type 1 SPB clock's battery has a life of at least 5 years under normal operating conditions.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.7

### 10.4.74. Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert

*Only applies to a Test Subject that is a Companion SPB (LDB or SM).*

Verify that the Test Subject retrieves the Projector SPB certificate over the marriage connection.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.5

### 10.4.75. Log Collection for Married MB

Verify that, when integrated within a projector as the projector's companion SPB, or permanently married to the projector, the MB provides 24/7 log recording support, and storage of all log records associated with the projector SPB.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.3

### 10.4.76. Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement

*The following applies only to Test Subjects that are Companion SPBs, i.e. MB or LDB designed to operate with an integrated projection system.*

Verify that the Test Subject does not operate unless integrated with a projector SPB. In particular,

- if the Test Subject is an LDB, verify that the Test Subject cannot perform link decryption functions unless integrated within a projector SPB; or
- if the Test Subject is a MB, verify that the Test Subject cannot perform any composition decryption function unless integrated within and married to a projector SPB.



Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.3, 9.4.3.6.2

### 10.4.77. Standalone MB Single Purpose Requirement

*The following applies only to a MB that is not designed to operate with an integrated projection system, i.e. not designed as a Companion SPB.*

Verify that the Test Subject cannot operate, or be reconfigured to operate with an integrated projection system, i.e. as a Companion SPB.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.3

### 10.4.78. Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements

Verify that the Projector SPB sends log event data across the marriage electrical interface for retention by the companion SPB, as specified in Table 19 of [DCI-DCSS-1-2].

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.3.6.1, 9.4.6.3.8

### 10.4.79. TLS RSA Requirement

Verify that the Test Subject, for the purpose of ASM communications, only supports the TLS CipherSuite "TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA" as specified in [SMPTE-430-6].

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.2.4

### 10.4.80. Dual Certificate SMS Authentication

*Note: Only applies to a Test Subject that is an SM that uses dual certificates.*

- Verify that if the Test Subject's SMS establishes the TLS session with the SM (SM is the TLS server) the SM Certificate (SM Cert) shall be presented by the SM.
- Verify that if the Test Subject's SM establishes the TLS session with SMS (SMS is the TLS server) the Log Signer Certificate (LS Cert) shall be presented by the SM.

Reference Document ID	Reference Document Section(s)
[DCI-DCSS-1-2]	9.4.5.3.2, 9.5.1, 9.5.1.2

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# Part III. Consolidated Test Procedures

The chapters in this part contain consolidated procedures and standardized test reports for testing Digital Cinema equipment and content. These consolidated procedures refer to the elemental procedures in Part I and Part II, building on those procedures to present a complete, ordered sequence for testing the subject.

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# Chapter 11. Testing Overview

## 11.1. Test Reports

To prepare a test report, select the report for the test subject and perform the tests in the order presented, recording the results of each test as you progress. When all tests have been performed, count the number of check marks in the greyed-out boxes and record this number in the test session detail as shown in Table 11.1 (over). Complete the other fields in the test session detail and then sign and date the report.

Information about the testing session itself is recorded in the following table for any test sequence performed. All fields must be filled in.

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**Table 11.1. Test Session Data**

Reporting date	
Name of Testing Organization	
Address of Testing Organization	1: 2: 3: 4:
Name of Test Operator	
Test location (if not at testing org's site)	1: 2: 3: 4:
Name of Test Subject Representative	
Address of Test Subject Representative	1: 2: 3: 4:
Make and model of Test Subject	
Serial number(s) of Test Subject. Record any applicable values.	
Software version number(s). Record any applicable values.	
Firmware version number(s). Record any applicable values.	
Test procedure performed (select one)	DCP Test Standalone Server Test Standalone Projector Test Projector w/Media Block Test Link Decryptor/Encryptor Test
Test status (select one)	Pass Fail

---

# Chapter 12. Digital Cinema Package (DCP) Consolidated Test Sequence

## 12.1. Overview

This chapter presents a complete sequence of procedures for validating the contents of a Digital Cinema Package (DCP). The tests are drawn primarily from Section 4.6.1. If the DCP contains Composition Playlists with digital signatures, the procedures from Section 2.1 will also be used.

These tests assume that the DCP under test is recorded on a random-access hard disk drive or optical disc using a well-known filesystem (a convention for arranging data on the device). While there are voluntary restrictions on the physical interfaces and filesystems supported for these types of devices, this test may be performed on any volume that can be read by the computer being used to perform the test.

Please note that while this procedure may confirm the correctness of the DCP on the media volume, it does not provide assurance that the media volume itself can be used by the intended playback device. Please consult the manufacturer's documentation to learn which media and filesystem combinations are supported by the intended playout device(s).

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## 12.2. DCP Test Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure.

**Table 12.1. Asset Map Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Verify that the filesystem root contains the filename <code>ASSETMAP.xml</code>			
2.	Verify that the <code>ASSETMAP.xml</code> file is a valid [SMPTE-429-9] Asset Map using the procedure in Section 4.1.1. Record the namespace name in the Measured Data field.			
3.	Verify that the filesystem root contains the filename <code>VOLINDEX.xml</code>			
4.	Verify that the <code>VOLINDEX.xml</code> file is a valid [SMPTE-429-9] Volume Index using the procedure in Section 4.1.2. Record the namespace name in the Measured Data field.			
5.	Verify that the <code>ASSETMAP.xml</code> file references at least one Packing List file. Record the number of Packing List files referenced.			
6.	For each Chunk element in the <code>ASSETMAP.xml</code> file, Verify that the filesystem path given in the <code>Path</code> element exists in the filesystem. Record any paths that do not exist. Check that the file size equals the value of the <code>Length</code> . Record any paths having mismatched sizes.			

Repeat the Packing List sequence for each Packing List in the DCP.

**Table 12.2. Packing List Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
7.	Record the filename of the Packing List in the Measured Data field.	(data only)		
8.	Verify that the Packing List is a valid XML structure per Section 4.2.1.			
9.	If the Packing List is signed, verify that the signature is valid per Section 4.2.1.			
10.	Verify that each <code>Asset</code> element in the Packing List exists in the <code>ASSETMAP.xml</code> file.			
11.	Verify that the value of the <code>Size</code> element in each <code>Asset</code> element matches the size of the respective asset file.			



Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
12.	Verify that the value of the Hash element in each Asset element matches the SHA-1 message digest of the respective asset file.			

Repeat the Composition Playlist procedure for each Composition Playlist in the DCP.

**Table 12.3. Composition Playlist Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
13.	Record the filename of the Composition Playlist in the Measured Data field.	(data only)		
14.	Verify that the Composition Playlist is a valid XML structure per Section 4.3.1.			
15.	If the Composition Playlist is signed, Verify that the signature is valid per Section 4.3.1.			
16.	Verify that each Asset element in the Composition Playlist references an asset in the ASSETMAP.xml file. If not, record the UUID values of the missing assets in the Measured Data field. <i>Note:</i> A valid DCP may have unresolved CPL asset references.	(data only)		
17.	Verify that the value of the Hash element in each Asset element (where present) matches the value of the Hash element in the respective Packing List entry.			

Repeat the Track File procedure for each Track File in the DCP.

**Table 12.4. Track File Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
18.	Verify that the track file is an OP-Atom MXF file per the procedure in Section 4.4.2.			
19.	Verify that the track file is at least one second in duration per the procedure in Section 4.4.4. Record the length in the Measured Data field.			
20.	Perform the set of procedures for the appropriate essence type. If the track file contains image essence, perform the procedures in Table 12.5: Image Essence Procedures. If the track file contains sound essence, perform the procedures in Table 12.6: Sound Essence Procedures. If the track file contains timed-text essence, perform the procedures in Table 12.7: Text Essence Procedures. Check Pass in this row if the procedure in the essence test sequence succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 12.5. Image Essence Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
21.	Verify that the image parameters in the MXF header are correct per the procedure in Section 4.5.1.			
22.	Verify that the images in the MXF file are correctly encoded using JPEG 2000 per the procedure in Section 4.5.2.			

**Table 12.6. Sound Essence Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
23.	Verify that each frame of the track file contains a complete, identically sized set of audio samples (as determined by the sample rate, sample size and channel count metadata) per Section 4.4.6. Record the payload size of the first frame in the Measured Data field.			
24.	Verify that the audio encoding parameters are correct per the procedure in Section 4.5.3.			

**Table 12.7. Text Essence Procedures**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
25.	Verify that the timed-text encoding parameters are correct per the procedure in Section 4.5.4.			

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# Chapter 13. Digital Cinema Server Consolidated Test Sequence

## 13.1. Overview

The test sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test a stand-alone d-cinema *server*. The configuration and architecture of the Test Subject will vary, but the test sequence assumes that the system consists of at least a Media Block (MB, containing a Security Manager, Media Decryptor, Link Encryptor, etc.) and a Screen Management Server (SMS). For the purpose of this test, the Test Operator may substitute a Theater Management Server (TMS) for the SMS if it implements the required functionality. Wherever a test procedure refers to an SMS, the equivalent TMS may also be used.

Before performing the test sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 13.2. Server Test Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following four sequence procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( *e.g.*, on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 13.1. Security Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the one or two X.509 digital leaf certificates associated with the Security Manager depending if the Security Manager uses single or dual certificate implementation, respectively. Obtain the complete chain of signer certificates for each of the one or two leaf certificate, up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate independently each of the one or two chains using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
	in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( *e.g.*, on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 13.2. Screen Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the SMS and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
5.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 13.3. Power**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
6.	Record the published operating voltage of each power inlet in the Measured Data field. Connect power to the Test Subject as directed by the operating instructions. If the Test Subject does not automatically start when power is applied, follow the manufacturer's power-up instructions to start the system.			(data only)

**Table 13.4. Operator Roles**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
7.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.9: SMS User Accounts. Record the available operator roles (names) and whether locally-defined accounts can be created. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 13.5. Screen Management System**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.10: SMS Operator Identification. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
9.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.11: SMS Identity and Certificate. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.1: Storage System Ingest Interface. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
11.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.2: Storage System Capacity. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
12.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.3: Storage System Redundancy. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
13.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.4: Storage System Performance. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
14.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.2: Show Playlist Creation. Record the result.	(data only)		
15.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.3: Show Playlist Format. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
16.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.5: Automation Control and Interfaces. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
17.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.6: Interrupt Free Playback. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
18.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.7: Artifact Free Transition of Image Format. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
19.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.8: Restarting Playback. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
20.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.12: Content Keys and TDL check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Table 13.6. KDM Ingest

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
21.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.1: KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
22.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.2: ETM IssueDate Field Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
23.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.3: Maximum Number of DCP Keys. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
24.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.4: Structure ID Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
25.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.5: Certificate Thumbprint Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
26.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.7: KeyInfo Field Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
27.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.8: KDM Malformations. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
28.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.9: KDM Signature. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
29.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.13: CPL Id Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Table 13.7. Interface

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
30.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.1: Digital Audio Interfaces. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
31.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.1: TLS Session Initiation. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
32.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.3: TLS Exception Logging. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
33.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.1: Auditorium Security Message Support. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
34.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.2: ASM Failure Behavior. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
35.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.3: ASM "RRP Invalid". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
36.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.4: ASM "GetTime". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
37.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.5: ASM "GetEventList". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
38.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.6: ASM "GetEventID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
39.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.7: ASM "LEKeyLoad". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
40.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.8: ASM "LEKeyQueryID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
41.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.9: ASM "LEKeyQueryAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
42.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.10: ASM "LEKeyPurgeID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
43.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.11: ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
44.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.12: ASM "GetProjCert". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Table 13.8. Log Reporting

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
45.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.1: Log Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
46.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.6: Log Report Signature Validity. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
47.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.2: Log Records for Multiple SPBs. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
48.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.3: Log Sequence Numbers. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
49.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.4: Log Collection by the SM. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
50.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.5: General Log System Failure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
51.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.1: SM Proxy of Log Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
52.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.2: SM Proxy of Security Operations Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
53.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.3: SM Proxy of Security ASM Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
54.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.4: Remote SPB Time Compensation. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 13.9. Security Events**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
55.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.1: FrameSequencePlayed Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
56.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.2: CPLStart Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
57.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.3: CPLEnd Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
58.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.4: PayoutComplete Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
59.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.5: CPLCheck Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
60.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.6: KDMKeysReceived Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
61.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.7: KDMDeleted Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
62.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.1: LinkOpened Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
63.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.2: LinkClosed Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
64.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.3: LinkException Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
65.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.4: LogTransfer Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			



Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
66.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.5: KeyTransfer Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
67.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.6: SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
68.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.8: SPBClockAdjust Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
69.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.10: SPBSoftware Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
70.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.11: SPBSecurityAlert Event. Record the result.	(data only)		

Table 13.10. Essence Reproduction

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
71.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.5.2: Decoder Requirements. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
72.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.5.1: Playback of Image Only Material. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
73.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.1: Image Integrity Checking. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
74.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.2: Audio Sample Rate Conversion. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
75.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.3: Audio Delay Setup. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
76.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.4: Click Free Splicing of Audio Track Files. Record the result.	(data only)		
77.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.2: Sound Integrity Checking. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
78.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.6: Timed Text Decryption. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

In the case that the Media Block implements an alpha channel overlay module, a subpicture renderer (a module that converts the subpicture file into a baseband image file with an alpha channel) and a Timed Text renderer (a module that converts Timed Text data into a baseband image file with an alpha channel), verify that timed text essence is rendered and displayed correctly by the system using the tests in the following table.

**Table 13.11. Text and Image Overlay**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
79.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.1: Media Block Overlay. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
80.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.4: Default Timed Text Font. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 13.12. Media Block Security**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
81.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.4: Restriction of Keying to MD Type. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
82.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.5: Restriction of Keying to Valid CPLs. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
83.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.6: Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
84.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.7: SPB Integrity Fault Consequences. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
85.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.8: Content Key Extension, End of Engagement. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
86.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.9: ContentAuthenticator Element Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
87.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.10: KDM Date Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
88.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.11: KDM TDL Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
89.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.12: Maximum Number of DCP Keys. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
90.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.13: CPL Id Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
91.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.2: Special Auditorium Situation Operations. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
92.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.3: LE Key Usage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
93.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.4: MB Link Encryption. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
94.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.1: Clock Adjustment. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
95.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.2: SPB Type 1 Clock Battery. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
96.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.3: Clock Resolution. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 13.13. Forensic Marking**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
97.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.1: FM Application Constraints. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
98.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.2: Granularity of FM Control. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
99.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.3: FM Payload. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
100.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.4: FM Audio Bypass. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
101.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.5: Selective Audio FM Control. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

### 13.3. Server Design Review

For each requirement listed in the tables below, prove that the system design meets the requirement by identifying the software or hardware mechanism that implements the requirement and analyzing the design to assure that the requirement has been met. If a proof cannot be made, the design will be considered non-compliant with regard to the requirement. To perform this analysis the examiner will require access to exhibit documents (system design artifacts) such as schematic diagrams, implementation source code, unit test source code, state diagrams, design notes, etc. See Chapter 9: *FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB* and Chapter 10: *DCI Requirements Review* for more information.

For each requirement, the examiner must record the identifiers of the exhibits consulted in proving the requirement, including applicable version identifiers, section or sheet numbers, grid identifiers, etc., and the examiner must record *Pass* or *Fail* to indicate whether or not the requirement has been met by the design. The examiner may also record any notes relevant to interpreting the exhibits and to the determination of the compliance status.

The requirements in the following table apply only to the components of the system designated *Type 1 SPB*.

**Table 13.14. FIPS 140-2 Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
1.	Section 9.5.1: SM Operating Environment			
2.	Section 9.5.2: LE Key Generation			
3.	Section 9.5.3: SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness			
4.	Section 9.5.4: Security Design Description Requirements			
5.	Section 9.5.6: SPB1 FIPS Requirements			
6.	Section 9.5.8: Asymmetric Key Generation			
7.	Section 9.5.9: Critical Security Parameter Protection			

**Table 13.15. DCI DCSS Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
8.	Section 10.4.1: Theater System Reliability			
9.	Section 10.4.2: Theater System Storage Security			
10.	Section 10.4.3: Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities			
11.	Section 10.4.4: Security Entity Physical Protection			
12.	Section 10.4.5: Secure SMS-SM Communication			
13.	Section 10.4.6: Location of Security Manager			
14.	Section 10.4.8: SM Secure Communications			
15.	Section 10.4.9: Playback Preparation			
16.	Section 10.4.10: Special Auditorium Situation Detection			
17.	Section 10.4.11: Prevention of Keying of Compromised SPBs			
18.	Section 10.4.12: SPB Authentication			
19.	Section 10.4.13: TLS Session Key Refreshes			
20.	Section 10.4.14: LE Key Issuance			
21.	Section 10.4.15: Maximum Key Validity Period			

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
22.	Section 10.4.16: KDM Purge upon Expiry			
23.	Section 10.4.17: Key Usage Time Window			
24.	Section 10.4.22: Clock Date-Time-Range			
25.	Section 10.4.23: Clock Setup			
26.	Section 10.4.24: Clock Stability			
27.	Section 10.4.25: Repair and Renewal of SPBs			
28.	Section 10.4.27: Clock Continuity			
29.	Section 10.4.28: TLS Endpoints			
30.	Section 10.4.30: SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer			
31.	Section 10.4.31: Idempotency of ITM RRP			
32.	Section 10.4.32: RRP Synchronism			
33.	Section 10.4.33: TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition			
34.	Section 10.4.34: RRP Broadcast Prohibition			
35.	Section 10.4.35: Implementation of Proprietary ITMs			
36.	Section 10.4.36: RRP Initiator			
37.	Section 10.4.39: RRP "Busy" and Unsupported Types			
38.	Section 10.4.40: RRP Operational Message Ports			
39.	Section 10.4.42: FM Algorithm General Requirements			
40.	Section 10.4.43: FM Insertion Requirements			
41.	Section 10.4.44: IFM Visual Transparency			
42.	Section 10.4.45: IFM Robustness			
43.	Section 10.4.46: AFM Inaudibility			
44.	Section 10.4.47: AFM Robustness			
45.	Section 10.4.48: FM Control Instance			
46.	Section 10.4.50: SE Log Authoring			
47.	Section 10.4.51: SPB Log Storage Requirements			
48.	Section 10.4.53: MB Log Storage Capabilities			
49.	Section 10.4.54: Logging for Standalone Systems			
50.	Section 10.4.55: Logging of Failed Procedures			
51.	Section 10.4.56: SPB Log Failure			
52.	Section 10.4.57: Log Purging in Failed SPBs			
53.	Section 10.4.58: MB Tasks			
54.	Section 10.4.59: Private Keys outside Secure Silicon			
55.	Section 10.4.60: Image Keys outside Secure Silicon			
56.	Section 10.4.61: Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability			
57.	Section 10.4.62: Use of Software Protection Methods			

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
58.	Section 10.4.63: TMS Role			
59.	Section 10.4.64: D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection			
60.	Section 10.4.65: RSA Key Entropy			
61.	Section 10.4.66: Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy			
62.	Section 10.4.67: MD Caching of Keys			
63.	Section 10.4.68: SPB 1 Firmware Modifications			
64.	Section 10.4.69: SPB1 Log Retention			
65.	Section 10.4.70: ASM Get Time Frequency			
66.	Section 10.4.72: SPB Secure Silicon Requirements			
67.	Section 10.4.73: SPB Type 1 Battery Life			
68.	Section 10.4.77: Standalone MB Single Purpose Requirement			
69.	Section 10.4.79: TLS RSA Requirement			
70.	Section 10.4.80: Dual Certificate SMS Authentication			

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# Chapter 14. Digital Cinema Projector Consolidated Test Sequence

## 14.1. Overview

The test sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test a stand-alone d-cinema projector. The configuration and architecture of the projector will vary, but the test sequence assumes that the system consists of at least a Link Decryptor Block (LD) and a light processing system including electronic and optical components.

Before performing the test sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 14.2. Projector Test Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 14.1. Projector Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the Type 2 SPB and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 14.2. Link Decryptor Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the Link Decryptor and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
5.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
6.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 14.3. Power**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
7.	Record the published operating voltage of each power inlet in the Measured Data field. Connect power to the Test Subject as directed by the operating instructions. If the Test Subject does not automatically start when power is applied, follow the manufacturer's power-up instructions to start the system.	(data only)		

**Table 14.4. Secure Processing Block Type 2**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.6: SPB2 Secure Silicon Field Replacement. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
9.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.1: Projector Physical Protection. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.7: Systems without Electronic Marriage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
11.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.8: Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check			



Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
	Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
12.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.2: Projector Access Door. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 14.5. Interface**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
13.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.1: TLS Session Initiation. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
14.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.3: TLS Exception Logging. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
15.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.1: Auditorium Security Message Support. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
16.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.2: ASM Failure Behavior. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
17.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.4: ASM "GetTime". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
18.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.5: ASM "GetEventList". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
19.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.6: ASM "GetEventID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
20.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.7: ASM "LEKeyLoad". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
21.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.8: ASM "LEKeyQueryID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
22.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.9: ASM "LEKeyQueryAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
23.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.10: ASM "LEKeyPurgeID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
24.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.11: ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
25.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.12: ASM "GetProjCert". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 14.6. Security Events**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
26.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.1: LinkOpened Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
27.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.2: LinkClosed Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
28.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.3: LinkException Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
29.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.4: LogTransfer Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
30.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.5: KeyTransfer Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
31.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.6: SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
32.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.7: SPBOpen and SPBClose Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
33.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.8: SPBClockAdjust Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
34.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.9: SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
35.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.10: SPBSoftware Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
36.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.11: SPBSecurityAlert Event. Record the result.	(data only)		

The procedures in the following table apply to log records retrieved via ASM.

**Table 14.7. Log Reporting**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
37.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.1: Log Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 14.8. Link Decryptor**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
38.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.2: Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
39.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.3: Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
40.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.2: LDB TLS Session Constraints. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
41.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.4: Remote SPB Clock Adjustment. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
42.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.3: LDB Time-Awareness. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
43.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.5: LDB Key Storage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
44.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.6: LDB Key Purging. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
45.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.2: SPB Type 1 Clock Battery. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 14.9. Image Processing**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
46.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.13: Projector Test Environment. Record the result.	(data only)		
47.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
48.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.4: Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion. Record the result.	(data only)		

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
49.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.5: White Point Luminance and Uniformity. Record the result.	(data only)		
50.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.6: White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity. Record the result.	(data only)		
51.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.7: Sequential Contrast. Record the result.	(data only)		
52.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.8: Intra-frame Contrast. Record the result.	(data only)		
53.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.9: Grayscale Tracking. Record the result.	(data only)		
54.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.10: Contouring. Record the result.	(data only)		
55.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.11: Transfer Function. Record the result.	(data only)		
56.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.12: Color Accuracy. Record the result.	(data only)		

In the case that the Projector implements an alpha channel overlay module, a subpicture renderer (a module that converts the subpicture file into a baseband image file with an alpha channel) and a Timed Text renderer (a module that converts Timed Text data into a baseband image file with an alpha channel), verify that timed text essence is rendered and displayed correctly by the system using the tests in the following table. A Digital Cinema server will be required to play the test content into the Projector.

**Table 14.10. Text and Image Overlay**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
57.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.1: Projector Overlay. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
58.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.4: Default Timed Text Font. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

## 14.3. Projector Design Review

For each requirement listed in the tables below, prove that the system design meets the requirement by identifying the software or hardware mechanism that implements the requirement and analyzing the design to assure that the requirement has been met. If a proof cannot be made, the design will be considered non-compliant with regard to the requirement. To perform this analysis the examiner will require access to exhibit documents (system design artifacts) such as schematic diagrams, implementation source code, unit test source code, state diagrams, design notes, etc. See Chapter 9: *FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB* and Chapter 10: *DCI Requirements Review* for more information.

For each requirement, the examiner must record the identifiers of the exhibits consulted in proving the requirement, including applicable version identifiers, section or sheet numbers, grid identifiers, etc., and the examiner must record *Pass* or *Fail* to indicate whether or not the requirement has been met by the design. The examiner may also record any notes relevant to interpreting the exhibits and to the determination of the compliance status.

The requirements in the following table apply only to the Link Decryptor (LD) module.

**Table 14.11. FIPS 140-2 Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
1.	Section 9.5.2: LE Key Generation			
2.	Section 9.5.3: SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness			
3.	Section 9.5.4: Security Design Description Requirements			
4.	Section 9.5.6: SPB1 FIPS Requirements			
5.	Section 9.5.8: Asymmetric Key Generation			
6.	Section 9.5.9: Critical Security Parameter Protection			

**Table 14.12. DCI DCSS Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
7.	Section 10.4.1: Theater System Reliability			
8.	Section 10.4.3: Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities			
9.	Section 10.4.4: Security Entity Physical Protection			
10.	Section 10.4.18: Projector Secure Silicon Device			
11.	Section 10.4.19: Access to Projector Image Signals			
12.	Section 10.4.20: Systems with Electronic Marriage			
13.	Section 10.4.21: Systems Without Electronic Marriage			
14.	Section 10.4.24: Clock Stability			
15.	Section 10.4.25: Repair and Renewal of SPBs			
16.	Section 10.4.26: SPB2 Protected Devices			
17.	Section 10.4.27: Clock Continuity			
18.	Section 10.4.28: TLS Endpoints			
19.	Section 10.4.30: SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer			
20.	Section 10.4.31: Idempotency of ITM RRP			
21.	Section 10.4.32: RRP Synchronism			

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
22.	Section 10.4.33: TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition			
23.	Section 10.4.34: RRP Broadcast Prohibition			
24.	Section 10.4.35: Implementation of Proprietary ITMs			
25.	Section 10.4.36: RRP Initiator			
26.	Section 10.4.40: RRP Operational Message Ports			
27.	Section 10.4.50: SE Log Authoring			
28.	Section 10.4.51: SPB Log Storage Requirements			
29.	Section 10.4.52: Remote SPB Log Storage Requirements			
30.	Section 10.4.54: Logging for Standalone Systems			
31.	Section 10.4.55: Logging of Failed Procedures			
32.	Section 10.4.56: SPB Log Failure			
33.	Section 10.4.57: Log Purging in Failed SPBs			
34.	Section 10.4.59: Private Keys outside Secure Silicon			
35.	Section 10.4.61: Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability			
36.	Section 10.4.62: Use of Software Protection Methods			
37.	Section 10.4.64: D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection			
38.	Section 10.4.65: RSA Key Entropy			
39.	Section 10.4.66: Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy			
40.	Section 10.4.68: SPB 1 Firmware Modifications			
41.	Section 10.4.69: SPB1 Log Retention			
42.	Section 10.4.72: SPB Secure Silicon Requirements			
43.	Section 10.4.73: SPB Type 1 Battery Life			
44.	Section 10.4.74: Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert			
45.	Section 10.4.76: Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement			
46.	Section 10.4.78: Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements			
47.	Section 10.4.79: TLS RSA Requirement			

# Chapter 15. Digital Cinema Projector with MB Consolidated Test Sequence

## 15.1. Overview

The test sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test a d-cinema projector with an integrated Media Block (MB). The configuration and architecture of the system will vary, but the test sequence assumes that the system consists of at least a light processing system including electronic and optical components, a Media Block (containing a Security Manager, Media Decryptor, etc.), and a Screen Management Server (SMS). For the purpose of this test, the Test Operator may substitute a Theater Management Server (TMS) for the SMS if it implements the required functionality. Wherever a test procedure refers to an SMS, the equivalent TMS may also be used.

For the purpose of compliance testing as defined in this Chapter, the spatial resolution of the projector shall be no less than that of the Media Block.

Before performing the test sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 15.2. Projector with MB Test Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following four sequence procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 15.1. Security Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the one or two X.509 digital leaf certificates associated with the Security Manager depending if the Security Manager uses single or dual certificate implementation, respectively. Obtain the complete chain of signer certificates for each of the one or two leaf certificate, up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate independently each of the one or two chains using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 15.2. Screen Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the SMS and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
5.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 15.3. Projector Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
6.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the Type 2 SPB and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
7.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			



**Table 15.4. Power**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
9.	Record the published operating voltage of each power inlet in the Measured Data field. Connect power to the Test Subject as directed by the operating instructions. If the Test Subject does not automatically start when power is applied, follow the manufacturer's power-up instructions to start the system.	(data only)		

**Table 15.5. Operator Roles**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.9: SMS User Accounts. Record the available operator roles (names) and whether locally-defined accounts can be created. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.6. Screen Management System**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
11.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.10: SMS Operator Identification. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
12.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.11: SMS Identity and Certificate. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
13.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.1: Storage System Ingest Interface. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
14.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.2: Storage System Capacity. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
15.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.3: Storage System Redundancy. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
16.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.1.4: Storage System Performance. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
17.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.2: Show Playlist Creation. Record the result.	(data only)		
18.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.3: Show Playlist Format. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
19.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.5: Automation Control and Interfaces. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
20.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.6: Interrupt Free Playback. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
21.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.7: Artifact Free Transition of Image Format. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
22.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.8: Restarting Playback. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
23.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.12: Content Keys and TDL check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.7. KDM Ingest**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
24.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.1: KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
25.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.2: ETM IssueDate Field Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
26.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.3: Maximum Number of DCP Keys. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
27.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.4: Structure ID Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
28.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.5: Certificate Thumbprint Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
29.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.7: KeyInfo Field Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
30.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.8: KDM Malformations. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
31.	Perform the procedure given in Section 3.5.9: KDM Signature. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.8. Interface**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
32.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.1: Digital Audio Interfaces. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.9. Log Reporting**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
33.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.1: Log Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
34.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.6: Log Report Signature Validity. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
35.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.3: Log Sequence Numbers. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The procedures in the following table apply only to a device which implements features that allow it to supply keys or content to a remote SPB.

**Table 15.10. Log Reporting for Remote SPB Support**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
36.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.5: General Log System Failure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
37.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.1: SM Proxy of Log Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
38.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.2: SM Proxy of Security Operations Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
39.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.1: TLS Session Initiation. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
40.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.3: TLS Exception Logging. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
41.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.1: Auditorium Security Message Support. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
42.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.2: ASM Failure Behavior. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
43.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.3: ASM "RRP Invalid". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
44.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.4: ASM "GetTime". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
45.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.5: ASM "GetEventList". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
46.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.6: ASM "GetEventID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
47.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.7: ASM "LEKeyLoad". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
48.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.8: ASM "LEKeyQueryID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
49.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.9: ASM "LEKeyQueryAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
50.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.10: ASM "LEKeyPurgeID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
51.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.11: ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
52.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.12: ASM "GetProjCert". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
53.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.2: Log Records for Multiple SPBs. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
54.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.4: Log Collection by the SM. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
55.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.3: SM Proxy of Security ASM Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.11. Security Events**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
56.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.1: FrameSequencePlayed Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
57.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.2: CPLStart Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
58.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.3: CPLEnd Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
59.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.4: PayoutComplete Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
60.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.5: CPLCheck Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
61.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.6: KDMKeysReceived Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
62.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.7: KDMDeleted Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
63.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.6: SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
64.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.8: SPBClockAdjust Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
65.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.10: SPBSoftware Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
66.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.11: SPBSecurityAlert Event. Record the result.	(data only)		
67.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.9: SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events. Record the result.			
68.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.7: SPBOpen and SPBClose Events. Record the result.			

**Table 15.12. Essence Reproduction**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
69.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.5.2: Decoder Requirements. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
70.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.5.1: Playback of Image Only Material. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
71.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.1: Image Integrity Checking. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
72.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.2: Audio Sample Rate Conversion. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
73.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.3: Audio Delay Setup. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
74.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.6.4: Click Free Splicing of Audio Track Files. Record the result.	(data only)		
75.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.2: Sound Integrity Checking. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
76.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.6: Timed Text Decryption. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
77.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.1: Media Block Overlay. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
78.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.7.4: Default Timed Text Font. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
79.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.1: Projector Overlay. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Table 15.13. Media Block Security

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
80.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.4: Restriction of Keying to MD Type. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
81.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.5: Restriction of Keying to Valid CPLs. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
82.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.8: Content Key Extension, End of Engagement. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
83.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.9: ContentAuthenticator Element Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
84.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.10: KDM Date Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
85.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.11: KDM TDL Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
86.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.12: Maximum Number of DCP Keys. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
87.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.13: CPL Id Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
88.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.1: Clock Adjustment. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
89.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.2: SPB Type 1 Clock Battery. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
90.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.3: Clock Resolution. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The procedures in the following table apply only to a device which implements features that allow it to supply keys or content to a remote SPB.

**Table 15.14. Media Block Security for Remote SPB Support**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
91.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.7: SPB Integrity Fault Consequences. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
92.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.6: Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
93.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.2: Special Auditorium Situation Operations. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
94.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.3: LE Key Usage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
95.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.4: MB Link Encryption. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.15. Forensic Marking**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
96.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.1: FM Application Constraints. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
97.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.2: Granularity of FM Control. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
98.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.3: FM Payload. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
99.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.4: FM Audio Bypass. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
100.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.5: Selective Audio FM Control. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.16. Secure Processing Block Type 2**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
101.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.6: SPB2 Secure Silicon Field Replacement. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
102.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.1: Projector Physical Protection. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
103.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.7: Systems without Electronic Marriage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
104.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.2: Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
105.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.8: Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
106.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.3: Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
107.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.2: Projector Access Door. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 15.17. Image Processing**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
108.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.13: Projector Test Environment. Record the result.	(data only)		
109.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			



Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
110.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.4: Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion. Record the result.	(data only)		
111.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.5: White Point Luminance and Uniformity. Record the result.	(data only)		
112.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.6: White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity. Record the result.	(data only)		
113.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.7: Sequential Contrast. Record the result.	(data only)		
114.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.8: Intra-frame Contrast. Record the result.	(data only)		
115.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.9: Grayscale Tracking. Record the result.	(data only)		
116.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.10: Contouring. Record the result.	(data only)		
117.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.11: Transfer Function. Record the result.	(data only)		
118.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.12: Color Accuracy. Record the result.	(data only)		

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## 15.3. Projector with MB Design Review

For each requirement listed in the tables below, prove that the system design meets the requirement by identifying the software or hardware mechanism that implements the requirement and analyzing the design to assure that the requirement has been met. If a proof cannot be made, the design will be considered non-compliant with regard to the requirement. To perform this analysis the examiner will require access to exhibit documents (system design artifacts) such as schematic diagrams, implementation source code, unit test source code, state diagrams, design notes, etc. See Chapter 9: *FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB* and Chapter 10: *DCI Requirements Review* for more information.

For each requirement, the examiner must record the identifiers of the exhibits consulted in proving the requirement, including applicable version identifiers, section or sheet numbers, grid identifiers, etc., and the examiner must record *Pass* or *Fail* to indicate whether or not the requirement has been met by the design. The examiner may also record any notes relevant to interpreting the exhibits and to the determination of the compliance status.

The requirements in the following table apply only to the components of the system designated *Type 1 SPB*.

**Table 15.18. FIPS 140-2 Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
1.	Section 9.5.1: SM Operating Environment			
2.	Section 9.5.3: SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness			
3.	Section 9.5.4: Security Design Description Requirements			
4.	Section 9.5.6: SPB1 FIPS Requirements			
5.	Section 9.5.8: Asymmetric Key Generation			
6.	Section 9.5.9: Critical Security Parameter Protection			

The following requirement applies only to a Type 1 SPB device or module which implements features that allow it to supply keys or content to a remote SPB.

**Table 15.19. FIPS 140-2 Requirements for Remote SPB Support**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
7.	Section 9.5.2: LE Key Generation			

**Table 15.20. DCI DCSS Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
8.	Section 10.4.1: Theater System Reliability			
9.	Section 10.4.2: Theater System Storage Security			
10.	Section 10.4.3: Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities			
11.	Section 10.4.4: Security Entity Physical Protection			
12.	Section 10.4.5: Secure SMS-SM Communication			
13.	Section 10.4.6: Location of Security Manager			
14.	Section 10.4.8: SM Secure Communications			
15.	Section 10.4.9: Playback Preparation			
16.	Section 10.4.11: Prevention of Keying of Compromised SPBs			
17.	Section 10.4.12: SPB Authentication			

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
18.	Section 10.4.13: TLS Session Key Refreshes			
19.	Section 10.4.14: LE Key Issuance			
20.	Section 10.4.15: Maximum Key Validity Period			
21.	Section 10.4.16: KDM Purge upon Expiry			
22.	Section 10.4.17: Key Usage Time Window			
23.	Section 10.4.18: Projector Secure Silicon Device			
24.	Section 10.4.19: Access to Projector Image Signals			
25.	Section 10.4.20: Systems with Electronic Marriage			
26.	Section 10.4.21: Systems Without Electronic Marriage			
27.	Section 10.4.22: Clock Date-Time-Range			
28.	Section 10.4.23: Clock Setup			
29.	Section 10.4.24: Clock Stability			
30.	Section 10.4.25: Repair and Renewal of SPBs			
31.	Section 10.4.26: SPB2 Protected Devices			
32.	Section 10.4.27: Clock Continuity			
33.	Section 10.4.28: TLS Endpoints			
34.	Section 10.4.30: SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer			
35.	Section 10.4.33: TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition			
36.	Section 10.4.35: Implementation of Proprietary ITMs			
37.	Section 10.4.42: FM Algorithm General Requirements			
38.	Section 10.4.43: FM Insertion Requirements			
39.	Section 10.4.44: IFM Visual Transparency			
40.	Section 10.4.45: IFM Robustness			
41.	Section 10.4.46: AFM Inaudibility			
42.	Section 10.4.47: AFM Robustness			
43.	Section 10.4.48: FM Control Instance			
44.	Section 10.4.50: SE Log Authoring			
45.	Section 10.4.51: SPB Log Storage Requirements			
46.	Section 10.4.53: MB Log Storage Capabilities			
47.	Section 10.4.54: Logging for Standalone Systems			
48.	Section 10.4.55: Logging of Failed Procedures			
49.	Section 10.4.56: SPB Log Failure			
50.	Section 10.4.57: Log Purging in Failed SPBs			
51.	Section 10.4.58: MB Tasks			
52.	Section 10.4.59: Private Keys outside Secure Silicon			
53.	Section 10.4.60: Image Keys outside Secure Silicon			

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
54.	Section 10.4.61: Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability			
55.	Section 10.4.62: Use of Software Protection Methods			
56.	Section 10.4.63: TMS Role			
57.	Section 10.4.64: D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection			
58.	Section 10.4.65: RSA Key Entropy			
59.	Section 10.4.66: Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy			
60.	Section 10.4.67: MD Caching of Keys			
61.	Section 10.4.68: SPB 1 Firmware Modifications			
62.	Section 10.4.69: SPB1 Log Retention			
63.	Section 10.4.72: SPB Secure Silicon Requirements			
64.	Section 10.4.73: SPB Type 1 Battery Life			
65.	Section 10.4.74: Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert			
66.	Section 10.4.75: Log Collection for Married MB			
67.	Section 10.4.76: Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement			
68.	Section 10.4.78: Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements			
69.	Section 10.4.79: TLS RSA Requirement			
70.	Section 10.4.80: Dual Certificate SMS Authentication			

The following requirements apply only to a Type 1 SPB device or module which implements features that allow it to supply keys or content to a remote SPB.

**Table 15.21. DCI DCSS Requirements for Remote SPB Support**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
71.	Section 10.4.10: Special Auditorium Situation Detection			
72.	Section 10.4.31: Idempotency of ITM RRP			
73.	Section 10.4.32: RRP Synchronism			
74.	Section 10.4.34: RRP Broadcast Prohibition			
75.	Section 10.4.36: RRP Initiator			
76.	Section 10.4.39: RRP "Busy" and Unsupported Types			
77.	Section 10.4.40: RRP Operational Message Ports			
78.	Section 10.4.70: ASM Get Time Frequency			

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# Chapter 16. Link Decryptor/Encryptor Consolidated Test Sequence

## 16.1. Overview

The test sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test a Link Decryptor/Encryptor device, *i.e.* an image processor inserted between a Media Block and a Projector. The configuration and architecture of the device will vary, but the test sequence assumes that the system consists of a single Type 1 SPB with signal interfaces for images and ASM messages.

Before performing the test sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 16.2. LD/LE Test Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( *e.g.*, on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 16.1. Link Decryptor/Encryptor Certificate (LD/LE)**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the LD-LE and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 16.2. Power**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Record the published operating voltage of each power inlet in the Measured Data field. Connect power to the Test Subject as directed by the operating instructions. If the Test Subject does not automatically start when power is applied, follow the manufacturer's power-up instructions to start the system.	(data only)		

**Table 16.3. Interface**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
5.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.1: TLS Session Initiation. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
6.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.3: TLS Exception Logging. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
7.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.1: Auditorium Security Message Support. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.2: ASM Failure Behavior. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
9.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.4: ASM "GetTime". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.5: ASM "GetEventList". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
11.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.6: ASM "GetEventID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
12.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.7: ASM "LEKeyLoad". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
13.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.8: ASM "LEKeyQueryID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
14.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.9: ASM "LEKeyQueryAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
15.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.10: ASM "LEKeyPurgeID". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
16.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.11: ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
17.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.12: ASM "GetProjCert". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 16.4. Security Events**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
18.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.1: LinkOpened Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
19.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.2: LinkClosed Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
20.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.3: LinkException Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
21.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.4: LogTransfer Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
22.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.5: KeyTransfer Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
23.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.6: SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
24.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.8: SPBClockAdjust Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
25.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.10: SPBSoftware Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
26.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.2.11: SPBSecurityAlert Event. Record the result.	(data only)		

The procedures in the following table apply to log records retrieved via ASM.

**Table 16.5. Log Reporting**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
27.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.2.1: Log Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 16.6. Link Decryptor**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
28.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.2: LDB TLS Session Constraints. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
29.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.4: Remote SPB Clock Adjustment. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
30.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.3.2: SPB Type 1 Clock Battery. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
31.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.5: LDB Key Storage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
32.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.4.6: LDB Key Purging. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

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## 16.3. LD/LE Design Review

For each requirement listed in the tables below, prove that the system design meets the requirement by identifying the software or hardware mechanism that implements the requirement and analyzing the design to assure that the requirement has been met. If a proof cannot be made, the design will be considered non-compliant with regard to the requirement. To perform this analysis the examiner will require access to exhibit documents (system design artifacts) such as schematic diagrams, implementation source code, unit test source code, state diagrams, design notes, etc. See Chapter 9: *FIPS Requirements for a Type 1 SPB* and Chapter 10: *DCI Requirements Review* for more information.

For each requirement, the examiner must record the identifiers of the exhibits consulted in proving the requirement, including applicable version identifiers, section or sheet numbers, grid identifiers, etc., and the examiner must record *Pass* or *Fail* to indicate whether or not the requirement has been met by the design. The examiner may also record any notes relevant to interpreting the exhibits and to the determination of the compliance status.

**Table 16.7. FIPS 140-2 Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
1.	Section 9.5.2: LE Key Generation			
2.	Section 9.5.3: SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness			
3.	Section 9.5.4: Security Design Description Requirements			
4.	Section 9.5.6: SPB1 FIPS Requirements			
5.	Section 9.5.8: Asymmetric Key Generation			
6.	Section 9.5.9: Critical Security Parameter Protection			

**Table 16.8. DCI DCSS Requirements**

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
7.	Section 10.4.1: Theater System Reliability			
8.	Section 10.4.3: Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities			
9.	Section 10.4.4: Security Entity Physical Protection			
10.	Section 10.4.24: Clock Stability			
11.	Section 10.4.25: Repair and Renewal of SPBs			
12.	Section 10.4.27: Clock Continuity			
13.	Section 10.4.28: TLS Endpoints			
14.	Section 10.4.30: SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer			
15.	Section 10.4.31: Idempotency of ITM RRP			
16.	Section 10.4.32: RRP Synchronism			
17.	Section 10.4.33: TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition			
18.	Section 10.4.34: RRP Broadcast Prohibition			
19.	Section 10.4.35: Implementation of Proprietary ITMs			
20.	Section 10.4.36: RRP Initiator			
21.	Section 10.4.40: RRP Operational Message Ports			
22.	Section 10.4.50: SE Log Authoring			

Step	Requirement	Pass	Fail	Exhibit Identifiers
23.	Section 10.4.51: SPB Log Storage Requirements			
24.	Section 10.4.52: Remote SPB Log Storage Requirements			
25.	Section 10.4.54: Logging for Standalone Systems			
26.	Section 10.4.55: Logging of Failed Procedures			
27.	Section 10.4.56: SPB Log Failure			
28.	Section 10.4.57: Log Purging in Failed SPBs			
29.	Section 10.4.59: Private Keys outside Secure Silicon			
30.	Section 10.4.61: Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability			
31.	Section 10.4.62: Use of Software Protection Methods			
32.	Section 10.4.64: D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection			
33.	Section 10.4.65: RSA Key Entropy			
34.	Section 10.4.66: Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy			
35.	Section 10.4.68: SPB 1 Firmware Modifications			
36.	Section 10.4.69: SPB1 Log Retention			
37.	Section 10.4.72: SPB Secure Silicon Requirements			
38.	Section 10.4.73: SPB Type 1 Battery Life			
39.	Section 10.4.74: Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert			
40.	Section 10.4.79: TLS RSA Requirement			

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# Chapter 17. Digital Cinema Server Consolidated Confidence Sequence

## 17.1. Overview

The test sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test for confidence a stand-alone d-cinema server. The configuration and architecture of the Test Subject will vary, but the test sequence assumes that the system consists of at least a Media Block (MB, containing a Security Manager, Media Decryptor, Link Encryptor, etc.) and a Screen Management Server (SMS). For the purpose of this test, the Test Operator may substitute a Theater Management Server (TMS) for the SMS if it implements the required functionality. Wherever a test procedure refers to an SMS, the equivalent TMS may also be used. A complete Server Test Sequence report containing no failures is a prerequisite to execution of this sequence.

Before performing the test sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject and the original CTP compliance test conducted per Chapter 13: *Digital Cinema Server Consolidated Test Sequence*. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 17.2. Server Confidence Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 17.1. Security Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the one or two X.509 digital leaf certificates associated with the Security Manager depending if the Security Manager uses single or dual certificate implementation, respectively. Obtain the complete chain of signer certificates for each of the one or two leaf certificate, up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
	Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 17.2. Screen Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the SMS and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
5.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 17.3. Screen Management System**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
6.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.7: Artifact Free Transition of Image Format. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
7.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.11: SMS Identity and Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 17.4. Log Reporting**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.3: SM Proxy of Security ASM Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 17.5. Security Events**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
9.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.6: KDMKeysReceived Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 17.6. Media Block Security**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.7: SPB Integrity Fault Consequences. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
11.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.8: Content Key Extension, End of Engagement. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
12.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.11: KDM TDL Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
13.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.4: MB Link Encryption. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 17.7. Forensic Marking**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
14.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.3: FM Payload. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

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# Chapter 18. Digital Cinema Projector Consolidated Confidence Sequence

## 18.1. Overview

The confidence sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test a stand-alone d-cinema projector. The configuration and architecture of the projector will vary, but the confidence sequence assumes that the system consists of at least a Link Decryptor Block (LD) and a light processing system including electronic and optical components.

Before performing the confidence sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 18.2. Projector Confidence Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( *e.g.*, on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 18.1. Projector Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the Type 2 SPB and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 18.2. Link Decryptor Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the Link Decryptor and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
5.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
6.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 18.3. Secure Processing Block Type 2**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
7.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.2: Projector Access Door. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 18.4. Link Decryptor**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.2: Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
9.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.3: Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 18.5. Image Processing**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			



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# Chapter 19. Digital Cinema Projector with MB Consolidated Confidence Sequence

## 19.1. Overview

The test sequence defined in this chapter is intended to be used to test a d-cinema projector with an integrated Media Block (MB). The configuration and architecture of the system will vary, but the test sequence assumes that the system consists of at least a light processing system including electronic and optical components, a Media Block (containing a Security Manager, Media Decryptor, etc.), and a Screen Management Server (SMS). For the purpose of this test, the Test Operator may substitute a Theater Management Server (TMS) for the SMS if it implements the required functionality. Wherever a test procedure refers to an SMS, the equivalent TMS may also be used.

Before performing the test sequence provided below, the Test Operator should read and understand the documentation provided with the Test Subject. If adequate documentation is not available, a Test Subject Representative should be available to provide assistance during the test session.

## 19.2. Projector with MB Confidence Sequence

For each of the tables below, follow the instructions in the Procedure column, referring to the appropriate test procedure where referenced. Indicate the status of the test in the Pass, Fail, and Measured Data columns as instructed. Any marks in greyed-out fields indicate a test failure. The Test Operator may record any additional observations in the Measured Data Field or on a separate list of notes.

The certificates required by the following four sequence procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 19.1. Security Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
1.	Obtain the one or two X.509 digital leaf certificates associated with the Security Manager depending if the Security Manager uses single or dual certificate implementation, respectively. Obtain the complete chain of signer certificates for each of the one or two leaf certificate, up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
2.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
3.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the			

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
	Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 19.2. Screen Manager Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
4.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the SMS and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
5.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The certificates required by the following three procedures are to be obtained directly from the manufacturer using a trusted channel ( e.g., on a USB memory device received in-person). These certificates will be compared later to those obtained electronically from the Test Subject.

**Table 19.3. Projector Certificate**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
6.	Obtain the X.509 digital certificate associated with the Type 2 SPB and the complete chain of signer certificates up to and including the manufacturer's self-signed root certificate. Validate each certificate using the procedures Section 2.1.1: Basic Certificate Structure through Section 2.1.16: Signature Validation. Check Fail in this row if any procedure fails on any certificate, otherwise check Pass.			
7.	Using the certificates obtained in the previous step, validate the chain using the procedure in Section 2.1.17: Certificate Chains. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
8.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.1.1: SPB Digital Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 19.4. Screen Management System**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
9.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.7: Artifact Free Transition of Image Format. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
10.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.11: SMS Identity and Certificate. Record the serial number of the Test Subject in the Measured Data field. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
11.	Perform the procedure given in Section 8.2.12: Content Keys and TDL check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The procedures in the following table apply only to a device which implements features that allow it to supply keys or content to a remote SPB.

**Table 19.5. Log Reporting for Remote SPB Support**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
12.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.2.2.7: ASM "LEKeyLoad". Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
13.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.3.3.3: SM Proxy of Security ASM Events. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 19.6. Security Events**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
14.	Perform the procedure given in Section 5.4.1.6: KDMKeysReceived Event. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 19.7. Media Block Security**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
15.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.8: Content Key Extension, End of Engagement. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
16.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.11: KDM TDL Check. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

The procedures in the following table apply only to a device which implements features that allow it to supply keys or content to a remote SPB.

**Table 19.8. Media Block Security for Remote SPB Support**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
17.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.6: Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
18.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.1.7: SPB Integrity Fault Consequences. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
19.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.2.4: MB Link Encryption. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 19.9. Forensic Marking**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
20.	Perform the procedure given in Section 6.4.3: FM Payload. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 19.10. Secure Processing Block Type 2**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
21.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.2: Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
22.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.8: Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
23.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.3.3: Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			
24.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.2.2: Projector Access Door. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

**Table 19.11. Image Processing**

Step	Procedure	Pass	Fail	Measured Data
25.	Perform the procedure given in Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure. Check Pass in this row if the procedure succeeds, otherwise check Fail.			

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# Appendix A. Test Materials

## A.1. Overview

To facilitate consistent testing of d-cinema equipment, a set of reference files has been produced to be used as directed in the respective test procedures. These materials are described in detail in this Appendix with the intention that the materials can be re-created from the descriptions and used to achieve testing results equivalent to those achieved with the original reference files.

The test material described below consists of digital certificates, Key Delivery Messages (KDM) and D-Cinema Packages (DCP). A DCP can be further deconstructed as a set of Track Files, Composition Playlists and related file descriptions. Some Track Files will be encrypted.

Because the identity of a Test Subject cannot be known until the device has been manufactured, it is not possible to create reference KDM files in advance. It is therefore necessary to divide the test material into two categories: common-use reference material and per-device reference material. Common-use reference material can be created once and used without limit on any compliant system. Per-device reference material must be created for each Test Subject, with foreknowledge of the date and time of the test session.

Two additional categories of reference material exist: compliant and intentionally non-compliant. Most of the material will be "golden" reference files, intended to be entirely compliant with the relevant specifications. Other files, however, will be intentionally broken to allow testing of error detection and recovery mechanisms.

## A.2. Images


### A.2.1. Introduction

This section defines a set of MXF picture track files. For each track file, a description is given which details the images encoded in the file. The image track files will be combined with sound files to make complete compositions (see Section A.4).

### A.2.2. Sync Count

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	sync_count_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing five seconds (120 frames) of plain frames followed by a ten second countdown and five seconds of plain frames. The countdown consists of ten identical one-second count segments, from 9-0. Each count segment consists of twenty-four frames of the respective digit for the count period. The first frame of each count segment will have a punch set to indicate sync. The example image below shows the first frame of the fourth count period, which contains the number 6 (six).
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:20:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.1. Sync Count



## A.2.3. Sync Count (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	sync_count_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file, contents are identical to Section A.2.2: Sync Count.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:20:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.4. 4K Sync Count

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	4K_sync_count_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	4K Resolution MXF track file, contents are identical to Section A.2.2: Sync Count.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:20:00
meta: PixelArraySize	4096x2160
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.5. Sync Count, 48fps

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	sync_count_48fps_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	48fps MXF track file containing five seconds (240 frames) of plain frames followed by a ten second countdown and five seconds of plain frames. The countdown consists of ten identical one- second count segments, from 9-0. Each count segment consists of forty-eight frames of the respective digit for the count period. The first two frames of each count segment will have a punch set to indicate sync.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:20:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	48/1

## A.2.6. Channel I.D. 5.1

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	channel_id_51_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing five seconds (120 frames) of plain frames followed by a thirty second audio channel identification set and five seconds of plain frames. The audio channel identification set consists of six identical five second identifier segments having the following consecutively displayed labels: Left, Center, Right, Left Surround, Right Surround, LFE. Each channel identifier segment consists of five seconds (120 frames) of the respective label.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:40:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1


## A.2.7. Channel I.D. 1-16

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	channel_id_01-16_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing two seconds (48 frames) of plain frames followed by an eighty second audio channel identification set and two seconds of plain frames. The audio channel identification set consists of sixteen identical five-second identifier segments displaying consecutively numbered channel labels: 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. through 16. Each channel identifier segment consists of five seconds (120 frames) of the respective label.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:01:24:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.8. "NIST" 2K Test Pattern

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing the "DCI NIST" pattern created during original DCI research project. The pattern (shown below) includes geometric dimensions, color chips, dimensional patterns, a grayscale gradient and full-color photographic images. The track file contains 30 seconds (720 frames) of this image. <i>Note: This image was obtained during the initial DCI study effort. It is used in the CTP because it is familiar to many in the d-cinema industry. The edge offset reticles are not accurate, however they are not used by any CTP procedure.</i>
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.2. "NIST" 2K Test Pattern




### A.2.9. "NIST" 4K Test Pattern

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	4K_nist_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	4K Resolution MXF track file containing the "DCI NIST" pattern as shown in Section A.2.8: "NIST" 2K Test Pattern. The track file contains 30 seconds (720 frames) of this image. <i>Note: This image was obtained during the initial DCI study effort. It is used in the CTP because it is familiar to many in the d-cinema industry. The edge offset reticles are not accurate, however they are not used by any CTP procedure.</i>
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	4096x2160
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.10. Black to Gray Step Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	gray_step_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing five seconds (120 frames) of a chart showing all gray step values for the Black to Gray values in Section 7.5.9: Grayscale Tracking. This is followed by 1 minute of each of the 10 values as a full frame.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:11:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.3. Black to Gray Step Series



### A.2.11. Black to White Step Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	white_step_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing five seconds (120 frames) of a chart showing all gray step values for the Black to White values in Section 7.5.9: Grayscale Tracking. This is followed by 1 minute of each of the 10 values as a full frame.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:11:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.4. Black to White Step Series



## A.2.12. Color Accuracy Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	color_accuracy_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing five seconds (120 frames) of a chart showing all color values for the test in Section 7.5.12: Color Accuracy. This is followed by 1 minute of each of the 12 color values as a full frame.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:12:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1



Figure A.5. Color Accuracy Series



## A.2.13. 4K Color Accuracy Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	4K_color_accuracy_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing the 4K version of the Color Accuracy Series shown in Section A.2.12: Color Accuracy Series.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	12:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	4096x2160
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.14. Black (Empty Frame)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	black_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 30 seconds (720 frames) of black (all pixels zero).
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1


**A.2.15. White (White Frame)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	white_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 30 seconds (720 frames) of white.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.16. Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_checkerboard_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing alternating checkerboard patterns and an aiming target.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.6. Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence



### A.2.17. Sequential Contrast Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_sequential_contrast_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing black, white and aiming target frames.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.18. 2K Picture Track File, Maximum Bitrate

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_max_bitrate_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing a count to check synchronization between picture and sound, 10 minutes (14,400 frames) of a frame that has a large file size (1,281,818 bytes) and a second sync count.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:10:40:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1


## A.2.19. 4K Picture Track File, Maximum Bitrate

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	4K_max_bitrate_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing a count to check synchronization between picture and sound, 10 minutes (14,400 frames) of a frame that has a large file size (1,299,183 bytes) and a second sync count.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:10:40:00
meta: PixelArraySize	4096x2160
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.20. DCI Numbered Frame Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	frame_num_burn_in_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a sequence of the "DCI NIST" frame that has an overlay of two identical visible number fields. The five digit field contains 00000 in the first frame of the file, with each consecutive frame increasing the count by 1. The last frame will be numbered 07199.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:05:00:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.7. DCI Numbered Frame Sequence



### A.2.21. DCI Numbered Frame Sequence (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	frame_num_burn_in_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a sequence of the "DCI NIST" frame that has an overlay of two identical visible number fields. The five digit field contains 00000 in the first frame of the file, with each consecutive frame increasing the count by 1. The last frame will be numbered 07199.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:05:00:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.22. DCI Scope Transition Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	transition-scope_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a sequence of Scope format (A.R. 2.39:1) plain frames, and the label "Scope Transition Test Sequence (2048 x 858)". Each of the first 24 frames of the sequence have two identical overlays displaying a number from 001 through 024. Each of the last 24 frames of the sequence have two identical overlays displaying a number from 024 through 001.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.23. DCI Flat Transition Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	transition-flat_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a sequence of Flat format (A.R. 1.85:1) plain frames, and the label "Flat Transition Test Sequence (1998 x 1024)". Each of the first 24 frames of the sequence have two identical overlays displaying a number from 001 through 024. Each of the last 24 frames of the sequence have two identical overlays displaying a number from 024 through 001.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	1998x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.24. StEM 2K

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing the complete DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.25. StEM 2K (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing the complete DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.26. StEM 2K Multi-Reel A (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_A_ct.mxf
description:	A set of encrypted MXF track files containing 2k image essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1



## A.2.27. StEM 2K Multi-Reel B (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_B_ct.mxf
description:	A set of encrypted MXF track files containing 2k image essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie. Identical to StEM_2K_j2c_multi_A_ct
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.28. StEM 2K Multi-Reel A

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_A_pt.mxf
description:	A set of plaintext MXF track files containing 2k image essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.29. StEM 2K Multi-Reel B**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_B_pt.mxf
description:	A set of plaintext MXF track files containing 2k image essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie. Identical to StEM_2K_j2c_multi_A_pt
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.30. StEM 2K 48 fps**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	StEM_2K_48fps_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a 48 fps DCI StEM Mini Movie clip.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:51:46
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	48/1

**A.2.31. pixel\_structure\_N\_2k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_N_2k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.32. pixel\_structure\_S\_2k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_S_2k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.33. pixel\_structure\_E\_2k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_E_2k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.34. pixel\_structure\_W\_2k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_W_2k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.35. pixel\_structure\_N\_4k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_N_4k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.36. pixel\_structure\_S\_4k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_S_4k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.37. pixel\_structure\_E\_4k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_E_4k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1


**A.2.38. pixel\_structure\_W\_4k\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	pixel_structure_W_4k_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:10:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.39. FM Constraints Begin (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	fm_constraints_begin_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "Begin Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.8. FM Constraints Begin (Encrypted)



#### A.2.40. FM Constraints Begin (Plaintext)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	fm_constraints_begin_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Plaintext MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "Begin Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.41. FM Constraints End (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	fm_constraints_end_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "End Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.42. FM Constraints End (Plaintext)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	fm_constraints_end_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Plaintext MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "End Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.43. 2K FM Control Granularity Begin (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_begin_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "Begin Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.44. 2K FM Control Granularity Begin

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_begin_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "Begin Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1



### A.2.45. 2K FM Control Granularity End (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_end_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "End Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.46. 2K FM Control Granularity End

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_end_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "End Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.47. 2K FM Payload Begin (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_fm_payload_begin_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF tack file with 10 seconds of slate reading "Begin Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.48. 2K FM Payload End (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	2K_fm_payload_end_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "End Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.49. Binary Audio FM Bypass

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	binary_audio_fm_bypass_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Plaintext MXF track file with 10 minutes of slate reading "Binary Audio FM Bypass".
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:10:00:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.50. Selective FM Begin

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Plaintext MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "Begin Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.51. Selective FM End

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	selective_fm_end_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	Plaintext MXF track file with 10 seconds of slate reading "End Detection" and 5 seconds of black.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:15:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.52. Timed Text Example with Missing Font**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF text
filename:	std_ctp_text_no_font_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing timed text using an OpenType font.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-5
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	The font shall not be present in the track file.
meta: Duration	00:01:00:00
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.53. DCI\_gradient\_step\_s\_white\_j2c\_pt**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	DCI_gradient_step_s_white_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 6.5.2: Decoder Requirements for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:16:16
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

Figure A.9. DCI\_gradient\_step\_s\_white\_j2c\_pt



## A.2.54. DCI\_gradient\_step\_s\_color\_j2c\_pt

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	DCI_gradient_step_s_color_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	See Section 6.5.2: Decoder Requirements for description.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:01:40:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.55. Timed Text Example with Font

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF text
filename:	std_ctp_text_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing multi-line timed text using an OpenType font.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-5, S428-7
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:01:00:00
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.56. Timed Text Example with PNG

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF text
filename:	std_ctp_text_png_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing timed text using PNG images.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-5
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:01:00:00
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.2.57. Sync Count Text

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF text
filename:	sync_count_tt_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing timed text using a font and images.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-5, S428-7
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:22:00
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.58. Sync Count Text (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF text
filename:	sync_count_tt_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing timed text using a font and images.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-5
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:00:22:00
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.59. subtitle background**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	subtitle_background_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-4, S422
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:01:00:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x858
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.2.60. Plain\_Frame\_nosub\_j2c\_ct**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	Plain_Frame_nosub_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing ...
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, RP431-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:30:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.61. m01 Picture Frame Out Of Order (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	m01_pict_frame_oo_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing the first 5 seconds (120 frames) of the NIST test pattern. The order of the first two frames has been deliberately swapped.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4, S429-6
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	The first two image frames of the track file have been swapped.
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.62. m03 Sound Splice

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	m03_snd_splc_j2c_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing one minute (1440 frames) of plain frames with the label "m03 Sound Splice Test".
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Duration	00:01:00:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1



### A.2.63. m05 Picture Track File With Wrong TrackFile ID (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	m05_pict_wrong_file_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file in which the integrity pack of the 7th frame has the TrackFile ID replaced with a different value.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1
meta: CiphertextHeader	yes

### A.2.64. m09 Picture track file with bad HMAC (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	m09_pict_bad_hmac_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	Picture track file in which one of the HMAC values for a single frame has been changed.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	The file contains a replacement EKLV packet for the seventh frame (index 6). The replacement packet is taken from another track file having a different PackageUID but encrypted with the same symmetric key.
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.2.65. m11 Picture With Bad Check Value (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF j2c
filename:	m11_pict_bad_chuk_j2c_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing one EKL V packet encrypted for another file.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: PixelArraySize	2048x1080
meta: EditRate	24/1

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## A.3. Sound

### A.3.1. Introduction

This section defines a set of MXF sound track files. For each track file, a description is given which details the sounds encoded in the file. The sound track files will be combined with image files to make complete compositions (see Section A.4).

### A.3.2. Sync Count 5.1

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	sync_count_51_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing six channels of audio. Channels 1,2,4,5 and 6 are silent. Channel 3 (Center) contains five seconds (120 frames) of silence followed by a ten second countdown and five seconds of silence. The countdown consists of ten identical one-second count segments. Each count segment consists of one frame (2000 samples) encoding of a 1 kHz sine wave at -20 dBFS, followed by 23 frames of silence.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	00:20:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.3. Sync Count 5.1 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	sync_count_51_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file, contents are identical to Section A.3.2: Sync Count 5.1.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:20:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.4. Sync Count 5.1 48fps

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	sync_count_51_48fps_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing six channels of audio. Channels 1,2,4,5 and 6 are silent. Channel 3 (Center) contains five seconds (240 frames) of silence followed by a ten second countdown and five seconds of silence. The countdown consists of ten identical one-second count segments. Each count segment consists of two frames (2000 samples) encoding of a 1 kHz sine wave at -20 dBFS, followed by 46 frames of silence.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	00:20:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	48/1

### A.3.5. Channel I.D. 5.1

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	channel_id_51_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a repeated voice announcement of the channel label of the respective channel: Left (Channel 1), Center (Channel 3), Right (Channel 2), Left Surround (Channel 5), Right Surround (Channel 6), LFE (Channel 4). Voice announcements are sequential, in the order given here.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	00:40:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.6. Channel I.D. 1-16

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	channel_id_01-16_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing a sequential voice announcement of the channel number of the respective channel.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Duration	01:24:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.7. Pink Noise, 16 Channels

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	pink_noise_1-16_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	Pink ( $1/f$ ) noise at -20 dBFS on sixteen channels, band limited to 22 KHz. Identical, sample-aligned signal must be used on all channels.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Duration	00:30:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.8. Pink Noise, 16 Channels, 96 kHz**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	pink_noise_1-16_96khz_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	Pink ( $1/f$ ) noise at -20 dBFS on sixteen channels, band limited to 44 KHz. Identical, sample-aligned signal must be used on all channels.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Duration	00:30:00
meta: SampleRate	96000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.9. Pink Noise, 16 Channels, 96 kHz (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	pink_noise_1-16_96khz_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing pink ( $1/f$ ) noise at -20 dBFS on sixteen channels, band limited to 44 KHz. Identical, sample-aligned signal must be used on all channels.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:30:00
meta: SampleRate	96000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.10. Maximum Bitrate, 16 Channels, 96 kHz (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	max_bitrate_1-16_96khz_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF sound track file containing a count to check synchronization between picture and sound, 10 minutes of pink ( $1/f$ ) noise at -20 dBFS on all sixteen channels, band limited to 44 KHz and a second sync count.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:10:40:00
meta: SampleRate	96000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.11. 1 kHz Sine Wave

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	1_khz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 1 kHz sine wave on sixteen channels at -20 dBFS.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Duration	02:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.12. 1 kHz Sine Wave, 16 Channels 96kHz**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	1_khz_sine_wave_96khz_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 96kHz sample rate 1 kHz sine wave on sixteen channels at -20 dBFS.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	16
meta: Duration	02:00:00
meta: SampleRate	96000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.13. 400 hz sine wave**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 400 Hz sine wave on six channels at -20 dBfs (dB Full Scale). LFE channel is full-range.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	02:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1



**A.3.14. 400 hz sine wave (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing 400 Hz sine wave on six channels at -20 dBfs (dB Full Scale). LFE channel is full-range.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	02:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.15. 400 hz sine wave, WTF (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing 400 Hz sine wave on sixteen channels at -20 dBfs (dB Full Scale). LFE channel is full-range.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	WTF
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	02:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.16. Silence, 5.1**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing six channels of silence.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	02:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.17. Silence, 5.1, 15 minutes**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	black_long_51_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing six channels of silence.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	00:15:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.18. Silence, 5.1, 15 minutes (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	black_long_51_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing six channels of silence.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:15:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.19. StEM 5.1 Sound**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_51_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.20. StEM 5.1 Sound (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.21. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel A (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_51_pcm_multi_A_ct.mxf
description:	A set of encrypted MXF track files containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.22. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel B (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_51_pcm_multi_B_ct.mxf
description:	A set of encrypted MXF track files containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie. Identical to StEM_51_pcm_multi_A_ct
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.23. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel A

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_51_pcm_multi_A_pt.mxf
description:	A set of plaintext MXF track files containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.24. StEM 5.1 Sound Multi-Reel B

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_51_pcm_multi_B_pt.mxf
description:	A set of plaintext MXF track files containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie. Identical to StEM_51_pcm_multi_A_pt
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: SegmentCount	128
meta: SegmentDuration	00:05:00
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.25. StEM 48fps 5.1 Sound

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	StEM_48fps_51_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing 5.1 sound essence for the 48 fps DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Duration	00:51:46
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	48/1

### A.3.26. FM StEM 5.1 Sound (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	fm_StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file for FM testing containing 5.1 sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.27. FM StEM WTF Sound

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_pt.mxf
description:	MXF track file for FM testing containing WTF sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	WTF
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.28. FM StEM WTF Sound (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file for FM testing containing WTF sound essence for the DCI StEM Mini Movie.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	WTF
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	11:31:21
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

**A.3.29. Binary Audio FM Bypass WTF Sound (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	binary_audio_fm_bypass_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Encrypted MXF track file for FM testing containing known binary audio content on 16 channels of WTF format sound essence.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S429-6, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: SoundFormat	WTF
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	10:00:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1



### A.3.30. m02 Sound Frame Out Of Order (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	m02_snd_frame_oo_51_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Malformed, encrypted MXF track file containing six channels of 400Hz sine waves.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	The KLV packets containing edit units 01 and 02 are swapped.
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.31. m04 Sound Track File With Wrong TrackFile ID (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	m04_sndtk_wrong_file_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file in which the integrity pack of the 7th frame has the TrackFile ID replaced with a different value.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.32. m10 Sound track file with bad HMAC (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	m10_snd_bad_hmac_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	Sound track file in which one of the HMAC values for a single frame has been changed.
conforms to:	S377-1, S429-3, S382
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	The file contains a replacement EKLv packet for the seventh frame (index 6). The replacement packet is taken from another track file having a different PackageUID but encrypted with the same symmetric key.
meta: SoundFormat	5.1
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: SampleRate	48000
meta: EditRate	24/1

### A.3.33. m12 Sound Track File With Bad Check Value (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	MXF pcm
filename:	m12_snd_bad_chuk_pcm_ct.mxf
description:	MXF track file containing one EKLv packet encrypted for another file.
conforms to:	S377-1, S422M, S429-3, S429-4
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None
meta: Encryption	AES-128
meta: Duration	00:00:05:00
meta: EditRate	24/1

## A.4. D-Cinema Packages

### A.4.1. Introduction

This section defines a set of D-Cinema Compositions and D-Cinema Packages. The Compositions depend upon the track files created in Section A.2 and Section A.3. The Packages contain the Compositions for ingest.

### A.4.2. DCI 2K Sync Test

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_sync_test.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_j2c_pt.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.3. DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_sync_test_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_j2c_ct.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.4. DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	sync_test_with_subs.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_with_subs_j2c_pt.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_pt.mxf, sync_count_tt_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.5. DCI 2K Sync test with Subtitles (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	sync_test_with_subs_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_with_subs_j2c_ct.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_ct.mxf, sync_count_tt_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.6. DCI 2K Sync Test (48fps)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	sync_test_48fps.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_48fps_j2c_pt.mxf, sync_count_51_48fps_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None
meta: EditRate	48/1

### A.4.7. 4K Sync Test

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	4K_sync_test.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	4K_sync_count_j2c_pt.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.8. DCI 5.1 Channel Identification

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	channel_id_51_pt.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	channel_id_51_j2c_pt.mxf, channel_id_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.9. DCI 1-16 Numbered Channel Identification

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	channel_id_01-16.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	channel_id_01-16_j2c_pt.mxf, channel_id_01-16_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.10. DCI NIST Frame with silence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	nist_pattern_black_audio.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.11. 4K DCI NIST Frame with silence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	4K_nist_pattern.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	4K_nist_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.12. DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	nist_pattern_pink_noise.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, pink_noise_1-16_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.13. DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	nist_pattern_1k.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, 1_khz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.14. DCI NIST Frame with Pink Noise (96 kHz)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	nist_pattern_pink_noise_96k.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, pink_noise_1-16_96khz_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.15. DCI NIST Frame with 1 kHz tone (-20 dB fs, 96kHz)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	nist_pattern_1k_96k.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, 1_khz_sine_wave_96khz_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.16. DCI NIST Frame no sound files

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	nist_pattern_no_audio.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.17. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	frame_num_burn_in.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	frame_num_burn_in_j2c_pt.mxf, black_long_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.18. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	frame_num_burn_in_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	frame_num_burn_in_j2c_ct.mxf, black_long_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.19. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Flat)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	frame_count_flat_2_reels.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	transition-flat_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.20. DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Scope)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	frame_count_scope_2_reels.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	transition-scope_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.21. DCI 2K StEM**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_pt.cpl.xml
description:	A plaintext composition consisting of the StEM 2K image and 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_pt.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.22. DCI 2K StEM (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.23. DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_sequence_pt.cpl.xml
description:	A plaintext composition consisting of six (6) reels. Each reel is composed of the StEM 2K image and 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_pt.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.24. DCI 2K StEM Test Sequence (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_sequence_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of six (6) reels. Each reel is composed of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None



### A.4.25. DCI 2K 48fps StEM

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_48fps_pt.cpl.xml
description:	A plaintext composition consisting of the StEM 2K 48 fps image and 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_48fps_j2c_pt.mxf, StEM_48fps_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.26. 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_128_a_reels_pt.cpl.xml
description:	A plaintext composition consisting of one hundred and twenty eight (128) reels. Each reel is composed of part of the plaintext StEM 2K image and plaintext 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_A_pt, StEM_51_pcm_multi_A_pt
malformations:	None

### A.4.27. 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_128_b_reels_pt.cpl.xml
description:	A plaintext composition consisting of one hundred and twenty eight (128) reels. Each reel is composed of part of the plaintext StEM 2K image and plaintext 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_B_pt, StEM_51_pcm_multi_B_pt
malformations:	None

### A.4.28. 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_128_a_reels_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of one hundred and twenty eight (128) reels. Each reel is composed of part of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_A_ct, StEM_51_pcm_multi_A_ct
malformations:	None

### A.4.29. 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_128_b_reels_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of one hundred and twenty eight (128) reels. Each reel is composed of part of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_B_ct, StEM_51_pcm_multi_B_ct
malformations:	None

### A.4.30. 64 Reel Composition, 1 Second Reels (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_StEM_64_1_second_reels_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of sixty four (64) reels, each with a duration of 1 second. Each reel is composed of part of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_multi_C_ct, StEM_51_pcm_multi_C_ct
malformations:	None

### A.4.31. 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_fm_constraints_ct.cpl.xml
description:	A composition consisting of FM testing instructions and both encrypted and plaintext StEM 2K image and 16 channel WTF format sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	fm_constraints_begin_j2c_pt.mxf, fm_constraints_begin_j2c_ct.mxf, fm_constraints_end_j2c_pt.mxf, fm_constraints_end_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_pt.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_pt.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_pt.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.32. 2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_no_fm.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 16 channel WTF format sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_begin_j2c_ct.mxf, 2K_fm_control_granularity_end_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.33. 2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_image_only_fm.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing the FM encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 16 channel WTF format sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_begin_j2c_ct.mxf, 2K_fm_control_granularity_end_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.34. 2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_sound_only_fm.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 16 channel WTF format sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_begin_j2c_ct.mxf, 2K_fm_control_granularity_end_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.35. 2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_image_and_sound_fm.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 16 channel WTF format sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_begin_j2c_ct.mxf, 2K_fm_control_granularity_end_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.36. 2K FM Payload (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_fm_payload_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition for FM detection containing the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 16 channel WTF format sound track files.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	2K_fm_payload_begin_j2c_ct.mxf, 2K_fm_payload_end_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf, StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.37. Binary Audio Forensic Marking Bypass Test (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	binary_audio_fm_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted 48 kHz sound track file with 16 channels of audio in WTF format.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	binary_audio_fm_bypass_j2c_pt, binary_audio_fm_bypass_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

### A.4.38. Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	selective_audio_fm_all-fm_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted sound track file with 16 channels of audio.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt, selective_fm_end_j2c_pt, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct, StEM_2K_j2c_pt, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

### A.4.39. Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	selective_audio_fm_no-fm_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted sound track file with 16 channels of audio.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt, selective_fm_end_j2c_pt, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct, StEM_2K_j2c_pt, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

### A.4.40. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	selective_audio_fm_6ch_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted sound track file with 16 channels of audio.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt, selective_fm_end_j2c_pt, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct, StEM_2K_j2c_pt, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

#### A.4.41. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	selective_audio_fm_8ch_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted sound track file with 16 channels of audio.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt, selective_fm_end_j2c_pt, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct, StEM_2K_j2c_pt, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

#### A.4.42. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	selective_audio_fm_10ch_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted sound track file with 16 channels of audio.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt, selective_fm_end_j2c_pt, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct, StEM_2K_j2c_pt, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

#### A.4.43. Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	selective_audio_fm_17ch_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition containing an encrypted sound track file with 16 channels of audio.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	selective_fm_begin_j2c_pt, selective_fm_end_j2c_pt, 400_hz_sine_wave_wtf_pcm_ct, StEM_2K_j2c_pt, fm_StEM_wtf_pcm_ct
malformations:	None

#### A.4.44. 2K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	2K_max_bitrate_ct.cpl.xml
description:	Encrypted composition containing picture and sound track files of the maximum allowable bitrate.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	2K_max_bitrate_j2c_ct.mxf, max_bitrate_1-16_96khz_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.45. 4K DCI Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	4K_max_bitrate_ct.cpl.xml
description:	Encrypted composition containing picture and sound track files of the maximum allowable bitrate.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	4K_max_bitrate_j2c_ct.mxf, max_bitrate_1-16_96khz_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.46. End of Engagement - Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	holdover_long_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition with duration of 6 hours and 11 minutes.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.47. End of Engagement - Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	holdover_short_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition with duration of 5 hours and 59 minutes and 30 seconds.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.48. Multi-line Subtitle Test**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	multiline-caption.cpl.xml
description:	Black background with multiple-line subtitles.
conforms to:	S428-7
prerequisites:	subtitle_background_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf, std_ctp_text_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.49. Multi-line PNG Subtitle Test**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	multiline-caption-png.cpl.xml
description:	Black background with multiple-line subtitles using PNG subpictures.
conforms to:	S428-7
prerequisites:	subtitle_background_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf, std_ctp_text_png_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.50. Subtitle Test Part 1**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	fox_test_with_subs-part_1.cpl.xml
description:	Fox Subtitle Test Reel, Part 1, version 11.
conforms to:	S429-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.4.51. Subtitle Test Part 2**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	fox_test_with_subs-part_2.cpl.xml
description:	Fox Subtitle Test Reel, Part 2, version 11.
conforms to:	S429-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None



### A.4.52. Subtitle Test Part 3

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	fox_test_with_subs-part_3.cpl.xml
description:	Fox Subtitle Test Reel, Part 3, version 11.
conforms to:	S429-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

### A.4.53. DCI Black Spacer - 5 seconds

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	black_spacer_5s.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	black_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.54. White Frame Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	white_pt.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	white_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.55. Intra-Frame Contrast Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	checkerboard_pt.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7, RP431-2
prerequisites:	2K_checkerboard_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.56. Sequential Contrast and Uniformity Sequence

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	sequential_contrast_pt.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7, RP431-2
prerequisites:	2K_sequential_contrast_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.57. DCI Gray Steps

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	gray_step.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	gray_step_j2c_pt.mxf, black_long_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.58. DCI White Steps

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	white_step.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	white_step_j2c_pt.mxf, black_long_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.59. DCI 2K Moving Gradient

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	moving-gradient-white.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	DCI_gradient_step_s_white_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.60. DCI 2K Moving Gradient

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	moving-gradient-color.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	DCI_gradient_step_s_color_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.61. Color Accuracy Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	color_accuracy_pt.cpl.xml
description:	Composition containing five seconds (120 frames) of a chart showing all color values for the test in Section 7.5.12: Color Accuracy. This is followed by 1 minute of each of the 12 color values as a full frame.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	color_accuracy_j2c_pt.mxf, black_long_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.62. 4K Color Accuracy Series

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	4K_color_accuracy_pt.cpl.xml
description:	4K composition containing contents identical to Section A.4.62: 4K Color Accuracy Series
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	4K_color_accuracy_j2c_pt.mxf, black_long_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.63. Pixel Structure Pattern N 2k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_N_2k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	North-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 and 8 x 8 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_N_2k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.64. Pixel Structure Pattern S 2k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_S_2k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	South-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 and 8 x 8 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_S_2k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.65. Pixel Structure Pattern E 2k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_E_2k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	East-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 and 8 x 8 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_E_2k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.66. Pixel Structure Pattern W 2k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_W_2k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	West-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 and 8 x 8 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_W_2k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.67. Pixel Structure Pattern N 4k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_N_4k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	North-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_N_4k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.68. Pixel Structure Pattern S 4k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_S_4k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	South-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_S_4k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.69. Pixel Structure Pattern E 4k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_E_4k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	East-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_E_4k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.70. Pixel Structure Pattern W 4k**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	pixel_structure_W_4k_pt.cpl.xml
description:	West-oriented pixel structure test pattern featuring 16 x 16 pixel patterns with binary position indicators. See Section 7.5.3: Projector Pixel Count/Structure for description.
conforms to:	S429-7, S431-1
prerequisites:	pixel_structure_W_4k_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

**A.4.71. DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m01_pict_frame_oo_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	m01_pict_frame_oo_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.72. DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m02_snd_frame_oo_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, m02_snd_frame_oo_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.73. DCI Malformed Test 3: Sound Splice Tests

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m03_snd_splic_test.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	m03_snd_splic_j2c_pt.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.74. DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m04_sndtk_wrong_file_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, m04_sndtk_wrong_file_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.75. DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m05_pict_wrong_file_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	m05_pict_wrong_file_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.76. DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m06_cpl_hash_error_ct.cpl.xml
description:	The contents of Asset Hash elements are replaced with random values.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None
meta: Signature	no

### A.4.77. DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m07_cpl_invalid_signature_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	The contents of dsig:DigestValue are replaced with a random value.

### A.4.78. DCI Malformed Test 8: DCP with timed text and a missing font

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m08_dcp_timetext_missing_font_pt.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	subtitle_background_j2c_pt.mxf, black_51_pcm_pt.mxf, std_ctp_text_no_font_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.79. DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m09_pict_bad_hmac_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	m09_pict_bad_hmac_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None



#### A.4.80. DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m10_snd_bad_hmac_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, m10_snd_bad_hmac_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.81. DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m11_pict_bad_chuk_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	m11_pict_bad_chuk_j2c_ct.mxf, 400_hz_sine_wave_pcm_pt.mxf
malformations:	None

#### A.4.82. DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m12_snd_bad_chuk_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	nist_2k_test_pattern_j2c_pt.mxf, m12_snd_bad_chuk_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	None

### A.4.83. DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m13_cpl_missing_asset_ct.cpl.xml
description:	The MainSound asset of this composition is an reference to a non-existent track file.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_j2c_ct.mxf
malformations:	The Id element of the MainSound shall be a random value.
meta: Signature	no

### A.4.84. DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m14_cpl_format_error_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_j2c_ct.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	Create valid CPL using an ad-hoc namespace name.
meta: Signature	no

### A.4.85. DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m15_cpl_signer_format_error_ct.cpl.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	sync_count_j2c_ct.mxf, sync_count_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	Create valid CPL signature using a SHA-1 certificate chain.
meta: Signature	no

### A.4.86. DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m16_cpl_malf_signer_no_role_ct.cpl.xml
description:	A composition consisting of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files, signed with a certificate that has no role.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	The signer certificate of the CPL has no role instead of CS.
meta: Register	no
meta: Signature	no

### A.4.87. DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m17_cpl_malf_signer_bad_role_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files, signed with a certificate with an incorrect role.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	The signer certificate of the CPL has the role of SM instead of CS.
meta: Register	no
meta: Signature	no

### A.4.88. DCI Malformed Test 18: CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	CPL
filename:	m18_cpl_malf_signer_extra_role_ct.cpl.xml
description:	An encrypted composition consisting of the encrypted StEM 2K image and encrypted 5.1 sound track files, signed with a certificate with an extra role.
conforms to:	S429-7
prerequisites:	StEM_2K_j2c_ct.mxf, StEM_51_pcm_ct.mxf
malformations:	The signer certificate of the CPL has the roles of CS and SM instead of only CS.
meta: Register	no
meta: Signature	no

**A.4.89. DCI DCP 2K (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DCP
filename:	DCI_2K_tests
description:	DCP containing well-formed test compositions
conforms to:	S429-8, S429-9
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct, 2K_StEM_pt, 2K_StEM_sequence_ct, 2K_StEM_sequence_pt, 2K_StEM_48fps_pt, 2K_fm_constraints_ct, 2K_fm_control_granularity_image_only_fm, 2K_fm_control_granularity_sound_only_fm, 2K_fm_control_granularity_no_fm, 2K_fm_control_granularity_image_and_sound_fm, 2K_fm_payload_ct, 2K_max_bitrate_ct, 2K_sync_test, 2K_sync_test_ct, black_spacer_5s, channel_id_01-16, channel_id_51_pt, checkerboard_pt, sequential_contrast_pt, color_accuracy_pt, frame_count_flat_2_reels, frame_count_scope_2_reels, frame_num_burn_in, gray_step, moving-gradient-white, moving-gradient-color, nist_pattern_1k, nist_pattern_1k_96k, nist_pattern_black_audio, nist_pattern_no_audio, nist_pattern_pink_noise, nist_pattern_pink_noise_96k, pixel_structure_E_2k_pt, pixel_structure_N_2k_pt, pixel_structure_S_2k_pt, pixel_structure_W_2k_pt, sync_test_48fps, white_pt, white_step, multiline-caption, multiline-caption-png, sync_test_with_subs, sync_test_with_subs_ct
malformations:	None

**A.4.90. DCI DCP 2K Multi-Reel 128 A (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DCP
filename:	DCI_2K_128_multi_a_tests
description:	DCP containing 128 reel StEM, 5 seconds per reel, set A
conforms to:	S429-8, S429-9
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_128_a_reels_ct
malformations:	None

**A.4.91. DCI DCP 2K Multi-Reel 128 B (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DCP
filename:	DCI_2K_128_multi_b_tests
description:	DCP containing 128 reel StEM, 5 seconds per reel, set B
conforms to:	S429-8, S429-9
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_128_b_reels_ct
malformations:	None

**A.4.92. DCI DCP 2K Multi-Reel 64 (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DCP
filename:	DCI_2K_64_multi_tests
description:	DCP containing 64 reel StEM, 1 second per reel
conforms to:	S429-8, S429-9
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_64_1_second_reels_ct
malformations:	None

**A.4.93. DCI DCP 2K, Malformed (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DCP
filename:	DCI_2K_malf
description:	DCP containing malformed test compositions
conforms to:	S429-8, S429-9
prerequisites:	m01_pict_frame_oo_ct, m02_snd_frame_oo_ct, m03_snd_splc_test, m04_sndtk_wrong_file_ct, m05_pict_wrong_file_ct, m06_cpl_hash_error_ct, m07_cpl_invalid_signature_ct, m08_dcp_timetext_missing_font_pt, m09_pict_bad_hmac_ct, m10_snd_bad_hmac_ct, m11_pict_bad_chuk_ct, m12_snd_bad_chuk_ct, m13_cpl_missing_asset_ct, m14_cpl_format_error_ct, m15_cpl_signer_format_error_ct, m16_cpl_malf_signer_no_role_ct, m17_cpl_malf_signer_bad_role_ct, m18_cpl_malf_signer_extra_role_ct
malformations:	None
meta: ExplicitPKLContents	yes

**A.4.94. DCI DCP 4K (Encrypted)**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DCP
filename:	DCI_4K_tests
description:	DCP containing well-formed 4K test compositions
conforms to:	S429-8, S429-9
prerequisites:	4K_color_accuracy_pt, 4K_max_bitrate_ct, 4K_nist_pattern, 4K_sync_test, pixel_structure_E_4k_pt, pixel_structure_N_4k_pt, pixel_structure_S_4k_pt, pixel_structure_W_4k_pt
malformations:	None

## A.5. Digital Certificates

Six certificate chains are defined, which separate certificates by device type and level of conformity. In the descriptions below, the IMB label refers to a certificate which contains roles for a Media Block (MB) or a certificate which signs such certificates. Similarly, PRJ refers to certificates or signers associated with a projector and KDS refers to certificates associated with a Key Distribution System (a KDM authoring entity).

- Chain A1 contains valid IMB certificates.
- Chain A2 contains valid IMB certificates but the chain has no intermediate signers.
- Chain A3 contains invalid IMB certificates.
- Chain B1 contains valid PRJ certificates.
- Chain C1 contains valid KDS certificates.
- Chain C3 contains invalid KDS certificates.

### A.5.1. Chain A1 IMB Certificate Files

Contents removed, not used by any procedure

### A.5.2. Chain A2 IMB Certificate Files

Contents removed, not used by any procedure

### A.5.3. Chain A3 IMB Certificate Files

#### A.5.3.1. chain-a3-root

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-root.pem
description:	Root cert, malformed leaves
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-root-key
malformations:	None

#### A.5.3.2. chain-a3-signer1

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1.pem
description:	Intermediate Signer, level one
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-root, IMB-chain-a3-signer1-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.3. chain-a3-osig-type**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-osig-type.pem
description:	Signature algorithm of outside signature not sha256WithRSAEncryption
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Signature algorithm of outside signature is sha1WithRSAEncryption

**A.5.3.4. chain-a3-isig-type**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-isig-type.pem
description:	Signature algorithm inside signature not sha256WithRSAEncryption
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Signature algorithm inside the signature is sha1WithRSAEncryption

**A.5.3.5. chain-a3-iosig-type**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-iosig-type.pem
description:	Signature algorithm inside and outside identical, but not sha256WithRSAEncryption
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Signature algorithm is sha1WithRSAEncryption

**A.5.3.6. chain-a3-no-rsa**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-rsa.pem
description:	Public Key not an RSA Key
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-no-rsa-key
malformations:	Public Key is a DSA key.

**A.5.3.7. chain-a3-short-rsa**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-short-rsa.pem
description:	Public Key Length 1024 bit
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-short-rsa-key
malformations:	Public key is 1024 bits.

**A.5.3.8. chain-a3-bad-exp**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-bad-exp.pem
description:	Public Key Exponent other than the required 65537
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-bad-exp-key
malformations:	Public Key Exponent is 3.

**A.5.3.9. IMB-chain-a3-BER-enc**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-BER-enc.pem
description:	Encoded as BER (not DER)
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Certificate uses BER encoding.

**A.5.3.10. chain-a3-no-saf**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-saf.pem
description:	Missing SignatureAlgorithm field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	SignatureAlgorithm field is not present



**A.5.3.11. chain-a3-no-svf**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-svf.pem
description:	Missing SignatureValue field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing SignatureValue field

**A.5.3.12. chain-a3-no-ver**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-ver.pem
description:	Missing Version field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Version field

**A.5.3.13. chain-a3-no-sn**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-sn.pem
description:	Missing SerialNumber field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing SerialNumber field

**A.5.3.14. chain-a3-no-sig**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-sig.pem
description:	Missing Signature field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Signature field

**A.5.3.15. chain-a3-no-issuer**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-issuer.pem
description:	Missing Issuer field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	The Issuer field is not present.

**A.5.3.16. chain-a3-no-subject**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-subject.pem
description:	Missing Subject field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Subject field

**A.5.3.17. chain-a3-no-spki**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-spki.pem
description:	Missing SubjectPublicKeyInfo field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing SubjectPublicKeyInfo field

**A.5.3.18. chain-a3-no-val-f**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-val-f.pem
description:	Missing Validity field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Validity field

**A.5.3.19. chain-a3-no-aki-f**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-aki-f.pem
description:	Missing AuthorityKeyIdentifier field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	The AuthorityKeyIdentifier is not present.

**A.5.3.20. chain-a3-no-keyuse**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-keyuse.pem
description:	Missing KeyUsage field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	The Key Usage field is not present.

**A.5.3.21. chain-a3-no-basic**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-basic.pem
description:	Missing BasicConstraint field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	The Basic Constraints field is not present.

**A.5.3.22. chain-a3-path-1**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-1.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. true, PathLenpresent and zero
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.23. chain-a3-path-2**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-2.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. true, PathLen present and positive
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.24. chain-a3-path-3**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-3.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. true, PathLen present and negative
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	PathLen is -1.

**A.5.3.25. chain-a3-path-4**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-4.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen absent
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.26. chain-a3-path-5**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-5.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen zero
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.27. chain-a3-path-6**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-6.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen positive
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.28. chain-a3-path-7**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-path-7.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen negative
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.3.29. chain-a3-org-name**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-org-name.pem
description:	OrganizationName in subject and issuer fields does not match
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	OrganizationName in subject field has first two letters transposed.

**A.5.3.30. chain-a3-role-1**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-role-1.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. False, no role specified in CommonName
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Common Name begins with a period (".")

**A.5.3.31. chain-a3-role-2**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-role-2.pem
description:	Non-SMS role in CN
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Common Name does not include SMS in the section to the left of the first period (".").

**A.5.3.32. chain-a3-date-exp**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-date-exp.pem
description:	Expired
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1, IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key
malformations:	Certificate Not After field contains a date value in the past.

**A.5.4. Chain B1 Certificate Files****A.5.4.1. chain-b1-root**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	PRJ Certificate
filename:	PRJ-chain-b1-root.pem
description:	Self-signed root certificate for PRJ devices
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	PRJ-chain-b1-root-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.5. Chain C1 Certificate Files****A.5.5.1. chain-c1-root**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c1-root.pem
description:	Self-signed root certificate for KDS devices
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c1-root-key
malformations:	None

## A.5.6. Chain C3 Certificate Files

### A.5.6.1. chain-c3-root

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-root.pem
description:	Self-signed root certificate for KDS devices
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-root-key
malformations:	None

### A.5.6.2. chain-c3-signer1

Item Data	Data Description
type:	IMB Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1.pem
description:	Intermediate Signer, level one
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-root, KDS-chain-c3-signer1-key
malformations:	None

### A.5.6.3. chain-c3-osig-type

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-osig-type.pem
description:	Signature algorithm of outside signature is sha1WithRSAEncryption
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

### A.5.6.4. chain-c3-isig-type

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-isig-type.pem
description:	Signature algorithm inside signature not sha256WithRSAEncryption
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Signature algorithm inside the signature is sha1WithRSAEncryption

**A.5.6.5. chain-c3-iosig-type**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-iosig-type.pem
description:	Signature algorithm inside and outside identical, but not sha256WithRSAEncryption
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Signature algorithm is sha1WithRSAEncryption

**A.5.6.6. chain-c3-no-rsa**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-rsa.pem
description:	Public Key not an RSA Key
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-no-rsa-key
malformations:	Public Key is a DSA key.

**A.5.6.7. chain-c3-short-rsa**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-short-rsa.pem
description:	Public Key Length 1024 bit
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-short-rsa-key
malformations:	Public key is 1024 bits.

**A.5.6.8. chain-c3-bad-exp**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-bad-exp.pem
description:	Public Key Exponent other than default 65537
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-bad-exp-key
malformations:	Public Key Exponent is 3.



**A.5.6.9. chain-c3-BER-enc**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-BER-enc.pem
description:	Encoded as BER (not DER)
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Certificate uses BER encoding.

**A.5.6.10. chain-c3-no-saf**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-saf.pem
description:	Missing SignatureAlgorithm field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	SignatureAlgorithm field is not present

**A.5.6.11. chain-c3-no-svf**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-svf.pem
description:	Missing SignatureValue field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing SignatureValue field

**A.5.6.12. chain-c3-no-ver**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-ver.pem
description:	Missing Version field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Version field

**A.5.6.13. chain-c3-no-sn**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-sn.pem
description:	Missing SerialNumber field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing SerialNumber field

**A.5.6.14. chain-c3-no-sig**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-sig.pem
description:	Missing Signature field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Signature field

**A.5.6.15. chain-c3-no-issuer**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-issuer.pem
description:	Missing Issuer field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	The Issuer field is not present.

**A.5.6.16. chain-c3-no-subject**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-subject.pem
description:	Missing Subject field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Subject field

**A.5.6.17. chain-c3-no-spki**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-spki.pem
description:	Missing SubjectPublicKeyInfo field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing SubjectPublicKeyInfo field

**A.5.6.18. chain-c3-no-val-f**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-val-f.pem
description:	Missing Validity field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Missing Validity field

**A.5.6.19. chain-c3-no-aki-f**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-aki-f.pem
description:	Missing AuthorityKeyIdentifier field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	The AuthorityKeyIdentifier is not present.

**A.5.6.20. chain-c3-no-keyuse**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-keyuse.pem
description:	Missing KeyUsage field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	The Key Usage field is not present.

**A.5.6.21. chain-c3-no-basic**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-basic.pem
description:	Missing BasicConstraint field
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	The Basic Constraints field is not present.

**A.5.6.22. chain-c3-path-1**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-1.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. true, PathLenpresent and zero
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.6.23. chain-c3-path-2**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-2.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. true, PathLen present and positive
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.6.24. chain-c3-path-3**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-3.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. true, PathLen present and negative
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	PathLen is -1.

**A.5.6.25. chain-c3-path-4**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-4.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen absent
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.6.26. chain-c3-path-5**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-5.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen zero
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.6.27. chain-c3-path-6**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-6.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen positive
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.6.28. chain-c3-path-7**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-path-7.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. false, PathLen negative
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

**A.5.6.29. chain-c3-org-name**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-org-name.pem
description:	OrganizationName in subject and issuer fields does not match
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	OrganizationName in subject field has first two letters transposed.

**A.5.6.30. chain-c3-role-1**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-role-1.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. False, no role specified in CommonName
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Common Name begins with a period (".")

**A.5.6.31. chain-c3-date-exp**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-date-exp.pem
description:	Expired
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	Certificate Not After field contains a date value in the past.

**A.5.6.32. chain-c3-role-2**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDS Certificate
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-role-2.pem
description:	Cert.Auth. False, role error (CN contains only FMI).
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1, KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key
malformations:	None

## A.5.7. Public/Private Key Pairs

### A.5.7.1. chain-a3-bad-exp-key

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-bad-exp-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for Public Key Exponent other than the required 65537
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	Public Key Exponent is 3.

### A.5.7.2. chain-a3-leaf-key

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-leaf-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for leaf
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

### A.5.7.3. chain-a3-no-rsa-key

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DSA keypair
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-no-rsa-key.pem
description:	DSA keypair for Public Key not an RSA Key
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	Public Key is a DSA key.

### A.5.7.4. chain-a3-root-key

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-root-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for root cert, malformed leaves
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.5.7.5. chain-a3-short-rsa-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-short-rsa-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for Public Key Length 1024 bit
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	Public key is 1024 bits.

**A.5.7.6. chain-a3-signer1-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	IMB-chain-a3-signer1-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for Intermediate Signer, level one
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.5.7.7. chain-c1-root-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c1-root-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for self-signed root certificate for KDS devices
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.5.7.8. chain-c3-bad-exp-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-bad-exp-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for Public Key Exponent other than default 65537
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	Public Key Exponent is 3.



**A.5.7.9. chain-c3-leaf-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-leaf-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for leaf
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.5.7.10. chain-c3-no-rsa-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	DSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-no-rsa-key.pem
description:	DSA keypair for Public Key not an RSA Key
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	Public Key is a DSA key.

**A.5.7.11. chain-c3-root-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-root-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for self-signed root certificate for KDS devices
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.5.7.12. chain-c3-short-rsa-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-short-rsa-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for Public Key Length 1024 bit
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	Public key is 1024 bits.

**A.5.7.13. chain-c3-signer1-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	KDS-chain-c3-signer1-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for Intermediate Signer, level one
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

**A.5.7.14. chain-b1-root-key**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	RSA keypair
filename:	PRJ-chain-b1-root-key.pem
description:	RSA keypair for self-signed root certificate for PRJ devices
conforms to:	S430-2
prerequisites:	None
malformations:	None

ARCHIVED VERSION  
NOT CURRENT

## A.6. Key Delivery Messages

### A.6.1. Introduction

The KDM files defined in this section must be generated for the device under test and the time and date of the test procedure.

### A.6.2. KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_sync_test_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.3. KDM for DCI 2K Sync Test with Subtitles (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	sync_test_with_subs_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	sync_test_with_subs_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.4. KDM for DCI 2K Image with Frame Number Burn In (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	frame_num_burn_in_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	frame_num_burn_in_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.5. KDM for 2K StEM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_StEM_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.6. KDM for 2K StEM Sequence (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_StEM_sequence_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_sequence_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.7. KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "A" Series (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_StEM_128_a_reels_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has all content keys for the track files referenced by the CPL, and additionally has one each of key types FMIK and FMAK. The FMIK and FMAK key values shall be appropriate for the specifications of the FM system used by the Test Subject.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_128_a_reels_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.8. KDM for 128 Reel Composition, "B" Series (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_StEM_128_b_reels_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has all content keys for the track files referenced by the CPL, and additionally has one each of key types FMIK and FMAK. The FMIK and FMAK key values shall be appropriate for the specifications of the FM system used by the Test Subject.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_128_b_reels_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.9. KDM for 64 1 second reel Composition (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_StEM_64_1_second_reels_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_64_1_second_reels_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.10. KDM for 2K FM Application Constraints (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_fm_constraints_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_fm_constraints_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.11. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - No FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_no_fm.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_no_fm.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.12. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Image Only FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_image_only_fm.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_image_only_fm.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.13. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Sound Only FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_sound_only_fm.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_sound_only_fm.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.14. KDM for 2K FM Control Granularity - Image and Sound FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_fm_control_granularity_image_and_sound_fm.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_fm_control_granularity_image_and_sound_fm.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.15. KDM for 2K FM Payload (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_fm_payload_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_fm_payload_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.16. KDM for Binary Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	binary_audio_fm_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with "no FM mark" flag applied to audio.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	binary_audio_fm_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.17. KDM for Binary Selective Audio Forensic Marking Test (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	binary_selective_audio_fm_6ch_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with audio forensic marking disabled on audio channels above 6 using the "selective audio FM mark" command.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	binary_audio_fm_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.18. KDM for Selective Audio FM - All FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	selective_audio_fm_all-fm_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with all audio forensic marking enabled on all audio channels.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	selective_audio_fm_all-fm_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.19. KDM for Selective Audio FM - No FM (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	selective_audio_fm_no-fm_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with all audio forensic marking disabled by the "no FM mark" URI.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	selective_audio_fm_no-fm_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.20. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 6 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	selective_audio_fm_6ch_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with audio forensic marking disabled on audio channels above 6 using the "selective audio FM mark" command. The KDM also has the "no FM mark" URI, which should be overridden by the "selective audio FM mark" URI.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	selective_audio_fm_6ch_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.21. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 8 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	selective_audio_fm_8ch_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with audio forensic marking disabled on audio channels above 8 using the "selective audio FM mark" command.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	selective_audio_fm_8ch_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.22. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 10 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	selective_audio_fm_10ch_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with audio forensic marking disabled on audio channels above 10 using the "selective audio FM mark" command.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	selective_audio_fm_10ch_ct.cpl
malformations:	None



### A.6.23. KDM for Selective Audio FM - Not Above Channel 17 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	selective_audio_fm_17ch_ct.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with audio forensic marking disabled on audio channels above 17 using the "selective audio FM mark" command. The KDM also has the "no FM mark" URI, which should be overridden by the "selective audio FM mark" URI.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	selective_audio_fm_17ch_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.24. KDM with two selective audio FM mark URIs

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-2-selective-fm-cmds.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that contains more than one selective audio FM mark URIs
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	KDM contains one ForensicMarkFlag element with the value "http://www.dcmovies.com/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-audio-disable-above-channel-06", and one ForensicMarkFlag element with the value "http://www.dcmovies.com/430-1/2006/KDM#mrkflg-audio-disable-above-channel-08"

### A.6.25. KDM for 2K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_max_bitrate_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_max_bitrate_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.26. KDM for 4K Maximum Bitrate Composition (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	4K_max_bitrate_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	4K_max_bitrate_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.27. KDM for Past Time Window Extension (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	holdover_long_ct-kdm-short-expire.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period that is current, but expires in the near future
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	holdover_long_ct
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidAfter element is a UTC timestamp no greater than 60 minutes in the future.

### A.6.28. KDM for Within Time Window Extension (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	holdover_short_ct-kdm-short-expire.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period that is current, but expires in the near future
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	holdover_short_ct
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidAfter element is a UTC timestamp no greater than 60 minutes in the future.

### A.6.29. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 1: Picture with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m01_pict_frame_oo_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m01_pict_frame_oo_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.30. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 2: Sound with Frame-out-of-order error (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m02_snd_frame_oo_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m02_snd_frame_oo_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.31. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 4: DCP With an incorrect audio TrackFile ID (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m04_sndtk_wrong_file_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m04_sndtk_wrong_file_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.32. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 5: DCP With an incorrect image TrackFile ID (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m05_pict_wrong_file_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m05_pict_wrong_file_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.33. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 6: CPL with incorrect track file hashes (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m06_cpl_hash_error_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m06_cpl_hash_error_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.34. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 7: CPL with an Invalid Signature (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m07_cpl_invalid_signature_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m07_cpl_invalid_signature_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.35. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 9: Picture with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m09_pict_bad_hmac_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m09_pict_bad_hmac_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.36. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 10: Sound with HMAC error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m10_snd_bad_hmac_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m10_snd_bad_hmac_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.37. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 11: Picture with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m11_pict_bad_chuk_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m11_pict_bad_chuk_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.38. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 12: Sound with Check Value error in MXF Track File (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m12_snd_bad_chuk_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m12_snd_bad_chuk_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.39. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 13: CPL that references a non-existent track file (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m13_cpl_missing_asset_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m13_cpl_missing_asset_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.40. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 14: CPL that does not conform to ST 429-7 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m14_cpl_format_error_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m14_cpl_format_error_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.41. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 15: CPL signed by a certificate not conforming to ST 430-2 (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m15_cpl_signer_format_error_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m15_cpl_signer_format_error_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.42. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 16: CPL signed with No Role Certificate (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m16_cpl_malf_signer_no_role_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m16_cpl_malf_signer_no_role_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.43. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 17: CPL signed with Bad Role Certificate (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m17_cpl_malf_signer_bad_role_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3x
prerequisites:	m17_cpl_malf_signer_bad_role_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.44. KDM for DCI Malformed Test 18: KDM for CPL signed with Extra Role Certificate (Encrypted)

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	m18_cpl_malf_signer_extra_role_ct.kdm.xml
description:	
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	m18_cpl_malf_signer_extra_role_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.45. KDM with invalid XML

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-any.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that contains an invalid XML file format
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	Missing </DCinemaSecurityMessage> tag

**A.6.46. KDM that has expired**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-expired.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period that has expired
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidAfter element is a UTC timestamp at least 24 hours in the past.

**A.6.47. KDM with future validity period**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-near-future.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period in the future according to the full ContentKeysNotValidBefore timestamp but is valid now if the local offset is ignored.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidBefore element is a UTC timestamp between 4 and 6 hours in the future, with a local offset of -06:00.

**A.6.48. KDM that has recently expired**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-recent-expired.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period that has expired according to the full ContentKeysNotValidAfter timestamp but that has not expired if the local offset is ignored.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidAfter element is a UTC timestamp between 4 and 6 hours in the past, with a local offset of +06:00.



### A.6.49. KDM with incorrect message digest

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-sig-digest.kdm.xml
description:	KDM in which a Signature Digest has been altered
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The plaintext form of the encrypted message digest in the signature is not the same value as a calculated message digest of the KDM.

### A.6.50. KDM with future validity period

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-future.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period that is in the future
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidBefore element is a UTC timestamp at least 24 hours in the future.

### A.6.51. KDM with empty TDL

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-no-tdl.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has an empty Trusted Device List (TDL)
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The DeviceList element of the KDM is empty.

### A.6.52. KDM with Assume Trust and random TDL entries

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-assume-trust-and-more.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL consisting of one entry Assume Trust entry (i.e. "2jmj7l5rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk=") and one random entry.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.53. KDM with the SM alone on the TDL**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-self-tdl.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a single entry on its TDL corresponding the recipient's SM certificate.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.54. KDM with the projector and LDB on the TDL**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-ldb-projector-tdl.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with two entries on its TDL corresponding the projector SPB and LDB connected to the MB.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.55. KDM with the projector alone on the TDL**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-projector-tdl.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a single entry on its TDL corresponding the projector SPB connected to the MB.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.56. KDM with the LDB alone on the TDL**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-ldb-tdl.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a single entry on its TDL corresponding the LDB connected to the MB.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.57. KDM with imminent expiration date**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-short-expire.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a validity period that is current, but expires in the near future
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_sequence_ct-kdm
malformations:	The value of the ContentKeysNotValidAfter element is a UTC timestamp no greater than 60 minutes in the future.

**A.6.58. KDM with corrupted CipherData block**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-CipherData-block.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that contains an Invalid Structure ID field in the CipherData element
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The first byte of the Structure ID field contained in the <enc:CipherValue> element inside the <enc:CipherData> element has been changed from "F1" to "1F"

**A.6.59. KDM with incorrect signer thumbprint**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-signer-tp.kdm.xml
description:	KDM for which the Thumbprint of the Signer's Certificate does not match the Signer of the KDM
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The thumbprint of the signer certificate as listed in the KDM is incorrect and does not match the thumbprint for the issuing certificate.

**A.6.60. KDM without signer certificate**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-chain.kdm.xml
description:	KDM in which the Certificate chain does not contain the Signer's Certificate
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The certificate that signed the KDM is not included in the KDM.

### A.6.61. KDM without AuthorityKey certificate

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-chain-no-cert-authkeyid.kdm.xml
description:	KDM in which the Certificate chain does not contain the certificate specified by the AuthorityKeyIdentifier value in the Signer Certificate
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	A KDM that specifies the signer's issuer certificate as the AuthorityKeyIdentifier but which does not contain that certificate.

### A.6.62. KDM with KeyInfo mismatch

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-bad-keyinfo.kdm.xml
description:	KeyInfo field of the audio EncryptedKey element does not match the KeyInfo field of the image EncryptedKey element
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The KeyInfo element of the audio encrypted key data contains the correct Issuer Name and an incorrect IssuerSerial of the certificate of the recipient of the KDM.

### A.6.63. KDM with invalid MessageType

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-bad-MessageType.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with an Invalid MessageType element
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	MessageType element contains: "http://www.smpte-qa.org/430-1/2006/KDM#kdm-key-type"

### A.6.64. KDM with expired Signer certificate

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-expired-signer.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with an expired Signer's Certificate and an ETM IssueDate later than Signer's Certificate expiry date
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	KDM signer's certificate's Validity "Not After" date is earlier than ETM IssueDate

### A.6.65. KDM issued before certificate valid

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-issue-before-cert-valid.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a valid Signer's Certificate, but ETM issue date before Signer's Certificate issue date
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The <IssueDate> element contains a date prior to the date of the signer certificate's Validity "Not Before" date.

### A.6.66. KDM validity exceeds signer validity

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-signer-cert-exp-before-kdm-expires.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a validity period that extends beyond the validity of Signer's Certificate expiry date.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The KDM has a ContentKeysNotValidAfter value later than the signer certificate's "Not After" value.

**A.6.67. KDM with mismatched keytype**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-mismatched-key-keytype.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with an encryption key that is valid but has an incorrect keytype
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	Key is a valid image encryption key but has the keytype "MDAK".

**A.6.68. KDM with non-empty NonCriticalExtensions**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-with-non-crit-exts.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a non-empty NonCriticalExtensions element
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.69. KDM with invalid ContentAuthenticator**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-bad-ContentAuthenticator.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with an Invalid ContentAuthenticator element
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	the content of the ContentAuthenticator element shall contain a thumbprint of a D-Cinema cert that does not match one in the signer chain of the CPL that the KDM references.

**A.6.70. KDM with bad CompositionPlaylistId value**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-bad-CompositionPlaylistId.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with an incorrect value in the CompositionPlaylistId element.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The content of the CompositionPlaylistId element shall contain a UUID value that does not match the Id value of the associated CPL.

### A.6.71. KDM with bad CipherData CompositionPlaylistId value

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-bad-CipherData-CPLId.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with an incorrect value in the CompositionPlaylistId field of the CipherData structure.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The content of the CompositionPlaylistId field of the CipherData structure shall contain a UUID value that does not match the Id value of the associated CPL.

### A.6.72. KDM with incorrect namespace name value

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-bad-namespace.kdm.xml
description:	KDM has the wrong namespace name.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The namespace name corresponding to the top level XML element does not match the value given in SMPTE-430-3-2006. The bogus value <a href="http://www.smpte-qa.org/schemas/430-3/2001/ETM">http://www.smpte-qa.org/schemas/430-3/2001/ETM</a> shall be used.

### A.6.73. KDM with random TDL entry

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-random-tdl.kdm.xml
description:	KDM has a random entry that does not match any known remote SPB.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The DeviceInfoList contains a single entry, a randomly generated value.

### A.6.74. KDM signed with incorrect signer certificate format

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-malf-signer-format.kdm.xml
description:	KDM which has been signed with a certificate not conforming with SMPTE-430-2-2006.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	The certificate that signed the KDM is Interop format.

### A.6.75. KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-assume-trust.kdm.xml
description:	KDM which has only the empty-string thumbprint "assume trust" in the TDL (i.e. "2jmj7l5rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk=").
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

### A.6.76. KDM for 2K StEM with Device Specific Special Auditorium TDL

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	2K_StEM_ct_device_specific_special_auditorium.kdm.xml
description:	KDM that has a TDL containing the certificate thumbprints of devices specific to a Special Auditorium Situation.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct.cpl
malformations:	None

### A.6.77. KDM for DCI 2K StEM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-5-3-2-2.kdm.xml
description:	KDM for DCI 2K StEM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None



**A.6.78. KDM with a TDL including Responder A**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-1-7-responder-a.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains the thumbprint for the certificate of Responder A
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.79. KDM with a TDL including Responder B**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-1-7-responder-b.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains the thumbprint for the certificate of Responder B
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_StEM_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.80. KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and an additional device certificate**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-2-2-special-auditorium-situation-and-additional-thumbprint.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and an additional device certificate.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

KDM with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation

### **A.6.81. KDM with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation**

<b>Item Data</b>	<b>Data Description</b>
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-2-2-special-auditorium-situation-less-one-thumbprint.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains all but one of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in that special auditorium situation.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

### **A.6.82. KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and the "assume trust" thumbprint**

<b>Item Data</b>	<b>Data Description</b>
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-2-2-special-auditorium-situation-and-assume-trust-thumbprint.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation and the "assume trust" thumbprint.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

### **A.6.83. KDM with a TDL that contains one more LD/LE device thumbprints than there are LD/projector thumbprints in the special auditorium situation**

<b>Item Data</b>	<b>Data Description</b>
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-2-2-special-auditorium-situation-and-additional-ld-le-thumbprint.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains one more LD/LE device thumbprints than there are LD/projector thumbprints in the special auditorium situation.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.84. KDM with Assume Trust TDL Entry**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-2-2-assume-trust.kdm.xml
description:	KDM which has only the empty-string thumbprint "assume trust" in the TDL (i.e. "2jmj715rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk=").
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

**A.6.85. KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation**

Item Data	Data Description
type:	KDM
filename:	kdm-6-2-2-special-auditorium-situation.kdm.xml
description:	KDM with a TDL that contains all of the certificate thumbprints for the devices in the special auditorium situation.
conforms to:	S430-1, S430-3
prerequisites:	2K_sync_test_ct-kdm
malformations:	None

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# Appendix B. Equipment List

## B.1. Hardware

AES3 Audio Analyzer	Digital audio signal analyzer with AES-3 inputs.
Sound System	5.1 or 7.1 sound system with calibrated level control.
Computer with POSIX OS	Computer with POSIX-like Operating System (OS), such as Linux or Mac OS X. The system must support TCP/IP via 1000 Mb/s ethernet and be backward-compatible to support 100 Mb/s Ethernet.
Digital Clock	Digital quartz time-of-day clock displaying time accurate to the second
Oscilloscope	Digital storage oscilloscope, 200 MHz or better, with two or more inputs plus external trigger.
Accurate Real-Time Clock	A real-time clock that uses an external reference to maintain precise time (within 1 ms). The external reference should be WWV, GPS or NTP traceable to a trusted hardware clock.
FM Decoder	Forensic mark decoder for image or sound essence. The exact type of decoder is dependent upon the type of watermark to be decoded. This equipment is expected to collect the full payload of the forensic marking system.
FM Detector	Forensic mark detector for image or sound essence. The exact type of detector is dependent upon the type of watermark to be detected. This equipment is expected to simply detect the presence of the forensic mark.
Ethernet Switch	A 1000Base-T Ethernet switch capable of sustained full-rate throughput on at least two port-pairs. The device must also be able to configure one or more ports as "monitor" ports (selected traffic on the switch can be copied to the monitor port to facilitate diagnostic capture).
Photodiode	Photodiode, of the type most sensitive in the human visible electromagnetic spectrum (about 390 nm to 780 nm), fitted with suitable length of shielded cable, terminated in a BNC connector.
Photometer	Photometer as described in [SMPTE-431-1].
Spectroradiometer	Spectroradiometer as described in [SMPTE-431-1].
Stopwatch	Digital stopwatch with .01 second resolution.
Still Camera	Digital still image camera.
48 fps Camera	Camera and recorder/reproducer system capable of 48fps (or better) capture rate.
SPB-2 Access Tools	Tools, supplied by the manufacturer of an SPB-2 device, required to gain authorized access to the protected area of the SPB-2.
D.U.T. Twin	A device identical to the Device Under Test.
DCI Projector Pair	Two DCI-complaint projectors of the same model and revision.
Dual-Link Monitor	Dual-link HD monitor.
Bridge Tap Connector	Connector with a bridge tap takeoff point, e.g. a "BNC Tee".

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GPIO Test Fixture	A test fixture comprising L.E.D. indicators, switches and a power supply, per the schematic in Appendix E.
DCI Projector	DCI-compliant standalone projector.
DCI Server	DCI-compliant server (includes Image/Sound Media Block)
LDB Monitor	LDB diagnostic utility
Digital Audio Recorder	Audio recorder capable of bit-accurate capture of AES/EBU channels.

## B.2. Software

Audio Editor	A digital audio workstation (DAW), such as Pro Tools or Audacity.
asm-responder	Auditorium Security Message (ASM) responder simulator. Allows inspection of ASM communications behavior in a peer device. See Appendix D for more information.
asm-requester	Auditorium Security Message (ASM) requester simulator. Allows inspection of ASM communications behavior in a peer device. See Appendix D for more information.
ftlint	The ftlint command line utility from the FreeType library. It is available from <a href="http://www.freetype.org/">http://www.freetype.org/</a> .
Network Analyzer	Network analysis tool such as Wireshark or <b>tcpdump</b> . It is available from <a href="http://www.wireshark.org/">http://www.wireshark.org/</a> .
Text Editor	Any text editor that can display and write plain text, such as <b>emacs</b> or <b>vi</b> , etc.
Sound Editor	Any sound editing software that provides sample-accurate manipulations of audio waveforms.
OpenJPEG	JPEG 2000 encoder/decoder software such as OpenJPEG. It is available from <a href="http://www.openjpeg.org/">http://www.openjpeg.org/</a> .
j2c-scan	JPEG 2000 scanner based on the OpenJPEG library. The source code for this program is available in Section C.8.
identify	<b>identify</b> is part of the ImageMagick library and utility suite. It is available from <a href="http://www.imagemagick.org/">http://www.imagemagick.org/</a> .
klvwalk	The <b>klvwalk</b> utility from the free asdcplib software package. It is available from <a href="http://www.cinecert.com/asdcplib/">http://www.cinecert.com/asdcplib/</a> .
asdcplib-test	The <b>asdcplib-test</b> utility from the free asdcplib software package. It is available from <a href="http://www.cinecert.com/asdcplib/">http://www.cinecert.com/asdcplib/</a> .
openssl	General purpose command line utility from the OpenSSL software package. It is available from <a href="http://www.openssl.org/">http://www.openssl.org/</a> .
schema-check	Validating XML Parser (note: may use parser from Xerces package). The source code for this program is available in Section C.3. It is available from <a href="http://xml.apache.org/security/">http://xml.apache.org/security/</a> .
checksig	XML Signature validator, distributed with the XML Security library. It is available from <a href="http://xml.apache.org/security/">http://xml.apache.org/security/</a> .

dsig_cert.py	XML Signature certificate manipulator. The source code for this program is available in Section C.8.
dsig_extract.py	XML Signature certificate extractor. The source code for this program is available in Section C.9.
uuid_check.py	UUID validator. The source code for this program is available in Section C.7.
dc-thumbprint	Certificate thumbprint calculator. The source code for this program is available in Section C.2.
eab_calc.py	Delta E*ab Calculator for color accuracy measurements. The source code for this program is available in Section C.6.
kdm-decrypt	KDM decryption tool. The source code for this program is available in Section C.4.

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# Appendix C. Source Code

## C.1. Overview

Wherever possible, the computer programs used in the test procedures in this document are freely available. Where appropriate, the listings in Appendix B provide a URL where the software can be obtained.

In some cases, it was necessary to develop programs because free alternatives were not available. Those programs are presented here in source code form along with instructions for building and executing the programs.

The programs are expressed in the C, C++ and Python programming languages. Build instructions and prerequisites for the C and C++ programs are given in the comments at the beginning of each source module. Machine readable copies of the programs are available in the `source-code` directory in the Reference Materials distribution (see Appendix A).

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## C.2. dc-thumbprint

This program reads a PEM formatted X509 certificate and calculates a SHA-1 message digest over the signed portion of the certificate as required by [SMPTE-430-2]. The value is encoded as a Base64 string and returned on `stdout`. The following example illustrates this usage:

### Example C.1. dc-thumbprint execution

```
$ dc-thumbprint my-cert.pem
aZMVnZ/TzEvLUCmQFcc8U0je9uo=
```

### C.2.1. dc-thumbprint Source Code Listing

```
/*
 * dc-thumbprint.c -- calculate certificate thumbprint of PEM-encoded
 *                   X.509 document per SMPTE 430-2
 *
 *
 * Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
 *
 * This program requires OpenSSL. To build:
 * $ cc -o dc-thumbprint dc-thumbprint.c -lcrypto
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>

typedef unsigned char byte_t;

char*
encodeBase64(byte_t* in_buf, int in_len, char* out_buf, int out_len)
{
    BIO *bmem, *b64;
    BUF_MEM *bptr;

    b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
    bmem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
    b64 = BIO_push(b64, bmem);
    BIO_write(b64, in_buf, in_len);

    if ( BIO_flush(b64) != 1 )
    {
        fprintf(stderr, "write to buffer failed.\n");
        return 0;
    }

    BIO_get_mem_ptr(b64, &bptr);

    if ( bptr->length + 1 > out_len )
    {
        fprintf(stderr, "encoding exceeds buffer length.\n");
        return 0;
    }

    memcpy((byte_t*)out_buf, bptr->data, bptr->length-1);
    out_buf[bptr->length-1] = 0;

    return out_buf;
}
```

```
int
main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    byte_t  sha_value[20];      /* buffer for resulting thumbprint digest */
    char    sha_base64[64];    /* buffer for Base64 version of the thumbprint digest */
    byte_t  p_key_buf[8192];   /* buffer holds DER encoded certificate body */
    size_t  length;           /* length of DER encoded certificate body (p_key_buf) */
    byte_t* p = p_key_buf;     /* pointer that OpenSSL will move at will */
    SHA_CTX SHA;              /* SHA-1 context for thumbprint */
    FILE*   fp;               /* PEM source file */
    X509*   x509obj;          /* X509 object for mangling certificate contents */

    OpenSSL_add_all_digests();

    if ( argc != 2 )
    {
        fprintf(stderr, "USAGE: dc-thumbprint cert-file.pem\n");
        return 1;
    }

    if ( (fp = fopen (argv[1], "r")) == 0 )
    {
        perror("fopen");
        return 2;
    }

    if ( (x509obj = PEM_read_X509(fp, 0, 0, 0)) == 0 )
    {
        fprintf(stderr, "Error decoding file %s\n", argv[1]);
        fclose (fp);
        return 3;
    }

    fclose (fp);

    /* get the certificate body as a DER string */
    if ( i2d_X509_CINF(x509obj->cert_info, &p) == 0 )
    {
        fprintf(stderr, "i2d_X509_CINF error\n");
        return 4;
    }

    length = p - p_key_buf;

    if ( length > 8192 )
    {
        fprintf(stderr, "i2d_X509_CINF value exceeds buffer length\n");
        return 5;
    }

    SHA1_Init(&SHA);
    SHA1_Update(&SHA, p_key_buf, length);
    SHA1_Final(sha_value, &SHA);

    if ( encodeBase64(sha_value, 20, sha_base64, 64) == 0 )
        return 6;

    printf("%s\n", sha_base64);
    return 0;
}

/*
 * end dc-thumbprint.c
 */
```

## C.3. schema-check

This program parses and validates XML instance documents. When an XML document is specified alone, the file is checked for well-formedness but is not validated. When an XML document is specified with one or more schema files, **schema-check** validates that file against the schemas. Only one file to be tested may be specified at a time. Note that schema files must be listed in order of dependency (most dependent last). The following example illustrates using the program to check well-formedness:

### Example C.2. Using schema-check to check well-formedness

```
$ schema-check perfect-movie.cpl.xml
```

The next example shows how to use the program to check for valid content:

### Example C.3. Using schema-check to check validity

```
$ schema-check perfect-movie.cpl.xml SMPTE-428-7.xsd
```

### C.3.1. schema-check Source Code Listing

```
//
// schema-check.cpp -- test XML document against schema
//
// Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
//
// This program requires the Xerces-c XML library. To build:
// $ c++ -o schema-check schema-check.cpp -lxerces-c
//

#include <iostream>
#include <list>
#include <string>
#include <cstdio>

#include <xercesc/util/OutOfMemoryException.hpp>
#include <xercesc/dom/DOM.hpp>
#include <xercesc/parsers/XercesDOMParser.hpp>
#include <xercesc/framework/XMLGrammarDescription.hpp>
#include <xercesc/sax/ErrorHandler.hpp>
#include <xercesc/sax/SAXParseException.hpp>

using std::cerr;
using std::endl;
XERCES_CPP_NAMESPACE_USE

// -----
// Utility code adapted from the DOMPrint program distributed with Xerces-c

// simple transcoding wrapper
class StrX
{
public:
    char* fLocalForm;

public:
    StrX(const XMLCh* const toTranscode) { fLocalForm = XMLString::transcode(toTranscode); }
    ~StrX() { XMLString::release(&fLocalForm); }
    const char* localForm() const { return fLocalForm; }
};
```

```
std::ostream&
operator<<(std::ostream& target, const StrX& toDump)
{
    target << toDump.localForm();
    return target;
}

// error handler interface
class DOMTreeErrorReporter : public ErrorHandler
{
public:
    void warning(const SAXParseException& toCatch) {}
    void resetErrors() {}

    void error(const SAXParseException& toCatch) {
        cerr << "Error at file \"" << StrX(toCatch.getSystemId())
              << "\", line " << toCatch.getLineNumber()
              << ", column " << toCatch.getColumnNumber() << endl
              << "    Message: " << StrX(toCatch.getMessage()) << endl;
    }

    void fatalError(const SAXParseException& toCatch) {
        cerr << "Fatal Error at file \"" << StrX(toCatch.getSystemId())
              << "\", line " << toCatch.getLineNumber()
              << ", column " << toCatch.getColumnNumber() << endl
              << "    Message: " << StrX(toCatch.getMessage()) << endl;
    }
};

// -----

int
main(int argc, const char** argv)
{
    try
    {
        XMLPlatformUtils::Initialize();
    }
    catch(const XMLException& e)
    {
        StrX tmp_e(e.getMessage());
        cerr << "Xerces initialization error: " << tmp_e.localForm() << endl;
        return 2;
    }

    // check command line for arguments
    if ( argc < 2 )
    {
        cerr << "usage: schema-check <xml-file> [<schema-file> ...]" << endl;
        return 3;
    }

    for ( int i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
    {
        FILE *f = fopen(argv[i], "r");
        if ( f == 0 )
        {
            perror(argv[i]);
            return 4;
        }
    }

    XercesDOMParser *parser = new XercesDOMParser;
    DOMTreeErrorReporter *errReporter = new DOMTreeErrorReporter();
    parser->setErrorHandler(errReporter);
}
```

```
parser->setDoNamespaces(true);
parser->setCreateEntityReferenceNodes(true);
parser->useCachedGrammarInParse(true);

if ( argc > 2 )
{
    parser->setDoSchema(true);
    parser->setDoValidation(true);
    parser->setValidationSchemaFullChecking(true);

    for ( int i = 2; i < argc; i++ )
    {
        if ( parser->loadGrammar(argv[i], Grammar::SchemaGrammarType, true) == 0 )
        {
            cerr << "Error loading grammar " << std::string(argv[i]) << endl;
            return 4;
        }
    }
}

bool errorsOccured = true;
try
{
    parser->parse(argv[1]);
    errorsOccured = false;
}
catch ( const OutOfMemoryException& )
{
    cerr << "Out of memory exception." << endl;
}
catch ( const XMLException& e )
{
    cerr << "An error occurred during parsing" << endl
        << "  Message: " << StrX(e.getMessage()) << endl;
}
catch ( const DOMException& e )
{
    const unsigned int maxChars = 2047;
    XMLCh errText[maxChars + 1];

    cerr << endl
        << "A DOM error occurred during parsing: '" << std::string(argv[1]) << "' << endl
        << "DOM Exception code:  " << e.code << endl;

    if ( DOMImplementation::loadDOMExceptionMsg(e.code, errText, maxChars) )
        cerr << "Message is: " << StrX(errText) << endl;
}
catch (...)
{
    cerr << "An unclassified error occurred during parsing." << endl;
}

return errorsOccured ? 1 : 0;
}

//
// end schema-check.cpp
//
```

## C.4. kdm-decrypt

This program reads a KDM and an RSA private key in PEM format and decrypts the EncryptedKey elements in the KDM. The decrypted key blocks are printed to `stdout`. Note that key blocks in the KDM must have been encrypted using the public key which corresponds to the RSA key given as the second argument to this program.

### Example C.4. kdm-decrypt execution

```
$ kdm-decrypt test_file.kdm.xml my_id_key.pem
  CipherDataID: f1dc124460169a0e85bc300642f866ab
SignerThumbprint: q50qr6GkfG6W2HzcBTee5m0Qjzw=
  CPL Id: 119d8990-2e55-4114-80a2-e53f3403118d
  Key Id: b6276c4b-b832-4984-aab6-250c9e4f9138
  Key Type: MDIK
  Not Before: 2007-09-20T03:24:53-00:00
  Not After: 2007-10-20T03:24:53-00:00
  Key Data: 7f2f711f1b4d44b83e1dd1bf90dc7d8c
```

### C.4.1. kdm-decrypt Source Code Listing

```
//
// kdm-decrypt.cpp -- decrypt and display KDM EncryptedKey elements
//
// Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
//
// This program requires the Xerces-c XML, XMLSecurity, OpenSSL
// and asdcplib libraries. To build:
//
// c++ -o kdm-decrypt kdm-decrypt.cpp
// -lxerces-c -lxml-security-c -lkumu -lcrypto
//
#include <KM_util.h>
#include <KM_fileio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <string>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <xercesc/util/OutOfMemoryException.hpp>
#include <xercesc/parsers/XercesDOMParser.hpp>
#include <xercesc/framework/MemBufInputSource.hpp>
#include <xsec/framework/XSECProvider.hpp>
#include <xsec/framework/XSECException.hpp>
#include <xsec/enc/XSECCryptoException.hpp>
#include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoKeyRSA.hpp>

XERCES_CPP_NAMESPACE_USE
using std::cout;
using std::cerr;
using std::endl;
using namespace Kumu;

const size_t KeyType_Length = 4;
const size_t DateTime_Length = 25;
const ui32_t X509Thumbprint_Length = 20;

// A structure to hold key block data retrieved during a decrypt operation.
struct S430_2_KeyBlock
{
  byte_t CipherDataID[UUID_Length];
  byte_t SignerThumbprint[X509Thumbprint_Length];
};
```

```

byte_t CPLId[UUID_Length];
byte_t KeyType[KeyType_Length];
byte_t KeyId[UUID_Length];
byte_t NotBefore[DateTime_Length];
byte_t NotAfter[DateTime_Length];
byte_t KeyData[SymmetricKey_Length];

S430_2_KeyBlock() {
    memset(this, 0, sizeof(S430_2_KeyBlock));
}

std::string Dump() const;
};

std::string safe_char(char c) {
    char b[2] = {'*', 0};
    if ( isprint(c) ) b[0] = c;
    return b;
}

// Pretty-print key block data.
std::string
S430_2_KeyBlock::Dump() const
{
    using std::string;
    Kumu::Identifier<X509Thumbprint_Length> TmpThumbprint;
    UUID    TmpUUID;
    char    tmp_buf[64];
    string  out_string;

    bin2hex(CipherDataID, UUID_Length, tmp_buf, 64);
    out_string = "    CipherDataID: " + string(tmp_buf);
    TmpThumbprint.Set(SignerThumbprint);
    out_string += "\nSignerThumbprint: " + string(TmpThumbprint.EncodeBase64(tmp_buf, 64));
    TmpUUID.Set(CPLId);
    out_string += "\n                CPL Id: " + string(TmpUUID.EncodeHex(tmp_buf, 64));
    TmpUUID.Set(KeyId);
    out_string += "\n                Key Id: " + string(TmpUUID.EncodeHex(tmp_buf, 64));
    out_string += "\n                Key Type: "
        + safe_char(KeyType[0]) + safe_char(KeyType[1])
        + safe_char(KeyType[2]) + safe_char(KeyType[3]);
    assert(DateTime_Length<64);
    tmp_buf[DateTime_Length] = 0;
    memcpy(tmp_buf, NotBefore, DateTime_Length);
    out_string += "\n                Not Before: " + string(tmp_buf);
    memcpy(tmp_buf, NotAfter, DateTime_Length);
    out_string += "\n                Not After: " + string(tmp_buf);
    bin2hex(KeyData, UUID_Length, tmp_buf, 64);
    out_string += "\n                Key Data: " + string(tmp_buf);
    out_string += "\n";
    return out_string;
}

// Given a KDM string and a parsed RSA key, decrypt the key blocks
// in the KDM and print them to stdout.
int
decrypt_kdm(const std::string& KDMDocument, EVP_PKEY* Target)
{
    assert(Target);

    XercesDOMParser* parser = new XercesDOMParser;
    parser->setDoNamespaces(true);
    parser->setCreateEntityReferenceNodes(true);

    try
    {
        MemBufInputSource xmlSource(reinterpret_cast<const XMLByte*>(KDMDocument.c_str()),

```



```

        static_cast<const unsigned int>(KMDocument.length()),
        "pidc_rules_file");
parser->parse(xmlSource);
int errorCount = parser->getErrorCount();
if ( errorCount > 0 )
{
    cerr << "XML parse errors: " << errorCount << endl;
    return -1;
}
}
catch ( const OutOfMemoryException& )
{
    cerr << "Out of memory exception." << endl;
}
catch ( const XMLException& e )
{
    char* emsg = XMLString::transcode(e.getMessage());
    cerr << "An error occurred during parsing" << endl
         << "  Message: " << emsg << endl;
    XSEC_RELEASE_XMLCH(emsg);
}
catch ( const DOMException& e )
{
    const unsigned int maxChars = 2047;
    XMLCh errText[maxChars + 1];

    cerr << endl
         << "DOM Exception code is: " << e.code << endl;

    if ( DOMImplementation::loadDOMExceptionMsg(e.code, errText, maxChars) )
    {
        char* emsg = XMLString::transcode(errText);
        cerr << "Message is: " << emsg << endl;
        XSEC_RELEASE_XMLCH(emsg);
    }
}
catch (...)
{
    cerr << "Unexpected XML parser error." << endl;
}

try
{
    XSECProvider prov;
    OpenSSLCryptoKeyRSA* PrivateKey = new OpenSSLCryptoKeyRSA(Target);
    if ( PrivateKey == 0 )
    {
        cerr << "Error reading private key" << endl;
        return -1;
    }

    DOMDocument* doc = parser->getDocument();
    assert(doc);
    XENCCipher* cipher = prov.newCipher(doc);
    cipher->setKEK(PrivateKey);

    DOMNodeIterator* Iter =
        ((DOMDocumentTraversal*)doc)->createNodeIterator(doc,
                                                         (DOMNodeFilter::SHOW_ELEMENT),
                                                         0, false);

    assert(Iter);
    DOMNode* Node;
    int keys_accepted = 0;
    int key_nodes_found = 0;

    while ( (Node = Iter->nextNode()) != 0 )
    {

```

```

char* n = XMLString::transcode(Node->getLocalName());
if ( n == 0 ) continue;

if ( strcmp(n, "EncryptedKey") == 0 )
{
    key_nodes_found++;
    S430_2_KeyBlock CipherData;
    ui32_t decrypt_len =
        cipher->decryptKey((DOMELEMENT*)Node,
            (byte_t*)&CipherData, sizeof(CipherData));

    if ( decrypt_len == sizeof(CipherData) )
    {
        keys_accepted++;
        cout << CipherData.Dump();
    }
    else if ( decrypt_len > 0 )
        cerr << "Unexpected cipher block length: " << decrypt_len << endl;
    else
        cerr << "Error decoding key block: " << key_nodes_found << endl;
}

XSEC_RELEASE_XMLCH(n);
}

Iter->release();
}
catch (XSECException &e)
{
    char* emsg = XMLString::transcode(e.getMsg());
    cerr << "Key decryption error: " << emsg << endl;
    XSEC_RELEASE_XMLCH(emsg);
    return -1;
}
catch (XSECCryptoException &e)
{
    cerr << "Crypto error: " << e.getMsg() << endl;
    return -1;
}
catch (...)
{
    cerr << "Unexpected decryption error." << endl;
}

delete parser;
return 0;
}

//
int
main(int argc, const char** argv)
{
    if ( argc < 3 )
    {
        cerr << "USAGE: kdm-decrypt <kdm-file> <RSA-PEM-file>" << endl;
        return 2;
    }

    try
    {
        XMLPlatformUtils::Initialize();
        XSECPlatformUtils::Initialise();
    }
    catch(const XMLException& e)
    {
        char* emsg = XMLString::transcode(e.getMessage());
        cerr << "Xerces or XMLSecurity initialization error: " << emsg << endl;
    }
}

```

```
XSEC_RELEASE_XMLCH(msg);
return 3;
}
catch (...)
{
    cerr << "Unexpected Xerces or XMLSecurity initialization error." << endl;
}

FILE* fp = fopen (argv[2], "r");
if ( fp == 0 )
{
    perror(argv[2]);
    return 4;
}

EVP_PKEY* Target = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, 0, 0, 0);
fclose(fp);

if ( Target == 0 )
{
    cerr << "Error reading RSA key in file " << std::string(argv[2]) << endl;
    return 5;
}

std::string XML_doc;
Result_t result = ReadFileIntoString(argv[1], XML_doc);
if ( KM_FAILURE(result) )
{
    cerr << "Error reading XML file " << std::string(argv[1]) << endl;
    return 6;
}

if ( decrypt_kdm(XML_doc, Target) != 0 )
    return 1;

return 0;
}

//
// end kdm-decrypt.cpp
//
```

NOT CURR

## C.5. j2c-scan

This program reads a JPEG 2000 codestream from a file and produces parametric data on the standard output. The following example illustrates this usage:

### Example C.5. j2c-scan execution

```
$ j2c-scan test_frame_000002.j2c
coding parameters
digital cinema profile: none
rsiz capabilities: standard
pixel offset from top-left corner: (0, 0)
tile width/height in pixels: (2048, 1080)
image width/height in tiles: (1, 1)
tile #1
  coding style: 1
  progression order: Component-Position-Resolution-Layer
  POC marker flag: 0
  number of quality layers: 1
    rate for layer #1: 0.0
  multi-component transform flag: 1
  component #1
    coding style: 1
    number of resolutions: 6
    code block width/height: (5, 5)
    code block coding style: 0
    discrete wavelet transform identifier: 0
    quantization style: 2
    number of guard bits: 1
    step size pairs: 16
    region of interest shift: 0
  component #2
    coding style: 1
    number of resolutions: 6
    code block width/height: (5, 5)
    code block coding style: 0
    discrete wavelet transform identifier: 0
    quantization style: 2
    number of guard bits: 1
    step size pairs: 16
    region of interest shift: 0
  component #3
    coding style: 1
    number of resolutions: 6
    code block width/height: (5, 5)
    code block coding style: 0
    discrete wavelet transform identifier: 0
    quantization style: 2
    number of guard bits: 1
    step size pairs: 16
    region of interest shift: 0
```

### C.5.1. j2c-scan Source Code Listing

```
/*
 * j2c-scan.cpp -- parse j2c file and display data concerning it
 *
 // Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
 *
 * This program requires the OpenJPEG library. Furthermore, it
 * requires the header files "openjpeg.h" and "j2k.h" from the
```

```

* OpenJPEG source distribution. Copy the headers to your build
* directory. After doing so, execute the following to build:
* $ c++ -o j2c-scan j2c-scan.cpp -lopenjpeg
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "openjpeg.h"
#include "j2k.h"

static void
j2k_dump_cp (opj_image_t * image, opj_cp_t * cp)
{
    char *s;
    int i, j;
    int step_size_pairs;
    printf ("coding parameters\n");
    if (cp->comment != NULL)
    {
        printf (" coding comment: %p\n", cp->comment);
    }
    switch (cp->cinema)
    {
        case OFF:          s = "none";          break;
        case CINEMA2K_24:  s = "2k @ 24 fps";    break;
        case CINEMA2K_48:  s = "2k @ 48 fps";    break;
        case CINEMA4K_24:  s = "4k @ 24 fps";    break;
        default:           s = "unknown";        break;
    }
    printf (" digital cinema profile: %s\n", s);
    switch (cp->rsiz)
    {
        case STD_RSIZ:     s = "standard";       break;
        case CINEMA2K:     s = "2k digital cinema"; break;
        case CINEMA4K:     s = "4k digital cinema"; break;
        default:           s = "unknown";        break;
    }
    printf (" rsiz capabilities: %s\n", s);
    printf (" pixel offset from top-left corner: (%d, %d)\n", cp->tx0,
        cp->ty0);
    printf (" tile width/height in pixels: (%d, %d)\n", cp->tdx, cp->tdy);
    printf (" image width/height in tiles: (%d, %d)\n", cp->tw, cp->th);
    for (i = 0; i < cp->tw * cp->th; i++)
    {
        printf (" tile #%d\n", i + 1);
        printf (" coding style: %x\n", cp->tcps[i].csty);
        switch (cp->tcps[i].prg)
        {
            case LRCP:     s = "Layer-Resolution-Component-Position"; break;
            case RLCP:     s = "Resolution-Layer-Component-Position"; break;
            case RPCL:     s = "Resolution-Position-Component-Layer"; break;
            case PCRL:     s = "Position-Component-Resolution-Layer"; break;
            case CPRL:     s = "Component-Position-Resolution-Layer"; break;
            default:       s = "unknown"; break;
        }
        printf (" progression order: %s\n", s);
        printf (" POC marker flag: %d\n", cp->tcps[i].POC);
        printf (" number of quality layers: %d\n", cp->tcps[i].numlayers);
        for (j = 0; j < cp->tcps[i].numlayers; j++)
        {
            printf (" rate for layer #%d: %.1f\n", j + 1,
                cp->tcps[i].rates[j]);
        }
        printf (" multi-component transform flag: %d\n", cp->tcps[i].mct);
        for (j = 0; j < image->numcomps; j++)
        {

```

```

    printf ("    component #%d\n", j + 1);
    printf ("        coding style: %x\n", cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].csty);
    printf ("        number of resolutions: %d\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].numresolutions);
    printf ("        code block width/height: (%d, %d)\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].cblkw, cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].cblkh);
    printf ("        code block coding style: %x\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].cblksty);
    printf ("        discrete wavelet transform identifier: %d\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].qmfbid);
    printf ("        quantization style: %d\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].qntsty);
    printf ("        number of guard bits: %d\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].numgbits);
    step_size_pairs =
        (cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].qntsty ==
         J2K_CCP_QNTSTY_SIQNT) ? 1 : cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].numresolutions *
        3 - 2;
    printf ("        step size pairs: %d\n", step_size_pairs);
    printf ("        region of interest shift: %d\n",
        cp->tccps[i].tccps[j].roishift);
    }
}
}

void
error_callback (const char *msg, void *client_data)
{
    FILE *stream = (FILE *) client_data;
    fprintf (stream, "[ERROR] %s", msg);
}

void
warning_callback (const char *msg, void *client_data)
{
    FILE *stream = (FILE *) client_data;
    fprintf (stream, "[WARNING] %s", msg);
}

int
main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char *filename;           /* name of the file to process */
    FILE *fp;                /* input file pointer */
    int file_length;         /* length of the input file */
    unsigned char *buffer = NULL; /* in-memory buffer containing the input file */
    opj_cio_t *cio = NULL;   /* OpenJPEG wrapper around file buffer */
    opj_dparameters_t parameters; /* decompression parameters */
    opj_dinfo_t *dinfo = NULL; /* pointer to a JPEG-2000 decompressor */
    opj_event_mgr_t event_mgr; /* manager of events' callback functions */
    opj_image_t *image = NULL; /* pointer to the decoded image */

    memset (&event_mgr, 0, sizeof (opj_event_mgr_t));
    event_mgr.error_handler = error_callback;
    event_mgr.warning_handler = warning_callback;
    event_mgr.info_handler = NULL;

    /* establish default decoding parameters for JPEG-2000 codestreams */
    opj_set_default_decoder_parameters (&parameters);
    parameters.decod_format = 0;

    if (argc != 2)
    {
        fprintf (stderr, "USAGE: j2c-scan file.j2c\n");
        return 1;
    }
}

```

```
filename = argv[1];
strncpy (parameters.infile, filename, sizeof (parameters.infile) - 1);

/* read the input file and put it in memory */
fp = fopen (parameters.infile, "rb");
if (fp == NULL)
{
    perror ("fopen");
    return 2;
}
fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_END);
file_length = (int) ftell (fp);
fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
buffer = (unsigned char *) malloc (file_length);
fread (buffer, sizeof (unsigned char), file_length, fp);
fclose (fp);

/* decode the JPEG-2000 codestream */
dinfo = opj_create_decompress (CODEC_J2K);
opj_set_event_mgr ((opj_common_ptr) dinfo, &event_mgr, stderr);
opj_setup_decoder (dinfo, &parameters);
cio = opj_cio_open ((opj_common_ptr) dinfo, buffer, file_length);
image = opj_decode (dinfo, cio);
if (image == NULL)
{
    fprintf (stderr, "ERROR -> j2c-scan: failed to decode image!\n");
    opj_destroy_decompress (dinfo);
    opj_cio_close (cio);
    free (buffer);
    return 1;
}
opj_cio_close (cio);
free (buffer);

/* display information about the image */
j2k_dump_cp (image, ((opj_j2k_t *) dinfo->j2k_handle)->cp);

/* free the memory */
opj_destroy_decompress (dinfo);
opj_image_destroy (image);

return 0;
}
```

NOT CUI

## C.6. Eab\_calc.py

This program reads a measured set of  $xyY$  values and a set of reference values and calculates the  $\Delta E^*_{ab}$  value of the two. This calculation is required to perform the test in Section 7.5.12. The following example illustrates this usage:

### Example C.6. Eab\_calc.py execution

```
$ Eab_calc.py 0.2650 0.6900 34.64 0.2719 0.6835 34.64
L=88.0 a*=-110.2 b*=106.1
L=88.0 a*=-106.2 b*=106.0
DeltaE=4.0
```

### C.6.1. Eab\_calc.py Source Code Listing

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# Eab_calc.py -- Calculate Delta E*ab from xyY inputs.
#               Adapted from the examples in SMPTE EG432-1.
#
#
# Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
#

import sys

reference = ((0.6800, 0.3200, 10.06),
            (0.2650, 0.6900, 34.64),
            (0.1500, 0.0600, 3.31),
            (0.2048, 0.3602, 37.94),
            (0.3424, 0.1544, 13.36),
            (0.4248, 0.5476, 44.69),
            (0.5980, 0.3269, 10.06),
            (0.2884, 0.5282, 34.64),
            (0.1664, 0.0891, 3.31),
            (0.2409, 0.3572, 37.19),
            (0.3382, 0.1838, 13.36),
            (0.3973, 0.4989, 42.46),
            )

# Simplified operation: fill in "measured" table
# and call without arguments.
measured = ((0.6767, 0.3201, 9.912),
            (0.2694, 0.6836, 33.930),
            (0.1511, 0.0621, 3.422),
            (0.2037, 0.3578, 36.920),
            (0.3407, 0.1546, 13.180),
            (0.4223, 0.5473, 43.490),
            (0.5963, 0.3264, 9.848),
            (0.2861, 0.5280, 33.580),
            (0.1671, 0.0897, 3.323),
            (0.2392, 0.3551, 36.170),
            (0.3365, 0.1828, 13.110),
            (0.3953, 0.4983, 41.300),
            )

_Xwhite = 42.940 # d-cinema reference white constants
_Ywhite = 48.0
_Zwhite = 45.812

def _Lab_f1(measured, white_ref):
    q = measured / white_ref
```



```
if q > 0.008856: return pow(q, 1.0/3.0)
return (1.0 / 3.0) * pow(29.0 / 6.0, 2) * q + (4.0 / 29.0)

class Lab_set:
    def init_with_xyY(self, x, y, Y):
        X = ( x / y ) * Y
        z = 1 - x - y
        Z = ( z / y ) * Y
        return self.init_with_XYZ(X,Y,Z)

    def init_with_XYZ(self, X, Y, Z):
        Yratio = _Lab_fl(Y, _Ywhite);
        self.L = 116.0 * Yratio - 16;
        self.a = 500.0 * ( _Lab_fl(X, _Xwhite) - Yratio );
        self.b = 200.0 * ( Yratio - _Lab_fl(Z, _Zwhite) );
        return self

    def calc_DeltaE(self, rhs):
        sum = pow(self.L - rhs.L, 2)
        sum += pow(self.a - rhs.a, 2)
        sum += pow(self.b - rhs.b, 2);
        return pow(sum, 0.5);

    def __repr__(self):
        return "L=%1f a*=%1f b*=%1f" % (self.L, self.a, self.b)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    if len(sys.argv) == 1:
        for i in range(12):
            measured_data = Lab_set().init_with_xyY(*measured[i])
            reference_data = Lab_set().init_with_xyY(*reference[i])
            print " measured: %s %s" % (measured[i], measured_data)
            print "reference: %s %s" % (reference[i], reference_data)
            print "DeltaE=%1f" % (reference_data.calc_DeltaE(measured_data))
        sys.exit(0)

    elif len(sys.argv) != 7:
        sys.stderr.write("usage: Eab_calc <x-m> <y-m> <Y-m> <x-ref> <y-ref> <Y-ref>\n")
        sys.exit(1)

    measured_data = Lab_set().init_with_xyY(float(sys.argv[1]),
                                             float(sys.argv[2]),
                                             float(sys.argv[3]))

    reference_data = Lab_set().init_with_xyY(float(sys.argv[4]),
                                             float(sys.argv[5]),
                                             float(sys.argv[6]))

    print " measured: %s" % (measured_data)
    print "reference: %s" % (reference_data)
    print "DeltaE=%1f" % (reference_data.calc_DeltaE(measured_data))

#
# end Eab_calc.py
#
```

## C.7. uuid\_check.py

This program reads one or more XML files containing d-cinema metadata and tests each of the UUID values for compliance with [RFC-4122]. The program will emit a message on `stderr` for each malformed UUID that is encountered. The following example illustrates this usage for a KDM file:

### Example C.7. uuid\_check.py execution

```
$ uuid_check.py Example.kdm.xml
UUID: 7556bff9-58f9-4320-bb1f-fb594219a957
UUID: bdb3a717-5062-4822-8dfc-0dc6570cc116
UUID: 71f7926e-8ce6-4763-b14b-0ef7dcd952f5
UUID: 6083adad-472c-43da-b131-c6dc601cd154
UUID: aeaae312-a257-11da-a601-8b319b685f8e
```

### C.7.1. uuid\_check Source Code Listing

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# uuid_check.py -- Scan an XML file and see that all UUID values
#                  conform to RFC-4122
#
# Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
#

import sys, re

# regular expressions for use below
urn_uuid_re = re.compile('urn:uuid:([<]*)')
uuid_re = re.compile('^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-\
([1-5])[0-9a-f]{3}-[8-9a-b][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$', re.IGNORECASE)

#
def uuid_scan(text):
    uuid_list = []
    while text:
        match = urn_uuid_re.search(text)
        if not match: break

        uuid_val = match.group(1)
        text = text[match.end():]

        match = uuid_re.match(uuid_val)
        if not match:
            sys.stderr.write("urn:uuid: value is not an RFC-4122 UUID: %s\n" % (uuid_val))
            continue

        type = int(match.group(1)[0])
        if type not in (1, 4, 5):
            sys.stderr.write("Unexpected UUID type: %d for value %s\n" % (type, uuid_val))

        uuid_list.append(uuid_val)

    return uuid_list

#
#
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    sys.stderr.write("usage: uuid_check.py <xml-file> [...]\n")
    sys.exit(1)
```

```
for filename in sys.argv[1:]:
    try:
        handle = open(filename)
        text = handle.read()
        handle.close()

    except Exception, e:
        print "%s: %s" % (filename, e)

    else:
        for uuid in uuid_scan(text):
            print "UUID: " + uuid

#
# end uuid_check.py
#
```

ARCHIVED  
NOT CURRENT VERSION

## C.8. dsig\_cert.py

This program reads a signed XML file and re-writes the file to the standard output using the certificate order expected by the **checksig** program from the XML Security package. The following example illustrates this usage for a KDM file:

### Example C.8. dsig\_cert.py execution

```
$ dsig-cert.py test-kdm.xml >tmp.xml
$ checksig tmp.xml
Signature verified OK!
```

### C.8.1. dsig\_cert.py Source Code Listing

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# dsig_cert.py -- Re-order certificates in an XML signature
#
# NOTE: This program requires Python 2.4 or greater
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#

import sys, re
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE

# regular expressions for use below
SignatureValue_end_re = re.compile('</(?:[\w\-\ ]+)?SignatureValue[^\>]*>')
X509Data_re = re.compile('<(?:[\w\-\ ]+)?X509Data[^\>]*>(.*?)</(?:[\w\-\ ]+)?X509Data\s*>\s+',
                          re.DOTALL)
X509Certificate_re = re.compile('X509Certificate[^\>]*>(.*?)</', re.DOTALL)
dnQualifier_re = re.compile('dnQualifier=(?:[\w\-\ ]+)=')

#
def get_dnq_type(pem_text, type):
    """Extract the dnQualifier value for the given certificate and common name."""
    handle = Popen(['/usr/bin/openssl', 'x509', '-noout', '-' + type],
                  stdin=PIPE, stdout=PIPE, close_fds=True)

    handle.stdin.write(pem_text)
    handle.stdin.close()
    name_text = handle.stdout.read()
    handle.wait()

    if handle.returncode != 0:
        raise Exception, "No X509Certificate element in " + pem_text

    dnq = dnQualifier_re.search(name_text.replace('\n', ''))
    if not dnq:
        raise Exception, "Error retrieving dnQualifier from %s." % type

    return dnq.group(1)

#
def PEMify(base64_text):
    """ create canonical PEM lines from any base64 input"""
    in_text = re.sub('[\r\n]', '', base64_text)
    idx = 0
    end = len(in_text)
    retval = ''
    while idx < end:
        retval += in_text[idx:idx+64] + '\n'
```

```

        idx += 64

    return retval

#
class dsig_certificate_set:
    """An object for manipulating XML Signature certificates."""
    def __init__(self, xml_doc):
        """Initialize with a signed XML document string."""
        body_end = SignatureValue_end_re.search(xml_doc)

        if not body_end:
            raise Exception, "Document does not contain a SignatureValue element."

        self.kdm_head = xml_doc[:body_end.end()]
        xml_doc = xml_doc[body_end.end():]
        self.X509Data_list = []

        x509_data = X509Data_re.search(xml_doc)
        if x509_data:
            self.kdm_head += xml_doc[:x509_data.start()]

        while x509_data:
            x509_text = xml_doc[x509_data.start():x509_data.end()]
            self.X509Data_list.append({ 'text': x509_text })
            xml_doc = xml_doc[x509_data.end():]
            x509_data = X509Data_re.search(xml_doc)

        self.kdm_tail = xml_doc

        for x509_data in self.X509Data_list:
            # extract the certificate
            cert = X509Certificate_re.search(x509_data['text'])
            if not cert:
                raise Exception, "No X509Certificate element in " + x509_data['text']

            cert = PEMify(cert.group(1))
            cert = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n%s-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n" % (cert)

            x509_data['subject_dnq'] = get_dnq_type(cert, 'subject')
            x509_data['issuer_dnq'] = get_dnq_type(cert, 'issuer')
            x509_data['pem_cert'] = cert

    def order_by_dnq(self):
        """Arrange certificates in leaf-root order."""
        root = None
        issuer_map = {}

        for x509_data in self.X509Data_list:
            if x509_data['subject_dnq'] == x509_data['issuer_dnq']:
                if root:
                    raise Exception, "Certificate list contains multiple roots."
                root = x509_data
            else:
                issuer_map[x509_data['issuer_dnq']] = x509_data

        if not root:
            raise Exception, "Self-signed root certificate not found."

        tmp_list = [root];
        try:
            key = tmp_list[-1]['subject_dnq']
            next = issuer_map[key]
            while next:
                tmp_list.append(next)
                key = tmp_list[-1]['subject_dnq']
                next = issuer_map[key]

```

```
except:
    pass

if len(self.X509Data_list) != len(tmp_list):
    raise Exception, "Certificates do not form a complete chain."

tmp_list.reverse()
self.X509Data_list = tmp_list
return self

def write_certs(self, prefix='cert_set_'):
    """Write PEMcertificates to files using the optional filename prefix value."""
    count = 1
    for x509_data in self.X509Data_list:
        filename = "%s%d.pem" % (prefix, count)
        handle = open(filename, 'w')
        handle.write(x509_data['pem_cert'])
        handle.close()
        count += 1

def __repr__(self):
    cert_text = ''
    for cert in self.X509Data_list:
        cert_text += cert['text']

    return self.kdm_head + cert_text + self.kdm_tail

#
if __name__ == '__main__':
    if len(sys.argv) < 2:
        sys.stderr.write("usage: dsig_cert.py <xml-file>\n")
        sys.exit(1)

    try:
        handle = open(sys.argv[1])
        text = handle.read()
        handle.close()

        cert_set = dsig_certificate_set(text)
        cert_set.order_by_dnq()
        print cert_set
    except Exception, e:
        print e

#
# end dsig_cert.py
#
```

## C.9. dsig\_extract.py

This program reads a signed XML file and writes the certificates contained within to individual PEM files. As shown below, the `-p` option can be used to provide a prefix for the automatically-generated filenames. In this example, the input document contained four certificates.

### Example C.9. dsig\_extract.py execution

```
$ dsig-extract.py -p my_prefix_ test-kdm.xml
$ ls my_prefix_*
my_prefix_1.pem
my_prefix_2.pem
my_prefix_3.pem
my_prefix_4.pem
```

### C.9.1. dsig\_extract.py Source Code Listing

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# dsig_extract.py -- Extract certificates from an XML signature
#
# Published with DCI-CTP v1.2, Copyright 2007,2009,2012, Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
#

from dsig_cert import dsig_certificate_set
import sys

prefix = 'xmldsig_cert_'
filename = None

def usage():
    sys.stderr.write("usage: dsig_extract.py [-p <prefix>] <xml-file>\n")
    sys.exit(1)

if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    usage()

if sys.argv[1] == '-p':
    if len(sys.argv) < 4:
        usage()
    prefix = sys.argv[2]
    filename = sys.argv[3]
else:
    filename = sys.argv[1]

try:
    handle = open(filename)
    text = handle.read()
    handle.close()

    set = dsig_certificate_set(text)
    set.write_certs(prefix=prefix)

except Exception, e:
    print e

#
# end dsig_extract.py
#
```

---

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# Appendix D. ASM Simulator

The **asm-requester** and **asm-responder** programs implement the Auditorium Security Message (ASM) protocol defined in [SMPTE-430-6]. Both programs have command-line options that are required for each invocation, *e.g.*, to specify the TLS certificate, certificate chain, and RSA private key. In the examples presented throughout this document, these options are collectively referred to as (*... standard options ...*). The use of this shorthand is intended to allow the reader to concentrate on the options that define program behavior for the respective procedure.

**asm-requester** issues request messages to an ASM responder, such as an LDB. The program has command-line options to specify the destination IP address and the certificate, certificate chain, and RSA private key that comprise its identity. Additional options signal the type of message to be sent (from the set in [SMPTE-430-6]) and the message parameters. Program status and response values are displayed and may optionally be saved to disk.

**asm-responder** responds to requests from an ASM requester, *i.e.* a Security Manager (SM). It maintains a persistent state from startup, logging events that occur until the program is terminated. The program has command-line options to specify the IP bind address and TCP port, plus the certificate, certificate chain, and RSA private key that comprise its identity. Other options to control its message response behavior, *e.g.*, causing the program to respond to all request messages with "Busy". Files containing XML messages can be specified at invocation to pre-load log events to be returned in response to GetEventList messages.

The **asm-requester** and **asm-responder** programs are not provided with this document. They are described in detail in this appendix to allow Testing Organizations and other interested parties to develop an implementation that can provide the services required to execute the respective test procedures defined in this document. In lieu of developing this program, interested parties may instead choose to instrument an existing ASM requester or ASM responder implementation.

## Note

DCI compliant ASM implementations may differ in the way they present certificates during the TLS handshake. An implementation must supply the leaf certificate that identifies the device, but implementations may optionally supply the signing certificates that correspond to the leaf. Peer devices must work correctly regardless of the presence of a complete or partial chain. Some test procedures check this functionality directly, thus **asm-requester** and **asm-responder** must implement *both* certificate exchange modes.

## D.1. ASM Requester and Responder

### Name

asm-requester — initiate Request-Response-Pair (RRP) messagetype requests to an RRP responder

### Synopsis

```
asm-requester  [--captured-prefix<hex-string>]  [--damage-queriespb]  [--disable-
certificate-validation      ] [--disable-proper-cipher] [--disable-strict-reponse-
times] [--interval      <integer>] [--end-time <YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss>] [--key <hex-
string-representation-of-key>] [--library-versions] [--link-encryption-file <link-
encryption-file>] [--validity-period      <length      in      seconds>] [--attribute-
data      <string>] [--log-format-S1] [--messagetype BadRequest/GetTime/GetEventList/
GetEventID/QuerySPB/LEKeyLoad/LEKeyQueryID/LEKeyQueryAll/LEKeyPurgeID/
LEKeyPurgeAll/X-GetEventBatch] [--misc-id id] [--pem-path <directory>] [--queriespb-
interval>seconds<] [--repeat-count      <count>] [--request-id <id-number>] [--responder-
address      <address>] [--responder-certificate-file-dump <responder-certificate.pem>]
[--start-time <YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss>] [--use-16k-packets] [--verbose] [--X-geteventbatch-
directory <directory>]
```

---

asm-requester [-h|--help]

## Description

**asm-requester** is an ASM requester simulator. It initiates request-response-pair (RRP) messages with a responder at a specified IP address. There are two modes of operation: single request per invocation and multiple requests per invocation (interactive mode). See *INTERACTIVE MODE* for more information. **asm-requester** recognizes ASM message types specified in [SMPTE 430-6].

## Options

`--attribute-data <hex-string>` -- Specify a value to be used as the seed for the counter mode cipher as specified by SMPTE 430-6. The value specified must be a 16-character long hexadecimal string. This option is only used, and is required, when the messagetype is *LEKeyLoad*.

`--captured-prefix <filename-prefix>` -- Specify a filename prefix for logging responses from a responder to a file. The default is to write received responses to standard output.

`--damage-queriespb` -- Send an incorrect (shortened) length on QuerySPB requests in violation of SMPTE 430-6-2010.

`--disable-certificate-validation` -- Causes the asm-requester to skip validation of the responder's certificate during TLS negotiation.

`--disable-proper-cipher` -- Disables AES-128 as an allowable cipher (in violation of SMPTE 430-6-2010.)

`--disable-strict-reponse-times` -- Disables validation of the 2-second response time as specified in S430-6-2008.

`--end-time <timestamp>` -- Specify the end timestamp for retrieving events using GetEventList. The timestamp is a UTC format timestamp, formatted as YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.

`--interval<seconds as integer>` -- The interval, in seconds, between repetitions of commands. When absent, the messagetype request is sent only once.

`--key <hex-string-representation-of-key>` -- A hexadecimal key representing the symmetric key used to decrypt protected content. This option is only used, and is required, when the messagetype is *LEKeyLoad*.

`--library-versions` -- Display detailed library information

`--log-format-S1` -- Indicates the responder returns logs in the Series 1 binary format instead of the XMLformat defined by SMPTE 430-4.

`--link-encryption-file=<link-encryption-file>` -- For the LEKeyLoad request, a tab-delimited file that contains one or more link encryption key quartets {ID, key, duration, seed}. Useful for batch key loads.

`--messagetype <messagetype>` -- Specify the messagetype of the RRP being initiated. Valid message types are listed in the MESSAGE TYPES section below.

`--misc-id id` -- This option is used for specifying identifiers for messagetypes that require them. The value of this option depends on the messagetype specified. For example, when the messagetype is *LEKeyLoad*, the misc-id will be the KeyID that corresponds to the key being transmitted. When the messagetype is *GetEventID*, this will be the event ID number.

`--pem-path <directory>` -- Specify a directory that contains a certificate (certificate.pem), private key (privatekey.pem), and certificate chain (a file of sequentially ordered certificates named chain.pem).

---

`--queryspb-interval <seconds>` -- Specifies the interval, in seconds, for a connected interactive requester to make a QuerySPB request. A value of '0' (zero) disables this option.

`--repeat-count <count>` -- The number of times a message request is sent to the responder, subject to any specified wait periods or intervals. The message ID will increment by one each time.

`--request-id <id-string>` -- Specify an ID to be used with messagetypes that set or request a response based on an ID.

`--responder-address <address>` -- The IP address of the responder to which the request will be sent.

`--responder-certificate-file-dump <responder-certificate.pem>` -- Write out a file containing the responder's PEM encoded certificate.

`--start-time <timestamp>` -- Specify the starting timestamp for retrieving events using GetEventList. The timestamp is a UTC format timestamp, formatted as YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.

`--use-16k-packets` -- Break compliance with S430-6-2010 for compliance with RFC 2246 by allowing a maximum TLS plaintext length of 16 kilobytes instead of 512 bytes.

`--validity-period <seconds>` -- the validity period of the key specified with the `--key` option. This option is only used, and is required, when the messagetype is *LEKeyLoad*.

`--verbose` -- Enable verbose message output.

`--X-geteventbatch-directory=<directory>` -- Specify directory for writing events retrieved using X-GetEventBatch.

`--version` -- Prints version information and then quits

## Message Types

ASM messages types fit into two categories: General Purpose ASM commands and Link Encryption ASM commands. Only one command (messagetype request) can be specified at a time. The following list describes the ASM Responder message types are accepted by the `--messagetype` (or available in the Interactive Mode) option:

BadRequest	Issues a request for an unknown message type to illicit a "BadRequest" response.
GetTime	Issues a request for the current time of the responder.
GetEventList	Issues a request for the list of events recorded between specified start and stop times.
GetEventID	Issues a request for the log record matching one of the log record IDs returned from a GetEventList response.
GetProjCert	Issues a request for the connected projector's certificate. The certificate received in response to this command is saved in DER format to the file "GetProjCert.der" and the general status and length of captured certificate are printed to the screen. Note that this MessageType is only available in Interactive Mode (see below).
QuerySPB	Issues a request for a system status report from the responder.
LEKeyLoad	Issues an LEKeyLoad message containing a link decryption key to the responder. Note that this messagetype requires the <code>--key</code> , <code>--validity-period</code> , and <code>--attribute-data</code> options.
LEKeyQueryID	Issues an LEKeyQuery message specifying the ID of a link decryption key

LEKeyQueryAll	Issues an LEKeyQueryALL message to a responder.
LEKeyPurgeID	Issues an LEKeyPurgeID message containing an ID of a key to be purged.
LEKeyPurgeAll	Issues an LEKeyPurgeAll message instructing a responder to purge all link decryption keys.
X-GetEventBatch	Gets batches of events

## Retrieved Messages

Once the request has been sent and either a response received or the timeout period exceeded, the message and/or status of the message is displayed to the screen and, optionally, recorded to a file using the `--captured-prefix` option to save it to a file.

## Interactive Mode

When **asm-requester** is invoked without the `--messagetype` option it enters its interactive mode and presents a menu of messagetypes that can be requested:

```

Press '0' to issue a bad request.
Press '1' to issue a GetTime request.
Press '2' to issue a GetEventList request.
Press '3' to issue a GetEventID request.
Press '4' to issue a QuerySPB request.
Press '5' to issue a LEKeyLoad request.
Press '6' to issue a LEKeyQueryID request.
Press '7' to issue a LEKeyQueryAll request.
Press '8' to issue a LEKeyPurgeID request.
Press '9' to issue a LEKeyPurgeAll request.
Press 'C' to issue a GetProjCert request.
Artificially generated meta-requests are also available:
Press 'z' to issue a GetEventList request followed by a GetEventID request for each event.
The returned event logs are placed into a directory.
Press 'X' to inject bad data into the TLS stream in violation of SMPTE 430-6-2010.
Press control-C to quit.

```

Message requests are selected by entering the corresponding number and pressing [Enter]. When the selected messagetype requires additional information, **asm-requester** will prompt for it.

```

2
Please enter the desired start and stop times in ISO 8601 time range format
  ("YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss/YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss"):
(press 'x' to return to the previous menu).
Press control-C to quit.
2009-03-26T16:02:58/2009-03-26T16:26:07
2009-04-02T20:50:52Z For request no. 0
  Retrieved 3 items from the list: [3, 4, 5]
  General response status: successful
Please enter the desired start and stop times in ISO 8601 time range format
  ("YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss/YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss"):
(press 'x' to return to the previous menu).
Press control-C to quit.

```

For some message types, like LEKeyLoad, sub-menus are presented depending on the information to be supplied:

```

5
Press '1' to enter the keys by hand.
Press '2' to load the keys from a file.

```

---

(press 'x' to return to the previous menu).

## Examples

```
$ asm-requester --responder-address 192.168.1.100 \  
  --pem-path /home/asm/pem_dir/ \  
  --captured-prefix virt-ldb-001-test01- \  
  --messagetype GetEventList
```

Starts an instance of the asm-requester with the specified PEM directory, establishes a TLS connection to 192.168.1.100, then sends a GetEventList message request. Output is logged to a file starting with the filename "virt-ldb-001-test01-".

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## Name

asm-responder — respond to Request-Response-Pair (RRP) messagetype requests from an RRP requester

## Synopsis

```
asm-responder [--allowed-idle-time <seconds>][--bind-address <address>][--bind-port <port>] [--captured-prefix <file-prefix>] [--damage-queryspb] [--disable-certificate-validation] [--disable-proper-cipher][--disable-realtime-logs][--enable-debug-event-id-response] [--enable-GetProjCert-response] [--log-directory <log-directory>] [--library-versions] [ --max-message-size <size>] [--pr-certificate-file <cert-file>][--preload-log-event <xml-file>][--requester-certificate-file-dump <requester-certificate.pem>] [--respond-wtih-state <string>] [--respond-with-status <string>] [--set-timezone-offset <minutes>] [--tls-only] [--use-16k-packets] [--wait-before-responding <non-negative-float>][--verbose]
```

## Description

**asm-responder** is an ASM responder simulator. It will respond to ASM Request messages received from an ASM requester. **asm-responder** recognizes ASM message types specified by SMPTE 430-6. When invoked, the responder will respond with a status messagetype of "Successful" (default), "Busy", "Invalid", or "Failed" as specified using the `--respond-with` or as specified at run time. More information about this is available in the `RUNTIME OPTIONS` and `INTERACTIVE MENU` sections below.

## Options

`--allowed-idle-time <seconds>` -- Number of seconds before an idle connection may be pre-empted. Default is 90 seconds.

`--bind-address <address>` -- The IP address on which to bind and listen for connections. If no address is specified, localhost is used.

`--bind-port <port>` -- The TCP port number on which to bind and listen for connections. If no port is specified, the default port of 1173 is used.

`--captured-prefix <file-prefix>` -- Specify a filename prefix for logging responses from a responder to a file. The default is to write received responses to standard output.

`--damage-queryspb` -- Send an incorrect (shortened) length on QuerySPB responses in violation of SMPTE 430-6-2010.

`--disable-certificate-validation` -- Disables the validation of the certificate(s) received from the remote requester during TLS initiation.

`--disable-proper-cipher` -- Disables AES-128 as an allowable cipher (in violation of SMPTE 430-6-2010.)

`--disable-realtime-logs` -- Disable interactive security log recording.

`--enable-debug-event-id-response` -- Allow the sending of debug event IDs, instead of indicating a bad request.

`--enable-GetProjCert-response` -- Allow the sending of the GetProjCert response, instead of indicating a bad request. Default is disabled.

---

`--log-directory<log-directory>` -- The directory into which log records should be saved. The default value of `./logDirectory` is used if no log directory is specified.

`--library-versions` -- Display detailed library information

`--max-message-size <size>` -- Specify the maximum message size, in bytes, that can be received by the responder.

`--pem-path <directory>` -- Specify a directory that contains a certificate (`certificate.pem`), private key (`privatekey.pem`), and certificate chain (a file of sequentially ordered certificates named `chain.pem`).

`--pr-certificate-file <cert-file>` -- Specify a file that contains a PEM or DER certificate that represents the PR identity that the `asm-responder` is married to. (Used in the `GetProjCert` response).

`--preload-log-event <event-log-file.xml>` -- Specify a file containing a log event. This option may be used multiple times, but only a single file may be specified per use.

`--requester-certificate-file-dump <requester-certificate.pem>` -- Write out a file containing the requester's PEM encoded certificate.

`--respond-with-state=<string>` -- Respond to all "QuerySPB" request messages with the specified response, either `NotPlaying`, `Playing`, or `SecurityAlert`

`--respond-with-status=<string>` -- Respond to all request messages with the specified general response.

`--set-timezone-offset <minutes>` -- Specify UTC offset, in minutes, for emitted logs.

`--tls-only` -- This option causes **asm-responder** to establish a TLS session when requested, then ignore (not respond to) any messages sent from a requester.

`--use-16k-packets` --Break compliance with S430-6-2010 for compliance with RFC 2246 by allowing a maximum TLS plaintext length of 16 kilobytes instead of 512 bytes.

`--wait-before-responding=<non-negative-float>` -- The length of time in seconds after receiving a request to wait before sending its response.

`--verbose` -- Enable verbose message output.

`--version` -- Prints version information and then quits

## Message Types

ASM messages types fit into two categories: General Purpose ASM commands and Link Encryption ASM commands. Only one command (`messagetype` request) can be specified at a time. The following list describes the ASM Responder message types that are recognized by the responder, and the action and response generated by receiving each message type:

<code>BadRequest</code>	Respond with a "BadRequest" response.
<code>GetTime</code>	Responds with a <code>GetTime</code> response message.
<code>GetEventList</code>	Responds with a message containing the list of events recorded between the start and stop times.
<code>GetEventID</code>	Responds with a message containing the log record matching the log record ID specified in the Requester's request message.
<code>GetProjCert</code>	Responds with a message containing the PR certificate specified by the <code>--pr-certificate-file</code> option in DER form.

QuerySPB	Responds with a message containing a system status report.
LEKeyLoad	Accepts a Link Encryption key and responds with a message indicating that the key was received.
LEKeyQueryID	Responds with a message indicating the presence or absence of the key matching the KeyID specified in the requester's message.
LEKeyQueryAll	Responds with a message containing all of the KeyIDs corresponding to the Link Decryption keys in the responder.
LEKeyPurgeID	Deletes the specified key, and responds with a message indicating that the key matching the KeyID specified by the requester has been deleted.
LEKeyPurgeAll	Deletes all Link Encryption keys and responds with a message indicating that the key matching the KeyID specified by the requester has been deleted.

## Runtime Options

When the asm-responder is invoked to respond with a status, either "Successful" (default), "Busy", "Invalid", or "Failed". If no status is specified, the default status of "Successful" is used. While the asm-responder is running this value can be changed by typing 0, 1, 2, or 3 and pressing [Enter]. Values are as follows:

- 0 Successful
- 1 Busy
- 2 Invalid
- 3 Failed

## INTERACTIVE MENUS

asm-responder emulates a physical device in that it has a secured "perimeter" as well as a marriageable SPB. The devices are married/divorced and opened/closed based on log events, whether preloaded or generated interactively. If the "perimeter" is open or "SPB" is not married, the responder will return a security alert to any QuerySPB requests. Otherwise, it will return the emulated playback state, which can be set via the "Press '3' to toggle the responder's playback status." menu option.

When invoked, asm-responder will enter its interactive menu mode. From this menu, responses to messagetype requests can be specified by entering the letter or number that corresponds to your selection followed by [Enter]. Specifying a response message type on the command will configure the responder for that query response when it is initialized. 'x' returns to the previous menu, and [Ctrl-C] exits the responder. Other letter and number functions are context dependent and their use changes depending on the current menu.

When the responder initializes the top level menu is presented:

```
$ ./asm-responder.py --pem-path=/home/asm/id --bind-address 127.0.0.1
The responder has started running.
Press '1' to display/modify a general response element.
Press '2' to create an operations security log.
Press '3' to toggle the responder's playback status.
Press '4' to toggle the responder's acceptance of GetEventID requests of debug log records.
Press 'X' to inject bad data into the TLS stream in violation of SMPTE 430-6-2010.
Press control-C to quit.
```

From this menu, we can see and modify the type of responses that will be sent (1), we can generate a security log (2), we can induce errors into the TLS stream, or quit ([Ctrl-C]). Entering '1' will display the list of event queries and the response that will be sent when that type of query message is received. Any (or all) of the message responses can be changed by selecting the message type, as described below.

```
1
```



```
Please select the request for which the response element should be modified:
Press 'a' for all requests.
Press 'b' for BadRequest (currently Successful).
Press 'c' for GetTime (currently Successful).
Press 'd' for GetEventList (currently Successful).
Press 'e' for GetEventID (currently Successful).
Press 'f' for QuerySPB (currently Successful).
Press 'g' for LEKeyLoad (currently Successful).
Press 'h' for LEKeyQueryID (currently Successful).
Press 'i' for LEKeyQueryAll (currently Successful).
Press 'j' for LEKeyPurgeID (currently Successful).
Press 'k' for LEKeyPurgeAll (currently Successful).
Press 'l' for GetProjCert (currently Successful).
Press 'x' to return to the main menu.
Press control-C to quit.
```

When a request type is chosen, a menu to select the response to the query will be presented. Once a response is selected, the responses for that query will correspond to the newly chosen response.

```
b
Please select which response should be returned for BadRequest:
Press '0' for "RRP successful".
Press '1' for "RRP failed".
Press '2' for "RRP invalid".
Press '3' for "Responder busy".
Press 'x' to return to the main menu.
Press control-C to quit.
1
```

The query menu is presented with the newly updated message query response.

```
Please select the request for which the response element should be modified:
Press 'a' for all requests.
Press 'b' for BadRequest (currently Failed).
Press 'c' for GetTime (currently Successful).
Press 'd' for GetEventList (currently Successful).
Press 'e' for GetEventID (currently Successful).
Press 'f' for QuerySPB (currently Successful).
Press 'g' for LEKeyLoad (currently Successful).
Press 'h' for LEKeyQueryID (currently Successful).
Press 'i' for LEKeyQueryAll (currently Successful).
Press 'j' for LEKeyPurgeID (currently Successful).
Press 'k' for LEKeyPurgeAll (currently Successful).
Press 'l' for GetProjCert (currently Successful).
Press 'x' to return to the main menu.
Press control-C to quit.
```

## Log records

The responder application generates records log events that occur and writes them to the specified log directory. Unless specified, logs are written to `./logDirectory/<private-key-hex-thumbprint>`. Log entries can be added to the responder by means of the `--preload-log-event` option, or by generating them via the interactive menu. The responder caches log entries as a means of providing a memory between invocations, so logs previously preloaded do not need to be preloaded again unless multiple instances of a log event record are desired. Log records can be generated by selecting '2' from the interactive menu, then selecting the type of log entry to be generated, and lastly entering the desired timestamp for the log entry:

```
The responder has started running.
Press '1' to display/modify a general response element.
Press '2' to create an operations security log.
```

```

Press control-C to quit.
2
Please select the type of operations log to write:
Press '1' for SPBOpen.
Press '2' for SPBClose.
Press '3' for SPBMarriage.
Press '4' for SPBDivorce.
Press '5' for SPBClockAdjust.
Press '6' for SPBSoftware.
Press '7' for SPBSecurityAlert.
Press 'x' to return to the main menu.
Press control-C to quit.
5
Please enter an ISO-8601 (YYYY-mm-ddTHH:MM:SS) timestamp (or press ENTER for the current time)
in the LOCAL timezone for the SPBClockAdjust record:
Press 'x' to return to the main menu.
Press control-C to quit.
[Enter]
Log created.

```

Log records present in the log record directory are read in when the responder is initialized, and are used to respond to log requests:

```

$ ./asm-responder.py --pem-path=/home/asm/id --bind-address 127.0.0.1
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2009-03-26T15:58:40+00:00
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2009-03-26T16:02:58+00:00
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2009-03-26T16:14:48+00:00
The responder has started running.

```

Similarly, log entries can be preloaded using the `--preload-log-event` option. Preloaded log entries are loaded before logs present in the log directory.

```

$ ./asm-responder.py --pem-path=/home/asm/id --bind-address 127.0.0.1 \
--preload-log-event /home/asm/xml/KeyTransfer.xml
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2008-12-05T08:00:01+00:00
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2009-03-26T15:58:40+00:00
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2009-03-26T16:02:58+00:00
Loading a log event with a timestamp of 2009-03-26T16:14:48+00:00

```

One log record, `BogusLogFormat.xml`, intentionally causes the responder to respond with a "BadRequest" response. When the `BogusLogFormat.xml` has been preloaded, and a specified `GetEventID` corresponds to the `BogusLogFormat` record, the responder will issue a "BadRequest" response with a general response element of "Responder Busy" and the request copy field will be null for that event only [SMPTE-430-6-2010, sec 7.1, bullet 3]. If the `--enable-debug-event-id-response` option is specified, the responder will instead respond with a `GetEventID` response with a general response element of "RRP Successful" and the `BogusLogFormat` log record in the log record field of the response.

## Examples

```

$ asm-responder --bind-address 192.168.1.100
--pem-path /tmp/testing-device-crypto-id

```

Invokes `asm-responder` configured with the default responses.

```

$ asm-responder --bind-address 192.168.1.100
--pem-path /tmp/testing-device-crypto-id
--respond-with Busy

```

---

Invokes **asm-responder** configured to respond to all message requests with a "ResponderBusy" response.

**NOT CURRENT VERSION  
ARCHIVED**

## D.2. Example Log Records

The following sections provide the text of the log records to be used with the `--preload-log-event` option of the `asm-responder` program.

### D.2.1. KeyTransfer

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000005</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-05T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>665</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType>
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes">ASM</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>3fGsFdLkaoY2WZDqfPZnW4wrISg</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000005</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType>
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-ASM"
      >KeyTransfer</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/M</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>
```

### D.2.2. LinkClosed

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<LogRecord xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <LogRecordHeader>
    <EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000002</EventID>
    <TimeStamp>2008-12-02T08:00:01-08:00</TimeStamp>
    <EventSequence>662</EventSequence>
```

```

<DeviceSourceID>
  <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
</DeviceSourceID>
<EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</EventClass>
<EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
>ASM</EventType>
<recordBodyHash>oU2PhjuLqThJRHhv0c74T7y4PP0=</recordBodyHash>
</LogRecordHeader>

<LogRecordBody>
  <EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000002</EventID>
  <EventSubType
    scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-ASM"
  >LinkClosed</EventSubType>
  <Parameters>
    <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/M=</dcml:Value>
    </dcml:Parameter>
  </Parameters>
</LogRecordBody>

<LogRecordSignature>
  <HeaderPlacement>start</HeaderPlacement>
  <SequenceLength>90</SequenceLength>
</LogRecordSignature>
</LogRecord>

```

### D.2.3. LinkException

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000003</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-03T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>663</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >ASM</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>qTr2Ix0vSwq8galr8taCmIMEUmw=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000003</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-ASM"
    >LinkException</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/M=</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>

```

```

    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.4. LinkOpened

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000001</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-01T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>661</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >ASM</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>NRvkzUwLMOJHvOArIT/icRR0igg</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000001</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-ASM"
      >LinkOpened</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/M</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.5. LogTransfer

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000004</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-04T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>664</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

```

```

</lr:DeviceSourceID>
<lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
<lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
  >ASM</lr:EventType>
<lr:recordBodyHash>axJxhHABMr+P7sTtHfTZCIRa0e0=</lr:recordBodyHash>
</lr:LogRecordHeader>

<lr:LogRecordBody>
  <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000004</lr:EventID>
  <lr:EventSubType
    scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-ASM"
    >LogTransfer</lr:EventSubType>
  <lr:Parameters>
    <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadncinspbldevicecert/M=</dcml:Value>
    </dcml:Parameter>
  </lr:Parameters>
</lr:LogRecordBody>

<lr:LogRecordSignature>
  <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
  <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
</lr:LogRecordSignature>

</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.6. Prop1

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:2de0414a-ba29-49e7-bf38-0f1d322d9bdd</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-01T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>675</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadncinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.fooby.foo/Debug/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.fooby.foo/#FooTypes">Info</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>AdVWKQumXjtZPxxh6JyZeXHDe79s=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:2de0414a-ba29-49e7-bf38-0f1d322d9bdd</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType scope="http://www.fooby.foo/#EventSubTypes-FOO">Prop1</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>Foo</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">Fooby</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>

</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.7. Prop2

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:33bda81a-ef49-4d56-ac09-bcb7abb09478</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-01T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>676</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.barby.bar/Debug/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.barby.bar/#BarTypes">Info</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>WVIMoL8/9+xSlkfrK+AdXIh8UZY=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:33bda81a-ef49-4d56-ac09-bcb7abb09478</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType scope="http://www.barby.bar/#EventSubTypes-BAR">Prop2</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>Bar</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">Barby</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>

</lr:LogRecord>
```

## D.2.8. Prop3

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:e9f0c6a6-5f61-4261-949b-48d45723e3df</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-01T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>677</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.dooby.doo/Debug/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.dooby.doo/#DooTypes">Info</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>cxaJlphGq50fjCYtWb8aptWz0XU=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:e9f0c6a6-5f61-4261-949b-48d45723e3df</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType scope="http://www.dooby.doo/#EventSubTypes-DOO">Prop3</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
```



```

        <dcml:Name>Doo</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">Dooby</dcml:Value>
    </dcml:Parameter>
</lr:Parameters>
</lr:LogRecordBody>

<lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
</lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.9. SPBClockAdjust

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmlsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000012</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-12T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>672</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >Operations</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>GlmZQsgXbRxKk2JzmPpHqDpPhjA=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000012</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
      >SPBClockAdjust</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>TimeOffset</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:integer">120</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>AuthId</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">TheIdentityThatSetTheTime</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>

  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.10. SPBClose

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000007</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-07T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>667</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >Operations</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>8o5NylM2iifHT3y2WYN28AlvY2k=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000007</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
      >SPBClose</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>AuthId</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">TheIdentityThatAuthorizedtheSPBClose</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>

</lr:LogRecord>
```

## D.2.11. SPBDivorce

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000009</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-09T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>669</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >Operations</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>i/Ki+2oWxVQal7Bhwt/ZzE6TP+M=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>
```

```

<lr:LogRecordBody>
  <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000009</lr:EventID>
  <lr:EventSubType
    scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
    >SPBDivorce</lr:EventSubType>
  <lr:Parameters>
    <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadcinspb2devicecert/A=</dcml:Value>
    </dcml:Parameter>
    <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>AuthId</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">TheIdentityThatAuthorizedtheDivorce</dcml:Value>
    </dcml:Parameter>
  </lr:Parameters>
</lr:LogRecordBody>

<lr:LogRecordSignature>
  <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
  <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
</lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.12. SPBMarriage

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000008</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-08T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>668</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspb1devicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >Operations</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>hiraA3hRIcV8fKOWnqLEhjNuF5Y=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000008</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
      >SPBMarriage</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>DeviceConnectedID</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="ds:DigestValueType">thisisadcinspb2devicecert/A=</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
      <dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>AuthId</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">TheIdentityThatAuthorizedtheMarriage</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>

```

```

    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.13. SPBOpen

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000006</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-06T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>666</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >Operations</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>JXeqZabUCW5BsVeYVn8Q4oBw/Fw=</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000006</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
      >SPBOpen</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>AuthId</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">TheIdentityThatAuthorizedtheSPBOpen</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.14. SPBSecurityAlert

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000014</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-14T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>420</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>

```

```

<lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
<lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
>Operations</lr:EventType>
<lr:recordBodyHash>n7fBiDi4PUyy9uxfh3ode/kbCRY=</lr:recordBodyHash>
</lr:LogRecordHeader>

<lr:LogRecordBody>
<lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000014</lr:EventID>
<lr:EventSubType
scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
>SPBSecurityAlert</lr:EventSubType>
<lr:Parameters>
<dcml:Parameter>
<dcml:Name>UnknownError</dcml:Name>
<dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">IAmDeeplyTroubled</dcml:Value>
</dcml:Parameter>
</lr:Parameters>
</lr:LogRecordBody>

<lr:LogRecordSignature>
<lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
<lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
</lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.15. SPBShutdown

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

<lr:LogRecordHeader>
<lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000010</lr:EventID>
<lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-10T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
<lr:EventSequence>670</lr:EventSequence>
<lr:DeviceSourceID>
<dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
</lr:DeviceSourceID>
<lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
<lr:EventType scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
>Operations</lr:EventType>
<lr:recordBodyHash>m+R6vBSS8aZOC4WgQMcbXx/fBc8=</lr:recordBodyHash>
</lr:LogRecordHeader>

<lr:LogRecordBody>
<lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000010</lr:EventID>
<lr:EventSubType
scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
>SPBShutdown</lr:EventSubType>
</lr:LogRecordBody>

<lr:LogRecordSignature>
<lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
<lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
</lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.16. SPBSoftware

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000013</lr:EventID>
    <lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-13T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
    <lr:EventSequence>673</lr:EventSequence>
    <lr:DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </lr:DeviceSourceID>
    <lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
    <lr:EventType>
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
      >Operations</lr:EventType>
    <lr:recordBodyHash>onrvqtocUYXdhNtNNvpjYtRS8pQ</lr:recordBodyHash>
  </lr:LogRecordHeader>

  <lr:LogRecordBody>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000013</lr:EventID>
    <lr:EventSubType>
      scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
      >SPBSoftware</lr:EventSubType>
    <lr:Parameters>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>SoftwareVersion</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">StringRepresentingTheNewSoftwareVersion</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>AuthId</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string"
          >TheIdentityThatAuthorizedTheSoftwareInstallation</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
      <dcml:Parameter>
        <dcml:Name>SignerID</dcml:Name>
        <dcml:Value xsi:type="xs:string">thisisadcinsigndevicecert/A</dcml:Value>
      </dcml:Parameter>
    </lr:Parameters>
  </lr:LogRecordBody>

  <lr:LogRecordSignature>
    <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
    <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
  </lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>
```

## D.2.17. SPBStartup

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<lr:LogRecord xmlns:lr="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">

  <lr:LogRecordHeader>
    <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000011</lr:EventID>
```

```

<lr:TimeStamp>2008-12-11T08:00:01-08:00</lr:TimeStamp>
<lr:EventSequence>671</lr:EventSequence>
<lr:DeviceSourceID>
  <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">thisisadcinspbldevicecert/A=</dcml:PrimaryID>
</lr:DeviceSourceID>
<lr:EventClass>http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/</lr:EventClass>
<lr:EventType>
  scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventTypes"
  >Operations</lr:EventType>
<lr:recordBodyHash>k9WRHg78rcBBOxwZz5QCnIsNrU8=</lr:recordBodyHash>
</lr:LogRecordHeader>

<lr:LogRecordBody>
  <lr:EventID>urn:uuid:12345678-9abc-def1-2345-000000000011</lr:EventID>
  <lr:EventSubType>
    scope="http://www.smpte-ra.org/430-5/2008/SecurityLog/#EventSubTypes-operations"
    >SPBStartup</lr:EventSubType>
</lr:LogRecordBody>

<lr:LogRecordSignature>
  <lr:HeaderPlacement>start</lr:HeaderPlacement>
  <lr:SequenceLength>90</lr:SequenceLength>
</lr:LogRecordSignature>
</lr:LogRecord>

```

## D.2.18. BogusLogFormat

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<LogRecord
  xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
  xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/" >
  <LogRecordHeader xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
    xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/" >
    <EventID>urn:uuid:22a815e4-8b5d-4763-ac67-a67578ad76e6</EventID>
    <TimeStamp>2011-02-02T14:20:44-08:00</TimeStamp>
    <EventSequence>0</EventSequence>
    <DeviceSourceID>
      <dcml:PrimaryID idtype="CertThumbprint">AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=</dcml:PrimaryID>
    </DeviceSourceID>
    <EventClass>http://www.cinecert.com/430-4/2008/DebugLog/</EventClass>
    <EventType>
      scope="http://www.cinecert.com/430-4/2008/DebugLog/#EventTypes">GetEventID</EventType>
    <recordBodyHash>5YoEzNqBbMdm352NVckpWJDtU9A=</recordBodyHash>
  </LogRecordHeader>
  <LogRecordBody xmlns="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/430-4/2008/LogRecord/"
    xmlns:dcml="http://www.smpte-ra.org/schemas/433/2008/dcmlTypes/" >
    <EventID>urn:uuid:22a815e4-8b5d-4763-ac67-a67578ad76e6</EventID>
    <EventSubType>
      scope="http://www.cinecert.com/430-4/2008/DebugLog/#EventSubTypes-geteventid">Disable</EventSubType>
    </LogRecordBody>
</LogRecord>

```

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# Appendix E. GPIO Test Fixture


The GPIO test fixture has eight outputs, which connect to ground via normally-open switch contacts. These outputs are expected to interface to command and/or status inputs of the d-cinema equipment under test.

The fixture has eight inputs, which connect to powered, current limited LEDs and will illuminate when the corresponding input is grounded. These inputs interface to command and/or status outputs of the d-cinema equipment under test.

Example circuits are provided below. Interface of outputs, inputs and ground is made via a single DB-25 female connector on the test fixture.


Testing Entities are not required to follow the above design, and are free to develop their own equipment and connector standards. The manufacturer of the d-cinema equipment being tested is responsible for providing a cable, appropriate for the individual device under test, that will interface to the test fixture being used.

**Figure E.1. GPIO Test Fixture Schematic**



Note that the LED inputs are internally current limited. External devices will be expected to sink 25mA per channel. Also, the test fixture has an integral PSU (the PSU may be external but it must use a different connector).

**Figure E.2. GPIO Test Fixture Connector**



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# Appendix G. DCI Specification v1.2

## References to CTP

DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
2.1.1.4	Decoder Requirements	6.5.2	265
3.2.1.2	Image Structure Container and Image Container Format	4.5.1	125
3.2.1.3	Image Structure Container and Image Container Format	4.5.1	125
3.2.1.5	Image Compression Standard & Encoding Parameters	4.5.2	127
3.2.1.7	Image Structure Container and Image Container Format	4.5.1	125
3.3.2.2	Audio Characteristics	4.5.3	129
3.3.2.3	Audio Sample Rate Conversion	6.6.2	272
3.3.4	Timed Text Track File Format	4.4.3	118
3.3.4.1	Audio Characteristics	4.5.3	129
3.4.2.2	Timed Text Resource Encoding	4.5.4	131
3.4.3	Default Timed Text Font	6.7.4	279
3.4.3.4	Timed Text Resource Encoding	4.5.4	131
4.2	Image Compression Standard & Encoding Parameters	4.5.2	127
4.3.2	Decoder Requirements	6.5.2	265
4.4	Image Compression Standard & Encoding Parameters	4.5.2	127
4.4.3.2	Timed Text Resource Encoding	4.5.4	131
5.2.2.2	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.2.2.3	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.2.2.4	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.2.2.5	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.2.2.6	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.2.3	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108
	Composition Playlist Signature Validation	4.3.2	109
5.3.1	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.3.1.3	Track File Length	4.4.4	120
	Playback of Image Only Material	6.5.1	264
5.3.1.6	Click Free Splicing of Audio Track Files	6.6.4	275
5.3.1.7	Composition Playlist Key Usage	4.3.3	110
5.3.2	Image and Audio Packaging Standard	4.4.2	116
5.3.3.2	Image Track File Frame Boundary	4.4.5	121
5.3.4.2	Audio Track File Frame Boundary	4.4.6	123
5.4.2	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108

<b>DCSS V1.2 Section</b>	<b>Procedure Title</b>	<b>CTP Section</b>	<b>CTP Page</b>
5.4.3	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108
5.4.3.2	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108
5.4.3.3	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108
5.4.3.4	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108
5.4.3.6	Composition Playlist Signature Validation	4.3.2	109
5.4.4	Composition Playlist Signature Validation	4.3.2	109
5.5.2.1	Asset Map File	4.1.1	101
	Volume Index File	4.1.2	102
5.5.2.3	Packing List Signature Validation	4.2.2	106
5.5.3.1	Packing List File	4.2.1	104
5.5.3.2	Packing List File	4.2.1	104
	Packing List Signature Validation	4.2.2	106
6.2.3	Storage System Ingest Interface	8.1.1	321
7.2.3.1	Theater System Reliability	10.4.1	351
7.2.3.11	Storage System Capacity	8.1.2	322
7.2.3.13	Restarting Playback	8.2.8	333
7.2.3.2	Theater System Reliability	10.4.1	351
7.2.3.5	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
7.2.3.7	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
7.3	Show Playlist Format	8.2.3	328
7.3.4	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
	Automation Control and Interfaces	8.2.5	330
7.4.1.1	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
7.4.1.2	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
	Restarting Playback	8.2.8	333
7.4.1.3	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
	SMS User Accounts	8.2.9	334
7.4.1.4	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
7.4.1.5	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
7.4.1.6	Show Playlist Creation	8.2.2	326
	Show Playlist Format	8.2.3	328
	Automation Control and Interfaces	8.2.5	330
	Artifact Free Transition of Image Format	8.2.7	332
7.4.1.7	Automation Control and Interfaces	8.2.5	330
7.4.1.8	Interrupt Free Playback	8.2.6	331
	Restarting Playback	8.2.8	333
	Audio Delay Setup	6.6.3	273



<b>DCSS V1.2 Section</b>	<b>Procedure Title</b>	<b>CTP Section</b>	<b>CTP Page</b>
7.4.4.2.5	Projector Overlay	7.5.1	307
7.5.3.2	Storage System Redundancy	8.1.3	323
7.5.3.3	Storage System Performance	8.1.4	324
7.5.3.4	Storage System Performance	8.1.4	324
7.5.3.6	Storage System Performance	8.1.4	324
7.5.3.8	Theater System Storage Security	10.4.2	351
7.5.4.2.5	Media Block Overlay	6.7.1	276
7.5.4.2.6	Media Block Overlay	6.7.1	276
	Projector Overlay	7.5.1	307
7.5.4.2.7	Media Block Overlay	6.7.1	276
	Projector Overlay	7.5.1	307
7.5.4.3	Digital Audio Interfaces	6.6.1	270
7.5.6.1	Digital Audio Interfaces	6.6.1	270
7.5.6.2	Digital Audio Interfaces	6.6.1	270
7.5.7.2	Automation Control and Interfaces	8.2.5	330
8.2.2.10	MB Link Encryption	6.2.4	245
8.2.2.6	Projector Pixel Count/Structure	7.5.3	309
8.2.2.7	Projector Pixel Count/Structure	7.5.3	309
	Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion	7.5.4	311
8.2.2.8	Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion	7.5.4	311
8.3.3	Contouring	7.5.10	317
8.3.4.11	Transfer Function	7.5.11	318
8.3.4.13	Color Accuracy	7.5.12	319
8.3.4.3	White Point Luminance and Uniformity	7.5.5	312
8.3.4.4	White Point Luminance and Uniformity	7.5.5	312
8.3.4.5	White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity	7.5.6	313
8.3.4.6	White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity	7.5.6	313
8.3.4.7	Sequential Contrast	7.5.7	314
8.3.4.8	Intra-frame Contrast	7.5.8	315
8.3.4.9	Grayscale Tracking	7.5.9	316
8.4.2	MB Link Encryption	6.2.4	245
8.4.3.1	MB Link Encryption	6.2.4	245
9.4.1	Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities	10.4.3	351
9.4.1.1	SMS Operator Identification	8.2.10	335
	Security Entity Physical Protection	10.4.4	351
	Secure SMS-SM Communication	10.4.5	351
9.4.2.2	Projector Physical Protection	7.2.1	284

DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
9.4.2.4	SM Operating Environment	9.5.1	346
	Location of Security Manager	10.4.6	352
	SM Secure Communications	10.4.8	352
9.4.2.5	SMS Identity and Certificate	8.2.11	336
	TMS Role	10.4.63	364
9.4.3.5	KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element	3.5.1	87
	ETM IssueDate Field Check	3.5.2	88
	Maximum Number of DCP Keys	3.5.3	89
	Structure ID Check	3.5.4	90
	Certificate Thumbprint Check	3.5.5	91
	KeyInfo Field Check	3.5.7	93
	KDM Malformations	3.5.8	94
	Image Integrity Checking	6.1.1	213
	Sound Integrity Checking	6.1.2	216
	Restriction of Keying to MD Type	6.1.4	219
	Restriction of Keying to Valid CPLs	6.1.5	220
	Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring	6.1.6	223
	SPB Integrity Fault Consequences	6.1.7	226
	Content Key Extension, End of Engagement	6.1.8	228
	ContentAuthenticator Element Check	6.1.9	230
	KDM TDL Check	6.1.11	234
	CPL Id Check	6.1.13	239
	Special Auditorium Situation Operations	6.2.2	241
	TLS Session Initiation	5.2.1	140
	Auditorium Security Message Support	5.2.2.1	143
	ASM "GetProjCert"	5.2.2.12	157
	TLS Exception Logging	5.2.3	158
	LE Key Generation	9.5.2	346
	Location of Security Manager	10.4.6	352
	Playback Preparation	10.4.9	352
	Special Auditorium Situation Detection	10.4.10	352
	Prevention of Keying of Compromised SPBs	10.4.11	354
	SPB Authentication	10.4.12	354
	TLS Session Key Refreshes	10.4.13	354
	LE Key Issuance	10.4.14	354
	Maximum Key Validity Period	10.4.15	354
	KDM Purge upon Expiry	10.4.16	355

DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
	Key Usage Time Window	10.4.17	355
9.4.3.5(15)	ASM "RRP Invalid"	5.2.2.3	147
9.4.3.5(9a)	ASM "RRP Invalid"	5.2.2.3	147
9.4.3.6.1	KDM TDL Check	6.1.11	234
	Projector Physical Protection	7.2.1	284
	Projector Access Door	7.2.2	285
	Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining	7.2.8	291
	Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage	7.3.2	293
	Projector Secure Silicon Device	10.4.18	355
	Access to Projector Image Signals	10.4.19	355
	Systems with Electronic Marriage	10.4.20	355
	Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements	10.4.78	367
9.4.3.6.2	Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage	7.3.2	293
	Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining	7.3.3	295
	LDB TLS Session Constraints	7.4.2	300
	LDB Time-Awareness	7.4.3	301
	LDB Key Storage	7.4.5	303
	LDB Key Purging	7.4.6	304
	TLS Session Initiation	5.2.1	140
	TLS Exception Logging	5.2.3	158
	SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness	9.5.3	346
	Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement	10.4.76	366
9.4.3.6.2.1	SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness	9.5.3	346
	SPB1 Log Retention	10.4.69	365
9.4.3.6.3	Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage	7.3.2	293
	Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining	7.3.3	295
	SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness	9.5.3	346
	MB Tasks	10.4.58	363
	SPB1 Log Retention	10.4.69	365
	Log Collection for Married MB	10.4.75	366
	Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement	10.4.76	366
	Standalone MB Single Purpose Requirement	10.4.77	367
9.4.3.6.5	KDM TDL Check	6.1.11	234
	TLS Session Initiation	5.2.1	140
	ASM "GetProjCert"	5.2.2.12	157
	Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert	10.4.74	366
9.4.3.6.6	KDM TDL Check	6.1.11	234

DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
	Systems without Electronic Marriage	7.2.7	290
	Systems Without Electronic Marriage	10.4.21	356
9.4.3.7	Clock Adjustment	6.3.1	247
	SPB Type 1 Clock Battery	6.3.2	249
	Clock Resolution	6.3.3	251
	Remote SPB Clock Adjustment	7.3.4	297
	Clock Date-Time-Range	10.4.22	356
	Clock Setup	10.4.23	356
	Clock Stability	10.4.24	356
	Clock Continuity	10.4.27	357
	ASM Get Time Frequency	10.4.70	365
	SPB Type 1 Battery Life	10.4.73	366
9.4.4	LE Key Usage	6.2.3	244
	MB Link Encryption	6.2.4	245
	LE Key Generation	9.5.2	346
9.4.4.1	Special Auditorium Situation Operations	6.2.2	241
	Special Auditorium Situation Detection	10.4.10	352
9.4.5	ASM "RRP Invalid"	5.2.2.3	147
	ASM "GetTime"	5.2.2.4	148
	ASM "GetEventList"	5.2.2.5	149
	ASM "GetEventID"	5.2.2.6	150
	ASM "LEKeyLoad"	5.2.2.7	151
	ASM "LEKeyQueryID"	5.2.2.8	153
	ASM "LEKeyQueryAll"	5.2.2.9	154
	ASM "LEKeyPurgeID"	5.2.2.10	155
	ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll"	5.2.2.11	156
9.4.5.1	SM Secure Communications	10.4.8	352
	TLS Endpoints	10.4.28	357
	SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer	10.4.30	357
9.4.5.2.1	Idempotency of ITM RRP	10.4.31	358
9.4.5.2.3	TLS Session Initiation	5.2.1	140
	Auditorium Security Message Support	5.2.2.1	143
	TLS Exception Logging	5.2.3	158
	Security Design Description Requirements	9.5.4	347
	RRP Synchronism	10.4.32	358
	TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition	10.4.33	358
	RRP Broadcast Prohibition	10.4.34	358

<b>DCSS V1.2 Section</b>	<b>Procedure Title</b>	<b>CTP Section</b>	<b>CTP Page</b>
	Implementation of Proprietary ITMs	10.4.35	358
	RRP Initiator	10.4.36	358
	RRP "Busy" and Unsupported Types	10.4.39	359
9.4.5.2.4	ASM "GetProjCert"	5.2.2.12	157
	RRP Operational Message Ports	10.4.40	359
	TLS RSA Requirement	10.4.79	367
9.4.5.3	Auditorium Security Message Support	5.2.2.1	143
9.4.5.3.2	TLS Session Initiation	5.2.1	140
	ASM Failure Behavior	5.2.2.2	145
	Maximum Key Validity Period	10.4.15	354
	Dual Certificate SMS Authentication	10.4.80	367
9.4.6.1.1	FM Payload	6.4.3	257
	FM Algorithm General Requirements	10.4.42	360
	FM Insertion Requirements	10.4.43	360
9.4.6.1.2	IFM Visual Transparency	10.4.44	360
	IFM Robustness	10.4.45	360
9.4.6.1.3	AFM Inaudibility	10.4.46	361
	AFM Robustness	10.4.47	361
9.4.6.2	FM Application Constraints	6.4.1	252
	Granularity of FM Control	6.4.2	254
	FM Audio Bypass	6.4.4	259
	Selective Audio FM Control	6.4.5	260
	FM Control Instance	10.4.48	361
9.4.6.3.1	Log Records for Multiple SPBs	5.3.2.2	167
	Log Sequence Numbers	5.3.2.3	168
	Log Collection by the SM	5.3.2.4	169
	General Log System Failure	5.3.2.5	171
	Log Report Signature Validity	5.3.2.6	172
	SE Log Authoring	10.4.50	361
	SPB Log Storage Requirements	10.4.51	362
	Remote SPB Log Storage Requirements	10.4.52	362
	MB Log Storage Capabilities	10.4.53	362
	Logging for Standalone Systems	10.4.54	362
9.4.6.3.10	Logging of Failed Procedures	10.4.55	362
	SPB Log Failure	10.4.56	362
	Log Purging in Failed SPBs	10.4.57	363
	SPB1 Log Retention	10.4.69	365

<b>DCSS V1.2 Section</b>	<b>Procedure Title</b>	<b>CTP Section</b>	<b>CTP Page</b>
9.4.6.3.2	Log Structure	5.3.2.1	166
9.4.6.3.3	Log Report Signature Validity	5.3.2.6	172
9.4.6.3.4	Log Sequence Numbers	5.3.2.3	168
9.4.6.3.5, 9.4.6.3.1	Remote SPB Time Compensation	5.3.3.4	181
9.4.6.3.7	Log Report Signature Validity	5.3.2.6	172
	SM Proxy of Log Events	5.3.3.1	175
	SM Proxy of Security Operations Events	5.3.3.2	177
	SM Proxy of Security ASM Events	5.3.3.3	179
	FrameSequencePlayed Event	5.4.1.1	183
	CPLStart Event	5.4.1.2	184
	CPLEnd Event	5.4.1.3	185
	PlayoutComplete Event	5.4.1.4	186
	CPLCheck Event	5.4.1.5	187
	KDMKeysReceived Event	5.4.1.6	188
	KDMDeleted Event	5.4.1.7	189
	LinkOpened Event	5.4.2.1	190
	LinkClosed Event	5.4.2.2	192
	LinkException Event	5.4.2.3	195
	LogTransfer Event	5.4.2.4	197
	KeyTransfer Event	5.4.2.5	199
	SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events	5.4.2.6	201
	SPBOpen and SPBClose Events	5.4.2.7	203
	SPBClockAdjust Event	5.4.2.8	205
	SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events	5.4.2.9	207
SPBSoftware Event	5.4.2.10	209	
Logging of Failed Procedures	10.4.55	362	
9.4.6.3.8	KDM Malformations	3.5.8	94
	SM Proxy of Log Events	5.3.3.1	175
	SM Proxy of Security Operations Events	5.3.3.2	177
	SM Proxy of Security ASM Events	5.3.3.3	179
	FrameSequencePlayed Event	5.4.1.1	183
	CPLStart Event	5.4.1.2	184
	CPLEnd Event	5.4.1.3	185
	PlayoutComplete Event	5.4.1.4	186
	CPLCheck Event	5.4.1.5	187
	KDMKeysReceived Event	5.4.1.6	188
	KDMDeleted Event	5.4.1.7	189

<b>DCSS V1.2 Section</b>	<b>Procedure Title</b>	<b>CTP Section</b>	<b>CTP Page</b>
	LinkOpened Event	5.4.2.1	190
	LinkClosed Event	5.4.2.2	192
	LinkException Event	5.4.2.3	195
	LogTransfer Event	5.4.2.4	197
	KeyTransfer Event	5.4.2.5	199
	SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events	5.4.2.6	201
	SPBOpen and SPBClose Events	5.4.2.7	203
	SPBClockAdjust Event	5.4.2.8	205
	SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events	5.4.2.9	207
	SPBSoftware Event	5.4.2.10	209
	Logging of Failed Procedures	10.4.55	362
	Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements	10.4.78	367
9.5.1	Basic Certificate Structure	2.1.1	13
	SignatureAlgorithm Fields	2.1.2	14
	SignatureValue Field	2.1.3	15
	SerialNumber Field	2.1.4	16
	SubjectPublicKeyInfo Field	2.1.5	17
	Validity Field	2.1.7	19
	AuthorityKeyIdentifier Field	2.1.8	20
	KeyUsage Field	2.1.9	21
	Basic Constraints Field	2.1.10	23
	Public Key Thumbprint	2.1.11	24
	Organization Name Field	2.1.12	26
	Entity Name and Roles Field	2.1.14	28
	Unrecognized Extensions	2.1.15	29
	Signature Validation	2.1.16	30
	Certificate Chains	2.1.17	31
	ASN.1 DER Encoding Check	2.2.1	33
	Missing Required Fields	2.2.2	34
	PathLen Check	2.2.3	36
	OrganizationName Match Check	2.2.4	38
	Certificate Role Check	2.2.5	39
	Validity Date Check	2.2.6	40
	Signature Algorithm Check	2.2.7	41
	Public Key Type Check	2.2.8	42
	SMS Identity and Certificate	8.2.11	336
	SPB Digital Certificate	5.1.1	135

DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
	TLS Session Initiation	5.2.1	140
	Dual Certificate SMS Authentication	10.4.80	367
9.5.1.1	KeyUsage Field	2.1.9	21
	SPB Digital Certificate	5.1.1	135
	Log Report Signature Validity	5.3.2.6	172
	Systems Without Electronic Marriage	10.4.21	356
9.5.1.2	KeyUsage Field	2.1.9	21
	Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining	7.3.3	295
	SPB Digital Certificate	5.1.1	135
	Log Report Signature Validity	5.3.2.6	172
	Systems Without Electronic Marriage	10.4.21	356
	Dual Certificate SMS Authentication	10.4.80	367
9.5.2.2	SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness	9.5.3	346
	Private Keys outside Secure Silicon	10.4.59	363
	Image Keys outside Secure Silicon	10.4.60	363
	Use of Software Protection Methods	10.4.62	363
	SPB Secure Silicon Requirements	10.4.72	366
9.5.2.3	SPB2 Secure Silicon Field Replacement	7.2.6	289
	Repair and Renewal of SPBs	10.4.25	356
	Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability	10.4.61	363
9.5.2.4	Projector Physical Protection	7.2.1	284
	SPB2 Protected Devices	10.4.26	357
9.5.2.5	SM Operating Environment	9.5.1	346
	LE Key Generation	9.5.2	346
	SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness	9.5.3	346
	Security Design Description Requirements	9.5.4	347
	SPB1 FIPS Requirements	9.5.6	347
	Asymmetric Key Generation	9.5.8	348
	Critical Security Parameter Protection	9.5.9	348
9.5.2.6	SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness	9.5.3	346
	Critical Security Parameter Protection	9.5.9	348
	D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection	10.4.64	364
9.5.2.7	SM Operating Environment	9.5.1	346
	SPB 1 Firmware Modifications	10.4.68	365
9.6.1	Location of Security Manager	10.4.6	352
9.6.1.2	Location of Security Manager	10.4.6	352
9.7.5	Composition Playlist Signature Validation	4.3.2	109



DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
9.7.6	LE Key Generation	9.5.2	346
	Asymmetric Key Generation	9.5.8	348
	RSA Key Entropy	10.4.65	364
	Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy	10.4.66	364
9.7.7	Maximum Number of DCP Keys	3.5.3	89
	Composition Playlist File	4.3.1	108
	Maximum Number of DCP Keys	6.1.12	237
	MD Caching of Keys	10.4.67	364
9.8	Basic Certificate Structure	2.1.1	13
	SignatureAlgorithm Fields	2.1.2	14
	SignatureValue Field	2.1.3	15
	SerialNumber Field	2.1.4	16
	SubjectPublicKeyInfo Field	2.1.5	17
	Validity Field	2.1.7	19
	AuthorityKeyIdentifier Field	2.1.8	20
	KeyUsage Field	2.1.9	21
	Basic Constraints Field	2.1.10	23
	Public Key Thumbprint	2.1.11	24
	Organization Name Field	2.1.12	26
	OrganizationUnitName Field	2.1.13	27
	Entity Name and Roles Field	2.1.14	28
	Unrecognized Extensions	2.1.15	29
	Signature Validation	2.1.16	30
	Certificate Chains	2.1.17	31
	ASN.1 DER Encoding Check	2.2.1	33
	Missing Required Fields	2.2.2	34
	PathLen Check	2.2.3	36
	OrganizationName Match Check	2.2.4	38
	Certificate Role Check	2.2.5	39
	Validity Date Check	2.2.6	40
	Signature Algorithm Check	2.2.7	41
	Public Key Type Check	2.2.8	42
	ETM Structure	3.3.1	54
	ETM Validity Date Check	3.3.2	55
	ETM Signer Element	3.3.3	56
ETM EncryptionMethod Element	3.3.4	57	
KDM MessageType Element	3.4.1	66	

DCSS V1.2 Section	Procedure Title	CTP Section	CTP Page
	KDM SubjectName Element	3.4.2	67
	KDM ContentAuthenticator Element	3.4.3	68
	KDM KeyIdList/TypedKeyId Field	3.4.5	70
	KDM EncryptedData Element	3.4.7	72
	KDM KeyInfo Element	3.4.8	73
	KDM DeviceListDescription Element	3.4.9	74
	KDM CompositionPlaylistId Element	3.4.13	78
	KDM Validity Fields	3.4.14	79
	KDM KeyIdList Element	3.4.15	80
	KDM CipherData Structure ID	3.4.16	81
	KDM CipherData Signer Thumbprint	3.4.17	82
	KDM CipherData Validity	3.4.18	83
	KDM CipherData CPL ID	3.4.19	84
	KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element	3.5.1	87
	ETM IssueDate Field Check	3.5.2	88
	Maximum Number of DCP Keys	3.5.3	89
	Structure ID Check	3.5.4	90
	Certificate Thumbprint Check	3.5.5	91
	KeyInfo Field Check	3.5.7	93
	KDM Malformations	3.5.8	94
	KDM Date Check	6.1.10	232
	KDM TDL Check	6.1.11	234
	CPL Id Check	6.1.13	239

---

# Appendix H. Abbreviations

AES	Audio Engineering Society
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CPL	Composition PlayList
DCI	Digital Cinema Initiatives, LLC
DCDM	Digital Cinema Distribution Master
DCP	Digital Cinema Package
DSM	Digital Source Master
ETM	Extra Theater Message
FM	Forensic Marking
GUI	Graphical User Interface
IMB	Image Media Block (deprecated)
ISO	International Organization for Standards
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
J2K	JPEG2000
KDM	Key Delivery Message
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
LD	Link Decryptor
LDB	Link Decryptor Block
LE	Link Encryptor
MB	Media Block
MD	Media Decryptor
POSIX	Portable Operating System Interface
RAID	Redundant Array of Independent Disks (formerly: Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks)
SM	Security Manager
SMS	Screen Management System
SPB	Secure Processing Block

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SPL	Show Play List
SMPTE	Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers
StEM	Standard Evaluation Material
TCP/IP	Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TDL	Trusted Device List
TLS	Transport Layer Security, also known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
TMS	Theater Management System
UMID	Unique Material Identifier
USB	Universal Serial Bus
UUID	Universally Unique Identifier
WTF	Wild Track Format (numbered audio channels)
XML	eXtensible Markup Language

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# Index

## A

Abbreviations, 625  
Access to Projector Image Signals, 355  
AFM Inaudibility, 361  
AFM Robustness, 361  
Artifact Free Transition of Image Format, 332  
ASM "GetEventID", 150  
ASM "GetEventList", 149  
ASM "GetProjCert", 157  
ASM "GetTime", 148  
ASM "LEKeyLoad", 151  
ASM "LEKeyPurgeAll", 156  
ASM "LEKeyPurgeID", 155  
ASM "LEKeyQueryAll", 154  
ASM "LEKeyQueryID", 153  
ASM "RRP Invalid", 147  
ASM Failure Behavior, 145  
ASM Get Time Frequency, 365  
ASM Simulator  
    requester, 583  
    responder, 583  
    TLS, 583  
ASN.1 DER Encoding Check, 33  
Asset Map File, 101  
Asymmetric Key Generation, 348  
Audio Characteristics, 129  
Audio Delay Setup, 273  
Audio Reproduction, 270  
Audio Sample Rate Conversion, 272  
Audio Track File Frame Boundary, 123  
Auditorium Security Message, 143  
Auditorium Security Message Support, 143  
AuthorityKeyIdentifier Field, 20  
Automation Control and Interfaces, 330

## B

Basic Certificate Structure, 13  
Basic Constraints Field, 23

## C

Certificate Chains, 31  
Certificate Role Check, 39  
Certificate Thumbprint Check, 91  
Certificates  
    Certificate Decoder Behavior, 33  
    Testing, 11  
Click Free Splicing of Audio Track Files, 275  
Clock Adjustment, 247  
Clock Continuity, 357

Clock Date-Time-Range, 356  
Clock Resolution, 251  
Clock Setup, 356  
Clock Stability, 356  
Clocks, 247  
Clocks and Time, 247  
Color Accuracy, 319  
Companion SBP Retrieve Projector Cert, 366  
Companion SPB Marriage Break Key Retaining, 295  
Companion SPB Single Purpose Requirement, 366  
Companion SPB Type 1, 292  
Companion SPBs with Electronic Marriage, 293  
Composition Playlist File, 108  
Composition Playlist Key Usage, 110  
Composition Playlist Signature Validation, 109  
Content Key Extension, End of Engagement, 228  
Content Keys and TDL check, 337  
ContentAuthenticator Element Check, 230  
Contouring, 317  
Control Messages  
    ETM, 54  
    KDM, 66  
    KDM Decoder, 87  
CPL Id Check, 239  
CPLCheck Event, 187  
CPLEnd Event, 185  
CPLStart Event, 184  
Critical Security Parameter Protection, 348  
CTP, 613

## D

D-Cinema Security Parameter Protection, 364  
DCI Requirements Review, 349  
DCI Specification v1.2, 613  
DCI Specification v1.2 References to CTP, 613  
DCP, 99  
    Asset Map, 99  
    Composition Playlist, 108  
    Consolidated Test Sequence, 373  
    d-cinema Package, 133  
    Digital Cinema Package, 373  
    Essence, 125  
    Packing List, 103  
    Track Files, 111  
DCP Integrity, 133  
Decoder Requirements, 265  
Default Timed Text Font, 279  
Digital Audio Interfaces, 270  
Dual Certificate SMS Authentication, 367

## E

Electronic Marriage Break Key Retaining, 291  
Entity Name and Roles Field, 28

---

Equipment List  
  Hardware, 555  
  Software, 556  
ETM AnnotationText Language, 58  
ETM EncryptionMethod Element, 57  
ETM IssueDate Field Check, 88  
ETM ReferenceList Element, 59  
ETM Signature DigestMethod Element, 64  
ETM Signature Reference Elements, 61  
ETM Signature Transforms Field, 63  
ETM Signature Validity, 65  
ETM SignatureMethod Element, 62  
ETM SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod Element, 60  
ETM Signer Element, 56  
ETM Structure, 54  
ETM Validity Date Check, 55  
Event Log Operations, 166  
Event Logs, 161

**F**

FIPS 140-2  
  Type 1 SPB, 341  
FIPS Laboratory  
  Type 1 SPB, 341  
FIPS Testing  
  Type 1 SPB, 341  
FM, 252  
FM Algorithm General Requirements, 360  
FM Application Constraints, 252  
FM Audio Bypass, 259  
FM Control Instance, 361  
FM Insertion Requirements, 360  
FM Payload, 257  
Forensic Marking, 252  
FrameSequencePlayed Event, 183

**G**

General Log System Failure, 171  
GPIO Test Fixture  
  Schematic Drawings, 607  
Granularity of FM Control, 254  
Grayscale Tracking, 316

**I**

Idempotency of ITM RRP, 358  
IFM Robustness, 360  
IFM Visual Transparency, 360  
Image and Audio Packaging Standard, 116  
Image Compression Standard & Encoding Parameters, 127  
Image Integrity Checking, 213  
Image Keys outside Secure Silicon, 363  
Image Reproduction, 264  
Image Structure Container and Image Container Format, 125

Image Track File Frame Boundary, 121  
Implementation of Proprietary ITMs, 358  
Ingest and Storage, 321  
Interrupt Free Playback, 331  
Intra-frame Contrast, 315  
Intra-Theater Communication, 140  
Issuer Certificate Presence Check, 43

## **K**

KDM CipherData CPL ID, 84  
KDM CipherData Signer Thumbprint, 82  
KDM CipherData Structure ID, 81  
KDM CipherData Validity, 83  
KDM CompositionPlaylistId Element, 78  
KDM ContentAuthenticator Element, 68  
KDM ContentTitleText Language Attribute, 75  
KDM Date Check, 232  
KDM DeviceListDescription Element, 74  
KDM EncryptedData Element, 72  
KDM EncryptedKey KeyType, 85  
KDM EncryptionMethod, 77  
KDM ForensicMarkFlagList Element, 71  
KDM KeyIdList Element, 80  
KDM KeyIdList/TypedKeyId Field, 70  
KDM KeyInfo Element, 73  
KDM KeyType Scope Attribute, 76  
KDM Malformations, 94  
KDM MessageType Element, 66  
KDM NonCriticalExtensions Element, 87  
KDM Purge upon Expiry, 355  
KDM Recipient X509IssuerName, 86  
KDM Signature, 96  
KDM Signer Certificate Presence, 69  
KDM SubjectName Element, 67  
KDM TDL Check, 234  
KDM Validity Fields, 79  
KDMDeleted Event, 189  
KDMKeysReceived Event, 188  
Key Delivery Message  
  Example, 49  
Key Usage Time Window, 355  
KeyInfo Field Check, 93  
KeyTransfer Event, 199  
KeyUsage Field, 21

## **L**

LD/LE  
  Consolidated Test Sequence, 411  
LDB, 299  
LDB Key Purging, 304  
LDB Key Storage, 303  
LDB Time-Awareness, 301  
LDB TLS Session Constraints, 300

---

LE, 240  
LE Key Generation, 346  
LE Key Issuance, 354  
LE Key Usage, 244  
Link Decryptor  
    Consolidated Test Sequence, 411  
Link Decryptor Block, 299  
Link Encryption, 240  
Link Encryptor  
    Consolidated Test Sequence, 411  
LinkClosed Event, 192  
LinkException Event, 195  
LinkOpened Event, 190  
Location of Security Manager, 352  
Log Collection by the SM, 169  
Log Collection for Married MB, 366  
Log Event Proxy, 175  
Log Events, 175, 183  
Log Proxy, 175  
Log Purging in Failed SPBs, 363  
Log Records  
    430-5-2011, 594  
    Log, 594  
    XML, 594  
Log Records for Multiple SPBs, 167  
Log Report Signature Validity, 172  
Log Sequence Numbers, 168  
Log Structure, 166  
Logging, 161, 183  
Logging for Standalone Systems, 362  
Logging of Failed Procedures, 362  
LogTransfer Event, 197

## M

Maximum Key Validity Period, 354  
Maximum Number of DCP Keys, 89, 237  
MB Link Encryption, 245  
MB Log Storage Capabilities, 362  
MB Tasks, 363  
MD Caching of Keys, 364  
Media Block Overlay, 276  
Missing Required Fields, 34

## O

Organization Name Field, 26  
OrganizationName Match Check, 38  
OrganizationUnitName Field, 27  
Overview, 1

## P

Packing List File, 104  
Packing List Signature Validation, 106  
PathLen Check, 36

Playback of Image Only Material, 264  
Playback Preparation, 352  
PlayoutComplete Event, 186  
Preloaded Symmetric Key Entropy, 364  
Prevention of Keying of Compromised SPBs, 354  
Private Keys outside Secure Silicon, 363  
Prohibition of SPB1 Field Serviceability, 363  
Projector  
    Consolidated Confidence Sequence, 421  
    Consolidated Test Sequence, 389, 397, 425  
    Integrated MB, 397, 425  
    Test Environment, 283  
Projector Access Door, 285  
Projector Image Reproduction, 307  
Projector Overlay, 307  
Projector Physical Protection, 284  
Projector Pixel Count/Structure, 309  
Projector Secure Silicon Device, 355  
Projector Spatial Resolution and Frame Rate Conversion, 311  
Projector SPB Log Reporting Requirements, 367  
Projector Test Environment, 320  
Public Key Thumbprint, 24  
Public Key Type Check, 42

## R

Reference Documents, 609  
References, 613  
Remote SPB Clock Adjustment, 297  
Remote SPB Integrity Monitoring, 223  
Remote SPB Log Storage Requirements, 362  
Remote SPB Time Compensation, 181  
Repair and Renewal of SPBs, 356  
Restarting Playback, 333  
Restriction of Keying to MD Type, 219  
Restriction of Keying to Valid CPLs, 220  
RRP "Busy" and Unsupported Types, 359  
RRP Broadcast Prohibition, 358  
RRP Initiator, 358  
RRP Operational Message Ports, 359  
RRP Synchronism, 358  
RSA Key Entropy, 364

## S

Schematic Drawings  
    GPIO Test Fixture, 607  
Screen Management System, 325  
SE Log Authoring, 361  
Secure Processing Block, 135  
Secure SMS-SM Communication, 351  
Security  
    Log Record Proxy, 164  
Security Design Description Requirements, 347  
Security Devices Self-Test Capabilities, 351

---

Security Entity Physical Protection, 351  
Security Log Events, 183  
    ASM, 190  
    Operations, 190  
Security Manager, 213  
SecurityLog Events  
    Playlist  
        Key, 183  
        Validation, 183  
Selective Audio FM Control, 260  
Sequential Contrast, 314  
SerialNumber Field, 16  
Server  
    Consolidated Confidence Sequence, 417  
    Consolidated Test Sequence, 377  
Show Playlist Creation, 326  
Show Playlist Format, 328  
Signature Algorithm Check, 41  
Signature Validation, 30  
SignatureAlgorithm Fields, 14  
SignatureValue Field, 15  
SM, 213  
SM Operating Environment, 346  
SM Proxy of Log Events, 175  
SM Proxy of Security ASM Events, 179  
SM Proxy of Security Operations Events, 177  
SM Secure Communications, 352  
SMS, 325  
SMS and SPB Authentication and ITM Transport Layer, 357  
SMS Identity and Certificate, 336  
SMS Operator Identification, 335  
SMS User Accounts, 334  
Sound Integrity Checking, 216  
Source Code, 559  
SPB, 135  
SPB 1 Firmware Modifications, 365  
SPB Authentication, 354  
SPB Digital Certificate, 135  
SPB Integrity Fault Consequences, 226  
SPB Log Failure, 362  
SPB Log Storage Requirements, 362  
SPB Secure Silicon Requirements, 366  
SPB Type 1 Battery Life, 366  
SPB Type 1 Clock Battery, 249  
SPB Type 2, 284  
SPB1 FIPS Requirements, 347  
SPB1 Log Retention, 365  
SPB1 Tamper Responsiveness, 346  
SPB2 Protected Devices, 357  
SPB2 Secure Silicon Field Replacement, 289  
SPBClockAdjust Event, 205  
SPBMarriage and SPBDivorce Events, 207  
SPBOpen and SPBClose Events, 203  
SPBSecurityAlert Event, 212  
SPBSoftware Event, 209  
SPBStartup and SPBShutdown Events, 201  
Special Auditorium Situation Detection, 352  
Special Auditorium Situation Operations, 241  
Standalone MB Single Purpose Requirement, 367  
Storage System Capacity, 322  
Storage System Ingest Interface, 321  
Storage System Performance, 324  
Storage System Redundancy, 323  
Structure ID Check, 90  
SubjectPublicKeyInfo Field, 17  
Systems with Electronic Marriage, 355  
Systems without Electronic Marriage, 290  
Systems Without Electronic Marriage, 356

## T

Test Materials, 431  
Theater System Reliability, 351  
Theater System Storage Security, 351  
Time, 247  
Timed Text Decryption, 281  
Timed Text Reproduction, 276  
Timed Text Resource Encoding, 131  
Timed Text Track File Format, 118  
TLS Endpoints, 357  
TLS Exception Logging, 158  
TLS Mode Bypass Prohibition, 358  
TLS RSA Requirement, 367  
TLS Session Initiation, 140  
TLS Session Key Refreshes, 354  
TMS Role, 364  
Track File Length, 120  
Transfer Function, 318

## U

Unrecognized Extensions, 29  
Use of Software Protection Methods, 363

## V

Validity Date Check, 40  
Validity Field, 19  
Volume Index File, 102

## W

White Point Chromaticity and Uniformity, 313  
White Point Luminance and Uniformity, 312

## X

XML tutorial, 45